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Abstract 
Revolution in the Microcosm: Love and Virtue in the
Cosmological Ethics of St Maximus the Confessor
I explore virtue and love in Maximus the Confessor’s theology with an aim to drawing
an ethics from it relevant to the present day. I use a meta-ethical framework derived
from contemporary virtue ethics and look at virtue as an instance of love within the
context of Maximus’ cosmic theology. Virtue becomes a path that leads us towards
love – who is God Himself. Virtue is thus about movement towards theosis. I describe
virtue as a relationship between humans and God, brought about through the mutual
practice of a life of ascesis from humans and grace from God. I look at the mediatoral
role  of  humans as  microcosms gathering up the universe  in an image  of  Christ’s
activity. In particular I analyse the way that human activity is simultaneously cosmic
and ascetic;  personal  and communal.  Te ethic of virtue that we pursue is always
caught up in a conversation about what creation gathered in love looks like. Using a
number  of  tools  derived  from  Maximus’  thought,  I  suggest  that  this  ethics  will
necessarily transform our current communities and personal practices.  Recognising
the cosmic dimension of personal behaviour means that our communities must be
scrutinised as  extensions of  our actions.  As an example,  I  critique the state  as  an
inadequate form of loving relationship, illustrating its systemic reliance on violence
and ideologies of alienation and hatred. I give examples of alternative ways of human
organising drawn from anarchist  thought that might beter enable us to love and,
more importantly, enable us to call to account failures to love. I conclude that to seek
theosis afer the manner Maximus describes involves recognising our personal  and
communal failures to love. His holistic understanding of human purpose can help us
see the cosmic dimension to personal ascetic practice and consequently set our sights
on a more cosmic vision of love here in the present world.
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If I speak in the toniues of oen or of aniels, but do not havee lovee, I ao only a 
resoundini ioni or a claniini cyobal. If I havee the iit of prophecy and can 
fathoo all oysteries and all knowledie, and if I havee a faith that can oovee 
oountains, but do not havee lovee, I ao nothini. If I iivee all I possess to the poor 
and iivee oveer oy body to hardship that I oay boast, but do not havee lovee, I iain 
nothini.
Lovee is patient, lovee is kind. It does not envey, it does not boast, it is not proud. It 
does not dishonor others, it is not self-seekini, it is not easily aniered, it keeps no 
record of wronis. Lovee does not deliiht in eveil but rejoices with the truth. It 
always protects, always trusts, always hopes, always perseveeres.
Lovee neveer fails.
(1 Cor. 13:1-8)
san has bouiht brains, but all the oillions in the world havee failed to buy lovee. 
san has subdued bodies, but all the power on earth has been unable to subdue 
lovee. san has conquered whole nations, but all his aroies could not conquer lovee. 
san has chained and fetered the spirit, but he has been uterly helpless before 
lovee. Hiih on a throne, with all the splendor and poop his iold can coooand, 
oan is yet poor and desolate, if lovee passes hio by. And if it stays, the poorest 
hoveel is radiant with waroth, with life and color. Thus lovee has the oaiic power 
to oake of a beiiar a kini. Yes, lovee is free; it can dwell in no other atoosphere. 
In freedoo it iivees itself unreserveedly, abundantly, coopletely. All the laws on the
statutes, all the courts in the univeerse, cannot tear it froo the soil, once lovee has 
taken root. 
Emma Goldman
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~  Introduction  ~
A. Revolution in the Microcosm
In this thesis I aim to derive an ethics from the thought of Maximus the Confessor 
(580-662AD).
I am particularly interested in the way that such an ethics might extend to our 
communal as well as personal life. For Maximus, there is not a separate domain of 
personal life that is isolated from communal consideration, or vice versa. How we act 
afects those around us, not just immediately, but also our communities, our 
environments, and the entire cosmos. It makes sense to me therefore, that when 
looking at the relevance of his thought for ethics today, we ask not just how one ought
to act, but also how this might require us to turn a critical eye on the communities we 
are a part of and consider that those, too, ought to be paradigms of Christ's love. If 
virtue, love, and the way of Christ are about how we interact with others, then this 
will necessarily shape the communities in which we live. 
For Maximus, to reorientate ourselves towards love is to be gathered to an end 
that is natural and always intended for us, but to the rest of human society, I argue, 
this is a revolutionary proposition. Tere are all sorts of instances where the loving 
thing to do starts usurping the structures of a status quo. Whilst it might be acceptable
to give £1 to a homeless person on my street corner, it is generally unacceptable for 
me to invite them into my home and give them dinner. Whilst it is acceptable for me 
to buy a Fairtrade product in my local supermarket, it is unacceptable for me wish to 
opt out of an entire capitalist economic system that is built on wage-slavery, 
exploitation and oppression of workers elsewhere. To be an upstanding citizen in a 
liberal Western democracy, we are encouraged to take part in a kind of ‘virtue ethics 
lite’, where so long as our desire to do good does not upset a status quo, it is 
permissible. We have a society litered with a casual interest in virtue ethics. When it 
becomes appropriate, undefned and unqualifed use of virtue enters political 
13
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discourse. Words like justice, courage, and hope hold meaning within already 
established political paradigms, that are rarely discussed but certainly have very set 
limits on the acceptability of more subversive virtues like love and mercy. Te ethics 
we derive from Maximus, I argue, upturns the safe paradigms we have come to 
recognise in present society.
One of the things I seek to do in this thesis is identify the systems that are in 
place whenever we start talking about virtue. Are all virtues equal? How do we defne 
virtue? And do they not also always require us to have an ideal person or society in 
mind that we wish to aim for? When looking at Maximus, I identify the end or ‘telos’ 
that qualifes his understanding of virtue to be theosis – the communion of the cosmos,
transfgured through Christ into the divine image. I also describe the way that 
Maximus follows St Paul in believing love to bind together all other virtues, being 
their summit but also the totality of all other virtue. I spend some time thinking about 
how this might make it easier to defne virtues within practical setings. One of the 
reasons it might be preferable to consider love rather than multiple virtues to be a 
beter means of making ethical decisions is that it can inform the way we understand 
those virtues, tempering them and allowing us to deal more efectively with complex 
situations.
As an example, we could think about the bishop in Les Misérables.1 An ex-
convict whom the bishop sheltered the night before has stolen some of the bishop’s 
silverware. A police inspector has caught the ex-convict and brought him to the 
bishop in order to verify an unlikely story. Te ex-convict is claiming that he didn’t 
steal the silverware, the bishop gave it to him. Te bishop at this point could choose to
tell the truth to the policeman, which perhaps would be the honest and just thing to 
do, or he could, as he does in Victor Hugo’s story, lie. Te bishop chooses to tell the 
policeman that he did indeed give the ex-convict the silverware, and that in fact the 
ex-convict lef some silver candlesticks behind. Tese he also gives to the ex-convict. 
Te ex-convict sees Christ in this action, sees the error of his ways and uses the 
silverware to start a business in which he goes on to care for others who are also 
fallen on hard times. In this example, the bishop has deemed honesty and justice, and 
the law of the land itself, to be subservient to the virtues of compassion and mercy, 
1 V. Hugo, Les Misérables. C.E. Wilbour (trans.) (New York: Carleton, 1862), 64-6.
14
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and we can see the repercussions of this act in the life of the one afected by this 
action.
In my mind this is a prime example of the way in which Maximus’ answer to 
the monk at the beginning of the Ascetic Life makes sense. How can we live in 
accordance with so many virtues? How can anyone hope to remember them all? Learn
to love, says Maximus, this is all the virtues.2 And more than that, it grants us 
perspective on what those virtues really are. Tey are defned in relation to this love. 
Te bishop in Hugo’s story has deemed, like St Isaac the Syrian,3 that the business of a 
Christian is not to exemplify the greatest degree of justice, or the greatest degree of 
honesty, but to exemplify the love of Christ. Te virtues are only ever a means to 
understanding what that love is, and sometimes that love supersedes what we might 
conventionally believe those virtues to be.
Within this thesis then, I talk about the structure of virtue ethics and the way 
virtues are defned in relation to the aim they point towards. I defne Maximus’ aim of 
theosis in more detail, then defne virtue for Maximus, elaborating especially on the 
above point where we can consider love to be the substance of all other virtues. I then 
discuss the practical, ascetic ways in which we might try to be virtuous people, and 
contextualise this within Maximus’ cosmic theology. For Maximus the human person 
is originally intended to be a mediator of divine love to all creatures, serving to gather 
all creation back to God through the gif of free will. Te human is thus considered to 
be a microcosm – one who contains the cosmos within them – one whose choices to 
love or hate heal or break apart the cosmos. Given the simultaneity of our ethics as 
both personal and cosmic, I ask what happens when we start treating virtue as 
something that transfgures communal relationships. If we allow our personal actions 
to be directed frst and foremost toward theosis then how acceptable are many of our 
traditional social structures by these standards? What is the point in tailoring our 
personal actions into a virtue ethics that is acceptable to institutions that perpetuate 
inequity and sufering, and entrench the supremacy of power, exploitation and greed? 
In what ways and to what extent are institutions like the state premised upon social 
structures that are incompatible with the love we are aiming for in theosis? And what 
2 Maximus, LA TCr. Ch. 3.
3 Isaac the Syrian, ‘Homily 51’ in Ascetical Homilies of St Isaac the Syrian. (Boston: Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery, 2011), 379.
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might happen if we instead envision society as arising from, and grounded in, these 
particular personal relations of love? In the fnal part of this thesis I draw on existing 
practical political ideas that might help us beter articulate a community founded in 
interpersonal love.
B. Union and Distinction
Maximus’ theology contains an interweaving and complementary understanding of 
communal and personal existence in love. Tis means that his theology allows for a 
vision of human communities co-existing in love, but at the same time vehemently 
defends the freedom of every person to choose that love and that way of life. Berthold 
believes that it is this defence of human freedom that made Maximus especially well 
suited to dealing with the theological controversy that dominated his own day.4 
Maximus’ famous defence of the wills of Christ, ultimately came down to preserving 
the ability of humans to receive the divine voluntarily. Love, for Maximus, must 
always be a relationship voluntarily entered into. It must always be relational and 
chosen by the free will of a person.
Maximus’ ethics is a cosmological ethics that concerns not just us now, but all 
things for all time. Human choices bind or break the universe, enabling or destroying 
the relationships between all creation and our end in God. But at no point in 
Maximus’ vision of the unity of the cosmos is there a moment when the particular 
personhood of any creature is eliminated or jeopardised in its identity. Tis balance 
between the massive and the minute is very particular to Maximus’ thought and is the
same idea that enables him to conceive of the simultaneity of one and many that will 
be explored in relation to virtue. In Maximus scholarship over the last ffy years, the 
idea of ‘one and many’ has been expressed in a number of diferent ways and with 
varying emphases on how systematically it should be treated. Melchisedec Törönen 
has been one of the strongest voices in suggesting a formal method. He calls this a 
theme of ‘union and distinction’ that runs through all Maximus’ thought.5 Törönen 
4 G. Berthold, Maximus the Confessor: Selected Writings. (London: SPCK, 1985), 121, note 30.
5 M. Törönen, Union an Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 1.
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ofered this idea in response to what he considered to be a strengthening trend in 
Maximian scholarship to instead identify ‘Chalcedonian Logic’ as the linchpin of 
Maximus’ thought.6 Törönen’s theme of union and distinction was a means of 
describing the way that much of Maximus’ thought contains many separate things 
being brought together as one, and yet remaining distinct even in this unity. Törönen’s
main argument for not calling this Chalcedonian Logic, was that these ideas pre-date 
Chalcedon and that the name is therefore misleading.
We frst see reference to Maximus’ use of the Chalcedonian formula as a kind 
of logic in Hans urs von Balthasar’s Cosmic Liturgy in 1941. In a passage from the 
revised edition of 1961 discussing the importance of the Chalcedonian formula, he 
writes that “everyone recognises that his [Maximus’] ontology and cosmology are 
extensions of his Christology, in that the synthesis of Christ’s concrete person is not 
only God’s fnal thought for the world but also his original plan”.7 Tis line of thinking
was further developed by Lars Tunberg, who wrote “In our conviction Maximus’ 
theology reveals rather a natural and logical development on the basis of a general 
Chalcedonian conviction, which is never seriously doubted or shaken”.8 Tus, von 
Balthasar and Tunberg proposed that the formula put forward at the Council of 
Chalcedon in 451AD could be understood as a kind of key underpinning the rest of 
Maximus’ work. Te Chalcedonian formula stated that Christ is one person in two 
natures:
one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begoten, in two natures being recognized 
without confusion, without change, without division, without separation, the 
diference of the natures in no way having been taken away because of the union, but 
rather the individual character of each nature being preserved and running together 
into one person and one hypostasis, not being parted or divided into two personss9
6 In later personal communication, Törönen has suggested that he put forth this thesis a little too 
forcefully and that his own idea of ‘union and distinction’ needn’t be as systematic in Maximus as he
made it out to be in his introduction.
7 H. U. Von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie: Maximus der Bekenner. (Frieburg: Herder, 1941), 193. 
This translation H. U. Von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy. B. Daley, (trans.) (San Fransisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1988), 207. 
8 L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator. (Copenhagen:C.W.K. Gleerup Lund, 1965), 9.
9 ‘The Symbol of Chalcedon’ in Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical notes. Volume II. 
The History of Creeds. P. Schaff (ed.). (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887), 62-3. [Chalcedonian 
Definition, P. Parvis, (trans.). (Unpublished)].
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Te way in which the union of natures takes place – perfect and yet unconfused – was
identifed as a main idea underlying Maximus’ cosmic theology. Christ himself and the
specifc union described in Chalcedon was not only the mirror for all other 
relationships of the one and many, but precisely how they came about. In Torstein 
Tollefsen’s words, this was a ‘Christocentric cosmology’10 in which all things were 
brought together through Christ’s union of natures.
In this thesis, I take the argument over whether ‘union and distinction’ or 
‘Chalcedonian Logic’ is more suitable to be largely unimportant since the terms are 
not mutually exclusive. As Törönen noted, union and distinction as an idea has been 
important prior to Chalcedon and there are plenty of people Maximus draws on who 
use it. Tis does not confict however with the Council of Chalcedon being the latest 
conduit for this idea, nor with Christ as one in two natures being the central element 
binding together the cosmos for Maximus.11 For the purposes of this thesis I will refer 
to this idea as union and distinction, since it more aptly describes the relationship in 
question. I will return to union and distinction as the relationship between the one 
and the many when discussing cosmic movement and the telos of creation, as well as 
when talking of the relationship between the virtues and love.
Te tension Maximus holds between communal and personal, one and many, 
union and distinction is one that we can see occurring again and again in his thought. 
Regardless of what we term it, we can see a continual atempt to hold in tension a 
paradoxical relationship between what is one and yet composed of many distinct 
elements that retain their personal identity and freedom. We can also see this tension 
running through the heart of much contemporary political philosophy. We are forever
asking about the balance of limitations and allowances between society and the 
individual. Maximus’ thought, then, might be a good place to look to in order to see, 
not the batle between society and the individual, but a diferent way of conceiving of 
community as simultaneous union and distinction that is born out of persons 
voluntarily entering into communal relationships.
10 T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).
11 This view is also shared by Tollefsen,Christocentric Cosmology, 10:  “I do not object to this 
[Törönen’s argument], but I still think that the ‘Chalcedonian logic’ could be seen as an expression 
of a first concern with union and distinction. The end result will not differ in any important respect.”
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C. A Virtue Ethics Approach
A question one might ask is: why virtue? While virtue is an important part of 
Maximus’ theological thought, it is not especially more important than any other area 
of his thought. One could just as easily have approached his ethics from an entirely 
diferent angle, such as a survey of his Centuries on Love and the way that his 
aphorisms build up a picture of the kind of life one ought to lead. One could have 
considered Maximus’ writings from within an ascetic genre following Evagrios of 
Pontos, and the importance of the stages of prayer as a personal and cosmic journey 
toward knowledge of the divine. One could have demonstrated his ethics by starting 
with his cosmic understanding of the human and the trajectory of creation toward 
fnal eschatological communion. All of these are ways into talking about ethics in 
Maximus, but a complete surveillance of his thought will come full circle and touch on
all of these things.
Tere are a number of reasons why I have selected virtue as a method of entry. 
Te frst is that, unlike the methods I just suggested above, it gives one a good way to 
immediately focus on the cosmic and ascetic dimension of Maximus’ writings, which I 
believe is essential to do justice to Maximus’ ethics. Te second is that, regardless of 
what particular subject one chooses to focus on in Maximus, if the study is thorough 
enough, I think all atempts to give an account of Maximus’ ethics will end up 
painting the same picture. Tis is because Maximus has such an interweaving nexus of
thought across all his work and such an enormous cosmological picture of how things 
ft together, that whether one starts with basic ascetic principles, prayer, the virtues, or
any other point, one will end up discussing the same thing eventually.
My two other reasons for choosing virtue are practical ones. Te twentieth 
century revival of virtue ethics12 means that starting from a similar place in Maximus 
will enable broader communication across disciplinary felds. Maximus’ ethics can be 
characterised as a kind of virtue ethics. Tis looks very diferent to modern virtue 
ethics, or any reconstruction of Tomas Aquinas’ or Aristotle’s virtue ethics, but this 
12 Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001) is credited as being one of the key philosophers advocating a 
return to an Aristotelian language of virtue, character and flourishing, paving the way for a modern 
day revival of virtue ethics. Cf. N. Athanassoulis, ‘Virtue Ethics’ in Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. IEP: http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/#SH1b (Accessed 02.09.17).
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is not necessarily problematic. So long as we can understand the similarities Maximus 
shares with other strands of virtue ethics, we can see his ideas as a variation (or 
innovation) on a theme, rather than uterly alien to previous ideas the feld has had 
contact with. As I go on to demonstrate, the current framework in which virtue ethics 
is conducted does not adequately allow for diferent modes of thought from 
philosophers from diferent times, places, world views, and faiths. I suggest that unless
we implement some changes into the current trend in the way virtues are thought of, 
then we cannot compare diferent ideas from diferent philosophical traditions. I ofer 
some suggested changes to virtue ethics that might let us integrate Maximus’ 
understanding of virtue into it. It is my hope that discussion of virtue in Maximus 
might consequently also be accessible to one coming from a background in 
philosophical virtue ethics.
 Te last reason I have chosen virtue, is that this practice has already been 
established. Te adoption of virtue ethics as a route to discussing Maximus and 
contemporary ethics is a very new phenomena, but its presence in academic circles 
came to the fore in summer 2013, in volume 26, issue 3 of Studies in Christian Ethics. 
Aristotle Papanikolaou with Perry Hamalis, Paul Blowers, and Andrew Louth all 
contributed articles on Maximus the Confessor and Virtue Ethics. I relate these in 
more detail and contextualise my own work in response to them below.
Whilst these papers provide a groundwork for future research, there is at 
present a defcit of work on the precise relation of virtue, love and ethics in Maximus’ 
thought and how this might serve as a resource for ethics today. Whilst it is generally 
accepted that, as Blowers writes, “this mystery of love is, in the long run, Maximus’s 
signature legacy in Eastern Orthodox ethics”,13 there is presently litle that applies 
Maximus’ understanding of virtue to contemporary ethical challenges. In response to 
and alongside these papers, virtue ethics and Maximus has become the topic of 
doctoral study for Demetrios Harper and myself.14
13 P. Blowers, ‘Aligning and Reorienting the Passible Self: Maximus the Confessor’s Virtue Ethics’. 
Studies in Christian Ethics 26:3 (2013): 350.
14 A number of conference talks based on our respective theses have also been given, including E. 
Brown Dewhurst, ‘The Ontology of Virtue as Participation in Divine Love in the Works of St 
Maximus the Confessor’ in Forum Philosophicum 20:2 (2015), 157-169.; and Maximus the 
Confessor as a European Philosopher: International Colloquium (Freie Universität, Berlin), 26th- 
28th  September 2014; and Harper’s paper ‘The Ontological Ethics of St. Maximus the Confessor 
and the Concept of Shame’ delivered to International Conference on Patristic Studies. (Examination
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I have chosen virtue as my topic then, because it is a useful way to frame 
Maximus’ cosmic and ascetic thought, it serves a practical purpose in appealing to a 
wider interdisciplinary feld of philosophy, and the beginnings of a feld of Maximus 
and virtue ethics are already in evidence, making it easier to interact with this new 
work by adopting the same virtue ethics terminology.
D. Maximus and Contemporary Ethics So Far
In this thesis I aim to present an in-depth study of virtue in Maximus and to 
demonstrate some of the practicalities we could draw from his thought for 
contemporary ethics. In this respect, the work is the frst of its kind as an analysis of 
virtue in Maximus and an example of how we might use it as a tool to critique present
circumstances and form an ethical basis for future communities. Te thesis arises in 
response to the work that has gone before it particularly by the aforementioned 
papers by Hamalis and Papanikolaou, Louth, and Blowers, and flls a gap that was 
identifed, amongst other places, in the conclusion to Tollefsen’s book Christocentric 
Cosmology.15 Troughout the writing of this thesis the feld of Maximus and 
contemporary ethics (both with and without reference to virtue) has continued to 
grow. I give here a brief overview of the recent work on Maximus and ethics.
In the paper that opens the special edition of Studies in Christian Ethics, 
Hamalis and Papanikolaou set out to contextualise Eastern Orthodoxy and virtue as a 
counterpoint to the Western tradition of virtue ethics, especially in light of the works 
of Lossky. Tey explain that in Eastern Orthodox thought a division between 
‘mystical’ and ‘theological’ cannot be maintained, and that ascetic and liturgical 
contributions are also important ‘theologically’. Whilst an important introductory 
article to an understanding of virtue in the Christian Greek-speaking world, I do not 
dwell on these arguments, since a division between mystical and theological does not 
exist in Maximus’ works and neither does it arise in any literature I interact with in 
this thesis. I do distinguish between ‘cosmic’ and ‘ascetic’ thought, using ‘cosmic’ 
Schools, University of Oxford), 10th- 14th August 2015.
15 Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 227-9.
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roughly to refer to those more metaphysical discussions of the trajectory of the 
cosmos, and ‘ascetic’ to refer to those texts in which Maximus has a more explicitly 
monastic audience in mind. Even when distinguishing between these terms however, 
there is no sense in which they map on to a mystical/theological divide since the 
terms I am using merely represent diferent topics or approaches within Maximus’ 
theology. As I mentioned earlier, all Maximus’ thought is interweaving and leads one 
to every other area of this thought anyway, so even if one began with a cosmic 
approach to his virtue, one would very soon be drawing on Maximus’ ascetic theology.
Nevertheless, Papanikolaou and Hamalis provide a good overview of the place of 
Byzantine thought in relation to contemporary ethics, and I pick up many of the 
themes they identify as essential, especially the centrality of theosis as telos (Chapter 
2), and “the elevation of love as the virtue of all virtues. For Maximus, all virtues lead 
to love and are manifestations of love”16 (Chapter 3), and the way that virtues are not 
acquired for Maximus but are “manifestations of God’s love”17 (Chapter 4).
Another of the articles in the special edition of  Studies in Christian Ethics was 
by Andrew Louth. Louth lays out a comparison between the positions of Tomas 
Aquinas and Maximus the Confessor on virtue. He situates his discussion in a recent 
history of virtue ethics and also within the ancient Greek account of virtue. Louth 
notes that for Plato, diferent strata of society are assigned a diferent virtue which 
they must work at in order for society to function well. While this hierarchical 
aportioning of virtue according to political rank and status does not feature in 
Maximus, deliberation on how virtue relates to our life in community in Maximus is 
something I spend a lot of time on later. In Chapter 6, I discuss how we can extend a 
personal search for virtue into a vision for communal life – basing society on those 
personal relations, rather than, as we might argue Plato is doing, virtues themselves 
being assigned rightful places in a preconceived structure of political life.
Louth indicates some important diferences between Hellenic and Christian 
understandings of virtue: “Te principal problem is that the notion of virtue could 
suggest that by our own eforts we could become good or virtuous, which goes 
counter to the Christian conviction that humankind has fallen away from its original 
16 P. T. Hamalis and A. Papanikolaou, ‘Toward a Godly Mode of Being: Virtue as Embodied 
Deification’ Studies in Christian Ethics 26:3 (2013): 276.
17 Hamalis and Papanikolaou, ‘Godly Mode of Being’, 277.
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condition and needs graces”.18 Te difculty Louth identifes also applies to 
contemporary virtue ethics – I primarily rely on the framework for a revised virtue 
ethics outlined in Chapter 1 to deal with this disparity. Louth identifes the Christian 
preoccupation with virtue as a concern “with what human beings are, rather than how
they make moral choices”.19 It is thus a teleological concern with who we wish to 
become that dominates Christian ethical thought, rather than the mechanism of our 
moral choices. In an early Christian context, Louth characterises this as a shif from a 
moral system based on the commandments to a focus on virtue. In contemporary 
terms, we might term this as a distinction between deontological ethics and virtue 
ethics.
Most noticeable in Louth’s comparison of Aquinas to Maximus is the 
consideration of natural virtues. Louth explains that for Maximus, virtues are natural, 
and sets this in a cosmic paradigm of seeking eternal well-being and divine likeness. 
He uses this to introduce Maximus’ triad of well-being and the ascetic observation 
that according to Maximus we can learn how to love. Louth compares this to Aquinas’
Aristotelian approach and the belief that virtue is not natural, but instead is the result 
of habit. Louth also characterises similarities and diferences relating to cardinal and 
theological virtues as arising from a distinction between grace and nature that is much
less strong in Maximus. I rely more heavily on Louth’s account of Maximian virtue, 
which I explore in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis. I broadly use Louth’s approach to 
Maximus on virtue as the starting point of my research, though I arrive at the topics 
he discusses in a diferent order.
In the article Blowers contributed to the special edition, he lays out the start of 
a synthesis between Maximus’ thought on virtue and contemporary virtue ethics. He 
begins by identifying the cosmic signifcance of oikonomia and Maximus’ corrective to
Origenist ideas in Ambiguum 7. Although I prefer the term ‘cosmic movement’ to talk 
about this overarching framework of creaturely trajectory towards God, the 
importance of this concept is refected in my own approach. When talking about 
Maximus’ recapitulation of Origen’s understanding of this movement, I term it the 
triad of cosmic movement (2.1.2). I follow Blowers in situating virtue in this cosmic 
18 A. Louth, ‘Virtue Ethics: St Maximos the Confessor and Aquinas Compared’. Studies in Christian 
Ethics 26:3 (2013): 353.
19 Louth, ‘Virtue Ethics’, 354.
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paradigm, allowing emphasis on virtue as simultaneously cosmic as well ascetic: 
“puting the inner house in order, which always entails, simultaneously, the healthy 
realignment of moral relations with other created beings”.20 Whenever we talk about 
virtue we are talking about personal action and its cosmic impact, or vice versa – the 
way in which the cosmos is transfgured through personal loving activity.21 Tis 
becomes an essential consideration when I move from discussing personal practice to 
communal consequences.
Blowers outlines several other key tenets in Maximus’ understanding of virtue. 
He discusses the way that, by ascetically disciplining our actions, we willingly turn 
our atention away from distraction and instead turn mind and body toward virtue. He
also considers the importance of the will in Maximus and its relation to virtue, and 
notes some important diferences between virtues in Greco-Roman thought and 
Maximus, especially the virtues of hope and mercy. Although I pick up many of these 
ideas, my discussion of will in Maximus is largely expressed through the relationship 
between person and nature, and tropos and logos (Chapter 4), while my analysis of 
acquiring virtue in Maximus focuses more on grace and ascetic discipline as a 
relationship between the divine and the human. My discussion of diferences between 
Maximus and other traditions of virtue is found instead in Chapter 1, where I identify 
the vast diferences (especially those Blowers identifes like mercy) as being 
problematic in our defnition of virtue and as possibly jeopardising the common 
terminology between Maximian thought and contemporary virtue ethics. While I 
cover almost all the points that Blowers raises in his paper, I do so in quite a diferent 
way in this thesis for the sake of following the coherence of my own argument.
As well as the journal special issue, in late 2014 Demetrios Harper submited 
his thesis entitled Te Analogy of Love: Te Virtue Ethic of St Maximus the Confessor. 
Harper more formally grounds Maximus’ thought as fully-fedged virtue ethic, with 
particular emphasis on Maximus’ philosophical roots in Aristotelianism and Stoicism. 
20 Blowers, ‘Aligning’, 339.
21 This was also a key theme in an article Kallistos Ware wrote on environmental ethics that drew on 
Maximus the Confessor. He describes the crisis out there as rather a reflection of crisis in human 
persons and our failure to live in right relation with the each other and the rest of the world. K. Ware 
‘Through Creation to Creator’ in Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian 
Perspectives on Environment, Nature and Creation. Chryssavgis, J. & Foltz, B.V. (eds.), (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2013.) (First published 1997).
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He develops a comprehensive understanding of virtue and love in Maximus, before 
going on to compare such an approach with Kantian deontological ethics. While I 
agree with Harper on most points there are a number of ideas he touches on that I 
approach quite diferently. Most noticeably, I focus heavily on the cosmological 
character of the relationship between love and the virtues, since a large part of my 
argument concerns the microcosmic mirroring of creation in the activity Christ 
restores to the human and the way in which all creation moves towards its telos. I also 
take this as a departure point from which to explore Maximus’ metaphysical 
understanding of universals and particulars, which I believe are very important for 
this discussion. Whilst this is not in contradiction with Harper’s ideas, it does make 
for a very diferent kind of enquiry that ofen runs parallel to, rather than directly 
building on his work. Whilst Harper spends considerable time tracing the Neoplatonic
and Aristotelian infuences on Maximus’ work, I work almost exclusively from the 
premise that Maximus is citing Paul in his lists of virtues, and use the context of the 
virtues in Paul to ground Maximus’ understanding of virtue. Whilst Harper’s work has
a strong historical and philosophical favour, my own inquiry is much more focused 
on the internal theological consistency and explanations found within Maximus’ 
corpus itself. For the most part my questions about what virtue is for Maximus follow 
his own explanations into the circles he draws us into. I look at what he means when 
he says that the virtues lead us to our telos, that the virtues are love, that the virtues 
are natural – and spend efectively a chapter on each of these, since they represent an 
ethical paradigm, the cosmic paradigm, and the ascetic paradigm that we might wish 
to inquire into in order to understand what virtue is for Maximus. Furthermore, the 
contemporary ethical interaction Harper has chosen consists of a defence of Maximus’
virtue ethics in the face of a deontological critique. Te way I have chosen to 
demonstrate Maximus’ ethical potential is to critique the contemporary institution of 
the state and claim that it has no place within a teleological ethics that embodies and 
reaches for love. I demonstrate the full radical implications of Maximus’ theological 
ethics of love by suggesting that stateless ideas of mutual aid might beter refect the 
communal relationships we are trying to build here on earth. My interest then is in 
trying to think about how we can start critiquing the present day and working for 
love here and now, rather than necessarily building a theoretical ethical paradigm 
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with the same rigour Harper does.
While virtue ethics is a signifcant direction in which Maximus’ works have 
recently been taken, it is by no means the only way in which his ethics has been 
expressed. Since the early 90s there has been a growing feld of Maximus the 
Confessor’s theology as a resource for environmental ethics.22 Tis has been tied in 
particular to Maximus’ logoi theology, where the logoi have been characterised as 
afrming the divine providential care and plan for every aspect of creation – human 
and non-human. Tis has been developed further to include contemplation of the 
logoi, and therefore human relationship with non-human creation, as an essential part 
of prayer and human relation to God.23 Tere has also been an expansion of ethical 
interests drawn straight out of Maximus’ theological writings. For example in 2016 in 
the panel ‘Byzantine Philosophy and Maximus the Confessor’ at the 23rd International 
Congress of Byzantine Studies, Sotiris Mitralexis delivered a paper entitled ‘Rethinking 
the Problem of Sexual Diference in Ambiguum 41’.24 Te paper considered Maximus’ 
understanding of male and female as a division that is overcome in Christ, and 
suggested the relevance of this thought for gender studies and ethics. Likewise, 
Dionysios Skliris delivered a paper at the same panel on ‘Te Notions of ἐπικράτεια 
and ἐγκράτεια in Maximus the Confessor’25 which looked at Maximus’ dyothelete 
writings as a way to overcome cycles of power and domination.
Aristotle Papanikolaou has also done much work on Maximus and virtue, 
22 Eg. E. Theokritoff, Living in Gods Creation: Orthodox Perspectives on Ecology. (New York: St 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 50-90; T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St 
Maximus the Confessor. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 225-30; A. Keselopoulos, Man 
and the Environment: A Study of St Symeon the New Theologian. E. Theokritoff (trans.). (New York:
St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001); R. Bordeianu, ‘Maximus and Ecology: The Relevance of 
Maximus the Confessor’s Theology of Creation for the Present Ecological Crisis’. The Downside 
Review 127 (2009); D. Munteanu, ‘Cosmic Liturgy: The Theological Dignity of Creation as a Basis 
of an Orthodox Ecotheology’. International Journal of Public Theology. 4, 3 (2010); E. Brown 
Dewhurst, ‘The Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor as a Basis for Ecological and 
Humanitarian Ethics’ in Teologikon 3 (2014). See also numerous papers in the collection Toward an 
Ecology of Transfiguration: Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature and Creation.
J. Chryssavgis & B.V. Foltz (eds.) (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). I discuss the way 
in which I draw on environmental ethics and Maximus the Confessor in 6.0.2.
23 On contemplation of the logoi in Maximus the Confessor as a resource for environmental ethics see 
especially: D. Bradshaw, ‘The Logoi of Beings in Greek Patristic Thought’ in Toward an Ecology;  
A. Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos in St Maximus the Confessor’, in Toward an Ecology.
24 S. Mitralexis, ‘Rethinking the Problem of Sexual Difference in Ambiguum 41’ Analogia: The 
Pemptousia Journal for Theological Studies 2:1 (2017).
25 D. Skliris, ‘From Domination to Impassibility: Overcoming the Dialectic Between Dominator and 
Dominated according to the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor’ Analogia: The Pemptousia 
Journal for Theological Studies 2:1 (2017).
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including a chapter looking at much more reconciliatory ideas between Aquinas, 
Augustine and Maximus and love.26 His largest contribution however is his book Te 
Mystical as Political in which considers the ethical implications of Maximus’ thought. 
He uses this to nominally support a human rights approach and an ecclesial 
community existing within a liberal democracy. Ultimately he concludes that we must 
make a distinction between political and ecclesial communities.27 While political 
communities are not places that enable theosis, they are spaces that, with the help of 
enforced human rights, allow for the fourishing of ecclesial communities.28 Te 
coercion of the state is in the political rather than the ecclesial domain then, but there 
is a certain kind of necessity to it if we wish to exist in an ecclesial community where 
food and water are provided and basic human rights are preserved.29 Te stakes are 
too high, Papanikolaou claims, for us to object to the minimal coercion of a liberal 
state that upholds human rights when we have so many more oppressive state 
structures that condone torture and deny basic human rights.30
Whilst I do not directly respond to Papanikolaou’s claims, as I have chosen to 
build my argument in a very diferent way, his book raised certain conclusions that I 
set out to ofer alternatives to. Papanikolaou’s concern that without the coercion of 
the state we risk having no safe spaces for basic human needs or mutual respect falls 
into an almost Hobbesian view of human society that requires the state for respect to 
be maintained across a broader political community.31 Tis has long been a position 
contested by anarchist thought, which maintains that it is entirely possible to 
construct communities of mutual aid and respect without the coercive power of the 
state.32 Additionally, whilst Papanikolaou makes a valid point that we are much beter 
of with the ofen fairly minimal coercive structures of a liberal state rather than the 
tyranny of a state that fails to implement human rights, like that of the Russian 
26 A. Papanikolaou, “Learning How to Love: Saint Maximus on Virtue” in Knowing the Purpose of 
Creation Through the Resurrection: Proceedings of the Symposium on St. Maximus the Confessor. 
M. Vasiljević, (ed.) (Alhambra: Sebastian Press & The Faculty of Orthodox Theology, 2013).
27 A. Papanikolaou, The Mystical as Political: Democracy and Non-Radical Orthodoxy. (Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 200. Panapnikolaou’s position put forward here was also 
clarified by personal e-mail communication (18.06.13).
28 Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 130.
29 Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 127.
30 Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 127-8.
31 I critique Hobbes and Mill on this point in Chapter 6.
32 I come to this in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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Federation,33 he fails to note that it is only for a select few that a state like the USA  is 
a safer and beter community to exist in. He mentions atrocities like the absence of 
human rights and the use of torture in some states that a liberal state shields us from, 
when in actual fact the coercive power and ability of a state such as the USA is such 
that they may remove any person at any moment from just such protection, and that 
many ethnic minorities face such discrimination on a daily basis. Furthermore, such a 
state cannot be divorced from its foreign policies and the clear abandonment of rights 
and allowance of torture where its own citizens are not concerned. 
My methodology is such that I draw suggestions for how we ought to live from
a Maximian theology of cosmicly-orientated ascesis and right human relation. I see no 
such division between ecclesial and political in Maximus’ work, in the sense that there
is not one set of ethical parameters that defne how we treat one another in one 
sphere and not the other. It seems to me an easy way out to claim that we can beneft 
from the ‘safety’ and luxuries aforded to us by a coercive state, and yet claim that the 
state itself is ‘political’ and not ‘ecclesial’ thus rendering ourselves unaccountable for 
the coercive cost of such an institution. Given that we are called to identify with the 
whole human race, and the whole cosmos even, and to sufer with them and on their 
behalf, I cannot understand how as Christians we could comfortably go about our lives
without at least trying to challenge the ‘liberal state’ which by nature of its very 
structure oppresses and exploits fellow human beings.
I am thus indebted to the book Mystical as Political for drawing together the 
thought of Maximus the Confessor and approaches to contemporary ethics, and it is as
a consequence of many of its conclusions that I am writing the present thesis. Whilst 
methodologically it is beyond the scope of this thesis to respond to the book, my 
conclusions are presented as an alternative to it, and I claim that as Christians we 
must strive for a political space that is not maintained through coercion. I present this 
as a theological derivative to how Maximus understands love, and discuss the way 
that the modern ‘liberal state’ of the UK fails in these dimensions, before using the 
anarchist thought as a basis for alternative visions on how to beter build communities
that enable love.
33 Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 128.
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E. Chronology and Context
Maximus the Confessor was born in about 580AD and died in 662AD. He was born 
and grew up either in Constantinople with ties to the civil service and the imperial 
court, or, depending on what sources we use, in Palestine to a relatively poor family 
where he had strong ties to the Palestinian monastic movement.34 At some point, 
possibly around 626,35 he abandoned all this and went of to become a monk in a 
monastery in North Africa. He was heavily infuenced by a famous theologian and 
monk, Sophronius, whose lead Maximus would eventually follow in taking a stand in 
Empire-wide theological controversies. Maximus appears to have remained a monk his
whole life, never being made a priest or bishop. Despite this, lay, monastic, and clerical
fgures from all over the empire wrote leters to him asking for his philosophical, 
theological, and spiritual advice on various maters. In Maximus’ later life he famously
wrote on the two wills of Christ, taking a theological stand during a time when 
political unity rather than theological orthodoxy was foremost on the imperial 
agenda.36 He was tried for heresy and treason and eventually his right hand and 
tongue were cut of (these being the tools by which he spread his heresy), and he was 
exiled to what is now modern day Georgia, where he died later that year on 13th 
August 662.37 His theology on the two wills later became the groundwork for the sixth
Ecumenical Council and he is now venerated as a saint in the Eastern Orthodox, 
Roman Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran traditions.
Maximus’ theology draws heavily on the previous Greek-speaking Christian 
34 Andrew Louth argues that Maximus’ familiarity with court and imperial proceedings along with his 
extensive education suggest that it is more likely that Maximus was born and raised in 
Constantinople (A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor. (London: Routledge, 1996), 5). Along with 
Brock’s earlier observation that Palestine would place Maximus close to his friend Sophronius, (see 
Louth, Maximus, 6-7), Pauline Allen argues that Maximus’ theology retains a distinctly Palestinian 
ascetic flavour such as his response to Origenism and awareness of Neoplatonism that would be 
made sense of if Maximus was Palestinian born. cf. P. Allen, “The Life and Times of Maximus the 
Confessor”, The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor. P. Allen & B. Neil (eds.), (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 9-14. The controversy over Maximus’ early life comes from two 
competing biographies of his life – an earlier Syriac one that hates him and a later Greek life that 
extols him.
35 All dates from the tentative timeline reconstructed by  Allen, “Life and Times”, 14.
36 For further background see Louth, Maximus, 7-16.
37 His first trial was in 655 after which he was exiled to Bizya/Thrace. His second trial was in 662 after
which he was exiled to Lazica/Georgia. Cf. Allen, “Life and Times”, 14-15; Louth, Maximus the 
Confessor, 16-18; Berthold, Maximus, 31, note 32.
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theological tradition, especially that of the Cappadocian Fathers,38 but also thinkers 
like Dionysios the Areopagite who used Neoplatonic imagery and language to 
articulate Christian theological conundrums and metaphysics,39 and Origen, whose 
work Maximus rethought to bring it more in line with the theological orthodoxy of his
own day.40 A lot of work has been done previously on Maximus’ Neoplatonic 
infuences.41 My own enquiry follows much more closely in the footsteps of Blowers, 
who focusses especially on the importance of Scriptural sources for Maximus the 
Confessor and the meaning that this imparts to Maximus’ thought.42
For the sake of clarifcation in this thesis, there are also a few naming 
conventions that should be addressed. Maximus makes many references to works that,
since his time, have had the authenticity of their authorship called into question. 
Unless it is pertinent to an argument that is being made, I leave these as they appear 
in the original and do not contest them, since my only interest in these texts is the 
context in which Maximus uses them. For example, I use the name ‘Dionysios the 
Areopagite’ to refer to the anonymous source ofen called ‘Pseudo-Dionysios’.
As when bringing any source from the past to present day circumstances, it is 
important to locate it in its original context and acknowledge the limitations of its 
utility. In this thesis I locate virtue within Maximus’ corpus and within his wider 
theology. Te alterations I suggest to a contemporary framework of virtue ethics are 
made in order to allow for a contextualised account of Maximus’ virtue. My interest is 
not so much in lifing a Maximian account of the world and transplanting it into the 
present day, but in deriving an ethics that acknowledges the relevance his theology 
still has for today. I discuss my method for bringing Maximus’ theology to 
contemporary ethics in Chapter 5 where I follow Andrew Louth and previous work 
38 Many of the Ambigua concern passages of Gregory of Nazianzus that Maximus explores and 
explains for others.
39 Cf. Y. De Andia, “Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor” in Oxford 
Handbook. 177-193
40 Cf. P. Sherwood,‘The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and his Refutation of 
Origenism’ in Studia Anselmiana XXXVI. (Rome: Orbis Catholicus, 1955).
41 eg. D. Harper, The Analogy of Love: The Virtue Ethic of St Maximus the Confessor. (PhD diss., 
University of Winchester, 2014).
42 P. Blowers, ‘The World in the Mirror of Holy Scripture: Maximus the Confessor’s Short 
Hermeneutical Treatise in Ambiguum ad Joannem 37’ in In Dominico Eloquio: In Lordly 
Eloquence. P. Blowers, A. Christman, D. Hunter, & R. Young, (eds.),  408-426. (Cambridge: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002).; Blowers, “Exegesis of Scripture” in Oxford Handbook. 253-
273.
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done on Maximus and environmental ethics to shape my own approach. Although 
Maximus conceived of the universe as a much smaller place, Louth suggests that the 
holistic, cosmic worldview present in Maximus’ theology may be particularly relevant 
to us now. He writes that we can see this in the trends in modern fashions that seek a 
return to such coherence of things – like New Age religions, paganism, alternative 
medicines etc.43 Te solipsistic orientation of consumer capitalism might give us 
reason to agree with this assessment. In an economic climate that seems to thrive on 
fragmentation, loneliness and unlimited purchasing for purchasing’s sake, what Peter 
Kropotkin called “morality drawn from account books”, “debt and credit philosophy” 
and “mine and yours institutions”,44 Maximus’ holistic theology seems not just timely 
but prescient. As I explain when it becomes relevant in Chapter 5, I am interested in 
taking Maximus’ theology as a basis for constructing a contemporary ethics. As well 
as a personal ethic, it is my hope that we can also use his thought to critique our 
political communities where they fail to stand up to the communal ethic required by a 
Maximian understanding of love and theosis. It is the logic of his theology that I use, 
rather than determining say, Maximus’ political opinion on his own context and 
circumstances. I do not wish to replicate Maximus’ Byzantine ethics in the twenty-frst
century, I wish to use his theological genius to inform an ethics for today that can aid 
us to make personal and communal decisions that look towards hope for theosis.
F. Shape of the Argument
Te thesis moves from a defnition and contextualisation of virtue in Maximus, to a 
practical vision of its implementation. Te practical ethics I later outline is an example
of the way that we might use Maximus’ thought in contemporary ethics, rather than 
an exhaustive one. When enquiring about a communal dimension to virtue ethics, the 
state leant itself as an obvious object of critique, given its monopoly on human social 
organisation in the present day. I develop this justifcation further in the introduction 
to Chapter 5.
43 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 68-71. Cf. Section 6.0.2 later in this thesis.
44 P. Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread. (Milton Keynes: Dodo Press, 2010 (First published 1892)), 
156.
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In each chapter I introduce a claim that I break down and prove within the 
chapter. Together, these claims lead one through the overall thesis argument that 
begins by locating Maximus within the feld of virtue ethics and ends with a statement
about the kind of community we can build with Maximus’ virtue ethics. Te claims I 
prove are as follows: virtues need to be defned within the context of a telos (Chapter 
1), the cosmos moves towards its perfect end in the gif of theosis (Chapter 2), virtues 
are activities that participate in divine love (Chapter 3), it is in human nature to gather
the cosmos in love (Chapter 4), the means of the state confict with Maximian virtues 
and telos (Chapter 5), our communities must always be rooted in and striving towards 
love (Chapter 6). Tese claims have been chosen to try and refect the key elements of 
Maximus’ thought when it comes to explaining human conduct and purpose. I also try
to keep the structure of the work familiar to one coming from a background in virtue 
ethics – moving from a discussion of telos, to one of virtue, to one about trying to lay 
hold of virtue, followed by practical examples. I explore the idea of a reciprocal ethics 
that retains its personal, ascetic dimension when in a cosmic, communal context, and 
suggest that we need to challenge our communities to be extensions of this personal 
ethic of love. Te title of the thesis refects this idea, with change or revolution in our 
communal relations beginning in a microcosmic expression of love. Tis idea was a 
key element in early work done on Maximus and environmental ethics, expounded 
especially by Kallistos Ware. His paper Trough Creator to Creator claimed that there 
was not an ‘environmental crisis’ but a crisis within the human, where the real 
problem was human atitudes towards one another and the rest of creation.45 I 
essentially extend this argument, and suggest that we also need to acknowledge our 
harmful actions even when they are more indirect. It is only the casual participation of
many people that allows insidious institutional operations to maintain power. Te 
revolution, if we like, is in seeing the link between microcosm and macrocosm – that 
there is no place that our personal actions do not touch, and that we cannot isolate our
actions to consist of what is immediate and obvious, but must consider their global 
impact and their importance in a cosmic trajectory toward theosis.
Chapter 1: I situate Maximus within the feld of virtue ethics. I explore the 
way we might consider Maximus’ thought to be a kind of virtue ethics in light of two 
45 Ware, ‘Through Creation to Creator’, 24.
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difculties. Tese are (1) the difculty of deciding what things are virtues, and (2) what
role does telos play in guiding virtuous activities. I identify problems with the way 
these two difculties have ofen been resolved in virtue ethics, and demonstrate that, 
as it stands, the feld of contemporary virtue ethics seems to be too exclusive to 
incorporate Maximus’ account of virtue. I point out some of the more universalist 
claims made in virtue discourse that do not hold for Maximus and suggest some 
revisions to the feld that would allow Maximus’ contribution to be considered within 
it.
Chapter 2: I use the revised virtue ethics language suggested in Chapter 1 to 
contextualise Maximian virtue. I discuss theosis as the telos of humankind and all 
creation. I outline the cosmic dimension that directs Maximus’ concern with human 
well-being and purpose. Tis cosmic dimension is necessary in order to understand 
why virtue is worth pursuing, what virtue is, and what is happening when it becomes 
manifest. I discuss the liturgy as an icon of theosis that simultaneously belongs to the 
present and the eschaton, and suggest that a cosmic liturgy requires us to love in all 
areas of life.
Chapter 3: I describe what virtue is for Maximus. I characterise the virtues and
love as an instance of union and distinction. Tis mirrors the creaturely cosmic 
movement of the previous chapter, where virtues are the path or logoi intended for us 
by God, and love is the telos that simultaneously incorporates these logoi. I conclude 
by explaining that this is not just a mirror, but an actual description of what is 
happening within creaturely cosmic movement, since the virtues are chosen by 
creatures and love is the telos of all creation – God Himself.
Chapter 4: I consider how we can participate in virtue and what happens 
when we do so. I discuss metaphysical questions such as how the physical world can 
be altered by ethical activity. I explore the language of universals and particulars and 
how Maximus’ ethics of unity and distinction interacts with material creation. 
Particularly important in this chapter is the claim that virtues are natural to humans, 
and the link between this personal choice to learn to love, and the cosmic 
consequences of such a choice.
Chapter 5: I point out that some of the ways that our contemporary structures
in society fall drastically short of the ethics that has been outlined thus far.  I challenge
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the idea that opposing monolith structures like the state is an absurdity, and suggest 
that we construct our ethics from a theological orientation toward theosis, rather than 
the convenience of the current status quo. I suggest that if Maximus’ ethics are really 
simultaneously ascetic and cosmic, then our personal ethics will inform our communal
coexistence. I claim that we are responsible for institutions that we partake in like the 
state. I suggest that a state structure fails by defnition to be an adequate outworking 
of personal and communal love and conclude that alternatives to it as a form of 
society must be considered.
Chapter 6: I ofer a more positive account of communal living that we can 
derive from Maximian ethics. I suggest that an ethics derived from Maximus will (1) be
rooted in love – emphasising atempts to live with others that enables personal 
choices to be made freely and to be respected by others – and (2) be striving towards 
love – emphasising a continual refection on how we are falling short of love and how 
we might perpetually reorientate ourselves toward love. I demonstrate the practical 
possibilities of such hopes by drawing on existing ideas and practices in the anarchist 
tradition. I ofer these examples as a way of opening up imaginative dialogue on how 
we might live out a Maximian ethics of love.
I conclude by noting that this is an ethics that requires the restructuring of 
ourselves in order to work. It’s not going to slot neatly into our current lives or ft 
within the priorities of a modern day Capitalist state. Tis is because teleologically 
orientated ethics already has an aim and that this aim has nothing to do with power 
and wealth. Te revolutionary element of this ethics is that we ought to love one 
another in our personal lives, and that when truly considering the extent of such a 
love, it will have a communal and cosmic impact on everything about us. Such a love 
cannot be constrained by the political, economic, social and geographic borders 
epitomised in the state, and necessarily challenges our ideas of what is demanded for 
community on earth. Humans are microcosms whose love is not contained by borders,
but unites all divisions through Christ, breaking apart the idea that there can ever be a
kind of sufering or oppression or love that does not have a cosmic impact.
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~ Chapter 1: Virtues of a Telos  ~
‘Virtues need to be defined within the context o  a telos.’
1.0 Introduction
In this chapter I argue that virtues need to be defned within the context of a telos. I 
make this argument for two reasons. One, is to establish a meta-ethical framework 
that Maximus’ ethics shares with modern virtue ethics studies. Te second is to 
demonstrate that Maximus’ thought may be of use to modern virtue ethics as it pushes
the boundaries of current meta-ethical frameworks and ofers a very diferent 
perspective on virtue.
As outlined in the Introduction, there are multiple reasons for choosing virtue 
ethics as mediator between Maximus’ thought and contemporary political thought. I 
explained that most of these ideas really come from the convenience that this 
framework gives us, rather than any deep identity that Maximus’ ethics shares with 
contemporary virtue ethics. Te arguments I gave were that, theologically speaking, 
focussing on virtue is a good way into the ascetic and cosmic dimensions of Maximus’ 
ethics, and that starting points in Maximus’ work can be fairly fuid, since the large 
network of his ideas will have to be broached regardless of where one starts. Also, 
from a more practical, meta-ethical perspective, virtue ethics as a feld already draws 
on a multitude of philosophers from all times and places and has a tradition of 
contextualising past writers and drawing them into dialogue with the present. Finally, 
some headway has already been made into establishing Maximian thought within the 
contemporary virtue ethics feld, and following in these footsteps makes for a much 
easier inquiry into the use of Maximus’ ethics for today.
In this chapter I present the meta-ethical framework I am using to harmonise 
the terminology that Maximus and contemporary virtue ethicists use. I do this by 
looking at two words: virtue (1.2) and telos (1.3). In particular I am concerned with the 
questions (1) how does one decide what things are virtues, and (2) what role does telos 
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play in guiding virtuous activities. Te overall answer to these questions can be 
summarised in the main argument of this chapter, that ‘virtues need to be defned 
within the context of a telos’. I primarily work with MacIntyre’s defnitions of virtue 
and explore his meta-ethical framework. I explain my choice to use MacIntyre below, 
along with a brief discussion of the use of primary sources in virtue ethics.
1.1 Method for Meta-ethics
1.1.1 A Chronological Conundrum
One of the reasons I am using virtue ethics to communicate Maximus’ ideas is that 
this feld has a long tradition of drawing on philosophers from very diferent 
traditions to our own. Whenever we refer to anyone’s work we must consider the 
time, context, location and culture of our source. Whenever there is a great period of 
time and geographical distance elapsed between the present and one’s source, one 
must be particularly careful, especially in the feld of ethics. We must be specifc about
the task we are doing and the way that we are doing it. Are we representing our 
sources truthfully within their original context? Is that our primary aim? If not, how 
are we distinguishing between material that is being faithfully represented and places 
where our opinions as ethicists diverge from source material. What grounds are we 
giving for dismissing some aspects of our sources that we do not care for, or feel to be 
irrelevant?
Virtue Ethicists have long treated with Aristotle, Tomas Aquinas and others, 
making comparative studies, supporting some aspects of thought, and ditching others. 
Te line between truthful historical enquiry and relevant contemporary ethics has 
never been one that is particularly problematic for virtue ethicists. Rosalind 
Hursthouse, for example, represents Aristotle’s thought within his own context and 
times. She agrees with lots of his ideas and methods but dismisses other areas of his 
thought as irrelevant to her. She has no time for any chauvinism or the assumption 
that wealth is required for a certain level of virtuousness in Aristotle’s ‘magnanimous 
man’.46 It is not a particularly contentious idea to delve into several thousand year old 
46 R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9.
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philosophies and say that some of it is useful and some of it is not. Of course there are 
always risks of misconstruing the past for a modern agenda, but that is no less a risk 
in any other area of thought.
Virtue ethicists that draw on philosophers past and present have a 
methodology that respects the context of their sources. However, this does not 
undermine their readiness to engage, criticise and learn from such sources. Te 
amount of time that passes does not alter how worthy a conversation partner one has. 
Te worth is in the philosophy itself. Te distinction between history and ethics is 
very well represented in virtue ethics and one I make use of throughout this thesis.  
While presenting Maximus’ ideas in the theological and historical context of his time, 
I will refect and try to draw out nuances in his thought that I believe still remain true 
to his time and context. However, I am also looking to bring this theology into 
dialogue with the present day. Like Hursthouse, this involves engaging, criticising and
learning from sources. She sorts out what of Aristotle’s virtue theory is desirable and 
what is not, efectively ‘updating’ Aristotle for the modern day. My main aim is not to 
update Maximus however, because I think his requirements of human behaviour are 
more radical and challenging than many predominant modes of human operation that 
occupy us today. His ideas faten any notion that consumerism, privatisation and free 
market liberalism have anything useful to contribute to human relationships and, 
when put up against the sorts of values grounding most of our political institutions, 
show that they are not at all watertight under his understanding of the requirement of
love.47 I talk about Maximus’ challenging these things, but the ethical force placed in 
these observations is not Maximus’, but my own position. I would like to think that 
this is vindicated in so far as it is true to Maximus’ theology and the application 
agreeable, but it also stands that one may just disagree with Maximus’ and therefore 
my own position.
In the course of this chapter I introduce the necessity of having an ethical 
paradigm that is tied to the telos of one’s virtues. I distinguish this from an overall 
meta-ethical methodology. Te meta-ethical methodology is what I hope to share with
other virtue ethicists. Tis includes the historical methodology discussed here and the 
general use of virtue and telos to be discussed below. Te ‘ethical paradigm’ by 
47 As will be shown in Chapter 5.
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contrast, is the bit that people may just disagree with. What I get into below is that in 
order to subscribe to a certain set of virtues, one has to place at least some faith in the 
wider metaphysics and teleology in which those virtues take place. As discussed in the
introduction, there are several reasons why Maximus might be a good candidate for 
one to be interested in ethically and spiritually. But there are also perfectly good 
reasons why one may have no interest in subscribing to his metaphysics.48 Even given 
these things however, I think stating Maximus’ theological ethics in the context of 
virtue ethics will be of some utility to the feld even if it is only in a technical49 or 
anthropological50 sense.
1.1.2 MacIntyre
I build on and critique the virtue theory of Alasdair MacIntyre in this chapter. Tere 
are a number of reasons for doing this, but the frst is that when looking to share a 
meta-ethical framework and methodology with other virtue ethicists, it seems prudent
to draw a basis from prior work done in this feld. In this chapter, I present the basic 
defnitions MacIntyre provides of his virtue theory, and look at what seems acceptable
and applicable in the context in which I am about to use them. In doing so the general 
structural statements MacIntyre makes fall under scrutiny. Some of these stand up, 
and for others I suggest amendments that I believe will make them more universally 
applicable tools.
MacIntyre’s work has been extremely important in the felds of virtue ethics 
and communitarian politics.51 He has worked extensively on Aristotelian accounts of 
agency and virtue, identifes as a Tomist,52 and recognises the importance of the 
historical context in which virtue theories are writen.53 He highlights the dangers of 
cultural appropriation and is wary taking the ‘virtues’ of our predecessors out of the 
48 If one wasn’t a Christian, for example.
49 I argue below that Maximus’ ethics stretches current virtue ethics language and paradigms beyond 
their limits.
50 By this I mean, as an observational study of Byzantine virtue theory, which has not had much focus 
in modern times despite its breadth and influence both then and now.
51 C.S. Luts, ‘Alisdair Chalmers MacIntyre’ in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-
0002: http://www.iep.utm.edu/mac-over/, (Accessed 10.12.15).
52 Luts, ‘Alisdair Chalmers MacIntyre’ in Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/mac-
over/, (Accessed 10.12.15).
53 See A. MacIntyre, “Chapter 13: Medieval Aspects and Occasions” in After Virtue: A Study in Moral 
Theory.(London: Gerald Duckword & Co. Ltd., 1985 (first Published, 1981)).
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teleological paradigm of their day.54 I think these are extremely important points and 
that their inclusion in a meta-ethical framework of virtue ethics is paramount. I 
explain some of the dangers of not doing so in the rest of this chapter. MacIntyre’s 
book Afer Virtue contributes a solid and searching critique of virtue theory thus far, 
and focusses on systemic,55 or what I am calling ‘meta-ethical’, issues. His dissection of
virtue ethics terminology provides an ideal starting point and enables one to study the
methodological diferences that might be encountered if one immediately tried to 
reconcile Maximus’ thought with most contemporary virtue ethics. Because of this 
strong meta-ethical basis, I personally believe that MacIntyre’s work is a very 
successful example of virtue theory. I share his belief in the importance of the 
relationship between virtue and telos, and largely critique him only on his consistency 
and commitment to his own ideas. I mostly draw on MacIntyre’s book, Afer Virtue, 
where most of his meta-ethical discussion is focussed. In this chapter I look at the 
relationship he proposes between virtue and telos, and use this as a basis for my own 
position and the introduction of Maximus’ ethics that follows in the chapters afer 
this.
1.2 Whose Virtues?
What are virtues, and who’s list of virtues should we go with? Tese questions reveal 
a lot about the philosophical underpinning of virtue theory. Tey also reveal the 
limitations and assumptions present in a theory. Te question ‘who’s list of virtues 
should we choose?’ is a particularly contentious area, as everyone writing on this 
topic has their own list in mind. Tose who defend their choices have to be extremely 
careful that they do not simply appeal to cultural dominance or their own personal 
familiarity with certain virtues as an assumed starting point. Alistair MacIntyre is 
particularly wary of this problem, although as will be seen, even he seems to fall foul 
of this. I begin this section by looking at MacIntyre’s defnition of a virtue (1.2.1), 
which I believe is one of the most successful defnitions. I then look at some 
54 See MacIntyre, After Virtue, 181-3.
55 MacIntyre, After Virtue. 260.
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difculties with this defnition, namely MacIntyre’s choice to defne virtues as ‘amoral’
and to defne their morality in relation to telos, rather than virtues themselves (1.2.2). 
Tis amounts to less a critique of MacIntyre and more an alternative to his idea of 
virtue, since he remains consistent and this position a useful one. I argue that 
Maximus ofers a very diferent concept of virtue that is both successful and does not 
ft this model at all. It therefore requires serious atention as an alternate, conficting 
idea of what things should be considered virtues. Tis feeds into the fnal part of this 
section on virtues (1.2.3). Because MacIntyre’s choice of what things are virtues does 
not follow through for Maximus, neither can the more generic conclusions that 
MacIntyre makes when he expresses that some virtues are found universally in many 
cultures. Whereas in 1.2.2 Maximus’ idea of virtue was an alternative to MacIntyre, 
MacIntyre’s claim to universality in 1.2.3 means that Maximus’ virtues confict with 
MacIntyre’s theses. Tey are worthy of atention in this regard also.
1.2.1 What is a Virtue?
In order to defne ‘virtue’, MacIntyre looks at consistency in how the word is used in 
diferent cultures, times and contexts. He asks what commonalities are there in the 
way that people use the word virtue that mean the term can be used interchangeably. 
MacIntyre notes that wherever one is on the globe, there are very diferent ideas about
what things should be considered virtues:
If we were to consider later Western writers on the virtues, the list of diferences and 
incompatibilities would be enlarged still further; and if we extended our enquiry to 
Japanese, say, or American Indian cultures, the diferences would become greater 
still.56
In a Western context alone there are many diferent lists of virtues, not to mention 
extending this to include other cultures. In Afer Virtue, MacIntyre describes this 
socio-historical context as a “paradigm of human excellence”.57 He notes for instance, 
that “For Homer the paradigm of human excellence is the warrior; for Aristotle it is 
56 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 181.
57 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 182.
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the Athenian gentleman”.58 What he means by this is that diferent times and places 
have diferent ideal pictures of what it means to be a good person, and that 
consequently any list of virtues compiled will refect these respective images. 
MacIntyre’s ‘paradigm of human excellence’ is the sum picture that a philosopher like 
Aristotle or Homer is working with. It is a picture that also assumes their readership 
will have some familiarity with and agree is worthwhile working towards. Ofen this 
‘paradigm of human excellence’ will therefore refect a popularly construed good way 
to go about conducting oneself from a particular time and place. To be Aristotle’s 
excellent Athenian gentleman, for example, one must adhere to courage, temperance, 
liberality, magnifcence, magnanimity etcetera.59 Whereas for Homer, as MacIntyre 
recalls, the virtues extolled are “those which enable a man to excel in combat and 
games” and consequently, “It follows that we cannot identify the Homeric virtues until
we have frst identifed the key social roles in Homeric society and the requirements of
each of them”.60 In other words, we understand virtues to be those things that 
contribute to a ‘paradigm of human excellence’. I might strongly disagree with 
Aristotle’s calling ‘magnanimity’ a virtue, or Homer’s calling ‘strength’  a virtue, but I 
can comprehend what is meant by this, because of the socio-historical paradigm of 
human excellence in which these philosophers are writing. Tis gives a consistency to 
what is meant by the term virtue, even though it is still contingent upon the 
contextual idea of what it is to be a good person. MacIntyre notes that “without an 
overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life, conceived as a unity, our 
conception of certain individual virtues has to remain partial and incomplete”.61 
So a virtue, thus far, has been defned as something that allows one to excel 
towards a specifc end. But what if my specifc end is something less grandiose than 
the Athenian gentleman? What if my aim in life is to be a good trumpet player, or a 
master chef, a gardener, soldier, or totalitarian dictator? Are the things that take me on
that path still to be considered virtues? Does the telos of a life have to be more widely 
shared in order to be considered a valid one? MacIntyre addresses this problem by 
distinguishing between becoming good so that we can get stuf, and becoming good so
58 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 182.
59 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Ross, D. (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 49-
79.
60 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 184.
61 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 202.
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that something inside us changes for the beter. He called these ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ goods. His idea meant that if we want to be a good chef and all we want is 
fame, wealth, prestige and tasty cakes, then we desire ‘external goods’.62 If however we
want to be a good chef because we want to hone our own discipline in making to 
recipes, diligence in being atentive to our work, patience in not rushing the 
procedure, then we are pursuing ‘internal’ goods. For ‘internal’ goods the specifc 
practice itself becomes less important because we have a picture of the sort of person 
we want to be which we are working towards. I can learn the same self-discipline, 
diligence and patience that I learned in cookery by practising trumpet, watercolour 
painting, martial arts or learning Greek grammar. External and internal goods instead 
become a distinction between goods that rely on material objects and goods that are 
somewhat more metaphysical and tied to choices and character.63 It is the later that 
MacIntyre wishes to call a virtue. Hence he defnes virtue like this:
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which 
efectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.64
An important point to note here, is that practices (the term we are using for cookery, 
trumpet playing, painting etc.) do not defne virtues. Tere is something above and 
beyond the goods we have located in these practises that means they are considered 
virtues. Tere is telos of human life which allows us to identify a set of characteristics, 
and it is these which we are locating in these practices. I believe MacIntyre 
overemphasises Aristotle from whom he is drawing at this point in Afer Virtue, and 
that he ends up implying that there is some kind of excellence in a task that is 
valuable regardless of whether its internal goods are determined by a telos.65 However, 
62 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 190.
63 I come back to the excellences of practices in section 1.2.2, as this becomes an important way in 
which what virtues are is decided, and relies heavily on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
64 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 191.
65 In MacIntyre’s examples of the chessplayer and the artist there is an implied goodness in these acts 
that he does not link up to telos. His argument would be stronger here I think if he re-emphasised 
that it is the goods we see in chess and painting that are good, and being a good human does not 
have to equate to being good at a specific task. This would not imply that the tasks are irrelevant or 
meaningless, but it would take them out of a moral paradigm and leave all moral choices dependent 
on telos. 
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I do not think this is MacIntyre’s intention to imply this, and rather think that he 
provides us with a suitable framework for understanding the example I used above 
where I said, what if we wish to become adept totalitarian dictators. According to 
MacIntyre’s defnition of virtues – this practice could only have anything to do with 
living a suitable life if we could locate internal goods (virtues) within such a practice. 
He also noted that these virtues are informed by a particular telos that we are 
subscribing to. If, for example, we followed a code that taught us that the purpose of 
human life was to learn peace, knowledge, serenity and harmony, it would be unlikely 
that one could ever claim as virtuous an intention to become a totalitarian dictator. We
are therefore able to leave the morality of an action to be defned by the telos we are 
aiming for, and to further break down the components of a practice into those things 
which are helpful and should be maximised and those things we wish to avoid.
So long as one works with McIntyre's defnition of virtue above, and adds the 
following,
s unless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices by 
constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of human life conceived as a 
unity, it will both be the case that a certain subversive arbitrariness will invade the 
moral life and that we shall be unable to specify the context of certain virtues 
adequately.66
then we can explain Maximus’ virtue ethics within this context. MacIntyre has tied the
defnition of virtues to their telos and the larger moral paradigm in which they are 
situated. Within this thesis I follow the framework as we see it here. Tere is a 
consistency and a continuity in the way Maximus is being presented that describes the
teleological paradigm in which he is working (Chapter 2) and describes what he 
believes virtue to be in light of it (Chapter 3). Te considerations that follow this 
represent difculties that arise when synthesising Maximus’ virtue ethics onto other 
structural comments made concerning the meta-ethics of virtue.
66 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 203.
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1.2.2 Amoral Virtues
In the previous section I gave an account of what MacIntyre believes virtues to be. I 
noted that it is telos that confers the moral paradigms onto the goods that are in 
practices. Curiously, however, rather than conferring the term virtue to these goods 
afer one has determined that they are morally good, MacIntyre uses the word virtue 
to refer to any internal good. 
I can understand why he wishes to do this, it is because this stays true to the 
generic use of the word virtue. It makes sense of why even things we personally 
believe are not virtues, can still be explained as such. It is a much neater defnition 
than trying to convey that a virtue is a virtue to anyone who believes this internal 
good adheres to the telos they follow. By doing this however, MacIntyre isolates the 
word ‘virtue’ from the moral paradigm and makes it instead identical to his term 
‘internal good’. Tis means that virtues are amoral until they are situated in relation to
a telos. Whilst this made sense when we were talking about amoral goods that could 
be got out of a practice (where good was purely a term for accumulating more of 
something regardless of its efect on us or others), it means that virtue also means this 
but concerns non-material acquisitions. Tis means that not everything that begins as 
a virtue ends up being moral or right.67 Tus: “It certainly is not the case that my 
account entails either that we ought to excuse or condone such evils or that whatever 
fows from a virtue is right.”68 He then says “Tat the virtues – as the objection itself 
presupposed – are defned not in terms of good and right practices, but of practices, 
does not entail or imply that practices as actually carried through at particular times 
and places do not stand in need or moral criticism” and “a morality of virtues requires 
as its counterpart a conception of moral law.”69
MacIntyre’s choice to defne a virtue in this way tells us something very 
important about the relationship of virtue to telos in his account. It is that while 
virtues are dependant on telos for morality and desirability, they are not dependant on 
telos for defnition. Tey exist (so to speak) independently of direction and end, and 
rather become harnessed as morally good once a telos has been pointed out. Tis is not
a problem for MacIntyre, and is entirely consistent with his account so far, but it 
67 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 200.
68 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 200.
69 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 200.
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becomes difcult to make sense of Maximus’ account of virtues with this allowance in 
place. MacIntyre’s explanation of virtues allows for one to begin an inquiry into virtue
ethics by talking about which virtues one thinks contribute to a telos. By the time one 
gets to this stage, it becomes virtually impossible to reconcile Maximus’ understanding
of virtue to this picture. Given Maximus’ very diferent and, I argue, valuable 
contribution, I suggest that this conception of virtue is unhelpful and poses meta-
ethical problems to facilitating communication between non-Western conceptions of 
virtue and morality. MacIntyre’s defnition of virtue does not lose much by instead 
conferring the term virtue only to those internal goods that make up the moral 
paradigm of one’s telos.70 Tis choice will change the focus of how one approaches 
virtue ethics. Tere will be less cause for delineating a list of virtues that ft an end, 
and, I think, more of a focus on the end itself and the way of living it evokes from us. 
Virtue will be less tied to any traditional word list we recognise as ‘virtues’ and what 
is good will be defned instead by the ends we wish to achieve. Tese may or may not 
ft some of the traditional words and terms we have used for virtues, or they may be 
actions, sentences, feelings – or anything else useful for conveying what is needed in 
order to become what we wish to be.
So far this is a minor alternative to MacIntyre’s defnition of a virtue. In the 
next section, I demonstrate the route that MacIntyre’s position goes in and how this 
very minor change becomes very important. Taken to its next logical steps, as 
MacIntyre does, his treatment of virtue becomes more and more alien to the Byzantine
contribution to the topic. Te diference is not problematic, since it is diversity on the 
treatment of virtue that is one of the most useful things about Maximus’ ideas. Te 
problem is that at this stage we are still largely working on a meta-ethical level, and 
under MacIntyre’s current defnition, Maximus’ ideas are nonsensical. Te kind of 
discussions and conclusions MacIntyre starts drawing come to be in direct opposition 
to Maximus, and instead of providing a meta-ethical framework of conversation we 
end up with moral diferences pulling apart what was meant to still be a 
terminological distinction.
70 i.e. That our definition of virtue should depend on what one believes the telos of human life to be.
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1.2.3 Universal Virtues
Tis difculty seems to be especially apparent when it comes to explaining who 
virtues are for. Do we really want to say that a telos depends on what one person 
considers the purpose of human life to be – and that therefore the goodness of virtues 
is relative to every person’s conception of telos? Tis question troubles MacIntyre in 
particular because, as he rightly notes, practices are not done by an isolated person 
but by a person in a community. Tey necessarily afect other people.
In order for a practice of any kind to be considered well done, MacIntyre says, 
we have to subject ourselves to the scrutiny and expertise of previous practitioners.71 
We have to accept the following three things:
We have to learn to recognise what is due to whom; we have to be prepared to take 
whatever self-endangering risks are demanded along the way; and we have to listen 
carefully to what we are told about our own inadequacies and to reply with the same 
carefulness for the facts.72
What we have here is a list of requirements outwith the previous framework 
discussed. We can see just what MacIntyre is trying to say by this in the statement 
that follows, which corresponds to the three requirements above:
In other words we have to accept as necessary components of any practice with 
internal goods and standards of excellences the virtues of justice, courage and honesty.
For not to accept these, to be willing to cheat as our imagined child was willing to 
cheat in his or her early days at chess, so far bars us from achieving the standards of 
excellence or the goods internal to the practice that it renders the practice pointless 
except as a device for achieving external goods.73
MacIntyre is saying that there are some virtues that are just necessary. In other words,
that there are some virtues that regardless of the telos, will always be found to be 
morally useful, and therefore morally good virtues. MacIntyre gives two examples 
justifying this proposition, the more convincing of which concerns the relationship 
71 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 191.
72 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 191.
73 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 191.
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between three people and the expectation of fair treatment in order for relationships 
to work.74 Regardless of whether one agrees with MacIntyre on the specifcs of this 
statement, it is a proposition that would appear unusual if it were being made afer a 
defnition that placed the defnition of virtue as dependent on telos. Tis proposition 
would come under a category of speculative but interesting general trends of virtue 
categorisation identifed within diferent cultures. But under MacIntyre’s current 
defnition it does not seem all that unreasonable to start saying there are some virtues 
which almost everyone is going to count as morally good. Te problem is even greater
than this however, as MacIntyre seems to actually go so far as to say everyone believes 
these virtues are good, additionally, though he does not say this later element directly, 
he implies that these virtues must be objectively good, since they are indisputable and 
everywhere. MacIntyre does provide some qualifcations whilst saying this, and at one
point notes that (italics added) “Just as, so long as we share the standards and purposes 
characteristic of practices, we defne our relationship to each other, whether we 
acknowledge it or not, by reference to standards of truthfulness and trust, so we defne
them too by reference to standards of justice or courage.”75 In the italicised clause, we 
might still read that all this is still dependant on a telos that acts as a moral paradigm, 
but this nuance becomes extraordinarily lost in light of this later paragraph:
I take it then that from the standpoint of those types of relationship without which 
practices cannot be sustained truthfulness, justice and courage – and perhaps some 
others – are genuine excellences, are virtues in light of which we have to characterise 
ourselves and others, whatever our private moral standpoint or our society’s particular
codes may be. For this recognition that we cannot escape the defnition of our 
relationships in terms of such goods is perfectly compatible with the 
acknowledgement that diferent societies have and have had diferent codes of 
truthfulness, justice and courage.76
I can only assume that our previously all-important and morality-determining 
paradigm of telos is what is being referred to in the above quotation as a “private 
74 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 192.
75 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 192.
76 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 192.
47
~ Chapter 1: Virtues of a Telos  ~
moral standpoint”. And that because MacIntyre has identifed for us what an 
objectively good relationship looks like, we can assume as always desirable the virtues
of truthfulness, justice and courage. We have now strayed so far from the idea that the
aim of human activity is to bring about the telos of human life, that it is impossible to 
situate Maximus’ virtues within this paradigm. Tis is especially the case if we take as 
a moot point MacIntyre’s addendum that everyone agrees with truthfulness, justice 
and courage. Let us consider this in more detail.
In defence of his above statement, MacIntyre goes on to cite three examples. 
He mentions the Lutheran child brought up to value truth, the Bantu child brought up 
to value truth, and the British child who likewise has some similar values. Afer this 
less than convincing cross-section of empirical evidence (for which no footnotes are 
provided), he concludes that “each of these codes embodies an acknowledgement of 
the virtue of truthfulness. So it is also with varying codes of justice and courage.”77 
MacIntyre seems to want to say that, certain features of virtuous behaviour recur in 
diferent cultures and that the frequency of this recurrence gives them privy status as 
‘genuine excellences’. To give a charitable interpretation of this: some virtues seem to 
be accepted as good, in enough situations, that we might go so far as to consider them 
essentially universal. Tere are some problems with this position, not the least of 
which is that MacIntyre seems to be proposing a much more hard-line universality 
than I’ve here atributed to him, and also because we have nothing other than 
speculation to pose this as a serious account of cross-cultural treatment of virtue 
anyway.  But more importantly, because it undermines his own atempt to be 
culturally sensitive in defning virtues, undermines his own atempt to emphasise the 
importance of telos in relation to virtue, and fnally, because we are still at the meta-
ethical defnition of virtue at this point in his work, it isolates communication with 
cultures that cannot assimilate his assumptions.
I will try and illustrate the dangers of all three of these problems in the 
following example. Te example is not from Maximus, but a theologian who lived 
shortly afer him and drew his thought from some of the same monastic sources as 
Maximus78:
77 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 192.
78 Evagrios of Pontos was an influence on both Maximus and Isaac. See J. Konstantinovsky, “Evagrius
Ponticus and Maximus the Confessor: The Building of the Self in Praxis and Contemplation” in 
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Mercy and justice in one soul is like a man who worships God and the idols in one 
house. Mercy is opposed to justice. Justice is the equality of the even scale, for it gives 
to each as he deserves; and when it makes recompense, it does not incline to one side 
or show respect of persons. Mercy, on the other hand, is a sorrow and pity stirred up 
by goodness, and it compassionately inclines a man in the direction of all; it does not 
requite a man who is deserving of evil, and to him who is deserving of good it gives a 
double portion.79
Tis is from one of the sermons of St Isaac of Nineveh, one of the great ascetic 
theologians and venerated as a saint in every apostolic Church in the Christian East, 
writen some time in the late 7th century. Unlike Lutheran, Bantu and British children, 
Isaac does not think that justice is a virtue. He thinks mercy is, and that mercy is 
incompatible with justice. Regardless of whether one agrees with Isaac, his is an 
ancient and infuential position that poses a serious challenge to the assumption that 
‘justice’ is incontestable virtue constantly present in all human societies everywhere.
 Isaac, in his Homily 51, frmly believes that justice has nothing to do with 
Christ and therefore nothing to do with the Christian life. One cannot be both 
merciful and just, he maintains. In a passage very reminiscent of Gregory of Nyssa’s 
Sermon 5 on the beatitude of mercy,80 Isaac describes mercy as that unconditional 
giving to the other and perpetual compassion. Tis is an inclination that has no 
comprehension of judgement, since “Te man who corrects his companions while his 
soul is infrm is like a blind man who shows others the way”.81 Isaac’s position may 
well cause us to question the supreme and ofen uncontested role that justice holds in 
our societies and our concepts of good relations. Gregory of Nyssa calls mercy the 
most “stable security for life”, since “just as the harsh and cruel man makes enemies of
those who have come to experience his savagery; so also, contrariwise, we become all 
friendly with the merciful man, since mercy naturally engenders love in those who 
Evagrius and His Legacy. J. Kalvesmaki & R. D. Young (eds.) 128-153 (Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2016) and C. Stewart, “Evagrius beyond Byzantium: The Latin and Syriac 
Receptions” in Evagrius. Kalvesmaki & Young (eds.) 206-235.
79 Isaac the Syrian, ‘Homily 51’, 379.
80 Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5 PG44 1252B.
81 Isaac the Syrian, Homily 51, 379.
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share it.”82 Tese are compelling statements that can have no place in an ethical 
discussion that has allowed for some virtues to be treated as universal, and not subject
to telos.
Claims to the universality of some virtues end up being unhelpful on many 
levels. Qite apart from being large, difcult to verify statements that require 
extensive anthropological research to back them up, these claims lend themselves to 
appearing as if they are beyond dispute. As in the above example provided in Isaac’s 
homily, this can end up prematurely cuting of stimulating debate on the telos of our 
societies, but also it risks projecting a particularly dominant socio-cultural norm onto 
a minority. Even though MacIntyre makes some allowance for “diferent codes of 
truthfulness, justice and courage”, and even though he himself has spent a long time 
saying that virtues are as multitudinous as cultures, the underlying atitude in this 
suggestion is one that slips very easily into assuming that all values everywhere look 
like those of our own culture. Tis is doubly problematic for that large number of 
academics who fnd themselves belonging to ex-colonial powers or countries with 
recent and even ongoing imperialist policies. For those of us to whom this applies in 
particular, I think it extremely important that we do not assume the ‘virtues’ of our 
culture, to be the virtues of everyone else’s.
MacIntyre’s argument that I put forward in 1.1.1 was about how we can fnd a 
common defnition of virtue that works across cultures. He did this by saying that 
paradigms may be diferent, but all these diferent things people call virtues contribute
to their idea of a perfect person. Tey are all the internal, non-material things that 
come out of what we do, and that we have decided are worthwhile, because they ft 
into an end vision of what is good. Even regardless of the diference I raised in 1.1.2, 
MacIntyre still holds that the moral dimension of the virtues is conferred by the telos 
to which they point. In order to still be consistent with this earlier position, MacIntyre
must believe that every telos confers moral virtuousness to the concepts of truth, 
courage and justice. Te alternative is that he thinks these three ideas are an objective 
or ‘natural’ unquestionable phenomenon, and this is inconsistent with his 
understanding of telos.83 If MacIntyre holds the former position, then the genuineness 
82 Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5 PG44 1253B [H.C. Graef, “Sermon 5” in The Lord’s Prayer, The 
Beatitudes. New York: Paulist Press, 1954), 134].
83 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 203.
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of his atempt to defne virtues in terms of culturally specifc paradigms, and to 
acknowledge true diversity (and particularly the existence of non-‘Western’ virtues) 
becomes highly suspect. As has already been demonstrated above, there are examples 
of ethical thought that do not share MacIntyre’s belief that these virtues are essential 
in any way.84
1.2.4 Defning Virtues through Telos
I therefore wish to use MacIntyre’s defnition of virtues from Afer Virtue, but with 
two specifc caveats. Te frst is that that ‘virtue’ is instead the term we use to refer to 
internal goods that are within the paradigm of a telos, and not amoral until selected. In
this way virtues are only virtues once internal goods are located within a teleological 
paradigm. And second, that there are no exceptions to this. Tere aren’t some virtues 
that are objective or so special that they are lef out of this framework. Te framework
that has been suggested here is one that is accessible, I believe (certainly it is a lot 
more accessible than that proposed at the end of MacIntyre’s chapter on Te Nature of 
the Virtues that I have been discussing here). Tis framework, which I am calling meta-
ethical since it still concerns the way in which we set up the playing feld before 
diving into the ethics, is currently amoral. It currently says nothing about culture, 
history, values or morality. Like a good formula, it is waiting for us to input the result 
(in this case the telos), before any calculations defning which things are virtues 
happen. All we are saying is that there are consequences that are more than purely 
material that arise when we act, and that when we think about the end vision of the 
people or society we wish to be, we are able to determine which of those 
consequences are desirable, and also what actions are desirable.
Under this defnition, which I do not think is too great an allowance for a 
virtue ethicist to make, Maximus can be situated as a conversation partner. His 
theology of virtue and telos as simultaneous participation and perfection correspond 
to this framework, and in fact start to make sense of how a telos can both be a sum 
total of all virtues, a potential perfection of all virtues and also a virtue in itself. I come
on to all this in Chapter 3, but this synthesis of defnition is essential I think, if we 
84 My example was in particular concerning ‘justice’, but the principal of the argument extends to all 
three virtues that MacIntyre proposes.
51
~ Chapter 1: Virtues of a Telos  ~
ever wish Maximus to be intelligible to contemporary virtue ethics, and also if 
contemporary virtue ethicists wish to extend their defnitions of virtue beyond those 
with which they have been traditionally comfortable and so far associated.
1.3 Why Telos?
So far we have talked about the dependence of virtue on telos. Tere have been some 
tentative defnitions of telos given above, but in the following section I wish to explore
in more detail what I mean when I use the term. Te necessity for this clarifcation 
arises from the complex history of the word, but also in particular the controversy 
that has recently surrounded it. I predominantly follow MacIntyre in both the 
defnition and use of telos, but I wish to explain its importance in my own terms here 
as this still seems to be a contentious and much misunderstood term. I do this by 
illustrating the dangers of not talking about telos whenever we are talking about any 
means or purposeful choice. I do this frstly by talking about obfuscating ends, where 
talking across purposes occurs because two parties are unaware of the paradigm that 
the other is operating within. Secondly, I talk about assuming ends, which, much like 
the universal virtue problem above, assumes that there is an objective and/or obvious 
end which everyone wishes, so discussing telos is pointless/outdated/philosophically 
incoherent.
In this section, I propose that in order to decide what virtues are and which 
things are virtues, they must be defned within the context of a telos. Without this 
telos all we can do is give an overarching general sense of what the word virtue entails
for all times and places (as MacIntyre does very successfully above, but ultimately will
always fall short of a convincing universal argument). To form this argument I frst 
deal with the word telos and some recent historical concerns with the word (1.3.1). 
Additionally, I outline how I am using the word telos, and how this both leads on from 
and difers from MacIntyre’s understanding of virtues being dependent on their socio-
historical context. I suggest that in explaining how virtues exist in relation to (and 
because of) a telos, we delineate the metaphysical paradigm in which we are working. 
Te example of this in practice will be Maximus, whose telos I state in Chapter 2, and 
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who’s virtues I defne in relation to this telos in Chapter 3. To further support this 
claim however, I ofer the following two difculties that arise when we do not defne 
virtues in the context of their telos. Te frst is not talking of telos at all and talking 
cross-purposes with a-teleological virtues (1.3.2), and the second is assuming a 
universal telos (1.3.3).
1.3.1 Te Bombardment of Telos
Te ‘paradigm’ in which virtues can be described is largely defned by their telos. By 
this I mean, we cannot be more specifc about what virtues are, unless we have 
defned the metaphysical paradigm in which we are working. Describing the telos of a 
list of virtues goes a long way to defning this paradigm. I frstly argue that a telos is 
present whenever we come across a list of virtues, since this is not a given in virtue 
ethics. I briefy touch on some problems that come of not describing or acknowledging
that one’s virtues have a telos.
Te term telos is commonly found in virtue ethics literature. It is used by 
Aristotle, Aquinas and Maximus, to refer to roughly an idea of ‘purposeful end’ 
towards which virtues are being employed.85 Tis usually amounts to someone’s 
understanding of what a good life or a good person looks like. Te virtues are the 
means for achieving this end aim of a good something. Te importance of telos in 
constructing a list of virtues is likewise identifed as important by MacIntyre,86 and its 
formation is subject to the socio-historical context previously discussed. Telos is the 
reason why a particular list has been constructed. Acknowledging the existence of 
telos in one’s list of virtues is part of a recognition that there is a reason why you have 
chosen the virtues you have, and an acknowledgement that you have a subjective 
picture in mind that your selected virtues conform to and help create. It is believed by 
some virtue ethicists that one may have a list of virtues without a telos.87 As I intend to
demonstrate however, I believe that in practice this only amounts to not 
85 Wilken argues that Maximus makes direct use of Aristotle’s definition of telos: P. Blowers & R. 
Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ. (New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003), 
48-9 note 10; On Aquinas use of Aristotle’s eudaimonism see S. Floyd, “Thomas Aquinas: Moral 
Philosophy” Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-moral/ (Accessed: 
11.06.17).
86 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 184.
87 Eg. S. Darwall, “Introduction” in Virtue Ethics. S. Darwall (ed.), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2003), 2.
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acknowledging the aim one has in mind when constructing a list of virtues.
Firstly, I wish to clarify how I am using the word telos. I use it to refer to the 
ideal picture that an ethicist has in mind when they select a list of virtues. I do not 
mean that an ethicist is choosing to frame all their ethics as growth toward some 
inevitable perfection and end, and I am aware that many consider this to be the 
meaning of telos. In Israel Schefer’s Of Human Potential, he suggests that the idea of a
telos being present in our comprehension of human growth and development implies 
that there is a sort of inevitable destiny of humanity which removes the moral and 
responsible dimension from choices we make. He described the danger of “the myth of
fxed potentials, the myth of harmonious potentials, and the myth of uniformly 
valuable potentials” and sought to deconstruct and “demythologize” “the 
inescapability of choice and responsibility for evaluation”.88 Tis is a danger that arises
when we understand telos to be ‘destiny’ and the inevitable end towards which we are 
taken regardless of our actions. It implies an absence of responsibility or freedom of 
choice and is consequently used to evade the complexity of decisions. Te telos I am 
talking of is that ideal we have decided to set as worthwhile working towards in life. 
We choose our actions because we would like them to conform to an end vision we 
have set our sights on. It is part of the construction process of our ethics. Mary 
Hayden likewise notes that whenever our choice of ethical obligation looks toward 
achieving an end of some kind, including classical utilitarianism and Kant’s categorical
imperative, these ideas are “necessarily teleological”, since they construct an ethics 
with an aim to bringing about some kind of a preferred mode of living.89 She too 
denies that a recognition of an end implies an “obligatory end”.90 It is, she goes on to 
say, the recognition of an end that allows us to construct statements about what it is 
we ‘ought’ to do.91 I maintain that collecting of a list of virtues also happens in this 
way. Virtues are the steps, the ‘oughts’, that reveal a picture of a character or a 
lifestyle that is aspired to. Tis picture is the ideal end desired, even if there is no 
metaphysics in place that claims this is some ‘fxed potential’ or inevitable direction of
life. In so far as one believes that more than one virtue can be atained at once, and 
88 I. Scheffler, Of Human Potential: An Essay in the Philosophy of Education. (Oxford: Routledge, 
2010 (1st ed. 1985)), 92.
89 M. Hayden, ‘Rediscovering Eudaimonistic Teleology’. The Monist 75:1 (1992): 71.
90 Hayden, ‘Eudaimonistic Teleology’, 72.
91 Hayden, ‘Eudaimonistic Teleology’, 72.
54
~ Chapter 1: Virtues of a Telos  ~
that ataining more than one virtue is preferable to ataining just one, there must be a 
picture of a preferred state made up of multiple virtues that is being employed. It is 
this preferred state that I am referring to as the telos of any given virtues.
1.3.2 A-teleological Virtues
Te necessity of discussing the telos of any set of virtues is best demonstrated I think, 
when we look at an example of its absence. MacIntyre demonstrates the place and 
purpose of telos in the example of two people who share apparently rival political 
views. Te example MacIntyre uses is that of person A, who has a more traditionally 
Libertarian view on just reward being given to those who have earned it, and person 
B, who follows a more traditionally state sanctioned socialist position where just 
distribution should be given to those who need it.92 MacIntyre notes that though these 
two people would vote for diferent parties and debate angrily with each other, they 
actually have a lot in common, and it is only a particular political set up that positions 
them against one another. Te point of their commonality is in their commitment to 
some notion (and therefore virtue) of justice, which they wish to see enacted in their 
society. Teir diferences and incompatibility however, is that “Te type of concept in 
terms of which each frames his claim is so diferent from that of the other that the 
question of how and whether the dispute between them may be rationally setled 
begins to pose difculties”,93 and that in other words, “...our pluralist culture possess 
no method of weighing, no rational criterion for deciding between claims based on 
legitimate entitlement against claims based on need. Tus these two types of claim are
indeed, as I suggested, incommensurable, and the metaphor of ‘weighing’ moral claims
is not just inappropriate but misleading”.94 MacIntyre maintains that the political stage
is dominated by language that is cross-purposes, much like person A and B both 
arguing that they want justice. He notes that “disorder arises from the prevailing 
cultural power of an idiom in which ill-assorted conceptual fragments from various 
parts of our past are deployed together in private and public debates which are notable
chiefy for the unsetlable character of the controversies thus carried on and the 
92 MacIntyre, After Virtue. 244-6.
93 MacIntyre, After Virtue. 246.
94 MacIntyre, After Virtue. 246.
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apparent arbitrariness of each of the contending parties.”95
I think what MacIntyre is geting at here is that modern political discourse is 
bound up with a rhetoric that fails to talk plainly of telos. Te conficting statements 
and way in which justice is being used exist because there is a further, broader vision 
of human existence that we are aiming at which has not been reconciled or even 
brought up in discussion. Person A and B might shove their own versions of justice 
down each others throats with varying emotional appeals, but unless there is a 
systematic evaluation of what they meant by justice, and what they are trying to do 
by suggesting that such a form of justice is desirable, this debate will never evolve 
from a posturing shouting match. It may be that persons A and B can fundamentally 
never reconcile their views because they both have wildly diverging claims as to what 
a good human society should consist of. Alternatively, a situation like that envisioned 
by MacIntyre and that I discuss in 1.3.3 might arise, where because there are common 
components of a debate, people may recognise the difering telos of another’s vision 
and still fnd discussion on the virtues useful. I maintain that the later is only ever 
going to result in frustration rather than understanding if the telos of each tradition is 
not disclosed.
As MacIntyre himself explains, his main task is to take a step back from moral 
philosophy and to try and tackle its systemic issues.96 In suggesting a return to 
teleological virtue ethics, he proposes a method of deconstructing how we think about
moral arguments. I think this is particularly important given that the ‘cultural power 
of an idiom’ that MacIntyre identifes is ofen wielded by those with the power to 
convey information and sway others. I am thinking in particular of the media and 
political rhetoric, but wherever language obscures true moral dimensions of a debate 
and especially when it favours those already in powerful positions, it becomes not just
browbeating of contrary opinions, but manipulative language that has nothing to do 
with ethical debate. As I write this, just today the British government has voted to 
begin air strikes on Syria. Prime Minister David Cameron said that those who vote 
against the air strikes should be considered ‘terrorist sympathisers’.97 Sound bites like 
95 MacIntyre, After Virtue. 256.
96 MacIntyre, After Virtue. 260.
97 BBC News, “Syria Vote: Cameron and Corbyn clash over air strikes” BBC, 2nd Dec. 2015. BBC 
News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34980504 (Accessed 02.12.15).
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“keep British people safe”98, “confront the evil”99 and rhetoric such as: “Do we work 
with our allies to degrade and destroy this threat and do we go afer these terrorists in 
their heartlands from where they are ploting to kill British people, or do we sit back 
and wait for them to atack us?”100 obscure an ethical question in sore need of 
rigorous, rational, ethical debate. Te severity of the situation is apparent from the 
need for Jeremy Corbyn to make the following statement: “It must be treated with the 
utmost seriousness, and respect given to those who make a diferent judgement about 
the right course of action to take.”101 Tat, on the mater of violating the sovereign 
territory of another country, against the directive of the UN, the British Parliament 
had to be reminded by the leader of the opposition that an alternative should be 
considered seriously, seems to add a reality to MacIntyre’s comments in 1981 so 
poignant as to be almost a pastiche.
Te proposition to situate the language of virtue that so readily permeates 
political and media rhetoric102 in the framework of a telos towards which virtues are 
orientated, forces ethical discussion to return to a dialogue of what we believe to be 
important and how we get there. Just like MacIntyre’s theoretical people, A and B, we 
cannot throw around terms like justice and expect anyone to know what we mean or 
be brought over to our argument. Without a teleological grounding that defnes 
justice, then the word is meaningless at best and obscures the course of dangerously 
necessary ethical debate at worst. Tis I think, is the danger of a language of 
ateleological virtue. It is a trap not just for a virtue ethicist but for a society that still 
latently draws on the cultural ideas of virtue,103 but does not situate them in a moral 
paradigm in which the point of them is considered. Te following comment by Shadow
98 David Cameron on the necessity of air strikes into Syria during Parliament. BBC, “Syria Vote”. BBC
News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34980504 (Accessed 02.12.15).
99 Hilary Benn on the necessity of air strikes into Syria during Parliament. BBC, “UK’s Syria debate: 
Key quotes and clips” BBC. 3nd Dec. 2015. BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
34986757 (Accessed 03.12.15).
100 David Cameron on the necessity of air strikes into Syria during Parliament. BBC. “Syria Vote”. BBC
News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34980504 (Accessed 02.12.15).
101 Jeremy Corbyn during Parliament. BBC, “Syria Vote”. BBC News: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-34980504 (Accessed 02.12.15).
102 Consider Hillary Benn’s above claim to justice. Or statement by MP Margaret Beckett countering 
that the injustice of killing innocents is already being committed, thereby implicitly justifying 
civilian bombing by the UK (BBC, “UK’s Syria Debate”. BBC News: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34986757 (Accessed 03.12.15)).
103 MacIntyre discusses this cultural hangover of late medieval and residue Greek philosophical ethical 
attachment to virtue which is found in much Western culture: MacIntyre, After Virtue, 251-2.
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Chancellor John McDonnell on the parliamentary Syrian air-strike debate seems an 
apt place to leave this section:
I thought Hilary, his oratory was great. It reminded me of Tony Blair’s speech taking 
us into the Iraq war and I’m always anxious about the greatest oratory is going to lead 
us to the greatest mistakes as well.104
1.3.3 Assuming a Universal Telos
Te problem of assuming that everyone agrees on the same telos is similar in many 
ways to the assumption of universal virtues (1.2.3) and the idea of a-teleological 
virtues (1.3.2). In the problem of universal virtues, we had the example of assuming 
that some virtues are accepted by everyone everywhere and can therefore be 
considered objectively virtuous. In the problem of a-teleological virtues, we had the 
problem of people sharing a dedication to a virtue, but having opposing defnitions of 
that virtue, because they never situated their understanding of virtue within a greater 
picture. Tis last difculty is slightly diferent, and it concerns instances where telos 
still is not talked about, as in 1.3.2, but because one believes all people to have a 
common idea of a good end. Te diference between this and the previous problem is 
important to point out, because it stunts conversation in a diferent way, and also 
because it potentially manipulates others in an even more dangerous way. 
Where there is a diference in power and where those with a greater degree of 
power orientate conversation toward their own perceived version of telos, it becomes 
extremely difcult for others to express dissidence. In assuming a telos and not 
providing an opportunity to question or discuss its existence, the tools used to express
dissidence have been taken away. Tis could be seen as an instance of the 
philosophical problem called ‘hermeneutical injustice’. Hermeneutical injustice is a 
form of epistemic injustice and refers to instances where language insufciently 
describes the experiences of a victim, and where language instead favours those in a 
more powerful position.105 Miranda Fricker, originator of the term ‘hermeneutical 
104 John McDonnell, quoted in P. Wintour, “David Cameron warns of lengthy Syria campaign” The 
Guardian. 3rd Dec. 2015. The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/03/first-uk-
airstrikes-syria-deal-real-blow-isis-michael-fallon (Accessed 03.12.15).
105 M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 1.
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injustice’ cites Nancy Hartsock’s feminist historical materialism as the source of her 
structural critique of language. Te premise from which these observations arise106 is 
that “Te dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes—purposes 
that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our 
development and even existence”.107 Leaving aside that the term ‘hermeneutical 
injustice’ ironically implies some kind of a-teleological virtue, the problem being 
articulated suits the one we have here. Where a situation is structured to favour one 
person’s purposes, it becomes very difcult to articulate oneself within such a 
framework. Within the context of hermeneutical injustice, the ‘injustice’ aspect of the 
term has to do with an imbalance in power relationships (hermeneutical disadvantage)
and to be considered an ‘injustice’, Fricker writes, it must be morally wrong.108 Even if 
neither of these things were the case however, we still have a meta-ethical problem. So
long as we assume that the telos we are working with is shared by everyone else, then 
we are structuring a hermeneutical paradigm towards our own purposes, and we are 
not enabling anyone to call into question the basis of that assumption.
For example, Rosalind Hursthouse proposes that there is an objective telos of 
human kind, which is a kind of rationality. She describes her account as a kind of 
‘ethical naturalism’, and whilst she does not wish to go so far as to call this a priori 
scientifc objectivity, she does call it “a kind of objectivity appropriate to the subject 
mater”.109 Hursthouse gives a detailed and nuanced defence of this position, but 
eventually writes that, though it has not yet been fully discovered so we must still be 
modifying how we precisely defne this good, we can say that ‘good’ is equatable to a 
mode of going about life that is natural and preferable for our species. In this way, 
“Our characteristic way of going on”, as humans, “is the rational way”.110 Regardless of
the defence that Hursthouse gives for the way she decides on virtues, she identifes 
the telos of humans as rationality. So long as Hursthouse maintains that her belief in 
an objective human telos is a subjective one, meta-ethically speaking, then there is still
106 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 147.
107 N. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays. (Colorad:. Westview Press, 
1998), 241.
108 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 152. Fricker’s use of injustice here actually falls into a similar fallacy to
that described in (1.3.2), however the hermeneutic critique she proposes still serves our purposes 
here.
109 Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, 240.
110 Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, 222.
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a conversation to be had, where one might suggest that rationality is perhaps an 
inadequate telos. If however, Hursthouse believes that everyone must subscribe to this 
idea as the only true one, and that ethical discussion is rather about discovering a list 
of virtues that most adequately suits this end, then we have a problem.111 We have a 
systemic problem where communication is either not possible or extremely difcult 
because a hermeneutic paradigm has been set up and it is assumed that all people are 
working within it. It would be extremely difcult, say, to propose that Maximus’ 
understanding of virtue made any sense or had anything to contribute to the world, if 
one had to work within a paradigm that assumed the good mode of human existence 
was to aim towards rationality, however one might defne that word.
Not only does the appeal to a universal telos run afoul of a hermeneutical 
‘injustice’, but it also runs the risk of being metaethically imperialist. Jesse 
Couenhoven uses the term ‘metaethical imperialism’ to describe a position that seeks 
“complete solitary domination of the ethical domain”.112 Couenhoven uses this term in 
the context of fnding common ground between deontological ethics and virtue ethics,
but I think the point being made is entirely applicable here – it has to do with the need
to see one’s own understanding of ethics as the only true or real way. Couenhoven’s 
point is that one’s ethical perspective does not need to lay claim to this in order to still
be a valuable position, and that, in fact, compatibility between ethical stances is 
perfectly acceptable and even preferable.113 Tis is also reminiscent of MacIntyre’s 
point that the incompatibility of rivalling ideas may not be so extreme if we have the 
technical framework in place to illuminate the nuances of the argument.114
An example of this problem in practice would be, if one did believe that all 
ethics must commit to rationality being the telos or ultimate good mode of being for 
humans, those societies who have more traditionally been commited to rationality as 
a favourable ideal might see eye to eye with this suggestion, but those which have no 
historical commitment to this ideal will see it only as a cultural imposition. In fact, the
language of rationality as an ultimate ideal was upheld all through Victorian society in
111 It is strongly implied that Hursthouse does believe this latter proposition. See Hursthouse, Virtue 
Ethics. 240.
112 J. Couenhoven, ‘Against Metaethical Imperialism: Several Arguments for Equal Partnerships 
between the Deontic and Aretaic’ Journal of Religious Ethics 38:3  (2010): 521.
113 Couenhoven, Metaethical Imperialism, 523, 541.
114 MacIntyre, After Virtue. 246.
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Britain, the Industrial Revolution, the colonial expansion of the Empire, and justifed 
many atrocities, including laying the foundation stone for socio-political ideas like 
Social Darwinism. Tis is not to say that the ideal of rationality has not led to a great 
many advances, benefts and liberties, but it is to say that it would be foolish to 
assume that the concept would not be regarded as further imperialist cultural 
expansion and oppression elsewhere on the globe were one to suggest that it is 
objectively the goal of all human existence. In this theoretical example, we can see the 
way that the idea of a universal telos ties into the power structures of language, and, 
like any idea that tries to strong-arm itself into universality, risks becoming more a 
tool of oppression than enlightenment.
It is important to point out, that this is not an argument being made against or 
for subjectivity or objectivity in virtue ethics. It is about the impossibility of claiming 
objectivity within meta-ethics. When delineating the tools of our arguments, we can 
no more claim our idea of telos to be universal than we can our ideas of virtues. Te 
moment we do so, we are no longer in an environment of ethical debate but are rather 
preaching a creed. We cannot expect philosophical discussion to take place if we 
structure a philosophical paradigm to favour our own position and eliminate others by
taking away the hermeneutic tools of their engagement. If ones own ethical position 
really does have a claim to objectivity, then it surely can stand up to rigorous 
philosophical critique set within a common meta-ethical framework.
In identifying the above two problems of ateleological virtues and universal 
telos, I hope to have demonstrated the importance of telos as a paradigm of discussion. 
As the end and purpose towards which our habits and actions are orientated, talking 
about telos is to spell out the ethical dimension in which we are working. Meta-
ethically speaking, it clarifes how we are using words like virtue, and lays clear the 
motives and beliefs we are working towards. It removes us from the sphere of rhetoric
and deception and beter places us to engage in useful discussion with other rival 
ethics. It is therefore necessary to dedicate some time to outlining what telos one 
subscribes to, but also to acknowledge that in describing such a telos we have moved 
from talking about meta-ethics to ethics. It is my hope that there is a degree of 
objectivity and commonality in the meta-ethical structures that we agree to use, and 
that in beter defning these, we are beter placed to begin describing our respective 
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ethical positions.
1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that in order for ethical debate to be constructive we 
need a meta-ethical framework that can be agreed upon. Tis involves a defnition of 
terminology broad enough that it can be subscribed to regardless of the ethics 
involved, but with enough content for ethicists to see the commonality between the 
components of one another’s arguments. Te meta-ethical proposition of this chapter 
is that virtues need to be defned within the context of a telos. Using Alistair MacIntyre’s 
reworking of the virtue ethics system, I have suggested a version of his defnition of 
virtue be used in this framework. I hold loosely to MacIntyre’s defnition that “a virtue
is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us 
to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which efectively
prevents us from achieving any such goods”,115 and hold strongly to the addition that a
virtue is defned by and within the paradigm of a telos.
I have demonstrated some of the shortfalls of straying one way or another into 
defning virtue or telos more concisely than this, which results in flling out meta-
ethical tools with one’s ethical commitments. While I do not think it was ever the 
intention of a virtue ethicist to do such a thing, I suspect that the relatively limited 
atempts to reconcile less traditionally ‘western’ virtue ethics with such frameworks 
may have inhibited the efectiveness of virtue ethics so far. As demonstrated with the 
example of Isaac the Syrian and as will become clear later when I describe the virtue 
ethics of Maximus the Confessor, the idea of virtue is very diferent in mid-Byzantine 
theology and the thought it infuenced. It is my hope that pointing out some of the 
difculties that have arisen when considering Maximus’ understanding of virtue may 
lead to a more solid meta-ethical foundation for virtue ethics.
115 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 191.
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‘The cosmos moves towards its per ect end in the gift o  theosis’
2.0 Introduction
It has been established that in order to understand the location and purpose of virtues 
within any ethics, we need to understand the telos towards which they aim. For 
Maximus, the telos of virtues is set within a distinctly Christian paradigm. What 
virtues are for him has to do with what creatures are and what they are envisioned to 
be. We can not make sense of what virtue is (Chapter 3) or how we can go about 
ataining it (Chapter 4), unless we frst understand what telos is for Maximus. Te 
short answer to this, is that the telos of all things is theosis, or deifcation. Tis is a well
established idea in Maximus’ literature,116 however the focus of this chapter is to 
explore Maximus’ understanding of theosis specifcally within the context of cosmic, 
creaturely movement towards rest. Tis brings the notion of theosis as close as 
possible to the familiar way in which telos is used in virtue ethics as an end vision 
towards which we decide to aim.
In the frst half of this chapter I look at creaturely movement. Maximus 
understands telos to be the completion of what was started in Genesis. To understand 
what the end is for Maximus, we have to understand where it fts into a picture that 
has a beginning and a middle. Tere are two sets of triads that Maximus uses to 
describe this story. Tese are: creation – movement – rest, and being – well-being – 
eternal well being. I shall briefy discuss the role of ethics, or human choice, within 
this paradigm, but this topic in particular will become a major theme in later chapters.
Te frst and last states in these triads (i.e. our beginning and our end) are given to all 
creatures by the grace of God and are beyond human control. Te central state 
however, that of movement and well-being, is up to humans to determine. Tis is 
116 See for example N. Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 293.
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where we may choose to receive the gifs God wishes to share with us. Included 
within this is the hoped for direction of all creatures, but also the inability to reach 
this end because of the Fall. Maximus uses this patern of cosmic movement to 
describe what was meant to be, what has been lost to us, and what we may aim for 
again when we partake of Christ. Te focus of the frst half of this chapter will be on 
describing how the cosmos moves towards its perfect end. Tis will include describing 
cosmic movement in more detail, describing how such a movement has been stalled by
human sin and how this movement is restored to us in Christ, and explaining the 
relationship between humans and the rest of the created order that makes this whole 
process cosmic and not just human.
In the second half of the chapter I will look at the promised perfect end in the 
gif of theosis. Teosis for Maximus is the promised salvation of God’s children – the 
adoption and sanctifcation talked of in Scripture. Despite the eschatological 
dimension of this doctrine, it is also something present with us here and now because 
the Spirit is with us now. Maximus gives a particularly concise window into theosis in 
his spiritual commentary on the liturgy, the Mystagogia. I look at how we can use the 
Mystagogia as a microcosm of cosmic movement, and use it to help us understand 
theosis. Drawing on this, I look at the concept of unity and distinction in relation to 
nature and person in theosis. In particular I look at the way that unity with the rest of 
creation and with God never compromises the unique identity of the individual. I 
fnish this section by looking at the idea of theosis as still to come and not yet 
complete.
Te purpose of this chapter is both to contextualise and explain the telos 
towards which all things move for Maximus. Tis will allow me to go onto explain in 
Chapter 3 what virtue is in light of this, and what we as humans in this state of 
movement need to do in order to atain virtues and their telos – God Himself.
2.1 The Cosmic Traeectory of Creatures
2.1.1 Microcosm and Mediator
In order to understand what telos is for Maximus, we must look at who it is for.  In 
Maximus’ understanding, telos is never purely about humans. Tis is because 
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humanity does not exist in isolation, but as a part of creation, all of which has been 
made by God. Humanity is not extracted from this cosmos, but, by merit of the gifs 
given to its nature, is the centrepiece and mediator of all creation. Tis means that the 
metaphysics of Maximus’ ethics is cosmic in scope. Te purpose of humanity is not 
isolated from the purpose of the rest of creation, and in fact, the purpose of humanity 
is to bring the rest of creation into fulflment of purpose – into perfection – telos. In 
order to understand what the telos of human ethical conduct is for Maximus, it is frst 
necessary to explain the relationship between human nature and the rest of the 
cosmos. 
In his Ambiguum 41, Maximus describes what he believes human nature to be. 
Drawing on Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Dionysios the Areopagite, 
Maximus describes the purpose of humanity through the functions restored in Christ’s
incarnation, crucifxion and resurrection. In this ambiguum, Maximus makes frequent 
use of Paul’s leters and Luke. Te Biblical passages he dwells on bring the cosmic to 
the microscopic, the impossibility of God to humanity, and perfection to creation.117 
Maximus identifes the human as the crucible in which divinity is brought to the rest 
of creation. He says that humanity is the “laboratory in which everything is 
concentrated and in itself naturally mediates between the extremities of each 
division”.118 Adam and Eve’s failure to choose God on behalf of creation causes human 
nature to fall. We can no longer move toward God unless we choose to live in renewed
human nature that has been reinstituted by Christ. It is because humans are 
mediators, that our failure is the fall of all creation, and Christ’s renewal is the 
renewal of all creation. Creation moves toward God, who is its end, its rest that is 
ever-moving. We will return to this, but frst we must note that it is through human 
mediation that the rest of creation can anticipate its telos:
For humanity clearly has the power of naturally uniting at the mean point of each 
division since it is related to the extremities of each division in its own parts. Trough 
that capacity it can come to be the way of fulflment of what is divided and be openly 
instituted in itself as the great mystery of the divine purpose. It proceeds 
harmoniously to each of the extremities in the things that are, from what is close at 
117 Eph. 1:10, Col. 1:16, Gal. 3:28, Luke 23:43, Heb. 9:24, Col. 1:20.
118 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305AB. [Louth, Maximus, 157].
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hand to what is remote, from what is worse to what is beter, lifing up to God and 
fully accomplishing union. For this reason the human person was introduced last 
among beings, as a kind of natural bond mediating between the universal poles 
through their proper parts, and leading into unity in itself those things that are 
naturally set apart from one another by a great interval.119
Te human person shares aspects of its nature with many extremities in creation, such
as the sensibility of non-rational creatures and the rationality of the immaterial 
angels.120 Maximus believes that the rationality humans have, that the choices we 
make, and that the love we are capable of, is ours as mediators. Our rationality, 
choices and love, become the rationality, choice and love of the cosmos. We are like 
litle worlds – microcosms – in whose choices the universe is bound up121. We are the 
voice of the silent world, the priests in the cosmic liturgy. Our choices have the 
potential to unite the cosmos with God. As Louth points out in his article on Maximus
and the environment however,122 when humans do not choose love, and instead choose
the nothingness of sin, they shater the relationships in the cosmos. Tis is so of the 
Fall, and also in every choice humans make subsequently. As Maximus writes:
Since then the human person is not moved naturally, as it was fashioned to do, around 
the unmoved, that is its own beginning (I mean God), but contrary to nature is 
voluntarily moved in ignorance around those things that are beneath it, to which it has
been divinely subjected, and since it has abused the natural power of uniting what is 
divided, that was given to it at its generation, so as to separate what is uniteds123
In the phrase “but contrary to nature is voluntarily moved in ignorance” (παρὰ φύσιν 
ἑκὼν ἀνοήτως κεκίνηται), Maximus emphasises the impact of human sin which is 
both against our nature (παρὰ φύσιν) and undertaken voluntarily (ἑκὼν) by humans. 
Tis causes us to fall into ignorance (ἀνοήτως) and to break apart (διαίρεσιν) those 
things which it was intended we unite (ἡνωμένων). Likewise ‘to which it has been 
119 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305BC, [Louth, Maximus, 157].
120 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305D-1308A.
121 See Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1312A-B [Louth,  Maximus, 160].
122 Louth, Man and Cosmos, 68.
123 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308C [Louth, Maximus, 158].
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divinely subjected’ recalls the curse of creation from Gen. 3 17-19 in which humans 
were subjected to the rest of creation and vice versa, reminding us that relation has 
also been disrupted between all the rest of creation and God. All of creation continues 
to groan with waiting in Rom.8:22, because although Christ restores human nature 
and all the cosmos, a human choice still exists. As already hinted at by Maximus’ 
choice of language, human sin and obliteration of mediation requires the renewal of 
human nature in Christ. Maximus twice in the above section uses language found in 
the Chalcedonian Formula: separate (διῃρημένων /διαίρεσιν) and union (ἕνωσιν/ 
ἡνωμένων). In the passage directly following this he uses the same language to 
describe the incarnation of Christ as one person in two natures:
Indeed being in himself the universal union (ἑνώσεως) of all, he has started with our 
division (διαιρέσεως) and become the perfect human being, having from us, on our 
account, and in accordance with our nature, everything that we are and lacking 
nothing, apart from sins124
I do not think it is an accident that Maximus echoes the Chalcedonian Formula here 
given the subject mater. Maximus’ understanding of human nature as mediator makes
sense of why Christ becomes a human. Christ comes as a human because it is humans 
who, as mediators between the extremes of the cosmos, have torn it apart with their 
choice to fall back into nothing. Christ restores this mediating ability that was lost 
when human nature chose nothingness,125 and now ofers a renewed human nature 
that may again choose the path it was frst invited to – that of love:
s therefore ‘natures have been instituted afresh’, and in a paradoxical way beyond 
nature that which is completely unmoved by nature is moved immovably around that 
which by nature is moved, and God becomes a human being, in order to save lost 
humanity. Trough himself he has, in accordance with nature, united the fragments of 
the universal nature of the all, manifesting the universal logoi that have come forth for 
124 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308D-1309A [Louth, Maximus, 159].
125 The terms I use here are found in Athanasius of Alexandria, ‘De Incarnatione Verbi Dei’ in SCh. 199
C. Kannengiesser, (ed.) (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1973) §4, though a similar understanding of sin 
being a choice of separation and void from God is found in Maximus, Ad Thal. 42 CCSG7 289 
[Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 122]. See also section 3.2.2 below.
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the particulars, by which the union of the divided naturally comes about, and thus he 
fulfls the great purpose of God the Father, to recapitulate everything both in heaven 
and earth in himself (Eph. 1:10), in whom everything has been created (Col. 1:16).126
Te recapitulation of heaven and earth within Himself is a literal restoration and 
reinstitution of the natural power that was lost to humanity. Likeness with God is 
returned to humanity by its reforged nature within the person of Christ. In choosing 
to partake in this renewed nature, it becomes possible again that humans may bring 
all creation to rest in God. I shall come on to this participation and choice in later 
chapters, but for now it is enough to note that Christ’s restoration enables humans to 
partake in a purpose for which we were always created. In Christ we can become 
mediators that allow the cosmos to move toward theosis. 
2.1.2 Te Triad of Cosmic Movement
So humans enable movement. When we follow in human nature reinstituted by 
Christ, we enable the cosmos to move towards theosis. Human ethical choices afect 
the capacity of the created order to move toward a complex but perfect rest in God. In 
this section, I will explain briefy what Maximus believes cosmic movement to be.
Maximus uses a triad to explain three stages of a creature’s existence. Tese 
stages are that of creation; life as we know and choose to live it; and life in God which 
is the promise to come. Maximus chooses to characterise these stages using language 
familiar to him from the works of Origin. In 1955, Sherwood noted that Maximus’ 
triad of cosmic movement is a direct inversion of and challenge to Origen’s triad of 
cosmic movement. Sherwood wrote that Origen’s formula of rest – movement – 
creation (stasis – kinesis – genesis), where we exist in perfection in God, fall and move 
towards becoming again what we were, is reversed in Maximus whilst deliberately 
retaining Origenist language to highlight the reversal.127 Maximus’ formula of creation
– movement – rest (genesis – kinesis – stasis) rejects the pre-existence of creation as 
rest in perfection in God and instead shows that creation is brought into being when 
the logoi become instantiated in material creation, making mater an essential part of 
creation. As Louth points out, in Maximus’ cosmology it is the incarnate Word that is 
126 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308D [Louth, Maximus, 158-9].
127 Sherwood, ‘The Earlier Ambigua’, 92-3.
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central rather than Origen’s metaphysical transcendence of the soul and rejection of 
mater.128 Maximus explains his position on this in Ambiguum 15:
Tus I think that whoever teaches the preexistence of souls, and promulgates the 
existence of a wholly motionless ‘unity’ (ἑνάδα) of rational beings, is rightly deserving
of condemnation, for afer the manner of the Greeks he has mixed together the 
immiscible, and asserts that the origin (γενέσει) of rational beings is simultaneous in 
existence with their rest (στάσιν). For it is irreconcilable with true thinking that origin
should be conceived of as anterior to rest, since rest by nature is devoid of motion 
(ἀκινήτου)129 s Simply put, to speak concisely, rest (στάσις) is a relative concept, 
which is not relative to origin (γένεσιν) but to motion (κίνησιν)...130
Maximus’ point is that we cannot, philosophically speaking, call something that is 
originating ‘at rest’ because rest only makes sense in the context of movement. 
Teologically, the point he is making is that ‘movement’ is necessary to who we are, 
and not a failing of our nature. We are created with the capacity to move toward rest, 
which makes the freedom of human choice essential to our perfection as opposed to 
suggesting that we may never truly gain the perfection that existed in the moment of 
our inception. Tis later position that Maximus is combating, implicitly harks back to 
the perfection of the soul prior to its being marred by mater. Maximus condemns this 
in the frst line of the above quotation, and it is this that Sherwood identifed as a 
polemic against Origen.
Maximus’ triad of movement is set in a wider cosmic picture in Ambiguum 7, 
where he emphasises more the theological purpose of beings contained within the 
triad:
Te movement that is tending toward its proper end is called a natural power, or 
passion, or movement passing from one thing to another and having impassibility as 
its end. It is also called an irrepressible activity that has its end in perfect fulflment. 
128 Louth, Maximus, 66.
129 Although Maximus clarifies elsewhere that since creatures rest in a God who is never fully 
knowable, even this perfect rest is one in which creatures continue to grow. I come on to this later.
130 Maximus, Amb. 15 PG91 1220C-D [N. Constas, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The 
Ambigua. (London: Harvard University Press, 2014), 373-4].
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But nothing that comes into being is its own end, since it is not self-caused.131
Maximus explains that motion is always directed to an end, and that the end of 
creatures is always external to themselves. Tis is because creatures are “not self-
caused”. What Maximus is about to introduce here is that everything that has and ever
will come into being, is directed naturally toward rest in God. According to Wilken in 
his notes to Ambiguum 7, Maximus’ defnition of end (τέλος) as “the end is that for the
sake of which all things exist, it, however, is for the sake of nothing”132 is Aristotelian 
in its origins.133 In order to make his point about the end of all things being in God 
however, and the perfection that is to come, Maximus draws from the Old and New 
Testaments:
Te saints Moses and David and Paul as well as Christ the Lord bear witness to the 
true understanding of these things. Speaking of the frst parents, Moses wrote. You 
shall not eat of the tree of life (Gen. 2:9, 17). And elsewhere he said: For you have not as 
yet come to the rest and the inheritance which the Lord your God gives you (Deut. 12:9). 
And David: Crying out I will be satisfed when your glory appears (Ps. 16:15). And: My 
soul thirsts for the strong and living God (Ps. 42:2). And St Paul writes: Tat if possible 
I may atain the resurrection from the dead. Not that I have already obtained this or am 
already perfect, but I press on to make it my own, because Christ Jesus has made me his 
own (Phil. 3:11). And to the Hebrews he writes: For whoever enters into God’s rest also 
ceases from his labours as God did from his (Heb. 4:10). And again in the same epistle he
afrms that no one received what was promised (Heb 11:39). Also Christ says: Come to 
me all you who labour and are heavy laden and I will give you rest (Mat 11:28).134
Maximus uses these Biblical passages to equate rest with that eschatological promise 
of perfection in God. Moving towards rest in God is a Scriptural idea, and, like the day
of rest at the end of creation, is the completion and culmination of all movement. 
Maximus also begins here to express what fnal rest is. We see it characterised as 
131 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1072B-C [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 48].
132 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1072C [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 48].
133 Wilken notes though that this is not a direct quotation of Aristotle. He also notes that Sherwood 
believes “Maximus may be quoting an aphorism of Evagrius preserved in Syriac”. (Sherwood, 
Earlier Ambigua, 100). Wilken himself believes that Maximus is aware that he is quoting Aristotle, 
since this passage is preceded by the phrase “Hence the definition is correct even though it was 
spoken by an outsider:”  (Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 48-9, note 10).
134 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1072D-1073A [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 49-50].
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inheritance in Deuteronomy, as the glory of God and the living God in the Psalms, as 
resurrection and rest from all labour in Paul’s leters, and as Christ Himself in 
Mathew. Tis collection of promises goes a long way to introduce what Maximus 
believes theosis to be. Of particular interest, I think, are the two Psalm quotations 
included, which talk both of an anticipation of the glory of God, and of the living God 
Himself. Maximus’ understanding of participation and theosis is encapsulated in both 
the distinctness and unity of this anticipation of God’s glory and of God Himself.135
Maximus concludes this long list of Scriptural references with the following 
statement:
Terefore no creature has ever ceased using the inherent power that directs it towards 
its end, nor has it ceased the natural activity that impels it towards its end, nor 
harvested what it has anticipated. For I am referring of course to being impassible and 
unmoved. For it belongs to God alone to be the end and the completion and the 
impassible. God is unmoved and complete and impassible. It belongs to creatures to be 
moved toward that end which is without beginning, and to come to rest in the perfect 
end that is without end, and to experience that which is without defnition, but not to 
be such or to become such in essence.136
Te movement of everything that has come into being is a movement that is 
completed in God. What this means precisely will be the topic of section 2.2, but as is 
already hinted in the last line of this passage, it means that creatures never become 
God by nature. In other words they never stop being themselves, and being creatures.
2.1.3 Te Triad of Well-being
In this section I explain the ethical dimension of Maximus’ triad of cosmic movement. 
Tis is caught up in the role of the human as mediator since it concerns the way that 
human choices impact the movement of all other things.
In Ambiguum 7, Maximus refers to a triad of well-being, where the movement 
of human being is dependent on the choices we make. Tese three stages map onto the
stages of cosmic movement. In the triad of well-being, there is being – well-being – 
135 I return to this in 2.2.
136 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1073B [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 50].
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eternal well-being.137 We are created with being, we choose to move toward well-being,
and we are given rest in eternal well-being:
Everything that comes into existence is subject to movement, since it is not self-moved
or self-powered. If then rational beings come into being, surely they are also moved, 
since they move from a natural beginning in ‘being’ (τὸ εἶναι) toward a voluntary end 
in ‘well-being’ (τὸ εὖ εἶναι). For the end of the movement of those who are moved is 
‘eternal well-being’ (τὸ ἀεὶ εὖ εἶναι) itself, just as its beginning is being itself which is 
God who is the giver of being as well as of well-being. For God is the beginning and 
the end. From him come both our moving in whatever way from a beginning and our 
moving in a certain way toward him as an end.138
Tis means that the three stages map like so onto the triad of cosmic movement:
In the above diagram I have also included a reference to the logoi in Ambiguum 7 and 
a reference to the Nazianzan phrase ‘slipped down from above’. Te logoi and their 
role in cosmic movement will be introduced more fully in Chapter 3, but they are 
included here to demonstrate that the stages of being – well-being – eternal well-being 
are the intended, natural movement of creatures that God desires for them.139 Te 
phrase ‘slipped down from above’ is the term Maximus is clarifying in Ambiguum 7 
and refers to human choice to turn away from God. In the language of Ambiguum 41, 
this is the human choice to create divisions in the cosmos rather than loving and 
137 Russell identifies a number of other triads in Maximian terminology that also illustrate the 
movement of creatures. He for example also talks of ‘the moral life, the intellectual life, and the 
divine life’ and ‘faith, hope, and love’. (Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 294).
138 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1073C [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 50-1].
139 This will be opposed later on to our tropos of movement, which is the actual way in which we 
decide to move. To be in harmony with God’s will is to bring our tropos in line with our logos, and 
so to realise God’s plan for us.
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uniting creatures. Te doted arrow represents the choice that is only open to humans 
because they may choose to participate in renewed human nature. Fallen human 
nature has ‘slipped down from above’ and has no access to well-being and eternal well-
being except through Christ. Tis will be discussed in more detail later, but it is worth 
noting that for this reason in the above quotation, Maximus calls ‘well-being’ both a 
‘voluntary end’ and that which is given by God. Far from being a contradiction, this 
concerns the reciprocal way in which well-being is established within humans. I 
explain this in Chapter 3 when looking at the formation of virtue within humans. For 
now however, the point of articulating this additional triad found in Ambiguum 7 is to 
introduce the central role of human choice.
Human choice and acceptance is necessary in order for being to be transformed
into well-being, and thereafer eternal well-being may be gifed. All things are created 
and have God-given movement, but if the human choice to love does not occur, 
creation cannot be gathered to a state of well-being, and consequently cannot fnd its 
rest in God. When humans ‘slip down from above’, a chasm forms between Creator 
and creation. Final rest in God is the telos that all creation hopes for. It is the perfect 
completion intended for creation, but the process of geting there is dependent on 
human complicity. In the next section I will look more closely at what Maximus 
understood theosis as the telos of creation to be. Te following passage from 
Ambiguum 15 provides us with a good bridging point between this and the next 
section. In it Maximus describes the end as the moment
... when all things will be free from all change and alteration, when the endless, 
multiform movement of beings around particular objects will come to an end in the 
infnity that is around God, in which all things that are in motion will come to rest. For
infnity is around God, but is not God Himself, for He incomparably transcends even 
this.140
Here we can see the way that cosmic movement ends in God but does not compromise
the integrity of creatureliness. Te questions this passage raises, such as what it means
to come to rest in infnity around God and how this relates to Maximus’ earlier 
140 Maximus,  Amb. 15 PG91 1220C [Constas, Difficulties, 373].
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passages where we come to rest in God, and how we can be with God if he transcends 
even the rest that we come to – these questions relate to Maximus’ doctrine of theosis 
and what is going on within the process of deifcation. It is to these difculties that I 
turn next.
2.2 The Telos of All Things
In the later half of this chapter, I look specifcally at what the fnal promise, or telos of
the cosmos is within Maximus’ thought. I have explained where this fts in relation to 
the rest of creaturely movement, and have also begun to explore what precisely this is.
Te telos of all things is theosis through the mediating power of the human.
Prior to Maximus, the doctrine of theosis has a rich theological history. Jules 
Gross wrote in the introduction to his book Te Divinization of the Christian According
to the Greek Fathers: “Is not all our theology of sanctifying grace, nearly to the word, a 
doctrine of deifcation?”.141 Gross’s book traces deifcation as a concept through 
Hellenic philosophy and Scriptural interpretation and then through the Greek 
theologians of the early centuries. His book concludes by looking at Dionysios the 
Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus. Gross notes the lasting 
infuence of Dionysios on Maximus’ understanding of deifcation, writing that “[...] 
despite numerous diferences of detail, Dionysios and Maximus agree in seeing 
deifcation through the mystical union with God as the goal of creation and of the 
incarnation, as well as of the moral activity of human kind.”142 Te infuence of 
Dionysios on Maximus’ work is clear, but the implication that Dionysios holds pride 
of place is a litle misleading.143 Berthold places more weight on Scripture as the 
primary source for Maximus’ understanding of deifcation. He notes that though 
deifcation is to be found everywhere in Christian theology, for Maximus ultimately 
141 J. Gross, The Divinization of the Christian According to the Greek Fathers. P.A. Onica (trans.), 
(California: A&C Press, 2002 (first published 1938)), 2; Sherwood also makes this point, noting that
for Maximus deification and salvation are one and the same, P. Sherwood, St Maximus the 
Confessor: The Ascetic Life & The Four Centuries on Charity (New York: Paulist Press, 1955), 71-
2.
142 Gross, Divinization, 254.
143 Gross does not exclude other sources and neither does he exclude the Bible, but the focus of his 
chapter is on the strong relation between Dionysios and Maximus and the inherited ideas of theosis.
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deifcation is the promise of New Testament.144 Maximus is clearly indebted to 
Dionysios, Evagrios, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzus and many more theological
forerunners in developing the doctrine of theosis, but it is especially important to take 
note of Berthold’s point: theosis for Maximus is a Scriptural phenomenon that has to 
do with the restoration of human nature through Christ and in the Holy Spirit.145
Another important overview of Maximus’ doctrine of deifcation was 
undertaken by Norman Russell. He provided a comprehensive survey of deifcation in 
the Greek Patristic tradition, he cites Maximus’ principle guide on the topic of 
deifcation to be Gregory of Nazianzus.146 He also provides a list of all the Greek terms 
that Maximus uses to convey this doctrine,147 but notes that “None of these terms 
seems to difer signifcantly from any other in meaning. Tey all refer to the same 
process by which human beings are penetrated and transformed by the divine”.148 
Russell’s choice to structure an inquiry into Maximus and theosis by going through 
each of his works allows a comprehensive overview covering all instances of the term 
in Maximus’ thought, although this approach is not necessarily the best one for trying
to describe Maximus’ overall cosmic paradigm where theosis is the telos of movement. 
Russell also loses out on opportunities to elucidate areas of Maximus’ thought by 
cross-referencing with his other works. For example, Russell gives an excellent 
summary of the process of deifcation in Maximus’ On the Lord’s Prayer, going 
through Maximus’ points as they appear in the text. Where “the ffh mystery” on “the
unifcation of human nature”149 arises however the text exhibits very litle of the 
complexity and centrality that this theme takes on in Ambiguum 41. While Russell 
does deal with the Ambiguum later on in his chapter, there is no synthesis of this with 
earlier mentions from On the Lord’s Prayer. Tis ends up implying a vast and 
haphazard shape to Maximus’ work – an unfair suggestion given that at least some of 
Maximus’ ideas overlap enough to give us a cosmic structure and movement to his 
paradigm of thought. In my exposition I atempt to order Maximus’ thought in a way 
144 Berthold, Maximus, 10. Berthold notes in particular 1 Jn 3:2; 2 Pt 1:4.
145 As we have seen in 2.1.2 and will see further especially in 2.2.3.
146 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 263.
147 θεόω, θέωσις, ἐκθέωσις, ἐκθεωτικός, θεοποιέω, θεοποιός, θεοποιητικός, ἀποθεόω, συνθεόω, 
θεωτικός. Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 264.
148 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 264.
149 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 268.
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that demonstrates the overall shape of this cosmic movement, and situates theosis as 
the complex end of this movement. Te unifcation of human nature, as we will see, is 
key to understanding the purpose of the human in relation to the whole of creation.
Te end movement of the cosmos, made possible in restored human nature 
which Christ has renewed within himself, is the sanctifcation of all creation. In the 
deifcation of the microcosm, the human who contains the extremes of the universe, 
all of creation is united to God. But what is deifcation, and if it is at the end of all 
movement, how can we have any notion of what it is now? Maximus’ understanding 
of the liturgy mirrors his understanding of cosmic movement. His exploration of 
sanctifcation during the Eucharist gives us an insight into the theosis of the universe. 
In 2.2.1 I look at what we can learn about theosis from Maximus’ Mystagogia 
(commentary on the mystery of the liturgy). In 2.2.2. I look at what Maximus means to
be united to God, and the importance of unity through grace and personal distinction. 
In section 2.2.3 I look at theosis as an eschatological idea, and its being a promise as 
yet unfulflled, and as something both immanent and present.
Troughout this section there are paradoxes pertaining to the relationship of 
the created and the divine. How can we be united to God and one another and yet 
distinct, how can theosis be within this lifetime and yet also at the end of it, how can 
God be the end of all things and yet with all things. Tese paradoxes, as I will explain 
as they arise, are brought together within the mystery of Christ’s person. Te mystery 
of the relationship between the created and the uncreated is brought into harmony 
within Christ’s one person and two natures. Te communion of the created and 
uncreated is within Christ and may be participated in by all of creation. It is worth 
bearing in mind this Christological underpinning as we explore Maximus’ 
understanding of theosis.
2.2.1 Te Liturgy as Microcosm
According to Maximus, unity with God is not just something confned to an 
eschatological epoch afer the end of human history. It is something that is always in 
process as we strive in this life for closeness with God.150 Tere are instances in life 
where we can even have a foretaste of the theosis that is to come. Tis is especially so 
150 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.7.
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of the divine liturgy for Maximus. We can understand what may be possible in fnal 
rest by treating the liturgy as a window into that which is to come. Maximus writes 
that this is possible “...because of the grace of the Holy Spirit which is always invisibly
present, but in a special way at the time of the holy synaxis. Tis grace transforms and
changes each person who is found there and in fact leads him to what is revealed 
through the mysteries which are celebrateds”151 We can read Maximus’ Mystagogia as 
a microcosm of the sanctifcation of all creation, as his commentary on the liturgy 
mirrors the process of creaturely movement leading to deifcation. Russell even goes 
so far as to suggest that it is here in the Mystagogia that we can truly see Maximus 
himself overawed and perhaps even flled with the grace of theosis.152 In the 
Mystagogia, Maximus emphasises that the Holy Spirit transforms each person by 
grace in proportion to what is more divine within them,153 but also notes that even 
those young in their faith are mysteriously transfgured by grace and grow in 
understanding.154 Te process of transfguration is one that a person comes to of their 
own volition, must be receptive to, and indeed rewards the faith and love of each 
person, but ultimately is mysterious, incomprehensible and a place beyond human 
control. Te transformation process itself is by the Holy Spirit and through grace.155
In the Mystagogia, Maximus provides an analysis of the physical actions that 
occur during the liturgy and their spiritual signifcance. Afer this though, he provides
an account of the movement of the soul and its elevation in the course of the liturgy. 
One particularly potent image of theosis that Maximus gives us is from Dionysios, and 
is that of the human becoming a mirror:
... in having God through prayer as its mystical and only Father by grace, the soul will 
center on the oneness of his hidden being by a distraction from all things, and it will 
experience or rather know divine things all the more as it does not want to be its own 
nor be able to be recognised from or by itself or anyone else’s but only all of God’s 
who takes it up becomingly and ftingly as only he can, penetrating it completely 
without passion and deifying all of it and transforming it unchangeably to himself. 
151 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.24 [Berthold, Maximus, 206].
152 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 295.
153 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.24.
154 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.24.
155 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.21.
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Tus, as says the very holy Dionysios the Areopagite, it becomes the image and 
appearance ‘of the invisible light, an accurate mirror, very transparent, without faw, 
undefled, unstained, receiving in itself, if we are allowed to say this, the splendour of 
the divine model and purely illuminating in himself, as far as possible, the goodness of 
the silence of the inner recesses.’156
Te deifed person is one who is so illuminated and flled with God’s presence, that 
they become a vessel that refects back the glory of God. Tis image of God 
illuminated within us, is us become like God, by adoption by the Holy Spirit.157 
Importantly, this adoption and likeness comes from beyond our nature and is efected 
by God.158 As implied above when Maximus and Dionysios talk of the human mirror 
receiving the image of God within themselves, there is a place for human activity in 
this reciprocal relationship, but this will be discussed in the following chapters. 
Another image of this mirror-like reciprocity can be found in Ambiguum 10,  where 
Maximus writes:
For they say that God and man are paradigms of one another, that as much as God is 
humanised to man through love for mankind, so much has man been able to be deifed 
to God through love, and that as much as man is caught up by God to what is known 
in his mind, so much does man manifest God, who is invisible by nature, through 
virtues.159
Te likeness of one has been deifed through love to the other. Te place of virtues 
mentioned here is one that will become important in Chapter 3, but we can see also 
here the central importance of love in this outpouring of grace. In a number of other 
places, we see Maximus calling this deifcation through love a self-emptying of the 
Son. For example in On the Lords Prayer Maximus writes
When we pray, let our aim be this mystery of deifcation (θεώσεως), which shows us 
what we were once like and what the self-emptying (κένωσις) of the only-begoten 
156 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.23 [Berthold, Maximus, 206].
157 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.24.
158 Maximus, Opusc. 1 PG91 33A-36A.
159 Maximus Ambiguum 10 PG91 1113B-C [Louth, Maximus, 101].
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Son through the fesh has now made uss160
and
Perhaps the counsel of God the Father to which David here refers is the unfathomable 
self-emptying (κένωσιν) of the only-begoten Son which He brought about for the 
deifcation (ἐπὶ θεώσει) of our nature, and by which He has set a limit to the ages.161
Like the reciprocal mirror from earlier, this self-emptying of the son is something that 
is mimicked by those who wish to receive deifcation through this self-emptying love: 
“Moreover, by emptying (κενώσει) themselves of the passions they lay hold of the 
divine to the same degree as that to which, deliberately emptying (κενώσας) Himself 
of His own sublime glory, the Logos of God truly became man”.162 Tis self-emptying 
love is essential to what is going on in the reciprocal relationship between God and 
humans and is essential to what theosis is. In the next chapter, I look at love in relation
to the rest of the virtues, and it will become especially important that love exists in 
this mutual self-emptying by both the giver and receiver, and that in this moment is 
the telos of all creation.
We have seen that the microcosm of the liturgy enables sanctifcation through 
the Holy Spirit. Tis is not just a model representing what is to come however. As 
Sherwood notes, the deifcation of the person, for Maximus, does not occur in 
isolation but in the community of the Church and in the sacraments.163 Maximus’ 
Mystagogia is flled with microcosmic imagery that relates what happens at a small 
level to what happens at a massive level. Just like Christ’s incarnation where the 
universe was sanctifed within the person of Christ, who brought together the divine 
and the human inside Himself, so do we fnd “...God's holy Church as a fgure and 
image of the entire world composed of visible and invisible essences because like it, it 
contains both unity and diversity”164 and that the “holy Church is like a man because 
160 Maximus Or. Dom. PG90 905D-908A [Palmer, Sherrard & Ware, The Philokalia Volume Two. G. 
Palmer, P. Sherrard, & K. Ware, (eds.) (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1981), 304].
161 Maximus, Or. Dom. PG90 873C-D [Palmer, Sherrard & Ware, Philokalia, 286].
162 Maximus, Or. Dom. PG90 877A [Palmer, Sherrard & Ware, Philokalia, 287].
163 Sherwood, Maximus, 71.
164 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.2 [Berthold, Maximus, 188].
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for the soul it has the sanctuary, for mind it has the divine altar, and for body it has 
the nave”165 and “that the whole world, made up of visible and invisible things, is man 
and conversely that man made up of body and soul is a world”.166 Everywhere, what 
relates to the small relates to the large, and vice versa. And everywhere we have also 
these distinctions that are in harmony and unity, following but also epitomised in 
Christ. We shall leave how one can achieve theosis to Chapter 4, but it is important 
that we not forget that the liturgy is not just an example of what theosis might look 
like, but a present reality here among us. It is both the promise of what is to come and 
a continuous reality here amongst us, simultaneously present and yet to come, by 
merit of the Holy Spirit.
Within the liturgy, Maximus talks in particular about the Divine Eucharist as 
being a moment where theosis is present on Earth:
By holy communion of the spotless and life-giving mysteries we are given fellowship 
and identity with him by participation in likeness, by which man is deemed worthy 
from man to become God. For we believe that in this present life we already have a 
share in these gifs of the Holy Spirit through love that is in faith, and in the future age
afer we have kept the commandments to the best of our ability we believe that we 
shall have a share in them in very truth in their concrete reality according to the 
steadfast hope of our faith and the solid unchangeable promise to which God has 
commited himself.167
Seamlessly moving between discussion of the Eucharist and eschatological theosis, 
Maximus depicts the Eucharist as fellowship (κοινωνία), identity (ταὐτότης) and 
participation (μετέχω) in likeness (ὁμοιότης), that as yet does not have the 
eschatological character which we will come to know according to ‘very truth in their 
concrete reality’ (κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀνυποστάτως).168 It is theosis in the present that 
anticipates theosis to come. When Maximus tells us that the whole world is the 
Church,169 he describes the material world as the nave, and the spiritual realm as the 
165 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.4 [Berthold, Maximus, 189-90].
166 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.7 [Berthold, Maximus, 196].
167 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.24, [Berthold, Maximus, 207].
168 “κατὰ μέθεξιν ἐνδεχομένην δι’ ὁμοιότητος κοινωνίαν τε καὶ ταὐτότητα, δι’ ἧς γενέσθαι θεὸς” 
(Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.24).
169 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.2.
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sanctuary and that they are one despite these distinctions. As the liturgy progresses, 
the nave is sanctifed by merit of being one with the sanctuary in which holy 
communion takes place.170 Te Church is also every person, with their physical body 
as the nave, the soul as the sanctuary, and the mind as the altar.171 As well as telling us 
about the united yet distinct spiritual and material elements of all the cosmos, 
Maximus also seems to be telling us something about where the Divine Liturgy takes 
place. Te Eucharist of the Church is cosmic in scope, happening at once here and 
everywhere, now and to come, uniting nave and sanctuary, mind and body, earth and 
heaven. 
Maximus immediately moves from talking about the divine mysteries of the 
Eucharist, to talking about the way that the spiritual world can be seen through those 
ascetics who practice natural contemplation172:
For the whole spiritual world seems mystically imprinted on the whole sensible world 
in symbolic forms, for those who are capable of seeing this, and conversely the whole 
sensible world is spiritually explained in the mind in the principles which it 
contains.173
In doing so he extends the cosmic sanctifcation happening in the Eucharist to the goal
of ascetic striving. Tus, through striving we can move towards well-being and 
participate in this moment when we receive grace and are gifed a glimpse of eternal 
well-being:
Conversely, man is a mystical church, because through the nave which is his body he 
brightens by virtue the ascetic force of the soul by the observance of the 
commandments in moral wisdom. Trough the sanctuary of his soul he conveys to 
God in natural contemplation through reason the principles of sense purely in spirit 
cut of from mater. Finally through the altar of the mind he summons the silence 
abounding in song in the innermost recesses of the unseen and unknown uterance of 
divinity by another silence, rich in speech and tone. And as far as man is capable, he 
170 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.3.
171 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.4.
172 Natural Contemplation and its relation to the ascetic life and the logoi is discussed in Chapter 4.1.3.
173 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.2, [Berthold, Maximus, 189].
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dwells familiarly within mystical theology and becomes such as is fting for one made
worthy of his indwelling and he is marked with his dazzling splendour.174
Maximus’ series of parallels between the Church, the world, the human, Scripture and 
so on, seem to be describing what we are to look forward to and where it is to be 
found. Maximus vividly portrays the impossibility and yet atainability of 
participation through the Eucharist in a serious of paradoxical images – the silence 
abounding in song; the unseen and unknown that are rich in speech and tone. Te 
cosmic trajectory of the world looks like the Divine Liturgy, in which heaven and 
earth are brought together and sanctifed at the alter, consummating all and bringing 
it to oneness with God. Von Balthasar describes this similarly, writing that the liturgy 
is more than a symbol for Maximus; it is “an efective transformation of the world into
transfgured, divinised existence”.175 Tis allows Von Balthalsar to famously refer to 
Maximus’ work as “cosmic liturgy”: “a way of drawing the entire world into the 
hypostatic union, because both world and liturgy share a christological foundation”.176 
Tis position is developed further by Loudovikos, who argues in Eucharistic Ontology, 
“For this passage [Myst. Ch.1] is, inter alia, a small but conspicuous and clear reminder
of the fact that the divine economy is summed up in the Divine Eucharist”.177 
Loudovikos goes on to explain that for this reason we can see that Maximus grounds 
the ontology of creatures in the Eucharist, which is itself grounded in the providence 
of God and his economy in Christ. Tis, he says, is a tradition inherited from the early 
Church and exegetical passages like that of John 6:51-58.178 Loudovikos writes that
Tis passage is tacitly assumed by the Confessor in those texts of his eucharistic 
theology which present Christ as ‘the living bread which came down from heaven’ 
(John 6:51) and essentially identify the Eucharist with the totality of the [sic.] God’s 
given activity in history, the working out of the divine economy.179
174 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.4, [Berthold, Maximus, 190].
175 Von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 322.
176 Von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 322.
177 N. Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor’s Eschatological Ontology of 
Being as Dialogical Reciprocity. E. Theokritoff (trans.) (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 
2010), 25.
178 As seen in passages like Maximus, Or. Dom. PG 90: 905CD.
179 Loudovikos, Eucharistic Ontology, 26.
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In his analysis of Maximus’ eucharistic theology, Loudovikos concludes that “there is a
very clear link between being and movement and the (communal) event of living, and 
the fnal fulflment of all of these in our eucharistic incorporation into Christs”.180 Te 
ascetic struggle of human life that seeks to move toward God is mirrored in the 
progress of the Divine Liturgy. He traces this not only in the providential language of 
the Mystagogia, but also in the eucharistic language of ascetic and eschatological 
themes in Maximus.181 For example, in On the Lord’s Prayer, we read:
I think, in fact ‘this day’ means in present history. Tus to understand this passage of 
the prayer in its clearest meaning we should say, ‘Our bread’, which you prepared in 
the beginning for the immortality of nature, ‘give us this day’, to us who belong to the 
mortal condition of the present life, so that nourishment by the bread of life and 
knowledge triumph over the death of sin. Te transgression of the divine 
commandment did not allow the frst man to become a sharer in this bread. For if he 
had satisfed himself with this heavenly food, he would not have fallen prey to the 
death brought in by sin.182
In this passage, Maximus talks about the trajectory of the cosmos in the terms of the 
Eucharist. Christ is the eternal bread who humanity rejected in the Garden of Eden. In
transgressing the divine commandment we turn from the ofered communion – 
Eucharist – with God, and fall into sin and death. Tus Maximus says we pray in the 
Lord’s Prayer every day for Christ as the bread of life, that we may be nourished and 
have a share in Him – theosis.
In Maximus’ eucharistic understanding of creaturely movement and telos, we 
can see the way that ascetic practice takes on a central role. In the present life we 
prepare ourselves for a fnal communion with God, so that our lives are part of a 
cosmic liturgy, gathering up the world for the fnal consummation. In this way, the 
ascetic demand to ‘pray without ceasing’183 in all we do, brings the mystery of the 
liturgy into all aspects of life. Te domain of the Church and the Divine Liturgy are 
180 Loudovikos, Eucharistic Ontology, 26.
181 Loudovikos, Eucharistic Ontology, 26-7.
182 Maximus, Or. Dom. PG 90: 896D-897A [Berthold, Maximus, 113].
183 1 Thessalonians 5:16-18; For Maximus’ commentary on this see Maximus, LA TCr. Chs.24-26.
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not reserved only for within the walls of the Church, but are imminent (‘give us this 
day’) whilst ultimately anticipating a telos and fnal Eucharist yet to come. Te ethics 
of the everyday is not separate from prayer, and not separate from the activity of the 
Church.184 As the Church in the world, our personal ascetic practice is of vital 
importance. Like the call to pray without ceasing, there is also a call to practice the 
ascetic life in all we do and enable the liturgy to become a cosmic event.
Following Maximus’ understanding here of the way that personal human 
choices are a cosmic afair, I start asking what this means for the communities we live 
in now. If our prayer is without ceasing, and the whole Church is a symbol of the 
world – and in turn the whole world is a Church, then surely our communities too, 
will necessarily be shaped by a call to love that is at once personal and cosmic. When I
later critique the state as a mode of human living, it is in lieu of an understanding of 
cosmic liturgy as not just eschatological but a daily unceasing prayer in which we 
strive always for communion with God – and thus, as we will see, communion with 
one another.185 Prayerful living then is not confned to weekly liturgy, but is also 
located in every aspect of our lives. Tis does not diminish the special and unique 
event taking place in the Divine Liturgy itself, but rather the refection of this mystery
is something we hope carries over from the microcosm of the Church building into the
macrocosm of the world. In a mystical commentary where the liturgy concerns all the 
cosmos and all times, Maximus invites us to think about what prayer and worship 
looks like in all that we do, at all times. Te hint we are ofered by Maximus’ ascetic 
texts is that the liturgy continues, and that the human ethical life, like a service, 
anticipates the Eucharist to come, and that our relations must always and everywhere 
be loving. Te liturgy becomes borderless, it becomes cosmic. Tus to talk of personal 
practices that strive toward virtue and a telos of theosis is not to move away from 
talking about the Church, but rather to talk of how manifesting love sanctifes the 
184 This is also expressed by Loudovikos, who writes “What stands out prominently here is the primacy 
of ontology in relation to ethics (askesis), and above all the eucharistic ontological foundation of the 
latter. This eucharistic grounding is the way Christian asceticism is rooted in truth, which thus 
becomes a longing to be given personal eucharistic universality, because it is divine knowledge that 
is truth.”  Loudovikos, Eucharistic Ontology, 29.
185 I take Loudovikos’ conclusions further here than he may be comfortable with, but he is certainly in 
agreement with the communal character that this eucharistic orientation lends Christian asceticism: 
“This is why Christian asceticism is profoundly communal, because there cannot be any orthopraxy 
in the ecclesial body that is not assumed, taken up in the Eucharist.” Loudovikos, Eucharistic 
Ontology, 35.
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world, transfguring the world itself into a kind of Church.186
2.2.2 To Be United Yet Distinct
Continuing to use the Mystagogia as a source for understanding theosis, let us look at 
unity and distinction. When talking either of the unity of creation or the deifcation of
creatures, Maximus always maintains a balance of unity and distinction. Deifcation 
never implies the loss of distinct persons, or identity with God's essence.
Firstly, let us look at the unity of creatures. We saw in Ambiguum 41, 
Ambiguum 7 and the Mystagogia that creatures are gathered together in unity. 
Concerning this, Maximus writes:
In conformity with this law there is engendered the principle of the unifying force 
which does not permit that the substantial identity uniting these things be ignored 
because of their diference in nature, nor that their particular characteristics which 
limit each of these things to itself appear more pronounced because of their separation
and division than the kinship in love mystically inspired in them for union. It is by this
kinship that the universal and unique mode of the invisible and unknowable presence 
in all things renders them unmixed and undivided in themselves and in relation to 
each other. And it shows that they exist by the relationship which unites them to each 
other rather than to themselves.187
In this passage Maximus writes that when creatures are united, they do not lose their 
identity, either as creatures or as being unique in themselves. Whatever unity means, 
it does not mean the obliteration of the person and who we are. Maximus goes further 
186 This becomes particularly important in Chapter 5, where I argue that various functions of the State 
are incompatible with the means and ends sought by those who wish to aim for theosis. In a logical 
extension of Maximus’ ideas, I effectively argue that resistance to State-sanctioned hatred and 
discrimination may be the only acceptable response for one who wishes to gather the world in love. 
Combined with an awareness of the eucharistic orientation of creation, one could go so far as to 
argue that resistance to the State in this way is a continuation of the command to pray without 
ceasing, placing love for one another above the limitations made of us by human political powers. 
One interpretation of Mark 12:17 (‘Give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s) 
might be that all the world and everything in it belongs to God, while that which belongs to Caesar 
is only the constructs of law and exchange, which the Christian finds no value in and is outside of 
since the heart is cosmicly orientated. (This argument is developed further by J. Ellul, Anarchy and 
Christianity, Bromiley, G.W. (trans.) (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1991), 59-61; and also 
in A. Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism: A Political Commentary on the Gospel. (Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2011), 158-160.)
187 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 7 [Berthold, Maximus,197].
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than this however, and asks why is it that we think a creature is somehow more 
unique and its characteristics more pronounced when it is alone, separated and 
divided? Part of the concept of the unity that Maximus is talking about is that it is 
natural and meant to be. A creature is not sufocated or lost in unity, but is more fully 
brought to perfection and more fully becomes themselves. Tey are themselves 
because of their relation to others. Who they are becomes more pronounced in light of 
love. In his notes to this translation,  Berthold writes “Maximus here sees this as a 
corrective to the Evagarian error of a proportioned fall from an original henad. Te 
identity, he afrms, must come not on the level of nature but on the level of love.”188 
What Berthold seems to be geting at here is that previously identity has been situated
in nature, and defned by those categories. Universals like our nature however need 
not merely be about delineating a thing according to its diferences from other things 
– a system that might lead one into thinking that the more diferentiated a description
of a thing, the more we have identifed what it truly is. Instead, as Maximus’ 
universals end up implying in Ambiguum 41, we can have a comprehension of 
universals as being a way of talking about how all things relate to each other.189 In this
way, as things are united and brought into a closer bond of love, so are they more fully
brought into perfection. Tey retain identity as being “unmixed and undivided in 
themselves and in relation to each other” and become more perfectly what it was 
intended they be.
Maximus’ doctrine of theosis is one that emphasises both the alienness and 
otherness of God, since He always remains essentially distinct and completely beyond 
comprehension, and yet at the same time hinges the entire concept of theosis on it 
being natural for creatures to rest in Him. It is a gif given to us by grace that 
completes us. It is beyond our ability to lay hold of it and to complete ourselves, and 
yet if we do not reach for it and desire to achieve it, we will never atain it. So telos for 
Maximus is simultaneously something we are destined for and something we must 
choose. It is both personal choice and naturally intended. As I will explain in later 
chapters, this is a distinction that Maximus situates in his concepts of logos and tropos 
188 Berthold, Maximus, 220, note 69.
189 Eg. T. Tollefsen, ‘The Concept of the Universal in the Philosophy of St Maximus’ paper presented to
The Architecture of the Cosmos: Studium Catholicum International Conference on St Maximus the 
Confessor. Helsinki, 2-4th Sept. 2013.
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– the potential things intended for us verses the reality we choose to make happen. 
Tese logoi are in Christ, who is and contains our renewed nature.190 When living in 
accord with such logoi, we live in Him and, through the Spirit, share in God.191 As this 
occurs, not only is our identity retained, but we also are elevated and completed, 
perfected and granted the telos that was always intended for us.192 We do not simply 
keep hold of our identity, but reach the summit of identity:
Jesus my God and Saviour, who is completed by me who am saved, brings me back to 
himself who is always flled to overfowing with plenitude and who can never be 
exhausted. He restores me in a marvellous way to myself, or rather to God from whom
I received being and toward whom I am directed, long desirous of ataining 
happiness.193
And consequently,
Hence the whole man, as the object of divine action, is divinised by being made God 
by the grace of God who became man. He remains wholly man in soul (φυχὴν) and 
body (σῶμα) by nature (φύσιν), and becomes wholly God in body and soul by grace 
(χάριν) and the unparalleled divine radiance of blessed glory appropriate to him.194
To understand how it is not purely paradoxical to say that we become more fully 
human when we become God by grace – we must, as in all instances of paradox that 
Maximus lays before us, have an understanding of perpetual relation (providence), 
that exists between Creator and creation. Te triads of cosmic movement along with 
the logoi of creatures concern the continual maintenance of creation by God and the 
way that free will fts into this picture. Te theological controversy that Maximus is 
most famous for arguing against concerns the wills of Christ. Tat topic as well as his 
cosmic theology are about the relationship of divine love to human free will. Maximus
is very precise about the way that God freely limits Himself in order to enable 
190 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1077C.
191 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1084B.
192 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1080C.
193 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 5 [Berthold, Maximus, 192].
194 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1088C [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 63].
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humanity to choose on behalf of all creation. We are free to choose God, but God is 
simultaneously integral to our being. Tis is aptly illustrated in the doctrine of the 
logoi, which come from and are in God, and which, when we stray from them cause us
to fall into sin. Tis is also very well illustrated by Athanasius in his summary of the 
relation of ‘being’ to God:
For if, out of a former normal state of non-existence, they were called into being by the
Presence and loving-kindness of the Word, it followed naturally that when men were 
beref of the knowledge of God and were turned back to what was not (for what is evil 
is not, but what is good is), they should, since they derive their being from God who is,
be everlastingly beref even of beings195 
God is integral to who we are – not just in the moment of creation, but perpetually 
and in every instant and moment-to-moment of our existence. As Athanasius 
identifes, in the above passage, and as Maximus tells us when noting the frst stage of 
our triad in 2.1.3: being belongs to God. Tis does not just mean that it is a one-of gif,
but that to turn away from God is to turn away from existence itself. Tis is why 
creation, which is, becomes more fully what it can be, in God. It is very diferent to 
God, and yet He is in it and it cannot exist without Him. Maximus’ paradox of unity 
and distinction in relation to theosis then, is actually not really a paradox at all, but an 
intricate simultaneous statement about the absolute divide between creation and 
Creator, and the absolute necessity of God for the existence of creation past, present 
and future.
2.2.3 New Heaven and Earth
Lastly, it is important to consider theosis as the end of all things. As has already been 
discussed, there are foretastes of theosis in this life that look forward to the fnal end 
and enables us to participate in the promise that is to come.196 Eschatological hope of 
tomorrow is never separate from action today – but rest in God is still a reality to be 
aimed for. Tere are two points that I wish to make regarding this. Te frst is the idea 
195 Athanasius, ‘De Incarnatione Verbi Dei’, §4, [A. Robertson,  Athansasius: Select Works and Letters.
P. Schaff (ed.) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1892), 19].
196 Russell notes that this is a theme found in Quaestiones and Dubia, which quotes Matthew’s Gospel 
and emphasises the eschatological dimension of deification: Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 266.
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of continual movement, even in rest. Related to this is a second point, concerning telos
being not just an end, but also the promise of a transfgured new beginning.
Firstly, our rest in God is one that still searches to know Him beter, since God 
is always greater than what can be grasped by a human mind. Tis is so of our ethical 
movement in this life and also of the promised rest that follows. In the Mystagogia 
Maximus writes:
For God is the truth toward which the mind moves continuously and enduringly, and it 
can never cease its movement since it does not fnd any discontinuity (διάστημα) there. 
For the wonderful grandeur of God’s infnity is without quantity or parts, and completely 
without dimension, and ofers no grip to take hold of it and to know what is in its 
essence.197
Using similar language to Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus understands that we are always
reaching to know God more fully and are constantly straining toward God.198 Russell 
likewise notes Maximus’ similarity with Gregory of Nyssa in presenting a concept of 
journey toward God without end. In which “successively higher levels of unity and 
ever greater intimacy with God”199. On this eschatological dimension, Russell writes 
that “In a sense it is therefore also a return to our origins. Te divine likeness lost in 
Adam was restored to humanity in Christ, and is acquired by believers in a personal 
way through their seeking their destiny in Christ”.200  Tis later quotation strikes me 
as odd for a couple of reasons – frstly, the ‘acquired by believers in a personal way’ 
term of phrase encourages a very abstracted approach to Maximus’ cosmic theology. It
does not really do justice to cosmic place of the human who moves toward God by 
loving, uniting and bringing to God all those around them. Likewise, talking of 
deifcation as “a return to our origins” causes some difculties, not least of which is 
that it sounds a litle too like the Origenist language Maximus was trying to invert and
counter. Whilst it is clear that Russell want ‘origins’ to refer rather to Edenic 
humanity (rather than our origin in nothing, or Origin’s pre-existence of souls) 
197 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 5 [Berthold, Maximus, 192].
198 Maximus describes movement according to one’s logos as constant straining in Amb. 7 PG91 
1080C, and uses language very similar to Gregory of Nyssa in the Life of Moses (Gregory of Nyssa, 
De v.M. SCh.1.225). I discuss this in greater detail in 4.3.
199 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 270.
200 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 270.
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making wider reference to Maximus’ theology would reveal more useful terminology 
for clarifying this. For example, referring to our logos which is again made possible for
our tropos, keeps the dynamic aspect of movement and ever-deepening understanding 
in our relationship with God (just talked about in Russell’s preceding paragraph) even 
in Adam’s case.201 I bring up these points to support my case for best understanding 
telos in Maximus through the cosmic scope of his theology. By seting any aspect of 
Maximus’ thought in light of the way that humans were originally meant to interact 
with creation and Creator much more depth and understanding can be acquired.
Te dynamism of rest in God and the complexity of this perpetual relationship 
can be seen elsewhere in Maximus’ thought. We can see that when creatures are in 
full communion with God they arrive in a rest that is also moving. In Qaestiones ad 
Talassium Maximus calls this ἀεικίνητος στάσις – ever-moving rest202 and στάσιμον 
ταυτοκινησίαν – stationary movement. In his analysis of this section of Ad Talassium, 
Sotiris Mitralexis noted that Maximus’ use of this paradoxical phrase is not merely 
rhetorical or one of standard apophaticism, but that “If we are to speak about motion 
or fxity concerning God, concerning ‘motionless’ God and the ‘perpetually 
interpenetrating’ Trinity of divine persons, we have to acknowledge that it is both the 
fullness of motion and the fullness of fxity, an understanding that transcends even the 
designation of being ‘beyond motion’”.203 Mitralexis points out that far from being 
puzzled by such an idea as movement and rest being simultaneous we should instead 
consider this the best possible way to use human language when contemplating a God
who is beyond and outside time and yet possesses all motion and stillness. In the 
context of the quotation from the Mystagogia, even creatures who have become god 
by grace are distinct from God’s essence, and therefore continue to seek greater 
knowledge of Him whilst being in Him.
Maximus also talks of theosis as being the transfguration of creation. Te 
promise of Scripture is not that all things will stop but that there will be renewal.204 
201 Russell does talk about the logoi but reserves this discussion for a different section on Ambiguum 7 
(Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 274.)
202 Maximus, Ad Thal. 59, CCSG22 line131.
203 S. Mitralexis, Ever-Moving Repose: The Notion of Time in Maximus the Confessor’s Philosophy 
through the Perspective of a Relational Ontology. (Berlin: Deutschen Akademischen 
Austauschdienstes, 2014), 149.
204 Isaiah 65:17; 2 Peter 3:12-13; Revelation 21:1.
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Maximus writes that:
... until such a time as pleases the one who bound them together to separate them in 
view of a greater and more mystical arrangement in the time of the expected universal
consummation, when the world, as man, will die to its life of appearances and rise 
again renewed of its oldness in the resurrection expected presently. At this time the 
man who is ourselves will rise with the world as a part with the whole and the small 
with the large, having obtained the power of not being subject to further corruption. 
Ten the body will become like the soul and sensible things like intelligible things in 
dignity and glory, for the unique divine power will manifest itself in all things in a 
vivid and active presence proportioned to each one, and will by itself preserve 
unbroken for endless ages the bond of unity.205
Maximus’ description of the world to come is one that envisions the transfguration 
and consummation of the universe. “Divine power will manifest itself in all things” - 
not belong to all things, but God will be in all in a way that is “vivid and active”. Body 
and sensibility will still exist, but will possess the dignity and glory of the soul and 
intelligible things that are not tempted to material desires over love for God. Teosis 
then is not static, but is life in God – life that is an ever-moving rest206 and a stationary
movement. It is not an abandonment of the physical but a new kind of living that 
upturns our understanding of time and brings all creation into God’s presence, where 
it participates and shares in Him, and seeks continually to know Him more intimately.
In order to understand what virtues are in Maximus’ ethics, we must 
understand the way in which telos is simultaneously the promise for all of creation 
tomorrow, and the beginning of this transfguration today. God is perpetually with all 
of his creation and icons such as the divine liturgy become microcosms of theosis to 
come and the consummation of the universe.
205 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 7 [Berthold, Maximus, 196].
206 Maximus, Ad Thal. 59 CCSG7 line131.
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2.3 Conclusion
Te telos of all creation is perfection, participation and rest in God. Humans shatered 
this possibility when they sinned. Human nature is renewed in Christ, who brings 
together all divisions inside Himself, forging anew human nature and its ability to 
mediate. Tis means that when humans choose to participate in Christ and take on 
His renewed human nature, they are again able to unite the divisions in creation and 
mediate between heaven and earth. Te perfection we may choose to participate in is 
God. Tis is never a participation in God’s essence, but is participation through grace 
and the Holy Spirit. We become more fully our own person when united in a distinct 
way to one another and to God. Tis theosis to which we look forward happens in 
miniature in the liturgy where we catch a glimpse of the unity of creation through the 
Eucharist. Final rest in God however is the promise yet to come when the universe 
will be transfgured through the actions, here and now, of humans – the mediators of 
the universe who choose to receive God within themselves and therefore within the 
entirety of creation.
Terefore we can say that the cosmos moves towards its perfect end in the gif of 
theosis. In this statement we also understand that this perfect end is the completion of 
creation and most fully realises the personal potential of every creature. In 
understanding the word ‘movement’ we have looked at the freedom that is given to 
humans to determine whether or not to love or to turn from God. Contained within 
this enormous work of cosmic creation, movement and rest toward God, is this 
fractional moment that causes all to hinge upon human choice. To study this moment, 
I think, is to study ethics. Te virtues and what is to be done ft in this fraction, but 
have no sense or importance unless they can be understood within this picture that is 
cosmic in scope, and that hopes for nothing less than the consummation and renewal 
of the universe through Christ in the Holy Spirit.207 Maximus’ understanding of the 
virtues continually makes reference to this framework and draws on it to make sense 
of our task, since there is no choice that does not involve the rest of the created order 
and its movement either toward or away from its Creator.
207 See 3.3.4 on the Spirit as bringer of grace that instils virtue in humans.
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~ Chapter 3: Virtue in the Cosmos of St Maximus ~
‘Virtues are activities that participate in divine love’
3.0 Introduction
Te purpose of this chapter is to address the question what is virtue for St Maximus the
Confessor? Te claim I wish to make is that, for Maximus, virtues are activities that 
participate in divine love. I will break down this chapter into three sections, all of 
which will build upon one another to substantiate this claim. St Maximus has varying 
lists of things he is willing to call virtues. What a virtue is for him, however, seems to 
be something more consistent. Virtues have something in common that makes them 
virtues. I claim that, for Maximus, the ontological status of virtues is reliant on their 
participation in love.
In the previous chapter I looked at what the telos of creation is for Maximus. In 
doing so I outlined both the specifc end that Maximus believes all things aim for, and 
also the overarching paradigm and metaphysics that correspond to this telos. Te telos 
that all the cosmos looks forward to is theosis, a sanctifcation by the Spirit in the self-
emptying love of Christ. In this chapter I look in particular at the role of this love and 
the way that Maximus talks about virtue in relation to it. As will become clear later in 
this chapter, Christ is love – the aim and theosis of all things, and the same love that is 
discussed as the start and completion of all virtue.
Te particular importance of love in relation to the virtues in Maximus’ 
thought has already been identifed and discussed in relation to virtue ethics by 
Aristotle Papanikolaou,208 Andrew Louth,209 and Paul Blowers.210 Papanikolaou believes
it is precisely the relationship of love to virtue that can be useful for contemporary 
ethics.  He writes: “It is in the interrelation between practices, virtues (St Maximus 
doesn’t restrict himself to the cardinal virtues), and the manifestation of the virtue of 
208 Papanikolaou, “Learning How to Love”, 241.
209 Louth, ‘Virtue Ethics’, 356.
210 Blowers ‘Aligning’, 346, 347.
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love as the telos of the human that St Maximus can ofer a substantive contribution to 
current discussions in virtue ethics”.211 Papanikolaou uses the paradigm of virtue as 
cosmic movement toward love, who is God, as a basis for the ethics he goes on to 
discuss (in the case of the above article – just war theories). We see this especially in 
his summary of virtue: “In the writings of St Maximus the Confessor, communion with
God, which is an embodied presencing of the divine, is simultaneous with the 
acquisition of virtue: Virtue is embodied deifcations And this love is simultaneously 
a uniting oneself with God, since God is love”.212 Likewise, in his paper on virtue ethics
and Maximus, Louth characterises ascetic struggle as that primary cosmic movement 
that the human partakes of in their search to know God. He writes that “Te ultimate 
purpose of this is to learn how to love”.213 Louth goes on to use the opening chapters 
of the Centuries on Love to discuss how the virtues are “a way that leads to love”.214 He 
expresses the cosmic position of love in Maximus as “It is love that makes things 
change and move, and the ultimate source of love is Gods Te story of the Fall is, for 
Maximos and the rest of the Fathers, a story about man’s failure to move in love 
towards God”. Virtue, in Louth’s article becomes synonymous with a discussion of 
human cosmic movement towards love, which is God. In Louth’s work we already see 
that virtues are identifed as activities that lead toward love. Te predominance of love
is also highlighted by Blowers,215 who chooses to use Maximus’ Leter 2: On Love as his
primary source for the virtues in Maximus: “Te Christian virtues that Maximus sees 
comprehended under the supreme virtue of love—hope, humility, meekness, self-
mastery, patience, longsufering, kindness, peace, joy”.216 My purpose in citing these 
examples is frstly by way of justifcation for my choice to focus primarily on the Four 
Hundred Chapters On Love and Leter 2: On Love for most material in this chapter 
pertaining to love and the virtues. Te second reason is to demonstrate that the claim 
that love is primary and particularly special in relation to the virtues for Maximus is 
not new. Neither is it new to place this relationship within Maximus’ cosmic paradigm
211 Papanikolaou, “Learning How to Love”, 241.
212 Papanikolaou, “Learning How to Love”, 241.
213 Louth, ‘Virtue Ethics’, 355.
214 Louth, ‘Virtue Ethics’, 356.
215 As well as the below quotation Blowers also references love in this way in Blowers, ‘Aligning’, 346,
347.
216 Blowers, ‘Aligning’, 342. Blowers cites Ep. 2 (PG91 393C-396B) as his source for the virtues listed 
here.
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of creaturely movement towards God, and hence to discuss virtue as activity through 
which there is participation in love. By integrating these ideas with Maximus’ 
understanding of the logoi, I hope to further develop our understanding of Maximus’ 
position.
In the frst part of this chapter, I explore the possible origins of Maximus’ 
understanding of love as frst among virtues as well as the cause and perfect end of all 
virtues. I suggest that he mainly draws on Paul's epistles for his treatment of love, 
since many of his passages on love and the virtues are almost exact quotations. 
Contained in the idea of love as cause and end of all virtues is the start of a statement 
about what virtue is. My second section concerns the term activities. I have chosen 
this term to convey the movement and action that Maximus ascribes to virtues. In this 
section I describe virtue as an activity and how it fts into Maximus’ understanding of 
cosmic movement, as well as discussing whose activity virtue is. My fnal section 
concerns the term participate and what is meant by it in terms of love and virtue for 
Maximus. I explain the way Maximus understands virtue to partake in love, through 
his description of the Logos and logoi. Maximus’ theology of the Logos and logoi is a 
broad feld that has had a lot of atention in recent academic study. I posit that the 
relationship of virtue to love can be understood as an instance of the relationship of 
that between the logoi and the Logos, and that in making this claim we can make 
radical and more clear statements about what virtue is for Maximus and what is meant
by its participation in love. Not least of the claims we can then make of love and 
virtue, is the relevance of the image of the circle and radii analogy that is applied to 
the Logos and logoi. Vladimir Cvetković has developed cosmological implications of 
this analogy which can thus also be applied to virtue and love, as I demonstrate 
later.217 Tis chapter then is made up of three claims, (1) that the root of Maximus’ 
description of love as the perfection of the virtues comes from Scriptural passages 
found in Paul’s epistles, (2) that virtues are activities, (3) that the way that virtues 
participate in love is an instance of the relationship Maximus posits between the logoi 
and the Logos. Tese three claims support the overall claim that virtues are activities 
that participate in divine love.
217 V. Cvetković, ‘Predeterminations and providence in Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the 
Confessor’ in Dionysius the Areopagite between Orthodoxy and Heresy. (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2011), 146.
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In all, the inquiry will make a statement about the ontological status of virtue 
as something inextricably linked to love, and something that requires us to talk of an 
activity that is always in the context of human struggle and movement towards love. 
Tis will allow for the next chapter to begin dealing with the topic of how virtue is 
achievable and the inquiry will turn from a focus on Maximus’ cosmology to his more 
ascetic writings.
3.1 The Origins of Love and Virtue
3.1.1 Leters from Paul
In the works of Maximus, love is recognised as particularly important in relation to 
the virtues. In this section I build on this and claim that virtues are actually dependent
on love for their reality. It is in this context that the term virtue makes any sense to us 
and is given any degree of consistency. I begin by comparing and contrasting 
references to Paul’s epistles in Maximus’ passages on love and virtue, which, given the
prominence of Pauline quotations in these passages, would seem to be the origin of 
Maximus’ usage. I look at the similarities and diferences of Maximus’ passages to 
Paul, and then some ways in which Maximus goes beyond the Pauline quotations.
One way in which Maximus describes love in relation to virtue, is as ‘the bond 
of perfection’. In the Mystagogia Chapter 24 Maximus writes that when the Holy Spirit
and Christ perfect us, a virtuous way of life becomes possible:
...having clothed ourselves with heartfelt compassion (οἰκτιρμοῦ), with kindness 
(χρηστότητα), humility (ταπεινοφροσύνην), meekness (πραΰτητα), and patience 
(μακροθυμίαν), bearing (ἀνεχόμενοι) with one another in love and forgiving 
(χαριζόμενοι) one another if one has a complaint against the other just as Christ has 
forgiven us, and over all these let us clothe ourselves with love and peace (τὴν ἀγάπην
καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην), the bond of perfection (τὸν σύνδεσμον τελειότητος), to which we 
have been called in one bodys218
Te virtues are brought to completion in “love and peace, the bond of perfection”. 
218 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.24 [G. Berthold, Maximus, 211].
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Maximus’ choice to list these specifc virtues as well as his choice to describe love as 
the ‘bond of perfection’, seem be derived from Paul’s leter to the Colossians. Indeed, 
the Colossians passage actually gives us more reason to believe that love, in particular,
even above peace, is really the central ‘bond of perfection’ amidst the virtues:
As God’s chosen ones, holy (ἅγιοι) and beloved (ἠγαπημένοι), clothe yourselves with 
compassion (οἰκτιρμοῦ), kindness (χρηστότητα), humility (ταπεινοφροσύνην), 
meekness (πρᾳότητα), and patience (μακροθυμίαν). Bear with  (ἀνεχόμενοι) one 
another and, if anyone has a complaint against another, forgive (χαριζόμενοι) each 
other; just as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive. Above all, clothe 
yourselves with love (ἀγάπην), which binds everything together in perfect harmony 
(σύνδεσμος τῆς τελειότητος). And let the peace (εἰρήνη) of Christ rule your hearts, to 
which indeed you were called in the one body. [Colossians 3:12-15]
Implicit in the choice of word for perfection (τελειότης) is also a purposeful end in 
which virtues are bound together. Tis sense of end in Paul’s description of love is 
imitated by Maximus and becomes particularly important in the way Maximus 
describes virtues as moving towards love, as will be discussed later. Maximus also 
quotes Paul in his Leter 2: On Love, where he describes love as being the other virtues:
For love (ἀγάπη), says the divine Apostle, or rather Christ, speaking these things 
through him, is long-sufering (μακροθυμεῖ) and kind (χρηστεύεται), not jealous (οὐ 
ζηλοῖ) or boastful (οὐ περπερεύεται), is not pufed up (οὐ φυσιοῦται) or rude (οὐκ 
ἀσχημονεῖ), and does not insist on its own way (οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῆς), is not irritable (οὐ 
παροξύνεται), does not think evil (οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν), nor rejoice in injustice (οὐ 
χαίρει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ), but rejoices in truth (συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ). Love endures 
(στέγει) all things, believes (πιστεύει) all things, hopes (ἐλπίζει) all things, and endures 
(ὑπομένει) all things. Love never fails (οὐδέποτε πίπτει), since it possesses God who is 
alone unfailing (ἀδιάπτωτον) and unalterable (ἀναλλοίωτον).219
Te quotation italicised by Louth in the above passage corresponds to 1 Corinthians 
13:4-8. Maximus draws atention to love as somehow being these virtues, and 
219 Maximus, Ep. 2, PG91 405A-B [Louth, Maximus, 92].
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ultimately being unfailing or unending (ἐκπίπτω) because God Himself is love. 
Maximus has just previously identifed God as love in this passage,220 and in the above 
quotation identifes Paul’s properties of love with God – love endures all things/God is
unalterable, love never fails/God who is alone unfailing. Interestingly, Paul, whilst also
identifying love as being all of the virtues he lists, seems to be referring to love in this 
passage as something that the human must have before they can even possess virtue. 
Love is not just the end of virtue but also the start:
If I speak in tongues of mortals and of angels, but do not have love (ἀγάπην), I am a 
noisy gong or a clanging cymbal. And if I have prophetic powers, and understand all 
mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains but do 
not have love, I am nothing. If I give away all my possessions, and if I hand over my 
body so that I may boast, but do not have love, I gain nothing. Love is patient 
(μακροθυμεῖ); love is kind (χρηστεύεται); love is not envious (οὐ ζηλοῖ) or boastful (οὐ 
περπερεύεται) or arrogant (οὐ φυσιοῦται) or rude (οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ). It does not insist 
on its own way (οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῆς); it is not irritable (οὐ παροξύνεται) or resentful 
(οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν); it does not rejoice in wrongdoing (οὐ χαίρει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ), 
but rejoices in the truth (συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ). It bears (στέγει) all things, believes 
(πιστεύει) all things, hopes (ἐλπίζει) all things, endures (ὑπομένει) all things. Love 
never ends. [1 Cor13:1-8]
We also fnd this in the last verse of this chapter:
And now faith (πίστις), hope (ἐλπίς), and love (ἀγάπη) abide, these three; and the 
greatest of these is love.[1 Cor 13:13]
Te focus in Paul’s passage seems to be that, without love, there is no sense or reality 
to any other virtue. Tey are worthless to us without love, which is immeasurably 
greater than all else. Love seems to be something we need to acquire before all else. 
For Maximus the focus rather seems to be about the divine quality of love, which is all 
virtue and most importantly is God Himself. Within the wider context of the section 
in Maximus’ Leter 2 from which this passage comes however, we read that it is not 
220 Maximus, Ep. 2, PG91 404C; in which Maximus quotes 1 John 4:8.
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just about the divine quality of love, but how one is led to divine love, and therefore 
deifed.221 We can see the root of Maximus’ discussion of movement through virtues to
love in Paul’s expression of the human needing to have love in order to make sense of 
virtue. So far I have mentioned the virtues leading to love in Maximus, yet the 
evidence from Paul seems to suggest that we rather need love before we can have 
virtue. Tis is a diference in the two passages, but not one that is lef unaccounted for 
by Maximus, as will become clear later in the chapter.
3.1.2 Christ in Every Word
It should also be mentioned that Maximus, in referring to Paul’s epistles, believes he is
doing more than appealing to Paul’s authority. As quoted earlier, Maximus precedes 
one of his passages by noting that “For love, says the divine Apostle, or rather Christ, 
speaking these things through him, is long suferings”.222 For Maximus these are not 
just the words of Paul but the words of Christ, upon whom Paul meditates and whose 
words he mediates. Indeed, we may extend this to say that, in drawing quotations 
from Scripture, Maximus believes that one draws from the text as a whole, which 
exists both as separate words (logoi) and as one book (logos), so that passages 
simultaneously point to the meaning of the whole of Scripture and bear witness to the 
Logos, Christ Himself.223 Scripture in this way is something that is both one and many,
both testifying to a material reality and pointing to a spiritual dimension of truth 
beyond the leters on the page.224 Te unifcation of material and spiritual is explored 
at length by Maximus in the Mystagogia where he treats with the divine liturgy. Tis 
union makes sense in light of the incarnation, where the material becomes a vessel for
the divine and Christ brings two worlds together within Himself.225 Tis consequently 
brings about a diferent way of comprehending the world, liturgy and scripture for 
Maximus. As Blowers puts it in his study of Maximus and exegesis; “For Maximus, real
vision is granted only to those who delve into the ever thickening plot of the Teo-
Drama, who join in the dense cosmic and scriptural ‘cloud of witness’ - heavenly and 
221 Maximus, Ep. 2, PG91 405A.
222 Maximus, Ep. 2, PG91 405A [Louth, Maximus, 92].
223 See Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.6: for Maximus on the cosmic logoi of scripture. See also Blowers 
discussion of the cosmos in Maximian exegesis in Blowers, ‘The World in the Mirror’, 409, 413, 
416, 426.
224 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.6.
225 See for example Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch.1.
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earthly beings, animate and inanimate things – in pressing to unveil the fullness of the
mystery of Jesus Christ”.226 Maximus’ thought on material scripture and spiritual truth 
is extensive and complex, however in this brief summary it will hopefully become 
apparent how it, like much of his other cosmic theology, ties into a larger 
cosmological paradigm that shares pervasive ideas of the one and the many; 
multiplicity and unity, brought together in Christ. Tis theme of the one and the many
brought to unity through Christ is one that will become especially important when we
turn to look at participation as relation between love and virtue and identify it with 
the Logos and logoi.
In 3.1 we have thus seen that Paul is clearly an important fgure for Maximus 
when it comes to defning the relationship between love and virtue. Maximus uses the 
same virtues Paul does and, like Paul, chooses to call love ‘the bond of perfection’ that 
unites virtues. He also, following Paul, identifes love with all of the virtues, but 
believes it to be the greatest of them all, implying that love itself is still a virtue. Paul 
at once calls love both the end/perfection and harmony of the virtues, but also 
describes love as being all the virtues and also the beginning of all virtue. As such, it is
not immediately clear whether love is a virtue, or is something more than a virtue, 
especially given that without love, there cannot begin to be anything else of worth 
that we posses. Te diference in Maximus (or perhaps more accurately, as we will see,
the elaboration of Paul present in Maximus’ writings) is the seting of these diferent 
(and seemingly contradictory) accounts of love within the context of activity and 
cosmic movement. Tis seems to be in keeping with Paul’s intended description of 
love in relation to virtue, as something which the human must possess and aspire to 
have and also as something virtues move from and towards. Te contradictory nature 
of the descriptions of love and virtue in Paul’s epistles seem to fuel a more in-depth 
cosmic account of this relation in Maximus. As expressed in the previous chapter, the 
use of paradox especially in relation to Christ’s recapitulation of the world in Himself  
is a recurring theme in Maximus. Unsurprisingly, it is Christ’s relation to creation in 
this way that will make sense of these seemingly contradictory accounts of love when 
we turn to them later. As well as originating in Paul’s epistles then, Maximus’ 
description of  love and the virtues is also an exploration and development of the 
226 Blowers, ‘The World in the Mirror’, 426.
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difculties in Paul’s passages.
3.2 Virtue as Activity
3.2.1 Defning Activity
In this section I clarify what I mean by virtues are activities in the context of their 
relationship with love. Te need to talk of virtues as activities arises from the relation 
we have seen developing between virtue and love. If Paul’s virtues start in love and 
are perfected in love then some degree of movement is implied. Tis movement is also 
present in Maximus’ understanding of the virtues in love. I refer back to some of 
Maximus’ wider cosmology in this section since the movement I am talking about will
concern the way in which we may choose to move toward God, i.e. movement in 
potential that when taken leads us closer to our telos. When I talk of ‘virtues moving’, 
Maximus’ wider cosmology allows us to understand ‘human activity in potential’. 
Activity is never devoid of agents, so it remains important when talking of virtues to 
situate them within a relationship between humans and God.
I tentatively distinguish the term movement from activity. By ‘movement ‘I am 
referring just to a continuous process that is set in motion. By ‘activity’ I am always 
referring to something that is being done and being set in motion by an agent. When I 
call virtue an activity, I am ascribing agency to its existence. For a human, virtue is a 
potential activity which we have the capacity to partake in. However, virtue starts and
originates and is in God, and so is always divine activity. Tis means that I am 
ascribing agency both to humans and to God when calling virtue an activity. Te 
reasons why this is not contradictory and what I mean by this will become clear 
throughout this section and the next.
I will briefy explain here what I mean by divine activity, since this term is not 
consistently present in Maximus. Tollefsen dedicates a signifcant part of his book on 
Maximus’ cosmology to discuss this topic. He makes a case for a distinction in 
Maximus’ corpus between God’s essence and that economic activity belonging to God 
which creatures may participate in. He traces this distinction, if not systematically 
then informally, in the Cappadocian Fathers and then in Maximus’ work. I am inclined
to agree that this distinction does exist, though, like Tollefsen, am very keen not to 
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construe this, in either the Cappadocians or Maximus, as a developed Palamite 
doctrine.227 With this in mind, Tollefsen notes several diferent terms Maximus uses to 
refer to that which is not God’s essence but which is still ‘around’ and ‘about’ Him 
and may be participated in by creatures. Tese include ἔργα/works,228  
ἐνέργεια/activity,229  ὄντα/beings,230  πρόοδοι/processions,231  μεθεκτά/those that are 
participated,232  ἰδιώματα/properties.233 It is worth also quoting Tollefsen’s descriptions
of these activities which helps clarify what they are and how they can be both God’s 
and shared with creation:
Being without beginning, these divine works are, of course, not created. In the same 
way, being without beginning, they are not by nature bound to the institution of 
creatures. Tey have their reality independent of God’s ‘relation’ to creatures, even if 
they play an important part in the institution, preservation and perfection of the 
created cosmos. Te divine works without beginning could be seen as God’s eternal 
manifestation of Himself to Himself ad intra. Te divine essence itself remains 
unknowable and the activity of this essence is a mystery. But this divine activity of the
essence, as activity out of the essence, according to Maximus, becomes participated 
(μεθεκτόν) at the appointed ‘time’, because it is by this power that God gives Himself 
‘economically’ to that which He creates.234
Tese activities (or activity – Tollefsen notes that God’s activity only appears 
prismatic in economic relation to creatures, but in itself is whole and one)235 are 
properly God, being without beginning. However, in the sense that we cannot identify
any particular activity with God’s essence, nor indeed say anything of the mystery of 
God in Godself, these activities are other than God’s essence. I think it would be a 
misunderstanding to consider these activities to be ‘solid beings’236 as, if there is one 
227 To read Palamas’ doctrine of Divine Energies into Maximus or the Cappadocians would be 
anachronistic and unhelpful at this stage and unrepresentative of their thought.
228 I here reference Tollefsen’s translation and use of Maximus’ Greek, Tollefsen, Christocentric, 160.
229 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 161.
230 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 162.
231 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 163.
232 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 166.
233 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 166.
234 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 161.
235 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 169.
236 As perhaps might be thought when Maximus uses the term ὄντα.
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thing that is certain, it is that Maximus is not implying the existence of subsidiary 
divinities. It is beter to think of these activities as capacities which God does not have
to manifest, but chooses to, so he is these things eternally, and he also chooses to 
share these with his creation, hence we can participate in them.237 Maximus writes 
that every nature has the potential to exercise activity. He argues in his dialogue with 
Pyrrhus that, “If he[Christ] has two natures (φύσεις), then He surely must have two 
wills (θελήματα), the wills and essential operations (ἐνέργειαι) being equal in number 
to the natures”.238 Te logic is that if something has a nature but no will and no 
operation of its own, that thing has no way of expressing itself or existing in 
accordance with that nature, and therefore has no real existence. God’s operations or 
activities, whatever we wish to call them, are a very real manifestation of Himself (and
hence why we may use such terms as theosis/deifcation and participation), but 
ultimately are representative of a capacity to act that is freely exercised. In a series of 
tables, Tollefsen identifes the sorts of things being referred to by Maximus in this 
general category of ‘activities of God we can participate in’. Tese include immortality,
life, holiness, virtue, goodness and being.239 It is in this sense that virtue is here being 
expressed as an activity. When now returning to look at the wider cosmological 
implications of virtue and movement in Maximus’ work, we can begin to understand 
why virtues are considered to be moving, how this relates to God Himself and is 
caused by God, and what this activity has to do with humanity. As part of this 
consideration the question ‘whose activities are virtues?’ will be asked, and the 
associated difculties in answering this question will be outlined. Te solution to this 
difculty will be dealt with in the last section on participation.
3.2.2 Virtues and the Triad of Cosmic Movement
I begin by looking at passages in Maximus on the movement of the virtues towards 
love. One of the most noticeable sections in which Maximus lists virtues bound 
together in love, is in the passage alluded to earlier by Blowers. In Leter 2: On Love, 
237 Cf. Bradshaw on Aristotle’s use of energeia meaning precisely this. D. Bradshaw, ‘The Concept of 
the Divine Energies’ paper presented to Purdue University & University of Pennsylvania. 
Pennsylvania, Autumn 2006. David Bradshaw Homepage: www.uky.edu/~dbradsh/papers/Concept
%20of%20the%20Divine%20Energies.doc (Accessed: 22.10.14)), 3.
238 Maximus, Pyrrh., PG91 289A-B [J. Farrel, Disputation with Pyrrhus. (Pennsylvania: St. Tikhon's 
Seminary Press, 1990), Ch.13, 4].
239 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 164.
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Maximus lists the virtues: love (ἀγάπη), faith (πίστις), hope (ἐλπίς), humility 
(ταπεινός), meekness (πραότης), gentleness (πραυπαθής), mercy (ἔλεος), self-control 
(ἐγκράτεια), patience (ὑπομονή), long-sufering (μακρόθυμος), kindness (χρηστότης), 
peace (εἰρήνη), and joy (χαρά).240  Afer this, Maximus writes:
Love is the fulflment (συμπλήρωσις) of these [virtues], wholly embraced as the fnal 
desire (ὁρεκτὸν), and furnishes them rest from their movement (κινήσεως στάσιν 
παρεχομένη). For love gives faith the reality of what it believes and hope the presence 
of what it hopes for, and the enjoyment of what is present. Love alone, properly 
speaking proves that the human person is in the image of the Creator by making his 
self-determination (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) submit to reason (λόγῳ), not bending reason (λόγον) 
under it, and persuading the inclination (γνώμην) to follow nature (φύσιν) and not in 
any way to be at variance with the logos of nature.241
Firstly, we notice the movement of virtues towards love. ‘Fulflment’ and ‘desire’ both 
suggest that love is something more than just another virtue, and, like Maximus’ use 
of the Pauline perfection (τελειότης), these words imply that love is the perfect 
completion of virtue and the aim towards which virtues reach. Both words indicate 
that virtues, or, more accurately, one who possesses them, move towards love. Indeed, 
the fact that love is fulflment, fnal desire and the rest towards which all moves, 
implies that love itself is the cause and reason virtues started moving in the frst place. 
Tings only move because they have this perfection to aim towards. Tis makes sense 
especially if we bear in mind that God is love, and also if we consider this in light of 
some of Maximus’ wider cosmology. In the previous chapter (2.1.2), the triad of cosmic
movement was introduced, where Maximus describes all creatures as being made in 
creation, moving in their lives, and fnally fnding rest in God. Te triad: creation 
(γένεσις) – movement (κίνησις) – rest (στάσις) is found in the sentence from above: 
“κινήσεως στάσιν παρεχομένη” (furnishes them rest from their movement). We are 
caused to move by love, that is, by God, towards love, that is, towards God. Te above 
description of movement seems highly consistent with the triad of cosmic movement 
240 From Maximus, Ep. 2, PG91 393C-396C [Louth, Maximus, 86].
241 Maximus, Ep. 2, PG91 396C [Louth, Maximus, 86].
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that Maximus’ expounds in Ambiguum 7.242 Louth believes that understanding love in 
the context of cosmic movement is key to understanding Maximus’ cosmology. He 
writes that; “It is love that makes things change and move, and the ultimate source of 
love is God, the unmoved mover, who causes movement by being loved: κινεῑ ὼς 
ἐρώμενον. Te story of the Fall is, for Maximos and the rest of the Fathers, a story 
about man’s failing to move in love towards Gods”.243
Virtue, then, has something to do with movement and is an activity in which 
humans can partake. Te cause of this movement, and the aim of human activity, is 
love. But if love belongs to God, and movement only occurs because of this love, then 
we might ask how human freedom fts in. How can we choose to do anything when 
even our movement (the one part of the triad given over to human choice and change)
is directed. If God causes our love and virtue and in doing so human beings are moved
towards Him, then there would seem to be no way for humans to reject God or truly 
choose to move towards Him of their own volition. However, in Leter 2 where we see 
this problem manifest: “Love alone, properly speaking proves that the human person 
is in the image of the Creator by making his self-determination (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) submit to 
reason”,244 Louth provides an alternative translation where ‘self-determination’ can be 
understood as “that which is within our power”.245 Tis translation also allows for a 
more liberal reading of the passage that has much more space for human activity: 
‘Love alone, properly speaking proves that the human person is in the image of the 
Creator by making that which is within our power submit to reason’. Tis sentence 
tells us that we know what love looks like in a person, because they have brought 
their own actions into alignment with reason. Reason here is the same word as the 
later word Louth chooses to leave untranslated as logos. Te English translation 
“submit to reason” , does not quite convey this, but in the Greek that ‘reason’ is also 
God’s will and God’s intended path of perfection for us, and Christ Himself. Love is 
present when we choose to bring those things that are in our power into alignment 
with God’s will and hope for us. It is clear that virtue and love involve activity to some
242 This is especially so given that the triad is initially used by Maximus to describe movement of the 
logoi towards God. Maximus believes that the virtues themselves are logoi, and hence fall into this 
description of movement. See 3.3.5.
243 Louth, ‘Virtue Ethics’, 357, on Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308C-D.
244 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 396C [Louth, Maximus, 86]. Also quoted above.
245 Louth, Maximus, 204, note 4.
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extent involving the human, and to some degree involving God, who is love. Further 
discussion on how an act of virtue can be both human and divine necessitates further 
discussion on the roll of free will in Maximus, which we will return to as we look 
further at the way virtue as activity fts into Maximus’ cosmology, and also when we 
discuss the use of paradox and participation in Maximus’ theology.
3.2.3 Virtues and the Divisions of Nature
Continuing to look at the wider cosmological implications of virtue and movement in 
Maximus’ work, we read in Leter 2 that:
All the forms of virtue (άρετής) are introduced, fulflling (συμπληροῦντα) the power 
(δύναμιν) of love, which gathers together (συνάγουσαν) what has been separated 
(μεμερισμένα), once again fashioning the human being in accordance with a single 
meaning (λόγον) and mode (τρὀπον).246
Virtues are described as fulflling (συμπληρόω) the power of love, the same word that 
was used in the previous quotation (3.2.2) to describe love as the fulflment 
(συμπλήρωσις) of the virtues. Te virtues are somehow love made manifest; they are 
demonstrative of the power (δύναμις) of love, which in itself is described as that which
“gathers together what has been separated (τὴν τὰ μεμερισμένα συνάγουσαν)”. 
Virtues thus have a roll in gathering separated things together in love. Tis language 
recalls Maximus’ cosmic divisions of nature as explored in his Ambiguum 41 in the 
previous chapter (2.1.1). In Ambiguum 41, Maximus describes how the human is the 
bond of the cosmos, with the ability to mediate between all extremes.247 Having failed 
in this regard, it is Christ who comes to restore this ability to the human by uniting 
heaven and earth in becoming one person in two natures. In doing so Christ also 
restores the ability to unite what is divided to humanity. At the climax of Ambiguum 
41, Maximus writes:
Tus he [Christ] divinely recapitulates (ἀνεκεφαλαιώσατο) the universe in himself, 
showing that the whole creation exists (ὑπάρχουσαν) as one, like another human 
246 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 400A [Louth, Maximus, 88].
247 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1305B-C.
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being, completed (συμπληρουμένην) by the gathering together (συνόδῳ) of its parts 
(μερῶν) one with another in itself, and inclined towards itself by the whole of its 
existence, in accordance with the one, simple, undiferentiated and indiferent idea of 
production from nothing, in accordance with which the whole of creation admits of 
one and the same undiscriminated logos, as having not been before it is.248
Creation becomes complete because its many parts are gathered together into one 
whole. Creation is recapitulated (Maximus draws on Paul – Ephesians 1:10) and 
restored to its intended fullness by the drawing together of its separate fragments, so 
that all is in accord with their logoi. Te cosmic paradigm of universal restoration from
works like Ambiguum 41 is refected in our passage on love and the virtues. Te 
gathering together (συνάγω) of the virtues in love resembles the way Christ gathers 
together (σύνοδος) the fragments of creation. Indeed, this is especially important as it 
is the love demonstrated in Christ’s incarnation, crucifxion and resurrection that 
precisely defnes the parameters of what love is. Te love that gathers the virtues is 
the divine love that overcomes the cosmic divisions in nature. As will be discussed in 
the next section, this is also the same love that the human becomes able to participate 
in. Te completion (συμπληρόω) of the virtues in love likewise resembles the 
completion (συμπληρόω) of creation as its many parts are united in harmony. Te 
dimension Ambiguum 41 grants to our understanding of virtue, is an awareness that 
the human capability to unite creation in love, is one that we have failed in and hence 
an ability that must be restored to us. Virtues too then also fall into this category of 
human capabilities we have fallen short of, and are only restored to us in Christ. It is 
Christ who works love in us and restores us. Virtue then, is in fact Christ’s activity, but
in doing so he also restores this capacity to humanity. We can join in Christ’s activity. 
Maximus is intent on virtuous activity being necessary for the human person and part 
of what we were always meant to become,249 and yet, in lieu of the fall, it is always 
with a passive participle (συνάγουσαν) that virtue is gathered to Christ. It is always 
the universe that is completed (συμπληρουμένην) by Christ. Tis also begins to shed 
light on the difculty of the previous section (3.2.2.1), where the practice of virtue 
needed to be a human choice and yet was an activity somehow beyond human 
248 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1312A-B [Louth,  Maximus, 160].
249 I discuss the virtues as natural to humans in 4.1.
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capacity, and that needed God. We will return to this issue in the next section in order 
to discuss precisely how we can have a share in Christ’s activity.
3.2.4 Virtues and the Logos/Tropos Distinction
Maximus’ wider cosmological vision is further alluded to in the earlier quotation from 
Leter 2 when he writes that in the act of “fulflling the power of love”, human nature 
is made whole, since we operate “in accordance with a single meaning and mode”.250 
Tese terms, logos and tropos, are particularly important in Maximus’ cosmological 
understanding of human life. When humanity fell, it ceased to move in accordance 
with God’s intention and meaning (logos) for it. Fallen humanity diverged from its 
intended logos in God. Only by partaking in renewed human nature in Christ is it 
possible to follow again the logos intended for us. Part of that intended logos for 
humans involves the perception of meanings (logoi) in all other things, the gathering 
of them together in love and the commending of them to God.251 Our task then is to 
bring our mode of living (tropos) into line with the way of living that God hopes we 
will take and has created us to take (logos). To seek to actualise virtue is thus to bring 
our tropos into line with our logos – to bring our mode of living into line with God’s 
intended meaning for us.252 Logoi theology will be explained in depth in the next 
section, but we can see here that the later part of the (Leter 2) quotation above is a 
concise rendition of the cosmological purpose of the human. Virtue is a key part of a 
process in which the human moves in accordance with God’s will towards the 
restoration and unity of the universe and the perfection of the human being – 
deifcation.
3.2.5 Virtues and Deifcation
We have so far discussed the movement of virtues towards love and noted that, when 
set within some of the broader cosmological themes in Maximus’ works, virtues are 
activities that draw the human closer to perfect love. Tis leads us into a direct 
discussion of the cosmic role of virtue in deifcation. Maximus explicitly links virtuous
action with the distilling of love and the leading of the human to deifcation. He writes
250 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1312A-B [Louth, Maximus, 160].
251 See 3.3.2.
252 This is explored further in 4.1.2.
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that:
I mean: love of humankind, brotherly and sisterly love, hospitality, love of the poor, 
compassion, mercy, humility, meekness, gentleness, patience, freedom from anger, 
longsufering, perseverance, kindness, forbearance, goodwill, peace towards all. Out of 
these and through these the grace of love is fashioned, which leads one to God who 
deifes the human being that he himself fashioned (πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἄγει θεουργηθέντα 
τὸν δημιουργήσαντα ἄνθρωπον).253
In this passage, the very existence of virtue implies love and leads one towards God. 
As we saw earlier in the comparative passages between Paul and Maximus, the virtues
seem to both lead one into love, and to be love in diferent forms. Other activities have
joined the list above, and these no longer just include Paul’s virtues but also love of 
humankind (φιλανθρωπίας), brotherly and sisterly love (φιλαδελφίας) and others 
more besides. Tese additions, I think, are especially important as they reveal 
something about the nature of what Maximus is willing to perceive as activity through
which love is made manifest. Tese are activities which demonstrate some kind of 
loving atitude, or, in Maximus’ own words, “Out of these and through these the grace 
of love is fashioned”. At this stage it seems apparent that virtue is a kind or version of 
love; an instance in which love is manifest. Te virtues both lead one into love, and 
seem to be love in diferent forms. When one practices a virtue, it is derived from love,
which is its source, and leads one to love, which is its end. Love is the τέλος and 
αἲτιον of all virtue. We could not call virtue the totality of love, or representative of all
love, but it is still undoubtedly an activity that somehow254 partakes of love and causes 
love to be present. Te way in which the human can cultivate and partake of virtue as 
part of the ascetic life and the spiritual journey of the human towards God will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. However, to demonstrate the way in which this cosmological 
position on love and virtue might be understood in practical terms as an activity that 
both is love and is a kind of love, let us return to the example above. Love of 
humankind (φιλανθρωπίας), which we might describe as a very generic care for those 
encompassed by human nature, and perhaps a care for what becomes of human nature
253 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 405A [Louth, Maximus, 91-2].
254 We will come on to precisely how.
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on a cosmic and eschatological scale, implies an atitude and associated actions 
pertaining to love. Tis is easily recognisable as a kind of love, but is still quite 
diferent from brotherly and sisterly love (φιλαδελφίας), which brings to mind a much
more personal kind of friendship and care. Te one who has love for humankind 
might be one who considers and writes on maters of philosophy and theology, a task 
that, at face value, might be categorised as a very diferent act as compared to the one 
who practices brotherly love. For Maximus however, these two diferent concepts are 
both the domain of the monastic and actually imply one another.255 A distinction does 
exist between the two kinds of love, and yet a theology (such as that of St Maximus’) 
arises from ascetic contemplation and living, whilst ascetic living is informed by a 
cosmic theology and philosophy.256 Each in turn lead one towards love of God. Hence 
we see two diferent virtues that are both kinds of love, that give meaning and arise 
from one another, and draw both their beginning and their end from love and 
contemplation of God, in the sense that they are loving, and yet through them we are 
led to a deeper understanding of love. We begin to see the way in which we might 
discuss virtues as diferent activities, and yet comprehend the more mystical 
description of them as caused by, causing, of, to and from love. Tere is a sense of 
cohesion implied in the term ‘virtue’ and its relationship with that which Maximus 
calls love. Tis would indicate that the virtues are virtues because they are diferent 
instances of loving activities. Tey are less an arbitrary list of good moral words, and 
rather selected as descriptions of what loving behaviour looks like in the diferent 
situations that confront us in life. Tey are what the dispensation of divine love would
look like at any given moment that might arise.
Te cosmological relevance of these activities is apparent in the next clause of 
the above quotation – “which leads one to God who deifes the human being that he 
himself fashioned”. Love leads one directly to God so that we become like God. Tis 
again leads us back to the earlier difculty we had where the act of virtue is both 
human and divine. Te activities through which love is made manifest are for the 
human to perform. We see this even more clearly in the line preceding the above 
quotation: “You, who have become blessed and most genuine lovers of this divine and 
255 Cf. Louth, Maximus, 33.
256 Cf. Louth, Maximus, 34.
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blessed way, fght the good fght until you reach the end, clinging fast to those 
qualities that will assure your passage to love’s goal. I means”.257 Tese are qualities 
which are ours to hold on to, qualities that “assure your passage to love’s goal”. 
However, we also read that love itself (which is the presence of these qualities), is 
fashioned through grace (χάρις). Deifcation is the gathering of the human being to 
God, by God’s grace, and not through human action alone. Tere must be meaningful 
sense in which the human can act and lay hold of virtue and the path to love, if we 
maintain that free will and choice are important.258 And yet, as we read earlier, it is 
Christ who gathers up the fragments of creation – it is God who deifes and not the 
actions of the human. Te reconciling of the need for the activity of virtue to be both 
meaningful human choice and undertaken by God will be dealt with in the next 
section on participation.
3.3 Participation
3.3.1 Chalcedonian Paradox
In this section I will clarify what is meant by participate with reference to the claim 
virtues are activities that participate in divine love. Participation is a recurring theme 
within Maximus’ theology, that ofen makes sense of paradox. A number of 
paradoxical remarks have been made in the course of this chapter so far. It has been 
said that virtues lead to love, and yet love leads to the virtues (Section 3.2). It has been 
said that love both is a virtue and is more than a virtue (Section 3.2 and 3.3). It has 
been said that virtues are activities that must be human, but also must be divine 
(Section 3.3). Tese statements however are not problematic for Maximus, partly 
because paradoxical statements refect the mystery of the divine that will always to a 
degree be unknown by us, and partly because of his understanding of participation. As
Maximus himself writes:
For who, relying on the power of rational demonstration, can explain how the 
conception of the divine Logos took place? How was fesh generated without seed? 
257 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 405A [Louth, Maximus, 91].
258 As we will come onto, Maximus believes that human free will is very important.
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How was there an engendering without loss of maidenhood? How did a mother afer 
giving birth remain a virgin? How did He who was supremely perfect develop as He 
grew up? How was He who was pure baptized? How did He who was hungry give 
sustenance? How did He who was weary impart strength? How did He who sufered 
dispense healing? How did He who was dying bestow life? And, to put the most 
important last, how did God become man?259
Whilst Maximus claims that we can never explain these paradoxes while “relying on 
the power of rational demonstration”, he does not suggest that there can be no further 
discussion on the mater. Te kind of discussion Maximus has in mind for dealing with
paradoxical propositions such as these is exemplifed in the defnition of the Council 
of Chalcedon. As we saw in the Introduction, the Chalcedonian Defnition atempted 
to say all that could be said for certain about the paradox of Christ being both divine 
and human, holding these statements in tension within the unity of the one person of 
Christ:
one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begoten, in two natures being recognized 
without confusion (ἀσυγχύτως), without change (ἀτρέπτως ), without division 
(ἀδιαιρέτως), without separation (ἀχωρίστως), the diference (διαφορᾶς) of the 
natures in no way having been taken away because of the union (ἕνωσιν), but rather 
the individual character (ἰδιότητος) of each nature being preserved and running 
together into one person and one hypostasis, not being parted (μεριζόμενον) or divided
(διαιρούμενον) into two personss260
Within the Chalcedonian Defnition, the divinity and humanity of Christ were both 
confrmed without implying that he had duality in person. Tis was done by afrming 
259 Maximus, ‘Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice’, I.13, [G. Palmer, 
P. Sherrard & K. Ware (eds.), The Philokalia Volume 2, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 
1981),168]. According to Laga and Steel, the authenticity of these five theological centuries is 
generally rejected. The centuries were composed with fragments from authentic Maximus texts. The 
only chapters of the five centuries that can be corroborated by earlier manuscripts and confidently 
attributed to Maximus are the first fifteen chapters of the first century. The quotation used here is 
from chapter 13, and thus likely to be of authentic authorship. (C. Laga & C. Steel, ‘Introduction’ in 
Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 7, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1980), LXXVI, LXXXI).
260 Chalcedonian Definition, The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith, Bindley (ed.) (1988): Early 
Church Texts: www.earlychurchtexts.com/main/chalcedon/chalcedonian_definition.shtml (Accessed 
02.04.14). [Parvis, unpublished].
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that union (ἕνωσις) could exist with diference (διαφορά), but without division 
(ἀδιαίρετος). In other words, dual statements could be held to be true without 
forfeiting a belief in the unity of the subject at hand. Te infuence of this formula in 
particular in Maximus’ work is particularly clear in Maximus’ theology of the Logos 
and logoi. We fnd Maximus using this same language from the Chalcedonian 
Defnition to parallel the natures of Christ with the way in which logoi are gathered to
the Logos:
Tis is evident in the incomparable (ἀδιαιρέτῳ) diferences (διαφορά) among created 
things. For each is unmistakeably unique in itself and its identity (ἰδιότητα) remains 
distinct (ἀσυγχύτως) in relation to other things. He [the one who has learned to 
contemplate the logoi] will know that the many logoi are the one Logos to whom all 
things are related and who exists in himself without confusion (ἀσυγχύτως), the 
essential and individually distinctive God, the Logos of God the Father.261
In the above passage, that which Maximus calls the logoi are gathered to union with 
the Logos and yet still retain their distinct identity. Tis is afer the same fashion that 
Christ’s natures still retain their identity but are the one person of Christ. Many can 
retain their identity as many without compromising the unity of that which is one. 
“All things are related” to the Logos through the many logoi, and yet the Logos himself
is “without confusion”. Similarly in the Chalcedonian formula, Christ’s created and 
uncreated natures do not mix, and are “recognized without confusion, without change,
without division, without separation”. In the case of both the Chalcedonian Formula 
and Maximus’ Logos and logoi, uncreated and created nature are totally unalike, and 
yet are brought into perfect communion in the person of the Logos who is Christ. Tis
is not a coincidence of terminology, but precisely how Maximus understands the 
deifcation of the created to be possible: it is because Christ has brought these two 
natures of divinity and humanity into communion in Himself. Te paradox of 
reconciling human nature with divine nature is overcome in the incarnation, 
crucifxion and resurrection of Christ, as has already been discussed in Ambiguum 41 
earlier. Understanding this resolution of conficting paradox into simultaneous union 
261 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1077C [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 54].
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and distinction through Christ’s reconciliation of the created and divine, is, I think, the
frst step toward understanding how virtue can be said to be partaking in love. In 
order to see how this union and distinction relates to participation, I will briefy 
describe Maximus’ theology of the Logos and logoi, which I will later identify with the
relationship of love to the virtues.
3.3.2 Logos and logoi
As suggested in the previous quotation (3.3.1), logoi have something to do with 
creatures, but also imply relation with the Logos. Te logoi are the principles and 
meaning for each creature. Tey are the ideas for creation that reside within the mind 
of God prior to creation.262 Te logoi do not imply the pre-existence of creation as 
divine or as purely spiritual beings since, Louth explains, “they are not ‘things’, ontic 
realities; they are what God intends for each of his creatures.”263 We were made in 
accordance with them, but in the Fall we deviated from them, as God’s will, and thus 
sinned. In Christ’s redemptive act, it becomes possible again to live according to one’s 
logos, and in so doing, one lives naturally and with meaning and directivity toward 
God.264 In this way, the logoi are both of God and concerning creation. Tey are both of
Him and yet other than Him. The Logos as the second person of the Trinity is still 
inefable and beyond participation, and yet, Maximus clarifes, He is expressed in the 
logoi which come to be instantiated in creation.265
Te Logos in particular for Maximus, is related to logoi, since it is through 
Christ’s reconciliation of earth to heaven that we are restored to the possibility of 
following our logoi. Additionally, as the similarity of the two words suggests, there is 
something of the Logos in us, when we are in harmony with our logos. Tis idea of our
participating in the Logos of God through our logoi is explored a couple of times by 
Maximus through the analogy of the circle and radii. Te logoi are gathered to the 
Logos within the analogy of the circle and radii in Ambiguum 7: “It is as though they 
262 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1081A.
263 A. Louth, ‘St Maximos’ Doctrine of the logoi of Creation’ in Studia Patristica XLVIII. Leuven: 
Peeters Publishers (2010), 82.
264 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1084B.
265 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1081B: “Although he is beyond being and nothing can participate in him in 
any way, nor is he any of the totality of things that can be known in relation to other things, 
nevertheless we affirm that the one Logos is the many logoi and the many logoi are One.” [Blowers 
& Wilken, Cosmic, 57].
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were drawn to an all-powerful center that had built into it the beginnings of the lines 
that go out from it and that gathers them all together (πάντων συναγωγὀς). In this 
way the many are one”.266 Within this analogy Maximus expresses the simultaneous 
unity and plurality of the Logos and the logoi, the meanings and directivity of all 
created things. Te logoi are thus dependent on the Logos for their existence, He being
their origin, but also their aim and desire:
For there is no end toward which he can be moved, nor is he moved in any other way 
than toward his beginning, that is, he ascends to the Logos by whom he was created 
and in whom all things will ultimately be restored.267
Tis description of the logoi being moved towards the Logos, recalls the cosmic 
paradigm of movement in which love and the virtues have already been situated. 
Before discussing the relation of the Logos/logoi to love/virtues, I will briefy outline 
the framework suggested by Vladimir Cvetković that posits the circle/radii analogy of 
the Logos/logoi as a means to understanding logoi theology in the context of Maximus’
wider cosmology.
3.3.3 Circle and Radii
In his recent work, Cvetković proposed that we may extend the analogy of the circle 
and radii quoted above to encapsulate Maximus’ whole cosmic vision of progress 
towards God-the-Logos through the logoi.268 Cvetković suggests that we think of 
particulars as points arrayed on the circumference of a circle, who are connected to 
the centrepoint of this circle by radii. Along these radii we fnd the universals that 
express diferences and commonalities between particulars. One travels through more 
generic logoi, then through more specifc logoi and towards the Logos, who is the 
point at which the many become one, and yet is one Himself and not many.269 Te 
centrepoint of this circle then, towards which all particulars and universals alike are 
266 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1081C [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 57]; Circle and radii analogy also to be
found in Maximus, Myst., Ch.1.; Maximus, Cap. Gnost. PG 90 1125D-1128A II.4.
267 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1080C [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 56].
268 Cvetković, ‘Predeterminations’, 146. This is primarily offered as an alternative to Porphyian Tree as 
a means of explaining the categories and shapes of Maximus’ metaphysics. See 4.2.2.
269 Cvetković, ‘Predeterminations’, 146.
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drawn and held in place, is God the Logos. “Tus,” Cvetković writes, “Te individual 
beings by following their natural logos converge toward other human beings by 
discovering that they share the same humanity or creatureliness, but these are just 
stations on the movement along the radius toward the centre of the circle which is 
God”.270
Te circle and radii analogy serves as an image of cosmic movement – the 
struggle of the human to know God. Te image is particularly useful for its depiction 
of movement, a feature which previous analogies such as the Porphyrian Tree271 are 
lacking. It also beter depicts participation in the divine as the human moves towards 
God. It will also bring clarity to my later discussion of human and divine activity in 
relation to virtue, allowing us to situate this within the context of a cosmic paradigm 
that points towards the Logos, or, as I will argue later, love.
Below I include a diagram showing the possible way in which this analogy 
may be depicted.272 Recent work by Cvetković273 has shown that this analogy has been 
drawn in a variety of diferent ways throughout times and places in reference both to 
Maximus and to the original image Maximus drew from Dionysios’ Divine Names.274 
Movement of creatures in accordance to their logos in the diagram below is from the 
outside toward the Logos.
270 V. Cvetković, ‘Maximus the Confessor’s Geometrical Analogies’ in Orthodox Theology and the 
Sciences. P. Pavlov, & S. Tanev, (eds.). (Columbia: Newrome Press, 2013), 6.
271 A hierarchical understanding of biological categories where being is the best and most generic 
category and particulars occupy the furthest away point from this. I discuss this in detail in 4.2.2.1.
272 Diagram adapted in light of Cvetković’s suggested way of differentiating universals and particulars 
according to his theory: Cvetković, ‘Geometrical Analogies’, 273 (Fig. 4.).
273 V. Cvetković, ‘The Concept of the Delimitation of Creatures in Maximus the Confessor’ paper 
delivered by C. Cvetković on behalf of V. Cvetković to XVII International Conference on Patristics 
Studies. Oxford, Examination Schools, 10th – 14th August 2015.
274 Dionysius, DN PG3 644A Ch.2.5; PG3 821A Ch.5.6.
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3.3.4 Te Logos as Love
In order to make use of the positions I have put forward thus far in this section, I will 
set the relationship of the Logos and the logoi in dialogue with that of love and the 
virtues. I posit that the relationship of virtue to love is identical to that of the logoi and
the Logos, and that in explicitly making this claim we can make radical and more clear
statements about what virtue is for Maximus and what is meant by its participation in 
love. For example, in identifying these two relationships with one another we can 
bring the abundance of scholarship on the Logos/logoi, like that of Cvetković’s, into 
direct contact with love and the virtues. In doing this we can gain a much more 
comprehensive understanding of the place of love and the virtues, and especially 
relating to participation, within Maximus’ cosmology.
Firstly we will look at the identifcation of the Logos with love, and what is 
consequently implied by such a statement.275 Maximus reminds us in Leter 2 when he 
275 Also discussed by Russell in his chapter on Maximus and deification: “This [deification] is more 
than just a moral achievement brought about by ascetic endeavour because the mystery of love in 
which the believer participates is that which has succeeded the law and the prophets – that is, Christ 
himself.” (Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 265).
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recalls 1 John 4:8: “Indeed, love is said to be God himself”.276 It is through love and 
because God is love, that
God takes form in each, through his great love for humankind, out of the virtue that is 
present in each through the ascetic struggle (πρᾶξιν) in accordance with virtue, in 
which and through which God receives his likeness to human beings.277
When virtue is present in us, love is present in us, which means God is present in us. 
Louth translates πρᾶξιν here as ‘ascetic struggle’. His choice to do so lies in the fact 
that Maximus uses  Evagrios’ triad of ascetic struggle (pratikê), natural contemplation 
(physikê) and theology as specifc terms through which the human ascends through 
prayer towards God.278 Ascetic struggle and virtue will occupy the topic of the next 
chapter, but it bears relevance now to participation and our paradox of virtue as 
human and divine actions. In practising ascetic struggle virtue is able to become 
manifest within us. Te actual presence of virtue is God in his love taking form in us. 
When this occurs, as Maximus goes on to elucidate, God is said to have “granted to 
you the splendour of virtue, which deifes you by grace, by sublimating your human 
characteristics. In you virtue also makes God condescend to be human, by your 
assumption, so far as it is possible for humans, of divine properties.”279 When the 
virtues are present, God, as love, is taking form in us. Tis sublimating of the human, 
in so far as it is possible for humans, is deifcation. Tis in itself can only occur 
through grace from the Holy Spirit:
Te Logos bestows adoption on us when He grants us that birth and deifcation which,
transcending nature, comes by grace from above through the Spirit. Te guarding and 
preservation of this in God depends on the resolve of those thus born: on their sincere 
acceptance of the grace bestowed on them  and, through the practice of the 
commandments, on their emptying themselves of the passions they lay hold of the 
divine to the same degree as that to which, deliberately emptying Himself of His own 
276 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 404C [Louth, Maximus, 91].
277 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 401B [Louth, Maximus, 90].
278 Louth, Maximus, 35-6.
279 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 408B [Louth, Maximus, 93].
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sublime glory, the Logos of God truly became man.280
So both human endeavour as ascetic struggle and the grace of God seem to enable love
as the virtues to become present in us. Tis is not a contradiction, but rather indicates 
that the virtues are instilled as part of a reciprocal relationship. Human ‘acceptance’ of
the virtues is only possible when there is space within the human to receive.281 We, 
like Christ, must frst empty ourselves before we can be flled with the other. Tere is 
not space for the other when we are flled with the passions of self-indulgence. As 
such, for God to take form in us, that is, for love, which is also the virtues, to take form
in us, we must allow space within us to receive. When the virtues become clear within
us, the love of God is within us and we share likeness with God. We are become like 
Him, in so far as it is possible for humans.282 Virtue is the sublimating of human 
characteristics. We are becoming more as God when we actualise them. Virtues move 
towards love because all things move towards God, and God is love. To return more 
specifcally to the Logos and logoi, when the Logos, as one of the persons in the 
Trinity, goes out and makes himself known through the logoi, he also is love. Human 
activity clears space for the Holy Spirit to instil virtue within us, which draws us 
closer to likeness with the Logos. So the presence of virtue within us is as a result of 
both human ascetic struggle and divine grace. At the moment virtue is present we 
partake in divine love. Te answer to our earlier query of if virtue is activity, whose 
activity is it?, lies in this understanding of ascetic struggle and virtue as participation 
in that which is of God.
3.3.5 Logoi and Virtues
Let us turn to the virtues and their relationship with the logoi. Te logoi concern 
creatures, but are of God. Tey do not exist as real entities, but are instead expressions
of hopes or predeterminations (προορισμός) that become manifest in creation when 
creatures act in accord with the divine will.  Maximus is both specifc and yet also 
broad in the way he is willing to use the term logoi in his cosmology. In so far as he is 
280 Maximus, Or. Dom. PG90 877A [Louth, Maximus, 33-4]. This translation is used as it is clearer, 
especially in relation to the key terms being discussed in this analysis.
281 Covered in 4.1.3.
282 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1081B.
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using the term to apply to predeterminations that are products of God’s will (θεῖα 
θελήματα),283 we could describe all these uses as saying something about the intended 
architecture of the cosmos according to God’s will. Some logoi are specifcally about 
creatures, and thus contain a vision for the trajectory of a creature’s life when lived in 
fullest communion with God. Other logoi concern how those creatures are ordered – 
Maximus says there are logoi of universals;284 and other logoi concern how those 
creatures relate to one another – Maximus implies there are logoi which are virtues.285 
All these logoi however are products or activities of divine will and we partake in 
them, we partake in God. Te cohesion in Maximus’ usage of the word ‘logoi’ seems to
be that, through this term, he wishes to express what intended right relation between 
all the cosmos and God is. A fully ‘rational’ (logikos) creation is one that is bound 
together in the person of Christ the Logos, entailing right relation at a personal level, a
universal level, and in relation to the divine.
When talking of universals, Maximus is clear that universals would cease to 
exist if they were not made up of particulars.286 We can see that logoi then do not have 
to refer just to the intended way of life for material things, but also express divine 
intention for the ordering of relation in creation. In Cvetković’s use of the circle and 
radii analogy he describes universal logoi as being “arranged all the way along each 
radius, while the logoi of each individual rational being, angel, man and woman are 
placed on the circumference at the fnal point of each radius.”287 In this way, travelling 
toward the Logos is the cosmic movement of creation, but occurs, as in Ambiguum 41, 
through the drawing of all created beings together in union through the person of 
Christ, and by the human following in Christ’s likeness by grace granted by the Holy 
Spirit. Te logoi of all things are brought together in harmony in their universal logoi 
and they fnd their fnal rest in Christ. Logoi here are still participable and the divine 
will for creation, and yet are about the relationship of particulars to one another.
In the same way that logoi concerning creatures and logoi concerning 
universals express the divine intention for the way in which creatures relate to one 
283 Maximus tells us he takes both the terms ‘predeterminations’ and ‘products of divine will’ from 
Dionysios: Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1080A.
284 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1080A.
285 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1081D. See below.
286 Maximus, Amb. 10 PG91 1189C-D.
287 Cvetković, ‘Predeterminations’, 146.
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another and God, so too can we see virtue as another architectural expression of right 
relation manifest in creation. In Ambiguum 7, Maximus uses the relationship between 
the Logos and virtue as a model example of how one lives and thinks in accordance 
with the logoi:
One who has learned to think devoutly about the logoi of existing things can explain 
this mater in another way. Tere can be no doubt that the one Word of God is the 
substance [ούσια] of virtue in each person. For our Lord Jesus Christ himself is the 
substance of all the virtues, as it is writen: ‘Tis one God made our wisdom, our 
justice, our sanctifcation and redemption’ (1 Cor 1:30). Tese things of course are said 
about him absolutely, since he is wisdom and righteousness and sanctifcation itself. 
Tey are not, as in our case, simply atributed to him, as for example in the expression,
a ‘wise man’ or a ‘just man’. It is evident that every person who participates in virtue 
as a mater of habit unquestionably participates in God, the substance of the virtues.288
As well as being an example of how logoi relate to the Logos, Maximus seems to be 
giving us another example of what the logoi are. Virtues are of God and belong to him,
and through grace and ascesis, we may partake of them. Tey themselves are another 
expression of right relation between the created and the uncreated, a divine activity 
which when considered from a creaturely perspective is a dynamic intention seting 
forth the parameters of an ethical life. I believe that under the defnitions given above 
that we can consider virtues themselves to be another kind of logoi – participable 
divine intentions that articulate the structure of the cosmos. Even without this full 
claim however, we can see in the above quotation that Maximus is happy to draw a 
parallel between the way we think about the logoi and the way we conceive of virtue. 
Tis in itself is still a useful observation since it means that we can apply the vast 
work done on our conceptions of the logoi in Maximus, like Cvetković’s geometrical 
analogies, to virtue.
We could consider, for example, that since Christ is the substance and the 
essence (ousia) of all virtue, that the virtues, like (other)289 logoi, can be thought of as 
288 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1081D [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 58].
289 I continue in this thesis to consider virtues as another instance of logoi, but the analogies that follow 
can still be considered valid even if one wished to claim that virtues should not be called logoi. The 
evidence for paralleling the concepts in Maximus is compelling and thus the apparatus we use to 
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radii that simultaneously are and are not the centre-point of the circle, which is love 
and the Logos Himself. Similarly, Christ, both is and is more than the logoi and the 
virtues. Tis is the answer to our earlier difculty, how can love be both a virtue and 
more than a virtue. It lies in Maximus’ understanding of the logoi participating in the 
Logos. Christ, like love, is the source and the perfection and end of all virtue and 
hence is virtue absolutely rather than atributively. Tus to partake of virtue is to 
partake of the Logos. We might be able to become a “just [wo/]man”, but Himself 
Christ is “justice”. We can become a “wise [wo/]man”, but Christ is wisdom. Our very 
partaking in these respective virtues causes Him to be manifest in us and we in Him. 
We are being deifed by grace when we partake of a virtue, since in so doing we are 
partaking of God Himself. Virtues, as some of the logoi, are an essential and natural 
part of our relation with our Creator.290 To live in accord with them is to live in accord 
with the intended natural beauty envisioned for us. It is to be gathered to oneness in 
love, in Christ. So the virtues are never foreign to us in the sense that they are 
something divine that is unatainable. Te virtues were meant to be chosen by us and 
are in fact something divine that is atainable.
However, despite the fact that the virtues, as logoi, were intended to be chosen 
by us, it is very important for Maximus that this choice is one that a human makes 
freely. We can see a description of this process very clearly in two passages especially. 
In Ambiguum 7, Maximus writes
Tat which is in our power, our free will, through which the power of corruption 
entered into us, will surrender voluntarily to God and will have mastery of itself 
because it had been taught to refrain from willing anything other than what God 
willss Do not be disturbed by what I have said. I have no intention of denying free 
will. Rather I am speaking of a frm and steadfast disposition, a willing surrender, so 
that from the one from whom we have received being we long to receive being moved 
as well.291
Also in Leter 2:
discuss logoi is still useful to any analysis of virtue in Maximus.
290 Maximus, Pyrrh. PG91 309B-C, Chs.88-95.
291 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1076B [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 52].
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And for this reason each one willingly frees himself from himself, by separating 
himself from any thoughts or properties to which he is privately inclined, and is 
gathered to the one singleness and sameness, in accordance with which nothing is in 
anyway separated from what is common to all, so that each is in each, and all in all, or 
rather in God and in others, and they are radiantly established as one, having the one 
logos of being in themselves, uterly single in nature and inclination.292
Tis is how unity occurs for Maximus: we willingly separate ourselves from selfsh 
thoughts and wrong-doing, and in doing so are gathered together by God. Te only 
active verb the human partakes of here is in freeing themselves from passion 
(άπολὑοντος: active participle). Afer doing this, the human ‘is gathered’ 
(συναγομένου: passive participle), which is a divine act that becomes possible now 
that the human has chosen to accept God’s love. Tis is a reprisal of the reciprocal 
relation that allows virtue to be instilled within us, where ascetic struggle meets the 
gif of grace. In choosing not to be dominated by the passions,293 we become free to 
receive and be gathered to God. Te virtues are logoi that we choose to turn towards, 
and, in so doing, we have already become receptive to the Logos, who is love. Tis is 
because the Logos and the logoi simultaneously exist as one and many, without 
ceasing to be either. And yet the logoi are of, point towards, and in a way are the 
Logos.294 So too is virtue of, leading us to, and partaking of the Logos. And so also is 
love, the gatherer of all virtues and the origin of all virtues, God Himself. To 
participate in virtue, is to participate in divine love. Tere is not “one form of love 
[assigned] to God and another to human beings, for it is one and the same and 
universal”.295 Te processes of deifcation – the human becoming like God – is the 
reconciliation of creaturely logoi to the Logos – it is the movement of humans through
virtues towards perfect love. All these things are expressions of that singular 
movement of the creature towards God – deifcation. Virtues move towards love 
because all things move towards God, and God is love.
292 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 400A-B [Louth, Maximus, 99].
293 Discussed further in 4.1.3.
294 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1081B-C.
295 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 401D [Louth, Maximus, 89].
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3.3.6 Chiasmus of Love and Virtues
Tere remains one paradox from earlier that has not yet been discussed, and that is to 
do with virtues leading to love, and yet love also leading to the virtues. Tis was a 
paradox that in part arose because we saw that for St Paul, if we do not have love, we 
have no virtues at all, whilst Maximus talked of the virtues leading us toward love. 
Given how much of Maximus is reliant on Paul’s use of the virtues, these seemed to be
an odd contradiction. In a comparison of Maximian and Tomistic virtue ethics, Louth 
refects on the relationship between love and virtue by considering the “chiastic 
structure”296 in chapters 2 and 3 of the Maximus’ First Century on Love. He translates 
these chapters as follows:
(I.2) Άπάθεια gives birth to love; hope in God to ἀπάθεια; patience and longsufering 
to hope; all embracing self-mastery is the source of these; the fear of God is the source 
of self-mastery; and faith in the Lord produces fear.
(I.3) He who believes in God fears punishment; he who fears punishment masters the 
passions; he who masters his passions endures tribulation; he who endures tribulation 
will possess hope in God; hope in God separates of all earthly inclination; the intellect
separated from this will possess love towards God.297
Louth then goes on to remark of these:
Te frst of these chapters has the sequence: love – ἀπάθεια – hope – patience-and-
longsufering – self-mastery – fear-of-God – faith-in-the-Lord; the second has the 
matching chiastic structure: faith-in-God – fear-of-punishment – mastery-of-the-
passions – tribulation – endurance-of-tribulation – hope – separation-from-earthly-
inclination [=  ἀπάθεια] – love-of-God.298
Louth is justifed, I believe, in identifying these two chapters as an instance of chiastic 
structure. We can see from the graphic I have put together below that the layout of the
stages in these two chapters reverse one another so that they form a cross shape in the
296 Louth, ‘Virtue’, 355.
297 Maximus, De char. PG90 962B I.2-3 [This translation: Louth, ‘Virtue’, 355-6]. I use this translation 
so that Louth’s analysis below matches up with the English terms he is using to translate the Greek.
298 Louth, ‘Virtue Ethics’, 351-363, 355-6; cf. Maximus, De char. PG90 962B I.2-3.
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structure of the text, resembling the leter chi, from which this literary technique 
derives its name ‘chiasmus’:
Te formation of the passage depicts the movement of love to faith, and then faith to 
love. In Louth’s breakdown of these of two chapters, we can see clearly the way in 
which Christian ascetic virtues originate in love and lead to deeper love of God. Love 
and the virtues are depicted as a mirror that refects cosmic movement, and 
importantly (as will be discussed in the next chapter) bring the actual ascetic practice 
of the virtues and love into a comprehensible paradigm. Tis is in keeping with the 
general purpose of the Centuries on Love, which at their heart are a practical set of 
aphorisms that enable the reader to refne their self-discipline and learn how to love. 
Love, as Louth also points out, can be learned –“Tere is a whole discourse about love 
that regards it as a kind of inspiration; it just happens, in some kind of amazing way 
we are swept of our feet. Maximos knows about that, too, but he is also intensely 
practical: we want to love – this is how to do it”.299 It is this former instance Louth 
refers to that describes a journey from love to faith (i.e. Chapter II) while the later is 
the means for the faithful to learn how to love. Te journey through virtues to love 
and vice versa is both a real movement through virtue and at the same time already is 
299 Louth, ‘Virtue Ethics’, 356.
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love. Te diferent virtues are distinct from one another, but, in light of what we have 
discussed in terms of participation, it makes sense that they both originate in love and 
lead to love. Tey both are love and are distinct from love, and at every stage our love 
is deepened.
Te movement of the person from one love through the many virtues to faith, 
and then from faith through the many virtues to love of God in the manner of the chi 
of chiastic structure, recalls the same kind of movement through logoi in and toward 
Christ that was discussed in the circle and radii model. Te simultaneity of movement 
present in the discussion of virtues in these chapters resembles that found in the 
analogy of the circle and radii. In the circle and radii analogy particulars are preserved
through and in Christ with movement from the centre of the radii toward the outside. 
Particulars also move in their ascetic lives toward Christ in their journey in and to 
Him, the centre-point of the radii. We likewise have a similar double movement in 
these chapters on love. In chapter II we have the movement of love to faith, a 
movement descriptive of how we can come to faith when moved by love, who is God 
Himself. In chapter III we have the movement of faith to love – the search of the 
ascetic who in faith searches for love, who is God.
Both the circle and radii analogy and the chiastic structure of these chapters 
serve to draw multiplicity into unity through movement, and depict passage through 
struggle toward God. Both are depictions of cosmic movement where the many are 
gathered up to rest in God through love. In light of the way Maximus describes cosmic
movement, it makes perfect sense that things can begin in love and progress toward 
deeper love, in the same way that all creatures were created by God and move toward 
most full relation with Him.
Within this section the Logos and logoi have been identifed with love and the 
virtues, so that a clearer understanding of participation can be gained. It has been 
explained that seemingly contradictory statements can be held in balance with one 
another following the logic of the Chalcedonian Formula. Te many virtues are love 
and love is the many virtues, and yet love is the beginning and end of all virtue; it is 
the perfection of all virtue. When virtue is manifest in us and our activity, so too is 
divine love. Te Logos and logoi relation has, I hope, not just furnished us with an 
understanding of what the relation of love to virtue is, but also how this is possible, 
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since it is the Logos and His activity of divine love in ‘recapitulating the world’ that 
means that virtue is something atainable for us, along with participation in divine 
love namely, deifcation. Tus I hope to have demonstrated that virtues are logoi. Tey 
are the way in which God intended us to live. What logoi are is necessarily tied to the 
person of Christ. Tey are who we become when we choose to move towards Him. By 
grace and ascetic struggle, virtue is instilled in the human and we then display divine 
love. Tis is why Cvetković’s use of the circle and radii analogy is particularly useful –
it helps us see the Logos and logoi as dynamic relation between Creator and creature, 
and in turn perfectly exemplifes the movement Maximus is talking about between 
virtue and love. Virtue for Maximus cannot be considered without love and without 
this cosmic paradigm of creaturely movement towards God. Just as there are no radii 
if we have no centre point of a circle, just as there are no logoi if they are not gathered 
by the Logos, so we can not begin to conceive of virtue if we do not understand the 
manner in which it participates in love. Ontologically grounding virtue in love and 
understanding love to be the same act as that performed by the Logos for all creation, 
allows us to begin making statements about what virtues must be. First and foremost, 
they must be acts of love. It is this that defnes them, and this that allows us to talk 
with any certainty of their existence. Virtues are diferent instances of love – of us 
acting in accord with divine will and so manifesting God’s presence on earth.
3.4 Conclusion
Te purpose of this chapter has been to explain what, for Maximus, virtue is. It has 
been claimed that virtues are activities that participate in divine love. I begun by 
looking at the quotations from St Paul that Maximus cites when describing the 
relation between love and virtue. Some similarities and diferences were identifed and
this raised questions such as how one could simultaneously claim that virtue both 
required love and led one to love. We moved on to set Maximus’ passages on love and 
virtue in the context of his wider cosmology, noting recurring language that recalled 
other areas of his thought and, on closer inspection, seemed to make more sense of the
way Maximus was describing virtue and love. Tis involved an exposition of cosmic 
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movement in Maximus’ thought. I noted that when talking of virtue as moving, we are
actually talking about human and divine relation made possible by both the activity of
God through grace and human activity as ascetic struggle. Tis led us to a fnal section
in which participation was discussed. Tis was done in light of the Council of 
Chalcedon and through the relationship of the Logos to the logoi, both of which shed 
light on the way in which it was possible for that which is of creation to participate in 
that which is divine without losing the particularity and uniqueness of one, nor the 
divinity and imparticipableness of the other. Tis understanding also allowed for the 
human to have meaningful activity whilst divine activity deifed through grace. Tis 
enabled us to explain how human activity could become virtuous, and how we could 
comprehend this gif to be equivalent to participating in the divine. As has become 
apparent, a discussion of the ontology of virtue very quickly becomes about the 
movement of creation towards deifcation. Tis is because a discussion of virtue in 
Maximus, is necessarily a discussion about the human struggling to become in the 
likeness of God and following in the activity that Christ made possible. It becomes 
impossible to qualify what a good life lived with virtue is, unless it is within this 
dynamic picture that points toward (and simultaneously participates in) our telos. 
Virtues are God’s activity as witnessed on earth and they might too become human 
activity, if we cultivate the right atitude. Virtues most fully manifest the divine love 
we have been called to imitate. Tey are distinct from love in their own particular 
fashion, but, by defnition of being divine activity, are always love.
What virtue is has been discussed, and we next come on to asking how the 
human might participate in virtue and what is meant by saying that virtues are 
natural to us. Tus the next chapter will continue our ontological enquiry into virtue, 
but will also begin to bridge the gap into discussing how virtue can be manifest within
our lives.
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~ Chapter 4: From Phnsical to Ethical in the Cosmos of
St Maximus ~
‘It is in human nature to gather the cosmos in love’
4.0 Introduction
In this chapter I will demonstrate that Maximus believes it is in human nature to 
gather the cosmos in love. I will explain what is meant by this statement and in doing 
so illustrate that the practice of virtue concerns both the sphere of ethical living and 
the material structure of the physical universe. It should therefore become apparent 
that the human struggle to acquire virtue is not only a personal ethics but is also, 
according to Maximus’ interpretation, integral to the cohesion of the universe. I will 
take my main statement apart in two sections. Te frst section (4.1) will be ‘virtues 
are natural’ which, following on from my previous chapter, explains how love as the 
summit and coalescence of the virtues belongs to human nature, and is therefore 
‘natural’. Tis section will be characterised in particular by the inquiry ‘how can we 
choose to be virtuous if virtues are natural?’. Tis question poses a contradiction 
between free will and nature. In the course of describing how we can atain the 
virtues, this difculty will be resolved. Te second section (4.2) will be ‘Gathering the 
Cosmos’ and will specifcally look at the relationship between human nature and all 
the rest of creation in Maximus’ Ambiguum 41. Ambiguum 41 recounts the ways in 
which human nature may overcome the physical divisions in the universe. Hence the 
main line of inquiry in this section will be ‘How can the physical world be gathered by
ethical activity?’, since it may not be immediately apparent how a sphere of ethics has 
any bearing on the physical, biological universe.
By the end of this chapter, I will have demonstrated how Maximus believes 
each of us may choose to acquire virtue and how it may be helpful to conceive of the 
virtues as manifold love. It will also have been shown that personal choice to love is a 
decision undertaken by the particular that enables unity in the divisions of nature that
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make up the created cosmos. It is this personal electing to live in communal love that I
shall take as particularly important in my next chapter when I critique current 
political institutions that we live in and maintain.
4.1 Virtues are Natural
As mentioned throughout the previous chapter, Maximus describes the virtues as 
natural rather than foreign to us. We do not have to reach for something beyond our 
capacity but can instead choose to become more fully who we are meant to be. In the 
course of proposing that virtue belongs to human nature, there arises a difculty of 
choice. If something is in our nature, it might be construed as being beyond our 
control. Tis creates difculties for how freely we can be said to be choosing virtue if 
it already belongs to our nature. Whilst explaining how Maximus believes the virtues 
to be natural within us, I will also resolve the difculties posed by the question ‘How 
can we choose to be virtuous if virtues are natural?’. I will begin this section (4.1.1) by 
looking at the passages in which Maximus describes virtues as natural, drawing 
especially on his Dialogue with Pyrrhus in which this topic is dealt with at length. 
Following this I will discuss the active role that the human takes in clearing the 
passions from within themselves (4.1.2). Tis should clear up a lot of the difculties 
surrounding what is natural and how we have free will. Lastly (4.1.3), I will discuss the
ascetic value Maximus places in referring to all the virtues as love. I will draw on 
Maximus’ Liber Asceticus where he describes the ascetic life as being easier to come to 
terms with when we consider the simplicity of love. Tis last section concerns how we
conceive of practical ethics and try to put it into practice. Love becomes not just a 
telos of virtues but also a measure against which we can know what virtue is, or a 
disposition in itself that maybe be easier to follow than a more disparate ‘virtue 
ethics’.
4.1.1 By Nature or By Habit?
An important part of Maximus’ conception of the virtues is that they are natural to the
human being. In this section I will explore what is meant by this. In the Dispute with 
Pyrrhus, Maximus describes the relationship between virtues and human nature:
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Pyrrhus: Virtues, then, are natural things?
Maximus: Yes, natural things.
Pyrrhus: If they be natural things, why do they not exist in all men equally, since all 
men have an identical nature?
Maximus: But they do exist equally in all men because of the identical nature!
Pyrrhus: Ten why is there such a great disparity [of virtues] in us?
Maximus: Because we do not all practice what is natural to us to an equal degree; 
indeed, if we [all] practiced equally [those virtues] natural to us as we were created to 
do, then one would be able to perceive one virtue in us all, just as there is one nature 
[in us all], and that ‘one virtue’ would not admit of a ‘more’ or ‘less’.300
In this passage we learn two important things. Firstly, that virtue is as much an 
essential part of what it is to be human as anything else we might ascribe to human 
nature. And secondly that human nature is not a static set of facts to which all 
particulars of that kind subscribe, but something that can be grown into. Te frst of 
these two statements is fairly self-evident from Maximus’ response to Pyrrhus: virtues
exist equally in all human beings because of our identical nature. Te second statement
is more unexpected as it implies that nature is not static but transformative, and 
therefore tied to the development of the particular person and their choices. Te 
transformative aspect of nature is something we can infer from the passage in which 
Maximus explains that all virtues exist in all of us equally, but that if we do not 
practise them they are not perceptible within us. Tis means that manifestation of 
nature is to some degree reliant on the practice of the particular. Maximus tells us that
by ‘natural’ he is referring to a capacity which we are able to exercise. What we have 
by nature is not an automated list of properties that make us up, but rather things we 
are capable of doing if we as particulars of this nature choose as agents to exercise 
these capacities. As Maximus is always reminding us, what exists by nature is only in 
existence when there are particulars that make it up. Tis means that to a certain 
extent nature is going to change with the particulars that make it up. Like for example,
if humans made an irreversible choice to cut themselves of from the love of God, 
human nature would forever be changed in a very real way. It would require a 
300 Maximus, Pyrrh. PG91 309B [Farrell, Disputation, Chs.88-93, 32-3].
131
~ Chapter 4: Froo rhysical to Ethical in the Cosoos of St saxious ~
reinstituting of human nature – a making it anew to restore the capacity to choose 
God again to humans. In the next section (4.1.2), I come back to this in more detail and
discuss what this means for the relationship of hypostasis to nature. For now however,
let us continue to look at this description of nature, as it is not at all the one Pyrrhus is
expecting. 
It is perhaps easiest to get to grips with Pyrrhus’ surprise and frustration with 
Maximus’ description of virtue as natural if we look at Aristotle’s reasonable but 
completely contrary position. At the beginning of book two of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle writes
... Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence its name (ethike) is one that is 
formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that 
none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can 
form a habit contrary to its natures Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do
the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made 
perfect by habit.301
Aristotle maintains that, because we are able to form habits that are vices and the 
opposite of virtues, it indicates that virtues don’t belong to our nature. According to 
Louth this habitual instilling of virtue is a position held by Tomas Aquinas as well as 
Aristotle,302 perhaps accounting for the prevalence of this position on virtue in 
contemporary culture. In a more detailed exposition of this point, Aristotle goes on to 
say:
Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we frst acquire the potentiality and 
later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the sense for it was not by ofen 
seeing or ofen hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them 
before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues 
we get by frst exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well.303
Senses, Aristotle explains, are capacities we have that we can just do. We don’t get 
301 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.1 1103a; lns 17-21, 24-26. [Ross, Nicomachean, 23].
302 Louth, Virtue Ethics, 358.
303 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.1 1103a; lns 27-33. [Ross, Nicomachean, 23].
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beter at hearing by practising ofen,304 it is just innate to us, Aristotle believes. In 
comparison, he says, virtue is much more like an artisan practice which we must work
at and fne hone until it is instilled in us by habit. Senses therefore belong to us by 
nature, Aristotle says, and virtues do not. Tis Aristotelian position sounds very 
familiar. We don’t get virtues the way we get sight or hearing or touch, we have to 
work hard at them in order to get them. Like playing a musical instrument or drawing 
and painting.
Maximus does not agree. For Maximus, virtues are much more akin to the way 
Aristotle understands senses. A beter way of puting it perhaps is that when we are 
not virtuous, it is the equivalent of us walking around with our eyes shut, or our noses
pegged closed, or our mouths taped up or so on. We have to consciously disrupt and 
distort something that is otherwise a natural part of our activity in order for it not to 
be present in us. Maximus further explains this to Pyrrhus when he writes:
Asceticism, and the toils that go with it, was devised simply in order to ward of 
deception, which established itself through sensory perception. It is not [as if] the 
virtues have been newly introduced from outside, for they inhere in us from creation, 
as hath already been said. Terefore, when deception is completely expelled, the soul 
immediately exhibits the splendour of its natural virtues Consequently, with the 
removal of things that are contrary to nature only the things proper to nature are 
manifest. Just as when rust is removed the natural clarity and glint of iron [are 
manifest].305
Tere is no in-between state where one is neither in possession of virtue or vice, 
Maximus maintains.  He writes that “he that is not foolish is intelligent, he that is not 
cowardly is bolds”.306 In order to disagree with Maximus, one must either posit that 
there is an in-between state where one is neither cowardly nor bold; foolish or 
intelligent; unrighteous or righteous, or one must posit that we naturally possess vice. 
304 Arguably one can fine hone hearing – for example to pick out the instruments playing in an 
orchestral symphony, or fine hone seeing – by learning what to look out for when spotting the 
silhouette of a raptor. But while we may be able to improve or fine hone senses, Aristotle is making 
the comparison between a sense that we can largely already use to a good degree when born and an 
artisan practice which we are clearly born with no knowledge of at all.
305 Maximus, Pyrrh. PG91 309C-312A [Farrell, Disputation, Ch.95, 33-4].
306 Maximus, Pyrrh. PG91 309C-312A [Farrell, Disputation. Ch.95, 34].
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We either possess neither virtue nor vice naturally and must work to acquire either 
(this would seem to be more in line with Aristotle’s position), or we possess one of 
virtue or vice naturally and our activity is focused either on ridding ourselves of vice 
(as rust on iron), or on trying to lay hold of virtues in order to overcome a natural 
state of vice (which amounts to us being foolish until we lay hold of intelligence, or 
cowardly until we become bold). One could argue however that Aristotle’s position 
actually has much more in common with this later idea. Since we have to work to lay 
hold of virtue which is beyond us, there is a sense in which, until we practice it, we 
possess only paucity on these fronts. Te image of rust removed from iron is a 
particularly useful one to paint Maximus’ position on virtue. When Louth translates 
this passage, he describes this metaphor as “the natural gleam and lustre of iron” 
(Φύσιν αὺγἠ και λαμπρότης).307 Humans possess a ‘natural gleam’ that becomes 
shrouded in rust as we choose to act in ways contrary to our nature. Te way we 
choose to act and its relationship with our nature falls into the hypostasis – physis 
relation that will be discussed below (4.1.2). Maximus can confdently claim that 
virtues are natural because of his understanding of the Logos and logoi mentioned in 
the previous chapter. If we think back to how virtues are descriptive of relationship in 
Christ, claiming that virtues are natural to the human is the equivalent of claiming 
that it is in our nature to be in Christ; to partake in God; to rest in theosis. Virtues, as 
logoi, are God’s will for us, and being in them is to exist and to exist well. Here we can
think back to Chapter 2 and the triad of well-being (2.1.3), where being was given to 
us, but well-being was a choice we make that is restored to us by Christ’s reinstitution
of human nature. If we think back to Chapter 3 (3.3) it is also precisely because virtues
are love, and love is God, that we can talk of telos and logoi as being a path we are 
meant to choose. By this I mean that we always have the choice whether or not to be 
in God, but that it is natural to us as creatures, and desired by God, that we choose to 
love.
What inevitably must follow from this observation however, is an 
acknowledgement that human nature is fallen. Virtues may be natural, but that 
connectivity and walking easily with God is what was, and is lost to us. Tis is of vital 
importance to Maximus, because, unlike Aristotle, he does not believe that any 
307 Maximus, Pyrrh. PG91 309C-312A [Louth, Virtue Ethics, 355]. 
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amount of human perseverance can change what has been lost to nature.308 Tis means
that the manifestation of virtue within the human always has its roots in Christ. It is 
grace and the divine opening His embrace to creation that has enabled the 
transformation of nature. Louth expresses the importance of the fall to the early 
Christians when considering why it was that they rallied to the notion of virtues 
rather than a moral system more directly derivative of the commandments:
Part of the reason is, paradoxically, connected with their belief in the Fall of 
humankind: given that, and the consequences for humankind, any approach to ethics 
that remained at the level of behaviour seemed quite inadequate – ethical behaviour 
had to fow from a reconstructed human nature: it was a mater of being, of ontology. 
Virtue ethics addresses the question of goodness at this level, for it is concerned more 
with what human beings are, rather than how they make moral choices, how they 
behave.309
Virtue, for Maximus, is intimately tied to his understanding of human nature and the 
Fall. Tough virtues are natural, their presence in us is always a reciprocal task where 
the human clears away the passions and stops misusing natural faculties, and the 
grace of God instils virtue within us. Before moving on to discuss how passions are 
cleared and human receptivity to divine instilling of virtue, let us look at the 
metaphysical implications of transformative nature and what this means for the way 
we as personal hypostases choose to act.
4.1.2 Transformative Nature and the Simultaneity of Nature and Hypostasis
We saw in 4.1.1 that Pyrrhus does not understand how Maximus can say that virtues 
are natural when virtues clearly change from person to person. In this section I shall 
look at the metaphysical implications of Maximus’ response to Pyrrhus. Where 
Pyrrhus goes wrong in his understanding of virtue, is in assuming that human nature 
is an abstract universal. He imagines that those properties which belong to human 
nature exist as a coherent set of identical atributes to which all humans conform. Not 
unreasonably, Pyrrhus’ understanding of ‘nature’ is a collection of words that we can 
308 Cf. Louth, Virtue Ethics, 353.
309 Louth, Virtue Ethics, 354.
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say certain things have in common. We expect there to be relatively litle disparity in 
the appearance of these features. For Aristotle, as well as the senses, human nature 
was considered to possess judgement, understanding, and intuitive reason.310 In our 
biological categories today, we recognise physical characteristics that we expect most 
human beings to share: two arms, two legs, a brain etc. All these things are ways in 
which we tend to identify humans in general – they are properties we confer on 
human nature that exhibit very litle variation from person to person. We can 
understand Pyrrhus’ confusion then when Maximus adds ‘virtues’ to this list. Surely 
this is a thing that is varied between people that we cannot consider to belong to 
human nature, Pyrrhus essentially says. In 4.1.1 I explained how Maximus sees virtues
as much more like senses that can be exercised, than limbs or other static features. I 
also mentioned that this means that our nature seems to be transformative. By this I 
mean that it does not appear to be a static series of descriptions, but that human 
nature, as in the Fall, has the capacity to be corrupted, and, through the restorative 
power of Christ and the grace of the Holy Spirit, may also grow into renewed human 
nature.
Unlike what appears to be the case in Pyrrhus view, Maximus has a 
simultaneous concept of nature and person. What is in human nature is not separate 
from the activity of particular instances of humans. A person is not separate from 
nature, but an instantiation of nature. Tere is not an abstract human universal to 
which we are conforming, but rather, through Christ we possess the restored capacity 
to most fully become what is in our nature. In this way, nature is not the prerequisite 
bit we get passed on at birth and stuck with, but what we can most fully become 
should we choose to act in accordance with God’s logoi for us. “It is not [as if] the 
virtues have been newly introduced from outside, for they inhere in us from creation, 
as hath already been said”,311 Maximus writes, recalling Gen. 1:31 where “God saw all 
that he had made, and it was very good”. Te distinction between what it is intended 
that we become and the path that we choose to take, is characterised as a distinction 
between logos and tropos (mode, or way of living). Loudovikos asks us to “...consider 
the logos-tropos distinction as an expression of the existential antinomy of necessity 
310 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.11 1143b; lns 6-8.
311 Maximus, Pyrrh. PG91 309C-312A [Farrell, Disputation. Ch.95, 33].
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and freedom which characterises the relationship between nature and person”.312 
Whilst ‘antinomy’ is an unhelpful term, suggesting opposition rather than 
participation, the characterising of nature as necessity and person (hypostasis) as 
freedom is still a useful distinction, in so far as it means that, if logos is the path upon 
which nature can be realised, then tropos is the way in which a person chooses to act in
order to achieve this. Logoi remain unchanged, and we must choose to live our lives in 
accordance with them, if we wish to live in Christ. 
Maximus’ explanation of tropos found in the Dispute with Pyrrhus is worth 
replicating at this point. Pyrrhus, like any good Chalcedonian, knows that Christ must
be considered one. He says, given this, “If Christ be one person, then He willed as one 
person. And if He willed as one person, then doubtless He hath one will, and not two”.
Maximus replies by saying if Christ is ‘one’, is He only God, or only man, both 
together? Pyrrhus replies, “Obviously God and man”. Maximus then says, so in what 
sense can we say that Christ is truly God and man if He cannot will according to the 
divine nature and according to human nature? In what way does He really possess 
these natures, if He cannot act according to them?313 Maximus makes a distinction for 
us between nature and person. He tells us that what we can do is to do with our 
nature, and what we do do is to do with personhood. In other words, personhood has 
to do with agency. Te capacity to do something, is contrasted with the human choice 
to exercise such a capacity:
Te will and the mode of willing are not the same, just as the power of sight and the 
mode of perception are not the same. Will, like sight, is of nature. All things which 
have an identical nature have identical abilities. But the mode of willing, like the mode
of perception – in other words, to will to walk or to will not to walk, and the 
perception of the right hand or of the lef, or of up or down, or the contemplation of 
concupiscence or of the rational principles in beings – is only a mode of the use of a 
power, of the employment of will and of perception. And the same distinction may be 
applied to other things as well. Tese things demonstrate that have, by nature, the will 
to eat or not to eat, to walk or not to walk. But these negatives are not applicable to 
the will as such, but only to the particular mode of willing. In other words, things 
312 Loudovikos, Eucharistic Ontology, 94.
313 Maximus, Pyrrh. PG91 288D-289C [Farrell, Disputation. Ch.8-13, 4-5].
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come to pass by choices.314
Maximus here explains for us the diference between what we are able to do, and what
we choose to do. Te will, which is a natural capacity we have, belongs to our nature. 
Choosing to exercise this capacity and the mode in which we carry it out belongs to 
the person. Te way we choose to use this natural capacity can either be in the way it 
is intended (i.e. in accordance with our logos) or can be in a twisted, corrupt mockery 
of this where we turn our love inwards to ourselves alone. Either way, what we do 
with our natural capacity is above called our ‘mode of willing’ or tropos. For Maximus,
what is natural extends not only to the capacity to do good, but also that intended 
trajectory – there is a good way we can act that is the natural way to exercise this 
faculty. Tis is how we can say that virtue is natural to everyone, even though not 
everyone has aligned their tropos to their logos to bring this into reality. Te outcome 
– the telos – is natural for humans, even if we choose to act unnaturally, virtue is still 
natural to us – we have just denied its presence in us and turned our natural capacities
toward unnatural ends.
When our own mode of living (tropos) is at variance with our logos and has 
strayed from what is natural, we are living ‘unnaturally’; against our nature. We can 
no longer reach for well-being because we have fallen away from being itself. We do 
not know what being even is, or how to live naturally. But if natural capacities can be 
used unnaturally, and if human nature is a universal tied to particular instances, is it 
not possible for human nature as a whole to no longer resemble what it was frst 
intended to be?
I believe that this is how Maximus understands human nature to have fallen. 
Humans as particulars rejected God and turned as one from him. Because of the 
simultaneity of hypostasis and nature, when all humans choose other than God, all 
human nature falls. Whatever human nature was intended to be, it no longer exists 
and particular humans can no longer reach for that original nature, because its 
existence was in God who gave us being itself, and whom we chose to reject. Te 
paradox is however, that to retrieve original human nature (which is to retrieve 
existence itself), there must be a particular instance of it, an archetype, in who’s image
314 Maximus, Pyrrh. PG91 292D-293B [Farrell, Disputation. Ch.23, 10].
138
~ Chapter 4: Froo rhysical to Ethical in the Cosoos of St saxious ~
we can be renewed. Tere must simultaneously be an archetype who is an instance of 
human nature, and yet who has the divine power to restore nature which is fallen (to 
create it anew – thus a divine business). Christ restores nature by uniting it to the 
divine, and by aligning his will to the divine will. In the language of our above 
paragraph, he exercises the human natural will and brings a human mode of willing 
(tropos) into line with the divine will and intention for us (which is also the logos that 
it was intended we follow). Christ dies into the death and non-being of fallen human 
nature which has turned from being itself (if we think back to the Triad of Well-being 
from Chapter 2), and as God and human unites those wills and resurrects human 
nature. Death and non-being are defeated and the whole of human nature brought out
of its self-condemnation of death. Christ makes the choices a human must make, even 
though a human cannot make them, because the original nature has fallen. He 
transfgures nature as a human because he is divine. Nature has been transformed and 
we, by choosing to die to the old corrupt nature may live in his new resurrected 
nature, bringing our tropos into line with our logos.
What this all means for our acquisition of the virtues, is that we cannot even 
start to reach for them, unless we choose to be a part of reconstructed human nature 
in Christ. At the same time, this very choice is the start of the acquisition of the 
virtues, since Christ Himself is the virtues within us, and the virtues are that moment 
where communion between the human and divine has become possible again. It also 
means that there is a process to becoming ‘human’ and exhibiting human nature, 
because we have fallen from our nature. Not only are virtues natural, then, but to talk 
of trying to acquire them, is to talk of becoming truly human. Exhibiting virtue is the 
most natural thing – it is us becoming human – a creature fully in communion with 
God – fully conjoined in love with all the cosmos.
4.1.3 Clearing Passions
I next ask how it is possible for humans to truly choose virtue when it is divine and we
require the grace of God to instil it in us. How can Maximus claim that we are doing 
anything important with our ‘mode of willing’ if virtue itself is somehow beyond our 
human capabilities to ever manifest alone. In the previous chapter, participation was 
discussed with reference to the logoi and the virtues (3.3). It was emphasised that the 
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manifestation of virtue within us is born both of human endeavour in ascetic struggle 
and the grace of God. Te metaphysical relation of grace and human activity has been 
covered (3.3), but here, using Maximus’ metaphor of the rusted iron, I think a more 
personal and useful (in the sense of utility to those interested in ascetic practice) 
picture can be painted.
Rather than the Aristotelian position we looked at earlier where virtue is 
external to the human, Maximus believes it is logismoi that are external to the human. 
Tese are feeting temptations and thoughts that plague our minds, or, in more 
familiar virtue language – they are the temptations towards vice. It is the task of the 
ascetic to repel these, on a level of mind and body. Maximus describes the diferent 
stages at which we fall into sin, where those who allow the logismoi to fower and 
fourish in the mind fall to sin, as well as those who then go on to carry physical 
actions as a result of these temptations.315 Tese feeting logismoi thus become 
passions, infammations within us that rust over our natural virtues. Tese are the 
choices that we make that are against our nature. Vice is thus given reality even 
though it is not natural to the human. Tis position is not unique to Maximus and we 
can see similar ideas in predecessors like Gregory of Nyssa316 and Evagrios.317 In Leter 
2: On Love, Maximus describes vice as the turning of virtuous capacities toward 
oneself. He writes that “humankind has brought into being from itself the three 
greatest primordial evils, and (to speak simply) the begeters of all vice: ignorance, I 
mean, and self-love and tyranny”.318 In a reversal of the virtues, Maximus identifes 
self-love as the origin of all vice.319 Vice itself however is a corruption given reality by 
human choice:
For reason, instead of being ignorant, ought to be moved through knowledge to seek 
solely afer God; and desire, pure of the passion of self-love, ought to be driven by 
yearning for God alone; and the incensive power, separated from tyranny, ought to 
315 Maximus, De char. PG90 1008B II.74;1010D-1012A II84;1043C III88.
316 Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5 PG44 1256B.
317 Evagrios of Pontos, Chapters on Prayer PG79 1169, Cg.9. [L. Dysinger (trans.), English public 
domain translation: http://www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/03_Prayer/00a_start.htm (Accessed 
05.04.16).]
318 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 397A [Louth, Maximus, 87].
319 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 397C [Louth, Maximus, 88].
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struggle to atain God alone.320
It is a misuse of our faculties that creates vice. Instead of fulflling our natural 
capacities which are directed teleologically toward God, we instead turn them to 
ourselves. It is our will then that has brought about evil and has caused our nature to 
become fallen. Again similar ideas are found in Gregory of Nyssa’s thought, who for 
example writes of evil that “It has no substance of its own; apart from deliberate 
choice evil exists nowhere”.321 In choosing to turn from God, we choose evil and our 
nature becomes corrupted. We would forever remain a slave to this fallen nature were 
it not for Christ’s hypostatic union to our nature and the renewal of our capacity to 
love.322 
We are not just defned by our natures however, but are simultaneously defned
by our personhood. Tis means that agency is involved as well as natural capacity. 
Christ has restored our natural capacity but we need to choose to clear away the 
passions that hide virtue. Maximus uses the metaphor of the bar of iron that, when 
cleaned of rust, is returned to its natural gleam and lustre (Φύσιν αὺγἠ και 
λαμπρότης).323 We fnd that when we work to eradicate the hold of the passions 
within us, the virtues become manifest within us. Tis is our “natural gleam” as “God 
takes form in each”.  As was discussed in Chapter 3 (3.3.5) the existence of virtue 
within us is part of reciprocal relation between the human and God. It is grace and the
Spirit through Christ which instils virtue within us, and it is the human who prepares 
the way. Warding of logismoi and the passions is that preparing the way. As Louth 
notes, it is this that the human partakes of when we talk of ascetic struggle, rather 
than any single person laying hold of virtue themselves:
Evagrios, the frst ‘philosopher of the desert’, as Guillaumont has dubbed him, devotes 
a good deal of time to the logismoi, and their classifcation. Tis is not, I think, 
primarily a doleful concern with the ravages of sin and the Fall; rather an awareness 
that what we can do is less to cultivate the virtues than to struggle against the assaults
and distractions that the Christian is beset by; what we are doing is more clearing the 
320 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 397AB [Louth, Maximus, 87].
321 Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5 PG44 1256B. [Graef, Gregory.,135-6.]
322 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 397BC [Louth, Maximus, 87-8].
323 Maximus, Pyrrh. 309B-312A.
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way for the operation of grace than building up the self through the virtues , 
something beyond our sinful powers.324
Tis clearing away of the passions is characterised by Maximus with reference to 
Evagrios of Pontos’ three stages of spiritual life.325 Tese stages are praktikē, physikē, 
theologia.326 David Bradshaw gives a good succinct description of what each of these 
three stages represent: “frst the ascetic practice of the virtues, then the contemplation 
of the logoi of beings, and fnally the contemplation of the Logos who is their 
source”.327 Tese stages of the spiritual life serve to roll together both the ascetic 
clearing of passions we have been discussing and the cosmic unity that comes about 
as a result. Clearing away the passions and receiving the Spirit within us allows us to 
see God’s meaning for all things about us more clearly, since to manifest virtue is to 
know the logoi which is to know the Logos Himself who is in all things.328 Tus far I 
have characterised these stages as simultaneous since my proposition in Chapter 3 
was that virtues are logoi and that the logoi are and are in the Logos. Seeing this as 
stages as in Evagrios’ method might also be a useful way to consider the spiritual life. 
It allows us to think frst of trying to clear self-love from our hearts, without being 
overwhelmed by the idea that this action will ultimately bind together and unite the 
cosmos in love to Christ through the Holy Spirit. It also allows us to break down what 
is going on in the establishment of love – that it begins with changing the self, that it 
re-establishes relation with the rest of the cosmos, and thus unites and brings all to 
God. As Bradshaw notes, ofen in Evagrian literature, these steps are characterised as 
a hierarchy that ascends away from the material world.329 Bradshaw is keen to stress 
that this is not always the case with Evagrios and neither is it with Maximus.330 A way 
to avoid the dangers of this way of thinking are to consider this as the natural 
movement of a developing relationship that begins when we allow Christ within us, 
and to consider the relative simultaneity of these stages, given that God is revealed 
both in virtue, the logoi of all creatures, and ultimately in the Logos. Nothing is lef 
324 Louth, Virtue Ethics, 354.
325 Maximus, De char. PG90 984B-985B II.1-6. 
326 Evagrios of Pontos, Chapters on Prayer PG79 1165, Prologue.
327 Bradshaw, ‘The Logoi of Beings in Greek Patristic Thought’ in Toward and Ecology, 15.
328 Also called theoria physike.
329 Bradshaw, ‘Logoi of Beings’  in Toward an Ecology, 14-15.
330 Bradshaw, ‘Logoi of Beings’  in Toward an Ecology, 15.
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behind, rather, the cosmos is gathered to.
The clearing o  passions is also a li etime’s work. In the Ascetic Life, Maximus 
presents the search  or virtue as a continuous struggle. He cites Paul’s letter to the 
Philippians, writing, “Let us emulate the holy athletes o  the Saviour. Let us imitate 
their combats, forietini the thinis that are behind, and stretchini forth (ἔμπροσθεν 
ἐπεκτεινόμενοι) to those that are before. Let us imitate their tireless course (τὸν 
ἀκατάπαυστον αὐτῶν δρόμον), their faming eagerness….331 The virtuous li e o  the 
saints is presented in the context o  feeing  rom passion and attachment to material 
desires. Instead we reach  orth (ἐπεκτείνω) in a race that is never set at rest 
(ἀκατάπαυστος). In an analysis o  this same Pauline passage, Gregory o  Nyssa 
suggested that the reason our ascetic striving is tireless and continuous is because God
always remains in some way mysterious. Much like the way Maximus discussed 
theosis itsel  as an ever-moving rest332, an arrival that is never complete, Gregory 
suggested that we can apply this apophatic mystery to the present li e as well. The 
idea o  perpetual reaching toward God was derived  rom Philippians 3:13: “Brethren, I 
count not mysel  to have apprehended: but this one thing I do,  orgetting those things 
which are behind, and reaching  orth unto those things which are be ore (ἔμπροσθεν 
ἐπεκτεινόμενος).. In his Life of soses, Gregory interpreted Moses’ theophany o  the 
pillar o  cloud in light o  Philippians and the story o  Jacob’s ladder (Genesis 28:10-19) 
as examples o  ascetic striving. Gregory described Moses’ seeing God’s back as part o  
the understanding that even in encounter with God there will always be part o  God 
that is unknowable. Hence it is always the case that “the soul rises ever higher and 
will always make its fight yet higher – by its desire o  the heavenly things strainini 
ahead for what is still to cooe (συνεπεκτεινομένη τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν), as the Apostle 
says..333 Whilst in Maximus we see no  ormal subscription to Gregory’s interpretation, 
we do have a sense o  the ceaselessness o  the ascetic’s task in striving  or virtue – a 
striving that does have an end, but an end that is ever-moving rest, and stationary 
movement in God. This recognition that our striving is a continual part o  our li e here
on earth becomes important later when I discuss the practical place o  this ethics in 
331 Maximus, LA. TCr. Ch. 45. [Sherwood, Maximus, 135]; referencing Phil. 3:13.
332 See 2.2.3.
333 Gregory of Nyssa, De v.M. SCh.1 2.225 [J. Malherbe & E. Ferguson Life of Moses. (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1978), 113].
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how we think about practical living.334
Tus far we have seen that virtue is natural to humans, but also beyond 
humans. Because of our choice to sin, what was natural to us was lost. To regain what 
was lost to us, we need to partake in the renewed nature that Christ has deifed. To do 
this we must turn ourselves away from self-love, and the misdirected use of our 
faculties and capacities. We must clear ourselves of these distractions and instead have
space and willingness to receive virtue, that is to know the will of God, and to 
therefore know God himself. Tis restored relation with God is also natural however. 
It is more truly natural to us because it is what it was intended we be prior to the Fall. 
We freely choose to align ourselves to God, and open ourselves to receive Him. What 
is lost is reinstituted. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (2.2.3), and as implied by Evagrios’ 
stages of spiritual life – this is both a foretaste of deifcation that is to come, but also a 
continual struggle in this life to clear the way for virtue, to know His creation and His 
will for it, and to know God Himself. 
4.1.4 Love as Simple and Manifold
In the course of discussing how the virtues are said to be natural we have made some 
progress in discerning what it is that we as humans need to do to live naturally and in 
Christ. We have read that virtue belongs in us and was always intended for us, and 
that it is only our will turned to selfshness that prevents us from following Christ. We
have seen Maximus calling this ‘clearing the passions’, but what does this look like in 
our day to day living? And does it not still seem to be an impossibly distant proposal 
despite having the label ‘natural’ added to it?
Maximus’ Ascetic Life starts with a startlingly human outburst from a monk 
who addresses his spiritual father on precisely these issues. Te monk asks, “And who,
Father, can do all the commandments? Tere are so many.” To which the response is 
“He who imitates the Lord and follows in His footsteps.” Te monk then says, “Who 
can imitate the Lord? Tough he became man, the Lord was God. But I am a man, a 
sinner, enslaved to a thousand passions. How can I imitate the Lord?”.335 Many things 
are explained to the monk, but eventually Maximus writes the following:
334 I discuss the importance of this concept in 6.2.1.
335 Maximus, LA. TCr. Ch.3 [P. Sherwood, St Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life & The Four 
Centuries on Charity. Sherwood, P. (New York: Paulist Press, 1955), 104].
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Tis is the sign of our love for God, as the Lord Himself shows in the Gospels: He that 
loves me, He says, will keep my commandments. And what this commandment is, which
if we keep we love Him, hear Him tell: Tis is my commandment, that you love one 
another. Do you see that this love for one another makes frm the love for God?... Te 
Lord Himself makes it clear and has shown it to us by His very works; and so too all 
His disciples, who strove til death for love of their neighbour and prayed fervently for 
those that killed them.336
Love by being virtuous, love by following all the commandments, Maximus 
paraphrases Christ, but what this truly means is love one another in the love Christ 
has shown you – in the love Christ has restored to you. If we think about the 
relationship between love and the virtues in Chapter 3, we can see how this 
metaphysical dimension makes sense in a very down to earth, practical way. When we
think of all the commandments and how difcult it seems to abide them all, we have 
only to think of love, which is the totality of all the commandments. When we think 
of the multitudes of things that have been called virtues, we can rest assured that 
when we love we have laid hold of all virtues.  When doing good seems like a 
multitudinous unending set of rules, we can think of the radii and the circle – virtues 
are not multitudinous but simultaneous. Tey are both many and one. Tis is why 
Christ can boil down all of the commandments and the law of God to love Him and 
one another – in other words, to love. Whenever we are overcome by what seems to 
be a great complexity of things we must measure up to, we can think of love. When 
we love, we complete all the commandments. As Maximus writes above “Do you see 
that this love for one another makes frm the love for God?”. In loving one another we 
partake in love itself which is God. 
Tis understanding of simultaneity of course works the other way as well. 
When Christ commands us to love, if we struggle to know what is loving in a 
situation, we can think of the instances of virtue that make it up. Understanding 
virtues as a form of love helps us understand what in any instance the virtuous thing 
to do would be. Either way, the simplicity of love as all virtues and commandments, or
336 Maximus, LA. TCr. Ch. 7 [Sherwood, Maximus,107].
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as the means through which to understand what virtuous action is, allows us to 
consider the structure of an ethics reliant on the simultaneity of virtue and telos.
By coupling this with the conclusions drawn in 4.1.3 that emphasise the 
elimination of passions we can also see the way that Maximus’ ‘virtue ethics’ is very 
unlike any other kind of virtue ethics. We do have a conventional structure of virtue 
and telos defned by a specifc relationship, but we also have a concept of striving to 
regain a holiness that already exists within us from the moment of creation. It is 
important to remember that part of our decision making must be about removing 
what is hurtful and selfsh from ourselves and our actions. Tis is, if we like, a kind of 
apophatic approach to virtue ethics that exists alongside Maximus’ expositions on 
love. It is also a useful way of thinking about the manifold nature of the 
commandment to love. One of the ways we can think about love is to think about 
eliminating what is unloving and self-centred from our actions and thoughts.
Tis will be picked up in the next chapter, but we have identifed three ways in 
which Maximus’ particular understanding of virtue and telos allow for a unique 
approach to ethics. Tese are (1) instead of trying to consider all virtues when we act, 
to instead think of love which is their most perfect totality, (2) if we have difculty 
thinking about love, we can break it down into virtues that we assess in light of them 
always being a kind of love, (3) that we need not always think in terms of how to do 
the virtuous thing, but instead can think about removing vices from ourselves, and 
preventing ourselves from being unloving and self-centred in our thoughts, desires 
and actions. Tus, when I talk about it being ‘in human nature to gather the cosmos in 
love’, I am talking about our ability to participate in the human nature that Christ has 
renewed in Himself. Te way we think about virtue and love and our approach to 
ethics are tools to help us try and become more truly human. Te frst half of this 
chapter has had a very personal focus – turning our lives to divine love transfgures us
as persons. In the later half of this chapter, I look at the cosmic transfguration that 
comes about as a result of our choices.
146
~ Chapter 4: Froo rhysical to Ethical in the Cosoos of St saxious ~
4.2 Gathering the Cosmos
Tus far I have discussed how we can participate in virtue, what it means for virtue to 
be natural, and how we can reach for this new nature that Christ has perfected. In this
section I wish to discuss the efects of this virtue on the rest of the cosmos. In 
Chapters 2 and 3 we looked at the cosmic implications of human activity, but what 
does this mean in practical terms? How can we reconcile the very personal and 
intimate actions discussed in 4.1 with this grand cosmic narrative? Te way I am 
phrasing this question is ‘how can the physical world be gathered by ethical activity?’.
When Maximus interprets Christ’s words to love God and our neighbour, he 
genuinely believes that following these commandments will afect the entire cosmos 
and eventually bring it to its telos in theosis. Tis means that the personal choices we 
make in our ascetic lives – our decision to align our tropos with our logos – are choices
that afects the entire created order and have immediate repercussions here and now. 
In this section, the ethics of 4.1 are brought under a cosmic lens and have a very real 
impact on the rest of the world.
4.2.1 Overcoming Divisions of Nature
To enquire into how Maximus believes the physical universe is transformed by ethical 
activity, I will look at the ‘divisions of nature’ Maximus describes in Ambiguum 41. 
Tese have been briefy touched on in Chapters 2 and 3, but I mean to go through the 
divisions more systematically here to get to the botom of how Maximus sees them 
being overcome. In this ambiguum, Maximus describes fve ways in which creatures 
difer from God and one another. Te diferences are natural, physical diferences 
which are overcome by the ascetic, mediating activity of human beings. Tis becomes 
problematic, however, as this ascetic practice occurs within a sphere we usually defne
as ‘ethical’. In confating these ‘physical’ and ‘ethical’ dimensions it becomes unclear 
how our actions can overcome and unite the physical diferences described in 
Maximus’ ‘divisions of nature’. Tis is a problem that in modern parlance we describe 
as a naturalistic fallacy, since it confates descriptive language with normative activity.
By using Maximus’ own logic of division and unity within this very ambiguum 
however, I maintain that Maximus does not see these two spheres of ‘physical’ and 
‘ethical’ as separate, but rather as distinctions within time contained in a single 
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subject mater.
In Ambiguum 41, the fve categories Maximus describes divide nature as 
follows: (1) uncreated and created, (2) intelligible and sensible, (3) heaven and earth, 
(4) paradise and the inhabited world, (5) male and female.337 
In the above diagram I have shown how in each division we have a link to the former 
division. In every instance the later category in each is divided further in the next 
step. So the created is split into intelligible and sensible, the sensible is split into 
heaven and earth, the earth is split into paradise and the inhabited world, and the 
inhabited world is mediated between by the human, who is split into male and female. 
Maximus’ divisions are not arbitrary but form a kind of branching tree that defnes the
primary diferences that exist between all natures.
Shortly afer this, we read that the role of the human person is to follow Christ 
in becoming a mediator between these divisions:
337 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1304D-1305B [Louth, Maximus, 156-7].
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In order to bring about the union of everything with God as its cause, the human 
person begins frst of all with its own division, and then, ascending through the 
intermediate steps by order and rank, it reaches the end of its high ascent, which 
passes through all things in search of unity, to God, in whom there is no division.338
Maximus goes on to say that the human
achieves this through the perfect knowledge, as I said, of its own logos, in accordance 
with which it is. Ten, by a way of life proper and fting to Saints, the human person 
unites paradise and the inhabited world to make one earths339
Maximus then leads us back up through the divisions of nature for a second time, 
describing how at every stage, each of the fve categories can be united by the life that 
the human person lives. Each physical diference is overcome by practical, ethical 
means, like in the above instance where the earth is made one “by a way of life proper 
and fting to Saints”. Te way of life Maximus is talking about is the ascetic practice 
discussed in 4.1. When I use the word ‘physical’ here I mean it both in its 
contemporary usage as that which is material, and in so far as it relates to the word 
physis, since these are natural divisions. So this term refers to the present state in 
which we fnd and describe the universe around us. In the above quotation Maximus is
describing what he believes to be the original mediating powers of the human that 
have been lost through sin, but are restored in Christ. We see this vividly portrayed in 
Ambiguum 41 as Maximus gives us a third repeat of all these divisions in nature, save 
this time describing the ways that these have already been united by Christ.340 We 
then get a fourth repeat of the divisions describing how the mediating power of Christ
restores this ability to the human by uniting us and all divisions to Himself.341 Tus we
have a depiction of the way the power to mediate as Christ does is restored to us and 
we, by grace, are able to reach toward virtue and consent to its presence within us.342 
Te power of mediation that is restored is one deeply rooted in the ascetic realm of 
338 Maximus, Amb 41 PG91 1305C [Louth, Maximus, 157].
339 Maximus, Amb 41 PG91 1305D [Louth, Maximus, 157].
340 Maximus, Amb 41 PG91 1309A-C [Louth, Maximus, 159-60].
341 Maximus, Amb 41 PG91 1309D-1312B [Louth, Maximus, 160].
342 Cf. Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 24 [Berthold, Maximus, 207].
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learning to love, having faith and receiving grace. In so far as this is a sphere that 
concerns the way in which humans decide to live, I am calling these activities ‘ethical’.
In Ambiguum 41, Maximus moves from a physical description of the cosmos, to saying
that somehow, by our ethical living, we can bring these physical divisions into unity. 
Tis confation of physical and ethical dimensions presents a problem for the modern 
theologian seeking to make use of Maximus’ thought. It becomes unclear in what way 
our actions can overcome and unite these biological diferences described in Maximus’
divisions of nature. Tis is an outline of the problem as it stands. Tere are two 
geometrical analogies I wish to look at to explain the way in which Maximus 
understands ethical activity to gather the physical world.
4.2.2 Geometric Structures of the Cosmos
Te key to resolving this difculty I think lies in recalling Maximus’ Chalcedonian 
understanding where diferences in nature remain distinct, but need not be divisive or 
at odds with one another. Tis also goes for our current problem. Descriptive, physical
defnitions are not separate from normative, ethical claims. Te normative is instead a 
potential, (and for our purposes) future path that may be chosen by the descriptive 
subject.343 Te subject as we describe it now, should it choose to take such a path, can 
look like the normative picture too. So our normative claims and ethical claims are 
distinct from each other when considering a subject from within time. Tey are united
when our present way of living is brought in line with the ethical trajectory which we 
can choose to align ourselves with. I will demonstrate how this problem is overcome 
frstly by briefy thinking about how Maximus perceives universals, and how 
realistically he can make claims about humans that extend to other creatures. 
Secondly, I go on to illustrate how our problem resolves into two distinct claims about 
one subject that can be brought into unity. Te former point I make with reference to 
the work of Torstein Tollefsen and in the later I use Vladimir Cvetković’s work. Tese
two analogies make sense of Maximus’ difculty by challenging our conceptions of 
taxonomy and participation.
343 We could arguably call this normative path timeless, since it corresponds to our logoi and to good 
life which is in Christ Himself. I use the term ‘future’ here in reference to the way that we as humans
think about ethical choices and paths that we have yet to choose.
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4.2.2.1 Universals of Division and Unity
Firstly, let us look at universals as categorisation of the biological world. For Maximus,
whenever we describe diferences between creatures, we are also stating a degree of 
similarity between them. Earlier I described Maximus’ divisions as branches on a tree. 
Ofen our taxonomical descriptions favour this hierarchical analogy when describing 
natural categories. Te application and misapplication of the Porphyrian Tree might 
be considered an example of a hierarchical depiction of taxonomy. In Melchisedec 
Törönen’s work on Maximus the Confessor, he describes Porphyry as  third century 
Phoenician who was a student of Plotinus. He claims that Porphyry’s famous 
taxonomical ‘tree’ was one of the “logical tools” that Maximus uses in his works. 
According to Törönen, Porphyry discusses fve terms in this tree:
[s] genus, diference, species, property, and accident. Out of these fve terms the frst 
and third, that is, genus and species, make up a framework within which all the beings
that constitute the universe can be considered. Te hierarchy of genera and species is 
commonly known as the Porphyrian Tree. Its description as a tree is not Porphyry’s 
own idea, but does convey in a tangible way the idea of hierarchy of predication which
Porphyry presents in his treatise. Te Porphyrian Tree was drawn, not as the 
ramifcations of branches into twigs of an oak tree, but as a subordinate succession of 
branches ending with the roots as with a spruce tree, the lef-hand-side and the right-
hand-side branches representing the contrasting elements of each subdivision. [s] In 
whatever way one wishes to picture this tree, in terms of logic what is generic is at the
top and what is specifc is at the botom. [s] Te fundamental rule of predication in 
this patern is that the higher ones, that is, the more generic ones, are predicated of the
lower ones, and never the reverse. Another similar rule is that the higher ones 
‘contain’ the lower ones, and the lower ones are ‘contained’ by the higher one.344
Tollefsen contests that Maximus is reliant on Porphyry as a tool, noting that it is 
possible that Maximus may never have known Porphyry's works. Despite this, he 
says, it seems that Maximus is familiar with the logic of this tree, as well as Aristotle’s 
Categories.345 Tollefsen notes that we must be careful when applying the Porphyrian 
Tree to Maximus’ work not to map a gradation of perfection and value onto this 
344 Törönen, Union and Distinction, 20-1.
345 Tollefsen, Christocentic, 15.
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taxonomical system.346 Tis is a practice that can easily be fallen into given the 
Neoplatonist appropriation of the Porphyrian Tree. In the Porphyrian Tree, although 
particulars are taken as starting points (as in Aristotle’s Categories), there was (and is) 
a risk of granting universals a greater degree of reality that the particulars that make 
them up. In part, this comes down to the most common universal shared by all things 
in Porphyry’s Tree being ‘being’ itself, possibly implying that sub-categories derived 
being from this one source at the top of the taxonomical tree. According to Tollefsen, 
some Neoplatonists, like Dexippus,347 seem to have considered “that this abstract 
Porphyrian tree is the conceptual copy of the perfect, intelligible system contained in 
οὐσία, the νουυς of Plotinus, as the primary source of being. In this manner the 
Aristotelian species and genera, that is, the secondary substances of the Categories, 
were transformed into an actually existent plenary of intelligible Ideas in a principle 
which is the highest οὐσία”.348
In granting greater value or reality to universals, one makes a statement about 
the importance of  ideas and concepts over mater. Te (literal) embodiment of things 
we have concepts for, become subsidiary to, or even imperfect instances of, ideas 
themselves. Immediately we fall into the kind of dualism that the early church spent 
much of its time trying to eradicate. We can think for example of the theologians 
Irenaeus, Tertullian and Hippolytus writing against Gnostics in the second and third 
centuries, where thinkers like Valentinus claimed that only through the Nous was 
knowledge of God revealed.349 Tis kind of dogma resulted in an anthropology that 
divided human beings up into those who could be saved and those who could not 
depending on their mental capacities, since what was most important was to be able 
to reach for the highest mental concepts and ideas.350 It was and is extremely 
important to Christian theology that mater is not evil, or to be rejected, but that it is 
part of who we as created beings are and has the potential to become holy. If 
perfection is located in disembodied universals, then the value of each particular along
346 He argues that this gradation has been applied to taxonomical systems by those such as Lovejoy in 
his 1978 book.  Tollefsen, Christocentic, 81, note 49.
347 Also including Proclus, Ammonius: Tollefsen, Christocentric, 33.
348 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 31.
349 J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines. Fifth Edition (London: Continuum, 2004 (First published 
1958)), 23.
350 Kelly, Early, 24.
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with the distinctiveness of each person and the choices each person makes, become of 
less importance than an overall commitment to a realm of ideas and thought. We 
certainly could not, in this framework, make sense of God becoming a particular 
human and reinstituting human nature by doing so. In order for this to ever make 
sense, there must be something transformative about the choices and existence of a 
particular hypostasis that afects universals. In other words, universals and particulars
must simultaneously be in one another and made up of one another. As Maximus puts 
it, “the parts exist and subsist in the wholes, and the wholes in the parts”.351
Tis dualist atitude toward taxonomy and the independent existence of 
universals is still prevalent today. In something Mark Balaguer tentatively calls 
‘platonism spelled with a lower-case ‘p’’’, there are contemporary positions that state 
that “there exist such things as abstract objects – where an abstract object is an object 
that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and 
non-mental”.352 Balaguer distinguishes this from Platonism as it draws from, but does 
not fully represent, the views of Plato or the early Platonists (or Neoplatonists). 
Balaguer names Gotlob Frege, Kurt Gödel, Bertrand Russell and W.V.O. Qine as all 
adhering to this kind of contemporary commitment to universals. Tese include 
commitments to the independent existence (not reliant on particulars) of numbers, 
relations and properties such as colour. Participation is claimed to be one-way, so that 
objects are said to participate in, exemplify or instantiate a property (such as redness), 
but no claim is made of the universal itself with regard to its make up.353
Recent work done by Tollefsen challenges the hierarchical depiction of the 
relationship between universals and particulars. He targets not only the position that 
universals possess more reality than particulars, but also ofers a much more cohesive 
way of depicting the mutual interdependence of universals and particulars, and 
particulars as the ultimate source of reality. Tollefsen suggests that we think of 
Maximus’ universals as more a horizontal system in which “each particular and each 
species mirror the whole class they belong to”.354 He emphasises that it is beter to 
351 Maximus, Amb. 10 PG91 1189D [Louth, Maximus, 145].
352 M. Balaguer, “Platonism in Metaphysics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 
Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.) Stanford: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/platonism/. 
(Accessed, 15.05.16).
353 Balaguer, “Platonism”.
354 Tollefsen, ‘Concept of the Universal’ , 17.
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think of universals as whole concepts rather than fractured composites.355 Every time 
we conceive of a particular, the universals that this particular partakes of is entirely 
embodied in that particular (and in every other particular that we identify with this 
universal).356 As a very simple example, we can look at the following:
In my diagram above, it is not as though there is something else to the universal of 
dog-kind that we are not seeing when we look at a particular dog. All of what it is to 
be a dog is contained within every particular dog, even though each particular dog 
does not exhaust the ways in which the universal of dog-kind can be expressed. Te 
fact that we can conceive of expressions of dog-kind that difer from the dog in front 
of us does not in anyway imply that there is a defciency of the universal expressed 
within this particular specimen. In Maximus’ language – there are diferent hypostases
(particular beings) that operate in diferent tropoi (modes of living) but they are still 
complete instances of a single nature. In this way, expressions of genera, species and 
particulars are a way of talking about the diferences but also the similarities that exist
355 Tollefsen, ‘Concept of the Universal’ , 16.
356 See Tollefsen, ‘Concept of the Universal’ , 16.
154
~ Chapter 4: Froo rhysical to Ethical in the Cosoos of St saxious ~
between all parts of creation. Universals enable us to talk about a genuine unity of 
particulars in species and of species in genera that is more than just semantic. 
Whenever we use a universal term we mean it to express unity between some things, 
and distinction from others. In the very act of describing the divisions in nature, 
Maximus is also expressing the way in which they are united. Universals always unite 
when compared to another diference. Our biological categories are not simply 
arbitrary linguistic titles, but are descriptive of the similarities we have found in all 
things around us, including us ourselves. Tere is biological identity between all these 
creatures that is distinguished by a mater of degrees. Tere is actually a very close 
unity between all things on our planet that ofen seems neglected when we instead 
focus on the separateness of every single particular. For Maximus, the world seems to 
be a balance of real, distinct creatures, bound in relation to one another and united by 
the properties they share. Te unity of the universe is preserved by its distinction from
God. Of course, this also applies to every other level right the way down to 
particulars, all of whom are preserved in precise distinction from one another 
precisely because of the way we expression commonality and diference in universals. 
Te very frst division Maximus discussed was that between uncreated and created – a
distinction that collects the entire taxonomy of the created universe into oneness as 
distinct from its Creator. Tis is what I mean when I say that ‘the unity of the universe
is preserved by its distinction from God’. Indeed, it is this division that can only be 
overcome by grace, and never by nature – if we think back to Maximus’ 
understanding of theosis in Chapter 2, this division is the unassailable chasm that we 
are ofered adoption into through Christ who brings uncreated and created nature 
together within him.
My point in this section is to point out that Maximus’ divisions of nature are 
not just divisions but also universals of unity, and descriptive not just of biological 
diference but also of the way in all things naturally coinhere. Physical descriptions of 
the universe already point toward unity and the Creator.
4.2.2.2 Unity of Subject, Distinctions in Time
Secondly, let us think about physical and ethical in relation to Maximus’ cosmology. I 
think we can map them onto the following ideas. As outlined in 3.3.3, Vladimir 
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Cvetković proposes the circle and radii analogy, to which Maximus alludes a number 
of times,357 as an image of the relationship between universals and particulars. He 
suggests that we think of particulars as points arrayed on the circumference of a 
circle, who are connected to the centrepoint of this circle by radii. Along these radii 
we fnd the universals that express diferences and commonalities between particulars.
Te centrepoint of this circle, towards which all particulars and universals alike are 
drawn and held in place, is God the Logos. “Tus,” Cvetković writes, “Te individual 
beings by following their natural logos converge toward other human beings by 
discovering that they share the same humanity or creatureliness, but these are just 
stations on the movement along the radius toward the centre of the circle which is 
God”.358 When we consider the way that convergence in Cvetković’s analogy happens 
alongside Tollefsen’s depiction of the relationships between universals and particulars,
we can also say something very special about what it means to be a person. 
According to Tollefsen’s position on horizontal universals, none of the things 
we are atributing to universals exclusively belong to common categories. Tese 
universals are always descriptive of things that belong to particulars. Particulars do 
not derive say, rationality, by belonging to the universal of rational beings. Te 
universal exists because rational creatures exist and creatures are collectively termed 
‘rational’ because this is something that is exhibited commonly. Any atempt to 
separate out properties from particulars results in a metaphysics that tries to strip 
away properties to fnd the real ‘person’ underneath – properties that, together, are 
who that person is and belong as much to them as to a universal category. Te 
purpose of distinguishing between universals and particulars is never to search for the
most propertyless, raw version of what a person is. Why, when devoid of 
commonalities we share with others, might we think we have found a truer picture of 
who we are? If we recall from Te Mystagogia: 
In conformity with this law there is engendered the principle of the unifying force 
which does not permit that the substantial identity uniting these things be ignored 
because of their diference in nature, nor that their particular characteristics which 
limit each of these things to itself appear more pronounced because of their separation
357 Maximus, Amb 7 PG91 1081C; Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 1; Maximus, Cap. Gnost. PG 90 II.4.
358 Cvetković, ‘Geometrical Analogies’, 6.
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and division than the kinship in love mystically inspired in them for union. It is by this
kinship that the universal and unique mode of the invisible and unknowable presence 
in all things renders them unmixed and undivided in themselves and in relation to 
each other. And it shows that they exist by the relationship which unites them to each 
other rather than to themselves.359
Instead, universals are descriptions of relations – similarities and diferences shared by
diferent particulars, and embodied in particulars.
Within a Christian cosmology – where all particulars are created – universals 
have an additional importance, since the similarities and diferences between all 
creatures are intended by God. Tese means that universals, as the order and 
architecture of the cosmos, are also created – they do not possess the same reality a 
particular does, but they are a patern of relation that exists and was willed into 
existence. In this way – universals are relation between particulars, and an integral 
part of how we relate to one another and how we understand who we are. Universals 
express something important about our identity, whilst at the same time describing 
similarities and diferences we have with others. We can talk about who we are as 
persons with reference to particular logoi and universal logoi, which simultaneously 
partake in one another, and all partake in Christ. If we consider Cvetković’s circle and 
radii model – in the grace of love we come to see the interrelation of all logoi and we 
are drawn together along the radii, through universals, to the Logos. Universals do not
just belong to metaphysics, but also to ethics. Tey are about a person understanding 
how similarity and diference draw the cosmos into unity. I am a distinct hypostasis 
with a distinct logos who can begin to grow into that logos by perceiving how I relate 
to all (through their logoi) about me and to the Logos. We are persons defned by logoi,
seeking to align ourselves with logoi that come together, through universals, to the 
Logos Himself. Cvetković’s model is a dynamic picture of particulars who are 
becoming who they were created to be as they seek theosis in the Logos who gathers 
all logoi.
Tus Cvetković’s model allows us to see the dynamism of the logoi and the 
way that this metaphysical structure is profoundly ethical in terms of the human life it
359 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 7 [Berthold, Maximus,197].
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depicts. Who we are as people is intimately bound up with how we choose to relate to 
those around us. When considering universals and particulars alongside Maximus’ 
doctrine of the logoi, we can see the way in which statements about particular 
creatures are never isolated from the potentiality that they have in their logoi. For 
Maximus, the reality of things as they are now, is not divided from the spiritual 
potential they have in moving toward the Logos. Each particular creature possesses a 
hypostasis that is who they are now. Every creature also possesses a logos, which is the
perfect unchanging idea or hope that God has for the life of that creature. In order to 
realise this logos, a creature has to choose to turn towards it and God. It has to bring 
its mode of life (tropos) into alignment with that perfect vision of its life that God has 
for it.360 Tis can be summarised in a modifed version of the stages of cosmic 
movement outlined in Chapter 2:
In the above diagram I have distinguished between our logos as the theoretical, ethical 
path we wish to align ourselves with, and our tropos as the actual enactment of those 
ethics, that allows our physical, material bodies to be brought in line by our choice to 
act in accordance with God’s will.361 Physical and ethical in this way are not two 
diferent spheres, but rather about how a physical subject may choose to act in an 
ethical way. Tere is the way we in our material bodies are living at present, and there
is our ethics. Tere is what we are and what we may become. Te distinction between 
physical and ethical then is not a division but a distinction between what currently is 
360 On the difference between capacity to do a thing, and mode of operation by choice (tropos) see 
Maximus, Pyrrh. 292D-293B [Farrell, Disputation, Ch.23, 10].
361 Also see this interpretation of logoi as necessity and tropos as freedom in Loudovikos, Eucharistic 
Ontology, 94.
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and what potentially may come to be. Te normative force of the later is still retained,
in that so long as one desires to align oneself to one’s logos, there is a practical 
imperative to choose it in preference over others. In this regard the distinction 
between the physical and ethical is always useful to maintain. However, unity 
between the two is now conceivable as bringing our current way of living (tropos) into
line with a good way of living (logos).
Cvetković’s proposed use of the circle and radii analogy is a particularly apt 
model for this purpose, since it already rolls the relations of logoi to creatures together
in Christ and paints a picture that captures both particular existence and trajectory 
toward Christ. Furthermore it also illustrates the way that universals are instances of 
simultaneous unity and distinction, as elaborated by Tollefsen. Te simultaneity of 
who we are is expressed in the points about the circle’s circumference, while the radii 
themselves form the trajectory of who we can be when we allow ourselves to be 
gathered to the centrepoint who is Christ. Hence my point earlier about rethinking 
hard distinctions between universals and persons – who we are is transfgured 
through relation and through the logoi, and we become more complete as persons 
when we draw closer to Christ, though, afer the Chalcedonian understanding, this 
unity never compromises the integrity of our unique personhood. Christ, the centre of
the cosmos reaches through the last division of nature and makes deifcation through 
grace possible for the united cosmos.
It should be noted that Cvetković’s analogy is not ideal for representing the 
diversity of particular taxonomy in relation to universals. It is hard using the circle 
and radii model, to see how universals gather up a range of particulars since the 
analogy lacks that traditional branching model we have come to expect in taxonomical
representation. However, if we think about this in relation to the Tollefsen’s point 
explained in 4.2.2.1 we do not have to rely on the branching picture to accurately 
depict the relationship between particulars and universals. If every particular fully 
participates in a universal with no defciencies, then we could represent the 
relationship between universals and particulars as a single line. It is true that we 
cannot see the diversity of particulars in this way, but neither do we risk implying a 
multiplicity in, or ascribing greater ontological reality to, a universal. In the end all 
these analogies fall short in some way of depicting cosmological movement and 
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relationships, but the circle and radii model is still a useful one that certainly serves its
purpose when it comes to demonstrating particulars and their trajectory in, and 
reliance on, Christ the Logos.
My solution then, is that we consider the distinctions of physical and ethical to 
be diferentiations of time concerning one subject. Tere are a ways of talking about 
what is, and of what may come to be when a subject moves in line with its logos. 
Within the context of Maximus’ cosmology, there is also a sense of timelessness to the
concept of the ethical, especially if we tie it to the idea of logos. Tis is the ethical path 
which God wishes us to take, which He always wished we would take. It is an entire 
concept, even if, to us in our lives, it seems like a linear set of choices. Tis means that 
we can also talk about the ethical as being in our past as something we have deviated 
from or tried to live in accordance with, as well as always being something that we 
wish to turn to. My overall point remains however, that the physical is that which we 
may bring in line with the ethical. Like all creaturely divisions described in Ambiguum
41, these two distinctions are brought together in Christ, so that our mode of being 
(tropos) becomes identical to our logos, which is a refection of Christ Himself. Our 
ethical activity, as mediating humans, determines the way in which creatures move in 
future, because we are deeply connected to them, as we can see when we think in 
terms of universals. 
What we choose then, can not help but be an extension of who we and the 
entire cosmos are at present. Tis places a much greater burden on human choice, 
which I am now claiming is responsible for the physical, integral structure of the 
universe. Tis should not come as a particular surprise given Maximus’ metaphysical 
commitments and the way he describes every particular as held in place and given life 
at every instance by the will of God. It is still difcult, I imagine, for the modern mind 
to comprehend that ethics can have such a real impact on the coherence of the 
physical structures of the cosmos. Tis is probably because of the divisions we have 
been taught are in place between our study of the sciences and our dealing with 
ethical choice and action. If we really think about it, it makes perfect sense that 
physical reality changes around us because of the choices we make. Te dualism 
between thought and action is a lot less marked than it is ofen made out to be. Of 
course the way we choose to act afects those around us. Of course it either destroys 
160
~ Chapter 4: Froo rhysical to Ethical in the Cosoos of St saxious ~
their lives or brings them a meaning or peace that might otherwise have been missing.
Tese ideas might have been removed from many of our academic ways of thinking, 
but on a popular, common sense level, these concepts still make sense. As Andrew 
Louth points out towards the end of an article on the theology of Maximus and the 
environmental crisis:
St Maximus's divisions of nature may seem to us quaint, but his idea that within the 
manifold that is the created order there are divisions that can either, when 
transcended, express the richness and beauty of the created order or, alternatively, 
cause gulfs of incomprehension, darkness, and pain seems to me an insight of 
continuing relevance.362
Humans have had dramatic efects on the balance of existence on the planet in which 
we live – the way we act is informed by the choices we make, which are, hopefully, 
informed by the ethics we live by. Te mystical aspect of Maximus’ thought that 
claims that humans ‘gather the cosmos’, is really a very obvious point about the far 
reaching extent of the choices we make. We ultimately have the gif of free will and 
must decide whether we are going to serve ourselves or clear a space within us to be 
flled with God’s love. Te physical is very much subject to the ethical, and the 
cohesion of the cosmos decided in the choices of the particular – of the human 
microcosm.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we treated with the proposition that ‘it is in human nature to gather 
the cosmos in love’. Tis was broken down into two sections, the frst of which 
concerned what is meant by atributing this activity to human nature, and the second 
focussed on the extent to which we are pushing the physical aspect of the word 
‘gather’.
In section 4.1 we looked at Maximus’ claim that virtues are natural to humans. 
362 Louth, ‘Man and Cosmos’, 68.
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Tis lead us into a discussion of the personal ascetic commitments implied by such a 
statement. We noted the simultaneous relationship of person and nature that 
necessitates both the grace of God, who restores nature and free will, and the agency 
of the person to turn toward God. I concluded this section with some thoughts on how
we can apply the principle of simultaneous nature and hypostasis to the way we think
about love and the virtues. I suggested that, from a personal, ascetic perspective, this 
kind of thinking might aid us in a more practical way to conceive of what we need to 
do to gather the cosmos in love.
In section 4.2, we then looked at what it meant to gather the cosmos in love, 
and how something physical could be moved through our ethical activity. It is 
important that we understand the literal way in which Maximus believes that the 
transfguration of the cosmos through grace can come about here and now. Tis is 
related to the discussion that was had in 2.2.3. Because theosis belongs both to the end 
of time but also to the present, our actions here and now mean that divine love can 
transfgure the world now, and that we can partake in fractions of the glory that is yet 
to come. Maximus is dedicated to striving for the sanctifcation of the cosmos here and
now – not just in the hope of eventual reward, but also in the manner of epektasis – 
constant struggling to deepen our knowledge of God in the present moment. Tis 
point is particularly crucial for the ideas that I will later draw out of these chapters – 
what we do now is paramount to now and the future. Like virtues which are 
simultaneous steps toward love, and the manifestation of love itself, our actions today 
and tomorrow and everyday afer are not just steps on a ladder, they are also 
meaningful communion in telos in and of themselves.
Te call for the human person to follow their nature is at once a profoundly 
personal and communal call. Tis is because it is a call to love that must be answered 
by a person, but the call to love is a call to a way of existing in relationship with 
others. We are called to be simultaneously one and many through Christ’s love. For, in
the moment we are united to God, we are united with every single part of creation, 
and all divisions are overcome. What we have in Maximus’ understanding of virtue 
and love is a deeply personal and communal ethics. His cosmic theology describes the 
radical choice laid before every human to love all things the way Christ loved and 
does love all things. We are called to simultaneous personal free choice and communal
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dependence. In my next chapter I take this understanding of personal choice to live in 
communal love and suggest that under our current political framework, there is no 
place either for personal choice or for communal love.
~
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~ Chapter 5: The Modern Borders of Love ~
‘The means o  the state confict with Maximian virtues and telos’
5.0 Introduction
5.0.1 Personal Practice as Communal Ethics
In the previous chapter I considered the interrelation of metaphysics and ethics in 
Maximus’ theology. I explained that human ethical conduct has the ability to unite the
cosmos or destroy the relationship between the created and uncreated. Te way 
humans act does not just have immediate personal ramifcations, but also binds or 
breaks the cosmos. Te things we do either allow love to fourish, or are part of 
problem – allowing hatred, division, greed, alienation, and oppression to dictate our 
relationships. Our personal ascetic practices present us with a vision for communal 
life. Already in every discussion of virtue, of love, of participation in Christ, and 
anticipation of theosis – we have an ethics that is simultaneously personal and 
communal. We saw in Chapter 2 that the Eucharist and Divine Liturgy serve as 
windows into the eschaton, anticipating a fnal telos of unity with God. We also saw in
Chapter 3 however, that the virtues are love, and love is God Himself. With the ability 
to receive virtue and work towards embodying God’s love in the world, every activity 
in our lives has the potential to be a place where God’s love is embodied. Tough the 
Divine Liturgy is a special place, unique in its uplifing of all creation to God, it is the 
task of humans to strive toward such consummation in all life, as evidenced by the 
continual place and purpose of ascetic striving in even the very smallest things we do. 
Our ethics becomes about continually striving to bring Christ’s love to all we see and 
touch. As discussed in Chapter 4, there is no personal practice that is not communal in
its outworking – by merit of the goal of personal ascesis being love, we are talking 
about actions that include others as well as ourselves. We do not acquire virtue, but 
seek to make space for it within us. Te ethics we draw from St Maximus’ theology 
lends itself not to concrete visions of political structures, but rather to a continual and 
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perpetual striving for space for love. Te eschatological telos that we anticipate, afer 
all, is for Maximus a cosmic reunion that is brought about through human receptivity 
to love here in this world. I wish to show that a dedication to the telos and growth of 
virtue in Maximian theology may have a far reaching impact not just on our personal 
day-to-day actions, but on our entire conception of the socio-political and economic 
structures we fnd ourselves living in. 
It is my contention in this chapter that the present social structures in which 
we live inhibit love and have no place for the communal vision that arises from the 
ethics we fnd in Maximus’ theology. When we think of virtue and seek to follow the 
commandment of love, we become aware of the way in which our lives harm others 
and the way that the structures in our communities institutionalise and rationalise 
these hurtful relationships. In this chapter I take apart our dogged atachment to the 
state as a facilitator of human relation, and characterise it as incompatible with the 
daily practices and vision of love that Maximus calls natural and necessary for human 
beings. In Chapter 6, I then go on to suggest more imaginative ways of organising 
human community, challenging any assumption that a state structure is the be-all-
and-end-all of possible societies. Following on from the preceding chapters, I instead 
suggest that we allow our ethics to defne the kind of relationships we wish to have 
with one another and build communities more capable of holding themselves 
accountable this love. Given the teleological character of this ethics and the 
importance of personal striving for the love of Christ, and also given Maximus’ 
understanding of the simultaneity of the cosmic and ascetic, its seems bizarre to me 
that we should not also strive to embody the love of Christ in the way we organise our
wider relations with one another.
Te best way to present the preceding chapters as cohesive is, I think, to give a 
example of the way in which it might direct our practical ethics today. Tere are many
ways one could begin a critique of the state, including not least its historical existence 
and the manner in which it frst came into being as an instrument of oppression that 
protected property and power belonging to the few from the many. Te route I have 
taken however, is one that fts more neatly into a virtue ethics paradigm of virtues and
telos, and that allows me to focus on the problems right here and now that the state 
creates. One might concede that the state has its origins in a barbaric form of inequity 
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and violence, but then claim that today it is altogether more civilised and a force for 
good. Te shape of my argument is chosen with this criticism in mind and to 
demonstrate that the state is still irredeemably problematic in its inherent structure 
and the way it orders the lives of human beings. Te claim I make in this chapter then 
is that ‘the means of the state confict with Maximian virtues and telos’. I construct my
argument by frst identifying the state as a way of human living. In defning it as a 
mode of human existence, I equate the means of the states (the way it goes about 
operating), as not the act of an alien reifed other, but as activity chosen by persons. 
Some personal acts weigh in with more strength that others, but it is the consistent 
carrying out by every person of their expected roles that allows states to have the 
power that they do. I thus equate the ‘means’ of the state as being in direct opposition 
to the virtues of Maximus’ ethics, since they both represent modes of being that we 
choose to partake in (tropoi). I then identify key modes of state operation and 
demonstrate the way in which they fail the standards of Christian virtue and telos as 
outlined by Maximus.
5.0.2 A Method for Ethical Critique
Te method I adopt for approaching this chapter is adapted from the current way in 
which environmental ethics draws on Maximus’ thought. In a paper called Man and 
Cosmos in St Maximus the Confessor, Louth describes his reasons for discussing 
Maximus’ theology in relation to contemporary environmental crises. He asks, how 
much of Maximus’ cosmological thinking can we still think today, given that there are
so many diferences in our comprehension of the universe today as compared to 
then?363 In answer to this, Louth writes:
Maximus sees the universe given meaning by the logoi through which creatures 
participate in God. Science sees the universe as governed by laws to which humans 
can give mathematical expression. But for all the impersonal objectivity of 
mathematics, it is only humans that can know it and understand it. Te same seems to 
363 A similar approach is also taken by Anestis Keselopoulos who frames contemporary environmental 
and political crises as theological failures. He therefore sees Maximus as a vital resource for 
addressing a deficiency in theological grounding for ethics today. Cf. A. Keselopoulos, ‘The 
Prophetic Charisma in Pastoral Theology: Asceticism, Fasting and the Ecological Crisis’ in Toward 
an Ecology, 356-64.
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be true at the other end of the scale: for instance, the discovery of how all living beings
are structured by DNA. Again, it is only to reason that these complex codes can yield 
any meaning, despite the tendency of some to anthropomorphize and speak, for 
example, of the ‘selfsh gene’.364
Louth explains that the hypotheses we make about the world still only make sense and
have meaning and utility because of human observation. Human inquiry and 
comprehension of the world and our place in it is a theme essential to Maximus’ 
thought. Louth argues that there is very much still a place for Maximus’ thinking in 
contemporary thought and that “all this suggests that much of the vision of St 
Maximus can be rethought in terms of current science”.365 However, he asks, just 
because we can rethink Maximus’ thought in this way “why bother?”.366 An answer he
ofers is:
Over the last few centuries, science has vastly expanded our understanding of the 
development of the cosmos, the history of life on this planet, and the details of the 
structures of living beings. But in so doing, there has been a lost sense of the whole, of 
the interrelationship between the vast and the tiny, the technical and the 
meaningful.367
He calls Maximus’ vision “more than an intellectual theory”, writing that it is “this 
sense of coherence revealed in a profound coinherence of everything in God through 
the Logos, who is the many logoi, that the vision of Maximus may help us recover”.368 
Louth suggests that Maximus’ vision could gif to contemporary thought this rich 
understanding of a cosmos that is interconnected, interdependent and coinheres in 
God. Louth thus contextualises Maximus’ thought within Maximus’ own time and 
364 Louth,  Man and Cosmos, 70.
365 Much work is currently being done in this area due to the resurgence of interest in Maximus’ work 
and its potential for contemporary ethics. For example, Paul Blowers discusses the compatibility of 
Maximus’ doctrine of the logoi with the theory of evolution: P. Blowers, ‘Unfinished Creative 
Business: Could Maximus the Confessor’s Protology and Doctrine of Creaturely Logoi Support an 
Evolutionary Theodicy?’ in On Earth as It Is in Heaven: Cultivating a Christian Theology of 
Creation D. Meconi (ed.)(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016).
366 Louth,  Man and Cosmos, 70.
367 Louth,  Man and Cosmos, 70.
368 Louth,  Man and Cosmos, 71.
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presents his theology as relevant for today. Maximus’ thought is not presented as an 
antithesis to contemporary mathematical and scientifc tools or as the same as them, 
but is instead a diferent way of seeing the world. As two living traditions that aid 
humans to seek understanding in the world, Louth sees no contradiction in how the 
two can interact and help us to recover those things which are necessary for our 
spiritual growth.
As agents moulded by our own time and place, there is an honesty to 
acknowledging our desire to learn from ethical lessons from the past. We, as 
contemporary theologians in our own time and place in history, can fnd utility in 
Maximus’ theological interpretations, while recognising that  the difculties of the 
present day are unique to us. We are the key part in interpreting and reworking 
Maximus’ thought – not as invisible translators of his work – but as visible agents in 
our own time fnding refuge in his wisdom, and interpreting faithfully to his 
intentions, but anew for our own contemporary troubles. Te common thread 
between our own thought and Maximus’ is that we are still dealing with a framework 
that concerns the human heart and how to love. As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, 
love does not change, since it is God, shared with us through Christ and the Spirit. 
What we are doing in our study of virtues and ethics then, is trying to understand 
what that love might look like in our own day. It has been the premise of this thesis 
that St Maximus is a useful dialogue partner in helping us to fnd out what this is. 
Tere are obviously many ways in which Maximus’ situation difers from ours. When, 
for example, one considers the relevance of Maximus’ thought for environmental 
ethics, the context of Maximus is kept so that we acknowledge that the current 
environmental crisis is unique to our own time now. Te precise political and 
climatological situation we are in is not one that Maximus shared. Te dimension of 
Maximus’ thought that is relevant, is in so far that his theology stays true to a Gospel 
that concerns how humans are to live. Te theological visions that Maximus explores 
provides us with a framework for thinking about how humans and the rest of creation
move toward theosis. Both his metaphysical underpinning and his ascetic advice 
concern ways of living that we can apply as tools to our very diferent present 
situation. We do not need to have the same context or scientifc knowledge as our 
sources in order to fnd utility in what they have to say about the human condition. 
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We do not, for example, have to try and prove that Maximus was an environmental 
activist in his own day in order to justify our own choice to use his theology as a basis
for the integrity of creation today. As we have seen in Louth’s choice to think about 
Maximian ideas in the context of the present day, we are not puting weight in an 
argument because it is what we think Maximus would have done, but rather are 
taking his thought as we might a teacher’s, who has helped us to read Scripture in 
more depth, and whose thought we consequently we build on to try and live Christ’s 
love in the world today. 
Like the environmental ethics example above, one could have an interesting 
discussion about whether Maximus in his own time had reservations over one form of 
governance or another, but my critique of the state arises only from the way in which 
I am applying what I believe to be the logical ends to Maximus’ ethics in my own day. 
Given the cosmic interpretation Maximus gives of Christ’s love, to what extent is it 
acceptable for us as Christians to consent to being a part of the state? Given the way 
that the state operates, the history it arises from, and the assumptions it makes of 
human existence and co-existence, how useful is it for us as Christians to advocate it, 
and might it be necessary to protest its existence or seek out more preferable modes of
community? Whilst I do not give an exhaustive account of the functions of the state, 
in the course of this chapter I claim that there is reason enough to seriously doubt 
whether living within and participating in states is compatible with the Christ-like 
love of Maximian ethics. In the next chapter I go on to talk about alternatives to this 
kind of political body and a future direction in which we might turn our eforts. But 
for this chapter, I confne myself solely to critiquing the state and presenting the case 
for its incompatibility with the mode of living suggested by Maximus.
5.0.3 Anarchist Critics of State Means
To present my case, I defne what I mean by the state, locating its defnition in the 
modes of its existence. I argue that two primary means of the state are coercive force 
and continual creation of national identity. I do this by presenting case studies from 
the UK supported by the analyses of a number of political theorists. It is important at 
this stage that my critique is solely a political one – I intend the frst half of this 
chapter (5.2) to be descriptive arguments concerning the state and its functions, before
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going on in the later half of this chapter (5.3) to analyse the compatibility of these 
means with Maximian ethics. Tis allows for a political and economic description of 
the state’s functions which I will then consider from a theological dimension. I thus 
distinguish between descriptive analysis of the state through its means and 
operations, and a normative critique that evaluates whether these should be supported
given a commitment to a Maximian understanding of virtue, cosmic movement, and 
telos.369
Te political commentators I draw on come from diferent strands in one of the
greatest political traditions of state critique – anarchist theory. I draw from key 
commentators today and also classical theorists from the past who fall into the general
category of anarchist thinkers, or who at least are familiar with the criticisms put 
forward in anarchist theory. Anarchist theory does not ofen see mainstream 
treatment in ethics, but I believe many arguments put forward by its proponents 
require more full treatment than has hitherto been given in contemporary ethics, 
especially when it comes to evaluating institutions like the state. Although I draw 
heavily on the critiques of anarchist theorists, it is the weight of primary source 
analysis that I hope will lend credence to my interest in this way of thinking. What 
anarchism is is less relevant here, as I am more interested in using the critical 
arguments put forward that afrm an alternative to the state at this point (although I 
will treat further on this topic in the next chapter.) 
In order to demonstrate the claim the means of the state confict with Maximian 
virtues and telos, the chapter will be in three parts. 5.1 will consider terminological 
defnitions, establishing what I mean by the state and my reasons for choosing it as 
the object of critique. In 5.2 I provide a descriptive analysis of the state and its means, 
demonstrating how it functions with reference in particular to the investigative 
research done by American political theorist and linguist Noam Chomsky and 
supported with primary evidence. In 5.3 I provide a normative overview of the state’s 
functions, critiquing its methods in light of the virtues and methods provided by 
Maximian ethics, and giving further evidence to suggest that the state should be 
369 This allows for a degree of continuity with other ethicists and political commentators, who, though 
they might have a different normative approach with a different telos in mind, can still see the logic 
in a methodological framework that considers what the state is, followed by why this is problematic 
given the parameters of a specific moral system. 
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opposed by those seeking to implement an ethics informed by Maximus’ theology. I 
conclude by suggesting that given these observations, it must be preferable for an 
ethics informed by Maximus to consider supporting and developing alternative ways 
of communal living and organising, to be discussed in Chapter 6.
5.1 Mental Furniture of the World
To demonstrate one of the ways in which we may apply Maximian ethics in our day-
to-day lives, I use this chapter to critique the state. I suggest that the means of the 
state are incompatible with the virtues and telos in Maximus’ theology. Tere are a 
number of reasons why I have chosen the state as the subject of this chapter: the frst 
concerns what the state is, and the second concerns the place it occupies within our 
thought.
5.1.1 What is the State?
Firstly then, what is the state? Te Concise Oxford Dictionary defnes the State as “a 
sovereign political power or community” or “the territory occupied by such a 
community”.370 But what do we mean when we refer to something by its power or its 
territory? How are we ascribing agency to something that is defned in terms of power
or place? Power belongs to something and must be enacted by someone, as Maximus 
reminds us in the dyothelete controversy of his day.371 Tis kind of way of talking 
about the state seems to mystify the source of its agency, obscuring its capabilities, 
actions, responsibilities and existence to the point where it becomes unclear what 
exactly we are referring to at any moment or how one can go about critiquing it. Te 
idea that the state is ‘community’ at least allows us to start locating a source for its 
agency. Who then is the state? At least by implication in the defnition above there 
seems to be a sense in which it is not just those with the most power in a state who 
are called ‘the state’ but also all those who caught up and included in its extended 
mechanisms.
370 W. T. McLeod & P. Hanks (eds.) “State” in Collins Concise Oxford Dictionary. (Glasgow: Collins, 
1987 (First ed. 1982)), 1135.
371 Maximus, Pyrrh., PG91 292D-293B.
172
~ Chapter 5: The sodern Borders of Lovee ~
For the German anarchist Gustav Landauer372 (1870 - 1919) the state was not 
something to be considered in abstract terms like ‘power’ and ‘territory’ or even in 
terms of ‘community’ where community refers exclusively to those more heavily 
involved in orchestrating the doings of the state. Te state was instead the way that all
involved in it had chosen to act:
Te state is not something which can be destroyed by a revolution, but is a condition, a
certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behaviour; we destroy it
by contracting other relationships, by behaving diferently.373
Landauer suggests that we ought to think of the state and any human organisation as 
persons in relation. Under this reading, the state is not an it, or even a them, it’s an us. 
Most of us were never given a chance to opt out of this community, but the way that 
we behave and allow ourselves to be directed and controlled is, according to 
Landauer’s defnition, what makes up the state. Tis might not be a comfortable 
defnition, but the alternative is to somehow start deconstructing the interwoven 
mechanisms of the state – do we call the politicians who pass legislation ‘the state’, or 
the civil service who run all the day to day functions, or the police who enforce law 
and order, or the military who are the fnal body called upon to enforce order, or local 
councils who enact government laws at a local level, or the private corporations who 
lobby and direct so many legislative interests. Tere is perhaps a good argument for 
considering all these to be the state, but for the state to maintain power and control, 
the vast majority of people need to conform to a certain kind of behaviour. Without 
this behaviour, Landauer suggests, the state would cease to exist.
Tis leads us to a defnition of the state in terms of how far its control can be 
maintained. If we continue with Landauer’s idea which implies that the vast majority 
of people need to conform to a certain kind of behaviour for the state to maintain its 
existence, then the state only exists in so far as it can maintain control over its 
372 Marshall credits Landauer as the most important German anarchist thinker after Max Stirner: P. 
Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism. (London: Harper Perennial, 2008 
(First ed. 1992)),410; Woodcock credits Landauer along with Erich Muechsam and Rudolf Rocker 
as being one of three outstanding German anarchist thinkers. G. Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of
Libertarian Ideas and Movements. (London: Penguin Books, 1986 (First ed. 1962)), 362.
373 G. Landauer, cited in C. Ward, Anarchy in Action. (London: Freedom Press, 2008 (First ed. 1973) 
(First Published in ‘Weak Statesmen, Weaker People’ in Der Sozialist (1910)), 30.
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members. Tere are a number of forms such a control might take, some of which will 
be explored later, but arguably the last resort through which the state can exert 
control is through coercive force. In the thesis introduction, I illustrated Aristotle 
Papanikolaou’s use of Patristic (and in particular Maximian) sources for contemporary
ethics. I explained that my approach is very diferent to Papanikolaou’s and that 
ultimately his conclusion that the liberal state is the best place for the Church to 
fourish374 seems more like a concession than a logical continuation of love in 
Maximian theology. Despite these methodological diferences and radically diferent 
conclusions, Papanikolaou does not shy away from conceding, as Zizioulas did, that 
(1) the state is coercive375 and (2) that this is extremely problematic for the Church.376 
He writes that “Zizioulas elaborates on the paradoxical fact that although the law 
should be designed to protect the uniqueness and freedom that is constitutive of 
personhood, it does so through the threat of coercion,”377 and goes on to quote 
Zizioulas saying “Personhood, by very defnition, abhors coercion and thirsts afer 
freedom. Te law, by its very nature, contains elements of coercion to the point of 
depriving liberty in order to – how paradoxical – secure freedom”.378 I have a number 
of problems with this passage – frstly, this description of personhood thirsting afer 
freedom, for example, is characterised in opposition to the restrictions of society. Tis 
implies that the freedom being talked about here is the more traditional one we might 
fnd in J.S. Mill – freedom of the individual to do as one wishes,379 rather than the 
freedom we encounter in Maximus which is expressed in contrast to what is necessary
by nature. Furthermore, this ‘paradox’, as Zizioulas and Papanikolaou present it, is one
374 This is an oversimplification of the nuance in Papanikolaou’s argument, but I defended this 
characterisation of his conclusion in this thesis introduction.
375 Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 126.
376 Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 126-7. When talking of the Church,  Papanikolaou and I assume
that  Maximus’ telos of theosis are received as vital theological contributions to the life of the 
Church. In theory this is the case for the Orthodox Church to which Papanikolaou is referring. In 
theory it could also be received by any other Chalcedonian Church, since Maximus is universally 
recognised as a saint by all Chalcedonian Churches. In actuality, positions like that of Aquinas and 
Augustine have been much stronger in western traditions. Aquinas and Augustine put forward 
positions much more amenable to state structures, particularly since they defend violence and 
coercion in some forms. I consider some of these differences in the next chapter (6.1.3.1) where I 
briefly point out how an Augustinian understanding of Just War is irreconcilable to Maximian ethics.
377 Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 126.
378 J. Zizioulas, “Law and Personhood in Orthodox Theology” in The One and the Many: Studies on 
God, Man, the Church and the World Today, (Alhambra: Sebastian Press, 2010), 411. Cited in 
Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 126.
379 Discussed further in 6.1.1.1.
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that is later afrmed as necessary rather than explored as an irreconcilable dichotomy.
Papanikolaou follows Zizioulas’s theology and uses this distinction to ground what 
will become one of his most important conclusions in the book – namely that there is 
a political sphere and an ecclesial sphere and that, while the two are always diferent, 
the ecclesial sphere can maintain its most important freedoms whilst existing within 
the political sphere of the liberal state. However, this is not at present what maters 
and I do not intend to argue with this position here. Te point about freedom and the 
diferent way Maximus uses it to those in post-Enlightenment philosophy is explained 
in detail in Chapter 6, while the dichotomy of the state’s methods as compared to the 
Church’s goals is the topic of this chapter. My point in using Papanikolaou and 
Zizioulas here is to illustrate that, even in a position that ultimately defends the state, 
the state is recognised as violent, coercive, and problematic for a theology of love and 
freedom. Papanikolaou takes this further and also afrms that “If the law is premised 
on the necessity for coercion, then it is also premised on fear, which further 
distinguishes the state from the church, the later being the realization of love.”380
Te claim that the state is necessarily coercive can be traced back to Max 
Weber, who in 1919 wrote that “Ultimately, one can defne the modern state 
sociologically only in terms of the specifc means peculiar to it, as to every political 
association, namely, the use of physical force.”381 If we look for further clarifcation on 
this, we can fnd Weber writing that
Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state – nobody 
says that – but force is a means specifc to the state. Today the relation between the 
state and violence is an especially intimate ones Today, however, we have to say that 
a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territorys Te state is considered the sole source of
the ‘right’ to use violence.382
Weber points out, violence383 is not the sole means of the state and he acknowledges 
380 Papanikolaou, Mystical as Political, 126-7.
381 M. Weber, “Politics and Vocation” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. H.H. Gerth, H.H & C. 
Wright Mills, (trans. & eds.) (New York: Routledge, 2009 (First delivered 1919), 77-8.
382 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, 78.
383 I am aware that I use the terms ‘coercion’ and ‘violence’ interchangeably, and that the definition of 
these terms is highly contentious in fields of political theory. Without straying too far into fields that 
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that it clearly also operates in other ways. It is however the only political entity that is
considered to have “the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence” and “claims the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force”. We could thus alter our defnition 
to say that that the state is all its citizens, in so far as they have been compelled (by 
one way or another) to conform to a certain way of behaving. 
Weber’s claim seems particularly prescient today, in an age where states are 
involved in combating terrorism. In an article assessing the use of the word terrorism, 
Noam Chomsky writes that rather than defning the term ‘terrorism’ and seeking 
instances of the phenomenon, it has been the almost exclusive practice of both 
governments and media bodies “to begin with the thesis that terrorism is the 
responsibility of some ofcially designated enemy”.384 From there the practice is to 
“then designate terrorist acts as ‘terrorist’ just in the cases where they can be 
atributed (whether plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be 
ignored, suppressed, or termed ‘retaliation’ or ‘self-defence’”.385 Te terminological 
diference Chomsky describes is one that supports Weber’s thesis that state violence is
legitimate violence. When a state holds the monopoly on violence, ‘retaliation’ or 
‘self-defence’ become applicable to their modes of operation. Where the monopoly on 
violence is not held, the activities of such perpetrators are much more likely to be 
designated ‘terrorist’. Tere is an acceptability and a legitimacy to the violence 
perpetrated by a state that points to the continued validity of Weber’s thesis today.
Te defnition of the state I am proposing is one that recognises it both as 
being us, the citizens whose collective behaviour make its existence possible, but also 
one that recognises it as the collective interests of certain people, and the capability to 
enforce those interests upon those who disagree with them. In other words, we make 
up the state and help enforce the state with our behaviour, but that does not mean we 
have equal (or any) representation in the interests that the state enforces. Te state is 
the sum total of its participants’ behaviour, but within this web of relationships there 
I cannot do full justice to here, I am using these terms to refer to imposing on and forcing others to 
act in a certain way against their will. I do not restrict this to physical force, but in most of the 
following examples it is these physical elements that are the topic of discussion.
384 N. Chomsky, “International Terrorism: Image and Reality” in Western State Terrorism. A.L. George 
(ed.) 12-38. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). This version Noam Chomsky’s Official Website, 
Chomsky.Info:  https://chomsky.info/199112__02/ (Accessed 09.06.17).
385 Chomsky, “International Terrorism”.
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is a power imbalance that grants a minority some form of administrative control over 
the majority. For such a minority to retain control this power imbalance must remain 
in place. For Hume, it seemed absurd to suggest that this minority control was 
maintained by coercive force, since it appeared to him that a majority of force is 
always on the side of the governed. He suggests that government by a minority must 
be therefore exist by consent and complicity of the governed.386 In his essay 
Containing the Treat of Democracy, Chomsky assesses the validity of Hume’s claim 
and allows that there is truth to the claim that all government is founded on some 
measure of consent. For this reason, he maintains, the control of thought is also 
important: “Te public must be reduced to passivity in the political realm, but for 
submissiveness to become a reliable trait, it must be entrenched in the realm of belief 
as well. Te public are to be observers, not participants, consumers of ideology as well 
as products.”387 Chomsky proposes that while the origins of the state have their roots 
in violence, it is primarily the maintenance of passivity through the threat of violence 
that preserves the state. A key element of maintaining control and therefore of 
defning the state, is its ability to manufacture consent388 and claim a monopoly on the 
use of force, thus allowing a minority to wield power.
Jason Lindsey, who wrote a monograph on methods of state control and power,
writes that key to the development of the state is the formation of ideology. He 
follows Marx in believing that ideology functions, frstly, as a way of taking 
something historically contingent and turning in it into an everlasting universal, and 
secondly as a means of explaining “the order of things so that everyone theoretically 
benefts, not just the class in charge”.389 He argues that ideology is therefore a product 
of class antagonism, created in order to justify and conceal inequity. Lindsey writes 
that ultimately “theories of political legitimacy can be deconstructed as eforts to 
conceal this kernel of violence that is the real foundation for the state. Te sanctions 
386 D. Hume, “Of the First Principles of Government” in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. E. F. 
Miller (ed.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987 (First ed. 1742)), Part I Essay IV. This version: 
Library of Economics and Liberty: http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL4.html 
(Accessed 09.06.17).
387 N. Chomsky, “Containing the Threat of Democracy” in Chomsky on Anarchism. B. Pateman (ed.) 
(Edinburgh: AK Press, 2009) (First ed. 1969) (Essay first published 1990)), 155.
388 A term first coined in E.S. Herman & N. Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy 
of the Mass Media. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).
389 J.R. Lindsey, The Concealment of the State. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 11.
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the state applies are so certain and absolute because they ultimately can be backed by 
violence to the individual resisting them”.390 Lindsey’s position allows us to afrm that 
we are both a part of the state as its citizens, since our agency and complicity is to a 
degree required, but that such a defnition does not eradicate the confict of interests 
that exist with a state. Te us and them language traditionally described in terms of 
class is an inevitable feature of a social structure that concentrates power and wealth 
in the hands of the few. Te class antagonism Lindsey mentions is thus a consistent 
reminder that the state is premised on violent relationships and existence of a 
monopoly on coercive force. Lindsey identifes ideology as a key way for that 
monopoly on coercive force to be maintained by a minority, describing one of the 
most important functions of ideology as allowing individuals serving the state to 
believe that maintaining the power of the state is for the common good, and to believe
that “Without these forces, how can one right wrongs in society and protect the 
vulnerable?”391 Te normalisation of the state’s methods and power becomes a key 
way of maintaining control and removing it from a sphere of arbitration and ethical 
consideration.
In his essay on Society and the State, Martin Buber describes a further 
interrelation between violence and national identity that the state relies on for 
consolidation and control. He writes that “the fact that every people feel itself 
threatened by the others gives the state its defnite unifying power; it depends upon 
the instinct of self-preservation of society itself; the latent external crisis enables it to 
get the upper hand in internal crises”.392 External crisis and the use of violence abroad 
can be used to create an identity and an ideology of nationhood. Naomi Klein argued 
that the Falkland War was a precisely an excuse for this kind of control at home. She 
claimed that confict could have been avoided in the Falklands but that this that helped
both Tatcher’s government in the UK and Galtieri’s in Argentina to maintain control 
at home.393 Te business of maintaining power for a minority becomes a balance of 
coercion that is supplemented by ideological justifcation. A monopoly on violence is 
kept, but so too is a kind of monopoly on ideology. Freedom of thought can be 
390 Lindsey, Concealment, 59.
391 Lindsey, Concealment, 12.
392 M. Buber, ‘Society and State’, World Review 27 (London, 1951), cited in Ward, Anarchy, 30.
393 N. Klein, The Shock Doctrine. (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 137.
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directed into avenues in which it is relatively harmless – our concerns become bound 
up in the nuances of the precise diference between a Conservative or Labour vote, 
rather than whether or not centralising power into the hands of the few will ever 
bring about a beter quality of life for those who have nothing.
I defne the state as being us, but also afrm that it represents a power 
imbalance where a minority are able to maintain control through a monopoly on 
violence. Like Lindsey, I consider ideology to be a key way that states maintain 
control, and I spend time in particular looking at nationalism as an ideology that 
simultaneous creates unity and xenophobia as systems of control. Coercive force and 
nationalist ideology as key means of the state will be explored in section 5.1.2. I claim 
that these means of the state, as a mode of human operation, have very litle in 
common with the tropos of virtue and love that our logoi point us toward. Prior to this,
I wish to give a defence of my choice to focus on the state in this chapter.
5.1.2 Why the State?
In choosing to analyse the state, I wish to demonstrate that it is an undesirable mode 
of human existence that is fundamentally reliant on means that are contrary to 
Maximian virtues and telos. Ethics orientated toward the cosmic telos that Maximus 
describes does not ft well into any political agenda. It does not serve any current 
mode of governance, political subscription or policy. I have chosen to focus on the 
state because it seems not to be an obvious choice.394 In 1851, the French philosopher, 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) wrote:
... government has always been presented to men’s minds as the natural agent of 
justice, the protection of the weak and the keeper of peace. As a result of this 
394 We can see for example from a brief survey of the conference topics of the Society for the Study of 
Christian Ethics over the last thirty-four years (Society for the Study of Christian Ethics: 
http://www.ssce.org.uk/conferences (Accessed 30.01.2017)), where conference titles concern a topic
in particular, they focus on issues that arise from within the state, rather than lending themselves to 
critiques of this entire mode of human conduct. Eg. 2013 Security and Surveillance, 2011 Sport, 
2007 Managerialism, 2004 Public Theology and Bioethics, 2003 Ethics of Education, 2000 Banking 
and Debt, 1999 Media Ethics, 1997 Euthanasia. One could conclude that the apparatus of the state 
has tended to remain invisible in Christian ethics. There are well established streams of Christian 
ethical thought like that of Liberation Theology, Feminist Theology, Eco-Theology that concern 
specific failures of the state to address equality and harmful human activity, but tradition of 
Christian ethics concerned with state itself is comparatively minor. (For a summative overview of 
Christian anarchist thinkers, see Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, 1-26).
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providential and sacrosanct atribute, government ensconced itself in men’s hearts and
minds alike. It became part of the mental furniture of the world: it was the citizens’ 
faith, their innermost and invincible superstition.395
Proudhon’s concern that the state has become part of the ‘mental furniture of the 
world’ is precisely the reason why it cannot escape our ethical scrutiny. It is never 
absurd that anything should be undermined by ethics. Tere should be no part of 
human society that is beyond the realm of ethical scrutiny. Te state is not mental 
furniture of the present day – omnipotent and immovable in its performing of 
background necessities – but a historical body created by human behaviour. How it 
came about, how it acquired and maintains power – all of these are important in an 
ethical assessment of the state, especially since it is held by many that the state 
ultimately still protects those ends for which it was originally set up. One of the key 
tenets leading to the development of anarchist intellectual thought, according to Peter 
Marshall, is precisely the growth of critical thinking considering the historical 
existence of the state and the functions it performs in the present. In his history of 
anarchism, Marshall notes that “... it became increasingly clear to bold and 
independent reasoners that while states and governments theoretically intended to 
prevent injustice, they had in fact only perpetuated oppression and inequality. Te 
state with its coercive apparatus of law, courts, prisons and army came to be seen not 
as the remedy but rather the principal cause of social disorder”.396 We can see this 
position developed more clearly by Noam Chomsky. In an essay investigating the 
philosophical history of the language of freedom, Chomsky looks at critics of the 
mode and formation of the state. Citing Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality (1775), he 
notes:
Rousseau argues that civil society is hardly more than a conspiracy by the rich to 
guarantee their plunder. Hypocritically, the rich call upon their neighbours to 
“institute regulations of justice and peace to which all are obliged to conform, which 
make an exception of no one, and which compensate in some way for the caprices and 
395 P. Proudhon, ‘The Authority Principle’ in No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism. D. 
Guérin (ed.) P. Sharkey (trans.) 81-98 (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005 (First ed. 1980) (Essay first 
published 1851)), 82.
396 P. Marshall, Demanding the Impossible,  x.
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fortune by equally subjecting the powerful and the weak to mutual duties”. [...] Tus 
society and laws “gave new feters to the weak and new forces to the rich, destroyed 
natural freedom for all time, established forever the law of property and inequality, 
changed a clever usurpation into an irrevocable right and for the proft of a few 
ambitious men henceforth subjected the whole human race to work, servitude and 
misery.”397
Rousseau’s essay, based on an Enlightenment principle of appealing to freedom as a 
natural property of human beings, argued that the means by which property and 
power were seized by a wealthy elite were unjustifable and therefore illegitimate. Te 
cementing of the role of the state and the creation of law were tied, Rousseau argued, 
to justifying the seizing and usurping of land and property and ensuring that this 
acquisition could not be undone and had the political and coercive apparatus to 
maintain its continued inequity. Tough the philosophical reasoning is based on this 
assumption of freedom being integral right belonging to human nature,398 much easier 
to synthesise with Maximian thought is the more raw appeal Rousseau makes 
elsewhere in the essay:
“Do you not know that a multitude of your brethren die or sufer from need of what 
you have in excess, and that you needed express and unanimous consent of the human
race to appropriate for yourself anything from common subsistence that exceeded 
your own?” It is contrary to the law of nature that “a handful of men be gluted with 
superfuities while the starving multitude lacks necessities.”399
Rousseau’s appeal places the injustices that the state perpetuates in its protection of 
property into an ethical perspective. Whilst still framed in terms of Enlightenment 
understandings of law and justice, the sufering caused by the inequity of wealth is a 
topic very familiar to early Christian and Byzantine writings.400 Te accusation that 
397 N. Chomsky, “Language and Freedom” in Chomsky on Anarchism, 103.
398 I discuss the differences between Byzantine and Enlightment concepts of freedom in 6.3.1.1. 
‘Rights’ language in general is a topic I am steering clear from as I believe it is too politically loaded
a term to be useful in this ethical discourse. The notion is a legal one that requires the coercive 
power of the state to uphold and maintain, making it tautological to employ in a critique of the state.
399 Chomsky, “Language and Freedom”, 103 (citing Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality (1775)).
400 Eg. Acts 2:45; Acts 4:32; J. Wortley (ed. & trans.) The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers: A 
Select Edition and Complete English Translation. ‘The Quarrel’,  N.352/17.26; Gregory Nazianzus, 
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the state is instrumental to the protection of forcefully appropriated property is an 
extremely problematic one for those looking to live by Maximian ethics. As I explain 
in the next section, the mode in which the state operates and the ends that the state 
upholds can be directly paralleled to the meta-ethical paradigm of virtue and telos we 
are working with. Coercive means and dedication to preserving the privileges of the 
powerful and wealthy have nothing to do with the means and end of Maximian ethics.
If the state does operate by these means with this telos in mind, then it is in direct 
opposition to the ethical life we are called to.
At the 1880 Congress of the Jura Federation, atended by the infuential 
anarchist theorists and geographers Peter Kropotkin and Elisée Reclus, there were 
concerns that the ends that the state worked for had very litle interest in the human 
as a person, and that consequently the means it operated by have very litle regard for 
human freedom. Te Federation went further to say that the state exists as a 
convenience, overriding many of ethical objections to its means by sheer force of it 
providing so many necessary amenities. Tey efectively argue that the magnitude of 
what the state is and does, occludes many atempts to hold it accountable for those 
things we disagree with.401 Teir argument is similar to Proudhon’s earlier, where, 
because it is inconvenient to critique the state, alternatives to its existence and even 
critical thought about its operations and relationships are pushed to one side. Te 
Federation therefore put forward an extremely important reason for critiquing the 
state, which is that its conveniences cannot absolve it of its defciencies and dangers, 
and that we cannot allow present day complacency to direct ethical undertakings.
Another reason to consider the state as the topic of critique is its role and 
relation to law. Kropotkin suggests that the relationship between law and the state is a
very close one and that, as in Rousseau’s critique, the primary purpose of law is to 
protect the interests of the few.402 Kropotkin suggests that historically the growth of 
Oratio IVX De Pauperum Amore ( Oration 14 On Love of the Poor), J. Migne, Patrologia Graeca 
(vol. 35), (Paris, 1857), 857-910; Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5 PG44 1247C-1204B.
401 D. Guérin (ed.) “The 1880 Congress of the Jura Federation” in No Gods No Masters, 289-290.
402 A position of recurring importance to anarchist thinkers is that removing law does not equate a 
propagation of chaos. Instead it is believed by a number of theorists that the ability to form 
agreements between people and live in a society comprised of free co-operation and mutual aid is 
not only possible but proven to be an alternative to state (and violent) imposition of law. This is the 
main topic of Kropotkin’s essay Law and Authority (P. Kropotkin,  Law and Authority. (London: 
William Reeves,1886.)Anarchist Archives: 
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/kropotkin/lawauthority.html (Accessed 09.06.17)), 
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laws as a system of governance is tied to reining in worse powers that previously ran 
rampant through the land. Using the example of the French Revolution, he writes that 
s during and afer the revolutions when the lawyers rose to power, they did their best 
to strengthen the principle upon which their ascendancy depended. Te middle class at
once accepted as a dyke to dam up the popular torrent. Te priestly crew hastened to 
sanctify it, to save their bark from foundering amid the breakers. Finally the people 
received it as an improvement upon the arbitrary authority and violence of the past.
Kropotkin’s observation that the law is the ‘principle upon which their ascendancy 
depended’ is a recurring critique of the relationship between the state and law. Tis 
passage echoes one that Proudhon wrote thirty-fve years earlier in Te Authority 
Principle, 
s government, no mater how popular it may have been in its origins, has sided with 
the best educated and the wealthiest class against the poorest and most numerous one:
that afer having shown its liberal face for a time, it has gradually become exceptional 
and exclusive: fnally, that instead of securing freedom and equality for all, it has toiled
doggedly at destroying these things, on account of its natural predisposition towards 
privilege.403
What Proudhon calls the state’s ‘natural predisposition towards privilege’, is for 
Kropotkin inseparable from the growth of law. Indeed, he implies that the growth of 
one is tied to the other, given that the law was created by those who held the 
monopoly of violence to enshrine power they had seized violently. We saw earlier that
Rousseau similarly believes that society and law were about the establishment of 
power over the powerless and for the protection of property.404 Kropotkin maintains 
however, that the contemporary use of law afer the French Revolution is just as 
problematic as the accusations Rousseau made of the Ancien Régime, since laws now 
and of Proudhon’s The Authority Principle (Proudhon, “Authority Principle” in No Gods No 
Masters, 81-98). An overview of this position as held to more broadly by anarchists is given in 
Woodcock, Anarchism, 21-22.
403 Proudhon, “Authority Principle” in No God No Masters, 82.
404 J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. P. Negri, & G. Boroson, (eds.) (New York: 
Dover Publications, 2004. (Essay first published 1775)).
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uphold “the interests of consumer, priest and rich exploiter”. In an assessment of the 
role of law within society, Kropotkin writes that “Tey [critics analysing law] study 
the characteristics of law, and instead of perpetual growth corresponding to that of the
human race, they fnd its distinctive trait to be immobility, a tendency to crystallise 
what should be modifed and developed day by day”.405 Te failure of a society to be 
able to change and evolve is a critique of Kropotkin’s that I shall come onto in more 
detail in the next chapter. However, in his criticism of the way that law ‘crystallises 
what should be modifed’ is the accusation that currently society is unable to truly 
change in the face of sufering and dissidence. Te belief that the state tends to 
entrench power further into the hands of the few arises from a certain criticism of law
– namely the way it is wielded and whom it ultimately protects. Closely tied to the 
suggestion that law and the state serve an elite minority and protect their interests 
over and above those of other people, is the role of violence and the ability of the state
to uphold such laws through coercive force. In an impassioned passage writen shortly
afer his second incarceration, Kropotkin writes:
Tey ask how law has been maintained, and in its service they see the atrocities of 
Byzantinism, the cruelties of the Inquisition, the tortures of the Middle Ages, living 
fesh torn by the lash of the executioner, chains, clubs, axes, the gloomy dungeons of 
prisons, agony, curses and tears. In our own days they see, as before, the axe, the cord, 
the rife, the prison; on the one hand, the brutalised prisoner, reduced to the condition 
of a caged beast by the debasement of his whole moral being, and on the other hand, 
the judge, stripped of every feeling which does honour to human nature, living like a 
visionary in a world of legal fctions, revelling in the infiction of imprisonment and 
death, without even suspecting, in the cold malignity of his madness, the abyss of 
degradation into which he has himself fallen before the eyes of those whom he 
condemns.406
Contextually, Kropotkin is writing this passage during or shortly afer his release from
Clairvaux prison in France, having previously also been incarcerated in Peter and Paul
Fortress in St Petersburg. Both of these sentences were for holding views considered 
405 Kropotkin, Law and Authority.
406 Kropotkin, Law and Authority.
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to be politically dissident. Kropotkin identifes the dehumanisation of not only the 
prisoner, but also the judge, and those caught up in the process, thereby propagating 
the criticism that not only the origins of the law, but also the way that it is enforced 
and carried through are problematic. He suggests that this is not justice, but yet 
another instance of the cruel use of power that degrades both the judge and the 
judged. It could be argued that in the United Kingdom this particular kind of political 
persecution is (theoretically) no longer existent, but Kropotkin’s concern that the 
enforcing of laws has nothing to do with virtue in either the judge or the judged is still
an important one for those considering Maximus’ position. Previously, I raised Isaac 
the Syrian’s concern that justice cannot be considered a Christian virtue for precisely 
Kropotkin’s concerns. St Isaac proposes mercy as the opposite of justice. As I argued 
before, regardless of how fully one agrees with Isaac, it is certainly worth time and 
thought to consider how such judgement as that required of our legal systems fts in 
with an ethics that has love as its telos. Te existence of a special kind of sufering 
permited in our prisons, is arguably what holds up the legal systems of the state. 
Laws require violence on one end to uphold them, and sufering on the other to serve 
as punishment for breaking them. Tis chapter is reserved for critiquing the methods 
and means of the state, rather than suggesting alternatives (which is reserved for the 
next chapter), but admitance that the upholding of law is reliant on this sufering and 
violence adds another layer to Weber’s premise that the state is defned by is 
monopoly on coercive force.
How the state operates and its ultimate aims have long been at the heart of 
critiques of the state. We can think about the way that the state operates and ask what
ends are being aimed for, that these means are seen as acceptable. For someone like 
Rousseau, the means and ends of the state ran contrary to many of Enlightenment 
principles that he held to, not unlike a system of virtues and telos. For thinkers like 
Kropotkin, whose ethics arose more from an instinctive aversion to oppression and 
cruelty in human relationships,407 there is again a system in place, however informal, 
that adheres to a certain concept of what is good, acceptable and desirable in human 
relations that the state fails to stand up for. Just as these thinkers have asked how the 
407 Though this would later feed into a theory of Mutual Aid and solidarity in the natural world. cf. P. 
Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist. (New York: Dover Publications, 1971 (First ed. 1899)), 48-
62, 338; See also 6.0.3.
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state is justifed within their own paradigms of ethical thought, so when applying 
Maximian ethics can we ask how the means and ends of the states we live in are 
justifable when our aim is a telos of theosis.
5.2 Means of State
Having defned what the state is and why it is worth talking about, I wish to 
demonstrate that not only are coercive force and the creation of ideology imperative 
for the formation of a state, but they continue to play a role in the day to day doings 
of a state. My purpose in doing so is to illustrate that, in giving our consent or 
allowing ourselves to be directed by the state, we are tacit in such modes of existence, 
and live our lives within the spaces that they create. As I mentioned before in my 
critique of Papanikolaou, it means that we accept some responsibility for the violence 
necessary to uphold the stability in our own lives. My claim in 5.3 will be that this 
trade-of is not good enough for one who truly wishes to live a loving mode of life. 
Te stability we gain for ourselves comes at the cost of the persecution of others. Such
a way of life is fundamentally opposed to Christ’s words and the theology Maximus 
draws from them.
In this section I look at coercive force and the ideology behind national borders
as means of the state. As there are limitations to what we can claim about a state in a 
generic capacity, I focus my critique on the United Kingdom and outline how coercive 
force and national borders are integral to the operation of the state in the UK. 
Although I am specifc in my critique, I believe many of these criticisms also hold in a 
more generic capacity. Firstly, in section 5.2.1, I demonstrate the way that coercion is 
not only a founding principle of the state, but is still a live and very present means and
mode of state operation. I look at standard police responses to peaceful political 
protest in the UK and demonstrate that coercive force continues to be a consistent 
state means of maintaining control. In section 5.2.2 I look at the way that the 
ideological language of us and them exists in the very way that the state conducts its 
operations, and directs its policy and enforcement of national borders. I look at the 
example of the UK Border Force and its public declarations of intent and conduct.
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5.2.1 Coercive Force
It is difcult to assess the extent to which coercive force is ofcially sanctioned by a 
state as its primary means of operation. As we have seen, Chomsky and Klein suggest 
that a systemic reliance on violence to sway popular opinion or suppress it is integral 
to the state’s continued existence, and the reliance of states on coercion is not too 
controversial a point to make. However for the purposes of this chapter I wish to 
demonstrate that coercive means are neither a relic of the past, nor always as secretive
and subversive as the measures Chomsky and Klein express, and nor are such means 
solely reserved for those who break laws that the state has decreed. In doing so I 
intend to illustrate that this coercive means is not just lurking in the background, 
purely as a residual threat, but is structurally integral to the function of the state and 
represents a consistent means of state response. Tis means that in consenting to 
partake in the state, and we allow such means to establish the status quo in which we 
live and work. In section 5.3 I will come on to reasons why this is problematic for 
Maximian ethics, but here I briefy wish to demonstrate that the maintenance of the 
status quo and the creation of the spaces in which we live are dependent on state 
violence. 
In the United Kingdom where expression of dissidence with the government in 
the form of protests is legal, regardless of the character of such protests, the go-to 
response of the state is to recognise such expressions as a threat and to treat with 
them violently. I defned the state as a community that contains a power imbalance 
where a minority are able to maintain control through a monopoly on violence. 
Despite an ideological stance that permits political protest, the reliance of the state on 
coercive force as means to maintaining order supersedes these ideological 
commitments. A concern along these lines was raised by the United Nations when 
reviewing the policing methods in the United Kingdom:
A trial on policing methods was brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereafer ECHR) where police tactics in peaceful protests were brought to 
court in light of what the ECHR called a right to protest, freedom of expression, and 
assembly, which it claimed are of fundamental importance to all democratic 
societies.408 On 15th March 2012, the ECHR ruled that the police operation to ‘ketle’ 
408 ECHR, quoted in P. Lewis “Human rights court backs police 'kettling'” The Guardian. 15th March 
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protesters in a demonstration in Oxford Circus, London 2001 was lawful.409 Te court 
found that “in the circumstances the imposition of an absolute cordon was the least 
intrusive and most efective means to be applied” and that “on the basis of the facts 
found by the trial judge, the court is unable to identify a moment when the measure 
changed from what was, at most, a restriction on freedom of movement to a 
deprivation of liberty”.410 Te court noted that
On the basis of these fndings, the Court considered that the coercive nature of the 
containment within the cordon, its duration; and its efect on the applicants, in terms 
of physical discomfort and inability to leave Oxford Circus, pointed towards a 
deprivation of liberty. However, the Court also had to take into account the ‘type’ and 
‘manner of implementation’ of the measure in question as the context in which the 
measure was imposed was signifcant. Te cordon had been imposed to isolate and 
contain a large crowd in dangerous and volatile conditions. It was a measure of 
containment that had been preferred over more robust methods which might have 
given rise to a greater risk of injury. [s] In this context, the Court did not consider 
that the puting in place of the cordon had amounted to a ‘deprivation of liberty’.411
In addition to this ruling, the court also added that “Te Court underlined, however, 
that measures of crowd control should not be used by the national authorities directly 
or indirectly to stife or discourage protest, given the fundamental importance of 
freedom of expression and assembly in all democratic societies” and that “Had it not 
remained necessary for the police to impose and maintain the cordon in order to 
prevent serious injury or damage, the "type" of the measure would have been diferent,
and its coercive and restrictive nature might have been sufcient to bring it within 
article 5”.412 Paul Lewis, the Guardian journalist covering the ruling, concluded that 
2012. The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/mar/15/human-rights-court-police-
kettling. (Accessed 09.06.17).
409 ECHR, ‘Article 5: Deprivation of liberty.’ in Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 150. 7-9 
(March 2012). Available online: ECHR: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CLIN_2012_03_150_ENG_906288.pdf (Accessed 31.01.17): 
“Containment of peaceful demonstration within a police cordon for over seven hours: Article 5 not 
applicable: no violation”, 7. 
410 ECHR, ‘Article 5: Deprivation of liberty’, 9.
411 ECHR, ‘Article 5: Deprivation of liberty’, 9.
412 ECHR, ‘Article 5: Deprivation of liberty’, 9.
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“The Met413 did not respond to requests for comment. But the ruling is likely to be 
taken by police as a validation of ketling, which they argue is an invaluable tool to 
prevent disorder from spreading”.414
On 23rd January 2013, the United Nations Special Rapporteur issued a press 
release detailing a statement on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association in the United Kingdom. In this statement, specifc mention was made of 
the above ECHR ruling on ketling. Te following is the full extract from the statement
concerning it:
Law enforcement authorities, when policing protests, have resorted on several 
occasions to the tactic of containment, also known as “ketling”, which consists of 
deploying a police cordon around a group of protestors, ofen for long periods, with a 
view to enclosing them and preventing other protestors from joining the “ketled” 
group. Te authorities have justifed this tactic by the need to prevent violence and 
damage to property. 
Te Special Rapporteur was particularly troubled to hear alarming stories of peaceful 
protestors, as well as innocent bystanders, including tourists, held for long periods 
with no access to water or sanitary facilities. Te use of this tactic was challenged 
before British courts, most of which ruled in its favour. In 2009, the European Court of 
Human Rights in Austin v United Kingdom confrmed the decision of the British courts.
While the Special Rapporteur takes note of these decisions, which by no means 
constitute a blanket endorsement of “ketling”, he nevertheless believes that this tactic 
is intrinsically detrimental to the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly,
due to its indiscriminate and disproportionate nature. 
Te practice of containment also undeniably has a powerful chilling efect on the 
exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly, as also highlighted by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur was informed 
that many people refrained from exercising their right to freedom of peaceful assembly
for fear of being “ketled”. Finally, it appears that “ketling” has been used for 
intelligence gathering purposes, by compelling peaceful protestors, and even 
bystanders, to disclose their names and addresses as they leave the ketle, increasing 
the chilling efect it has on potential protesters.
413 ‘Met’ here and after refers to the Metropolitan Police Force of Greater London.
414 Lewis, “Human rights” The Guardian.
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Te Special Rapporteur was also informed of allegations of excessive use of force 
further to the G20 London Summit in 2009, despite the aforementioned training 
provided to police forces. For instance, in December 2010 during protests in London 
against education cuts and higher education fees, the police reportedly “punch[ed] 
students who had their hands in the air, kick[ed] students who were on the foor, and 
ma[de] horse charges. 43 protesters were taken to hospital, [and] one students had to 
undergo a three-hour brain operation for a stroke afer being hit by a police 
truncheon”. Some of the police ofcers covered their ID numbers and/or wore 
balaclavas, making it impossible to identify who was responsible. A number of 
peaceful protestors against the evacuation of travellers from Dale Farm on 19 October 
2011 were also reportedly brutalized.415
Ketling continues to be used as tactic for containing protesters, regardless of whether 
there is any indication of violence. According to a list compiled on Wikipedia, ketling 
has been recorded as a major police tactic in the UK during protests in 1995, 1999, 
2001, 2005, 2009, 2010 and 2011.416 Reports on Indymedia suggest this continues to be a
regular present police response to protests of all kinds.417
As evidenced by the numerous court rulings, the law in these instances, 
protects the use of coercive state police tactics, despite, as atested to by an 
independent rapporteur, the infringement on an ideological commitment to ‘freedom 
to protest’ and the consequential criminalisation of protestors. Te frequency of this 
police tactic as a response to political protest must be considered carefully in an 
ethical evaluation of the state. Te luxuries and relative safeties that the state afords 
415 M. Kiai (United Nations Special Rapporteur), “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association.” Former UN Special Rapporteur. 17th June 2013 
Free Assembly: http://freeassembly.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/A-HRC-23-39-Add1_en-
mission-to-UK-20131.pdf (Accessed 09.06.17), 8-9.
416 Wikipedia contributors, “Kettling” Wikipedia: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kettling#United_Kingdom, (Accessed 02.06.16).
417 See for example (Anon) Rabble, “10.12.14: We Can’t Breathe” 11th Dec. 2014 Indymedia: 
https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2014/12/518870.html (Accessed 09.06.17); (Anon) Reposter, 
“18.06.14: Justice for Shale” 18th June 2014. Indymedia: 
https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2014/06/516982.html (Accessed 09.06.17); (Anon) Photographer, 
“08.06.13: Anti-EDL” 8th June 2013. Indymedia: 
https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2013/06/510259.html (Accessed 09.06.17); ‘29.01.14 National 
Student Protest’ D. Lee & B. Jackson, “Police accused of kettling student protesters at a national 
demonstration in Birmingham” The Independent. 30th Jan. 2014. The Independent: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/student/news/police-accused-of-kettling-student-protesters-at-a-
national-demonstration-in-birmingham-9095907.html (Accessed 09.06.17).
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its citizens must be considered alongside an awareness that it is the common practice 
in the United Kingdom to treat peaceful political dissidents as criminals that are met 
with coercive force. We have seen this upheld in courts of law in the United Kingdom 
and in Europe, with rulings that this is an acceptable way for a state to conduct itself. 
When I talk about coercive force being a means of the state, and the state being reliant
on the support, or at least the non-resistance, of its citizens, I am claiming that we are 
complicit in the perpetual maintenance through violence of the society in which we 
live. 
In talking specifcally about political protest, I also wished to highlight that 
disagreement with this method, regardless of what a state professes to ideologically 
commit to, it to a large extent not possible. Te state permits disagreement through 
those channels it controls, e.g. writing to politicians, phoning the police, but in 
instances where it is politicians that have failed the public (e.g. Iraq War Protest 15th 
Feb 2003; 2010 Student Protests), and the police who are defending the state, dissent is 
met with coercive force and protest is criminalised.418 When I go on to suggest that the
state is an inadequate form of human community due to its reliance on coercion, I am 
not just talking about the State’s historical roots, its foreign policy, or its justice 
system, I am talking about its day to day response to those who disagree with the way
it conducts itself. When we are represented by and partake daily in the rituals and 
working life of the state, we must be aware that we are living in amidst this violence. 
Te perception of safeties and freedoms we are permited are contained by the threat 
of, and the carrying out, of violence. Tere is plenty of evidence to suggest that those 
who fail to conform to acceptable forms of dissent are met with coercive force and 
treated as criminals. Any ethical critique of the state must occur with the awareness 
that this coercive force is endemic to the state, and shapes the human community that 
exists within it.
5.2.2 Nationalist Ideology in Border Enforcement
I have argued that a key means of state operation is coercive force. I argue that 
another key means of the state is the use of ideology, in particular, nationalist 
418 In all but name. See for example the practice of taking down personal data of protestors, as well as 
arrests, brutality, hiding police identity, and kettling: Kiai, “Report of the Special Rapporteur”, 8-9.
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ideology to create cohesion. Earlier we looked at Klein’s claim that the creation of this 
identity can be used to draw atention away from domestic problems. A sense of 
collective identity can be directed towards an external threat, creating an artifcial 
sense of unity that overlooks internal disputes in favour of hostility towards those 
beyond one’s own state. Further evidence of this kind of tactic can be seen for example
in the recent referendum in the United Kingdom. Te campaign to leave the European 
Union was won on the back of excessive xenophobia and in some instances open 
racism. In the wake of the leave result, spates of anti-immigrant violence, grafti, 
propaganda, and National Front demonstrations have surfaced to levels we have not 
seen in decades.419 In this section I wish to demonstrate that this kind of xenophobic 
nationalism is not just the domain of politically charged rhetoric in the run up to 
elections, or in rare foreign policy excursions at time of internal political strife as in 
Klein’s analysis of the Falklands War. It is my contention that xenophobic nationalist 
ideology exists in the delineation and enforcing of national borders. My intention in 
demonstrating this is to show that inherent in the idea of the state and the creation of 
nationalist identity is an insidious atitude that treats those outside the state as lesser 
human beings. I will go on in 5.3 to illustrate exactly why this is problematic for those 
following Maximian ethics. In order to do this, I look at the professional statements of 
intent of the UK Border Force, and also look at the history of immigration control in 
the UK as an expression of the growth of extreme nationalisms.
The policing of borders in the United Kingdom is undertaken by the Border 
Force. According to UK Government website the Border Force is “a law enforcement 
command within the Home Ofce”, which “secures the border and promotes national 
prosperity by facilitating the legitimate movement of individuals and goods, whilst 
preventing those that would cause harm from entering the UK”.420 The priorities of the
Border Force are:
419 A. Lusher, “Racism unleashed: True extent of the ‘explosion of blatant hate’ that followed Brexit 
result revealed” The Independent. 28th July 2016 The Independent: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-racism-uk-post-referendum-racism-hate-
crime-eu-referendum-racism-unleashed-poland-racist-a7160786.html (Accessed 09.06.17).
420 UK Home Office, “Border Force” UK Home Office Website. Gov.UK: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/border-force (Accessed: 13.03.14). As of 07.07.16, 
this information is still present, although additional priorities have been added beneath these 
concerning customer service and revenue. Despite these additions, the ordering of priorities with the 
statement to ‘deter and prevent’ can still be found above the ‘facilitate the legitimate movement’ 
statement.
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Our priorities are to:
 deter and prevent individuals and goods that would harm the national interests from 
entering the UK 
 facilitate the legitimate movement of individuals and trade to and from the UK.421
The frst priority when policing the border then is to restrict movement. Te priorities 
of the Border Force are expressed within a framework that already understands a 
division between ‘us’ and ‘them’; between desirables and undesirables. Te language 
of ‘national interest’ is one that has entered popular discourse and thus obscures the 
more xenophobic tendencies it encapsulates. In order to look at what this language 
entails, I wish to spend a few moments deconstructing these sentences and rethinking 
the way in which this language is used.
Let us think of a border as the way in which the movement of people and 
objects are controlled, like a membrane or gateway. Ten let us look about the 
statements above, except where the word ‘national’ or ‘UK’ is writen, let us 
understand ‘Group A’, and where an undesirable individual, specifcally from outside 
the nation is specifed, let us understand ‘Group B’. Now we may read that the Border 
Force “secures the border and promotes Group A’s prosperity by facilitating the 
legitimate movement of Group B and goods, whilst preventing those that would cause 
harm from entering Group A.” Te frst priority on the list becomes, to “deter and 
prevent Group B and goods that would harm Group A’s interests from entering Group
A”. My purpose in rethinking these statements is to point out that integral to 
existence and maintenance of borders is the division of persons in such a way that is 
already value laden. Group A is pre-defned and its needs, desires and safety come 
above that of any other. Regardless of whether Group B represents a legitimate or 
illegitimate party entering the country, regardless of whether Group B means harm to 
those living in the country or whether they are merely visiting a friend abroad, Group 
A has already been classifed as a distinct group with rights and safeties that are 
paramount. I suggest that it is in these border places that Group A is defned, and that 
that defnition happens in opposition to the other. Key to the notion of nation and the 
consolidation of ideas like that of the state, are those who are not in it. Tose who are 
421 UK Home Office, “Border Force”.
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not in it experience varying degrees of discrimination based upon the fact that they 
are considered part of Group B rather than Group A. We have come to see these kinds 
of discriminations as part an parcel of belonging or not belonging to a state, but the 
creation of border restrictions in the UK is a relatively recent invention. Te Border 
Force statement is a very sanitary expression of border control, but as we will see, 
these restrictions on movement have and always will disproportionately afect those 
who are poor, under-represented and otherwise perceived as ‘undesirable’ by the state 
controlling the border.
Prior to the 1905 Aliens Act, no formal long term immigration control existed 
in the UK.422 Previous Aliens Acts were temporary restrictions formulated to restrict 
those felt to be politically motivated troublesome outsiders such as, social historian 
David Glover recounts in his history of the Aliens Act, “spies, subversives, agitators, 
and fanatics”. Where the 1905 Act was diferent, Glover explains, is that it “set the 
precedent for the ever-tightening web of immigration control that is in place today”. 
As Glovers points out, “Immigration laws create borders,” where previously freedom 
of movement has existed, not only are restrictions now in place, but a system of 
judgement of who is in and out then must exist: “Immigration laws create borders – 
not in the sense of natural frontiers or territorial divisions, to take the two commonest
meanings of the term, but borders as sites of discrimination, zones in which migrants 
are granted or denied a provisional legal status”.423 Te 1905 Act targeted ‘undesirable 
aliens’, which were defned as those entering the UK who were impoverished, in ill-
health, or were criminals. Glover explains that “Immigrants who seemed unlikely to be
able to ‘decently’ support themselves or their dependants were refused entry, as were 
those whose physical infrmities or mental state indicated that they would probably 
become a burden on the state”.424 As Mary Riddell, a Telegraph columnist, pointed out 
422 At the time of the 1905 Aliens Act this law applied to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland. The act was repealed and replaced with continuing and more extensive provisions in both 
Great Britain and Ireland during and after Irish independence (1921-2). See UK Government, Aliens 
Act 1905. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1905). Available online: The National Archives: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Edw7/5/13/contents/enacted (Accessed 09.06.17); UK 
Government, Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919. (London: Swift, 1919). Available online: 
The National Archives: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/9-10/92 (Accessed 31.01.17); 
Office of the Attorney General, Irish 1935 Aliens Act. Available Online: Irish Statute Book: 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1935/act/14/enacted/en/html (Accessed 31.01.17).
423 D. Glover, Literature, Immigration, and Diaspora in Fin-De Siècle England: A cultural History of 
the 1905 Aliens Act. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-2.
424 Glover, Literaturee, Immigration and Diaspora, 2.
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however, though it is more politely expressed, it is a similar list of people who are 
excluded by immigration controls today.425 Te full extent of the harmful creation of 
borders and maintenance of immigration controls is best put, I think, by those groups 
who see the harmful efects.
‘No Borders’ are a decentralised grassroots organisation who work with those 
victimised by borders and immigration controls and believe in freedom of movement 
for all. Te organisation points out that the maintenance of a border elevates 
movement of people into a commodity purchasable only by those with the economic 
wealth or political power to do so. Te system of deportation and border control target
and criminalise those who are poor. In this way, ‘No Borders’ write, “Modern states 
try to turn movement into a right that is granted or denied according to economic and
political power”.426
Likewise, we fnd an argument made by the group ‘No One Is Illegal’ where 
immigration control falls outside the scope of all other law, and represents the only 
instance in which people rather than actions are considered illegal. As such, they write
that “Tose subject to immigration control are dehumanized, are reduced to non-
persons, are nobodies”.427 Within their manifesto, ‘No One Is Illegal’ go on to trace the 
history of immigration controls as part of an enforced border. Tey, too, point out the 
very recent introduction of immigration controls with the 1905 Aliens Act.428 Tey 
stress that these controls controls were largely brought about through an unsavoury 
mixture of British concern over large numbers of migrant Jews feeing persecution in 
their respective countries and political pressure at home from extreme right wing 
organisations (the British Brothers League formed in 1901 to demand controls,429 and 
later, Oswald Mosley’s Union Movement and Colin Jordan’s White Defence League 
whose actions arguably lead to the passing of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act). ‘No One Is Illegal’ maintain that the modern day enforcement of borders can not 
425 M. Riddell in “The Aliens Act of 1905” The Long View, BBC Radio 4. First aired Tuesday 17th 
February 2015. Also available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b052j0tp 
426 No Borders, ‘A No Borders Manifesto’: http://noborders.org.uk/node/47 (Accessed 20.03.14).
427 No One Is Illegal, ‘All Immigration Controls Must Go’: http://www.noii.org.uk/controls-must-go/ 
(Accessed 20.03.14).
428 Cf. UK Government, Aliens Act 1905; UK Government, Aliens Act 1919.; Cf. H. Wray ‘The Aliens 
Act 1905 and the Immigration Dilemma’, Journal of Law and Society. Vol. 33, 2 (2006): 302-323.
429 A British anti-immigration antisemitic paramilitary group whose slogan was ‘England for the 
English’. Their legacy continued in the BUF, the BLESMAW, the UM and the NF.
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be divorced from its historical roots in proto-fascism. Tey write that “Immigration 
laws are inherently racist, since their purpose is to exclude outsiders. And they feed 
and legitimise racism”. Tey believe that the existence of immigration controls 
presupposes “the crudest of all nationalisms — namely the assertion that the British 
have a franchise on Britain.”430
I have argued that an important part of the day to day functioning of the state 
is the maintenance of its borders, and deciding who is in the state and who is out. I 
have argued that this is necessarily makes judgements and divisions about the worth 
of those seeking entry into a country, and that those who are worse of are those with 
the least political and economic power. When making an ethical assessment of the 
state as a mode of human living, I think it is extremely important that we are aware of
the historic and present day racism and persecution implicit in the existence of 
borders and border control. We are living in a community where only those deemed 
acceptable or who happen to have been born into it are permited entry. As Jason 
Lindsey termed it, the ‘concealment’ of these methods by the state becomes a part of 
the legitimisation of these nationalist and racist ideas. Ideologies of nationalism and 
patriotism are entrenched in the legality of our borders, and it is precisely ‘the 
assertion that the British have a franchise on Britain’ that is represented in the UK 
Border Force intention to ‘deter and prevent individuals and goods that would harm 
the national interests from entering the UK’. In 5.3 I go on to assert that ideologies of 
nationalism fundamentally contradict the kind of life we are trying to lead by 
following Maximian ethics.
5.3 Counter to a Cosmos of Love
I have identifed two key ways in which the state conducts itself that I am calling 
‘means’. I have said that state consists of the people who consent to be in it, and 
therefore that the things the state does – the means it employs – are things that we as 
humans participating in it allow, contribute to, and therefore to a degree are 
430 No One Is Illegal, ‘No One Is Illegal Manifesto’: http://www.noii.org.uk/no-one-is-illegal-
manifesto/ (Accessed 20.03.14).
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responsible for. I have also identifed the power imbalance in the state as a defning 
part of it, so that the means of the state are predominately ways in which a governing 
minority may maintain power. Te two means I identifed were the way that control is
maintained through coercive force and the way that nationalist ideology is enforced in
border policy to create the physical and conceptual identity of the state. In this section
I critique these two means in light of the Maximian ethics outlined in previous 
chapters. My purpose in doing so is to illustrate the way that we can bring this 
theology into the heart of very pressing debates today, and to show the depth of 
requirement that Maximian cosmology places upon human living. As I will 
demonstrate, dependence on coercive force and creation of identity through 
nationalist ideology become extremely problematic givens for a community when held
up to a virtue ethics paradigm that understands means as simultaneous to ends. When
we think about aligning our personal activity toward the telos Maximus speaks of, the 
means the state relies on become extremely problematic obstacles.
As I discussed before, there is no one way to implement the ethics we derive 
from Maximus’ theology. We can think about virtues, we can think about love as a 
unity that gathers the virtues, we can even think of wider tools and ideas found in 
Maximus’ cosmology. All of these are valid ways of trying to understand how to be 
persons capable of receiving grace and looking toward theosis here and in the 
eschaton. I explore four ways in which we might use Maximus’ thought to challenge 
and reconsider the state and its means of operation. Tese are (5.3.1.1) the importance 
of free will within Maximus’ understanding of cosmic movement, (5.3.1.2) the virtue of
compassion and the kind of sympathy it requires of our actions, (5.3.2.1) the use of the 
Chalcedonian formula of union and distinction as a way of considering cultural 
variation and diference, and fnally (5.3.2.2) love as our ultimate telos and the critique 
it poses to rival teloi in society.
5.3.1 No Coercion in Love
In Section 5.2.1 I analysed coercive force as a primary means of the state. I claimed 
that it is essential to the maintenance and therefore existence of the state. In lending 
our support and assenting to participate in the state, we afrm that coercive force has 
a place within our relationships with one another and in the way that we organise 
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ourselves. Over the course of three chapters, I have outlined Maximus’ understanding 
of human purpose. I have shown that he believes humans to have been granted being, 
and to possess logoi, which are a way of life in Christ laid out for each of us personally
that awaits our reception and choice to be fulflled and realised. We have seen that the
path to virtue is one that is open to us through Christ and gifed to us in the Holy 
Spirit. But consistently, we have also seen that all of this relies on human choice. Te 
cohesion of the created universe relies on humans choosing to love in Christ. Te 
choice rests with us as unique persons, even though failure to choose love might 
destroy us and all creation. Below, I look at two critiques of coercive force, one that 
focusses on the importance of free will (5.3.1.1), and the other that re-evaluates 
coercive force in light of the virtue of compassion (5.3.1.2).
5.3.1.1 Freedom – Love in Letting Go
Firstly, when looking at Maximus’ understanding of the cosmic place of the human, 
we have seen that the ability to love is essential to who we are, who we can become, 
and our purpose in creation. Central to this is the gif of free will – human choice to 
turn to God – human choice to clear the passions from within us – human choice to 
receive the grace of the Holy Spirit. Who we are as human beings and how we come 
to be human beings is rooted in how we choose to live with one another in Christ. One 
can read the ascetic practices Maximus outlines in the Four Hundred Chapters On Love 
as directions for personal spiritual growth, which is certainly what they are, but as the
contents is a testament to, even the most isolated ascetic is not alone, but lives in the 
world. Ascetic treatises are about how one lives in and as a part of creation with 
directivity toward God, and about how we as unique persons who partake in the 
Church strive to bring cosmic liturgy into the heart of all our actions and choices.
Te ascetic practice of clearing passions so that virtue and love might exist 
within us, is a personal one. It is not forced on a person by God, by nature, or by any 
other. It is a personal, hypostatic response to an invitation asking us to be in relation 
with God. Te cosmic relation between God and his creation is tied up with a 
continued respect for human free will because without it, there is no love. As discussed
in chapters 2 and 4, the weight of sin is caused by human choice to reject God – to 
reject being itself and consequently to bring the curse of non-existence upon human 
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nature and the rest of creation. Christ’s incarnation as one person in two natures 
means that human free will has a second opportunity – to choose to turn from that 
corruption or to persist in turning from God. All throughout the cosmic story in 
which human movement is described, is the importance of humans to be able to 
choose to love. Grace and the presence of the Spirit might instil virtue within us, but 
without the human choice to clear a space free from the passions and allow the Spirit 
entry, there is no well-being or eternal-well-being for that person, for human nature, 
or for the cosmos. Te relationship between tropos and logos can only be brought close
in the moment that a person chooses to turn toward Christ’s love. From the example 
we are given in the story of creation to the ofering of the crucifxion, the gif of 
freedom and choice seems to be essential to understanding what divine love is. Love 
and relation with God is never forced upon us, and indeed to even think of such a 
thing seems to be tautological. As Maximus put it in the Commentary on the Lord’s 
Prayer:
[...] and in those who are willing He frees the whole of human nature from the 
oppressive rule of the law which dominates it, in so far as they imitate His self-chosen 
death by mortifying the earthly aspects of themselves. For the mystery of salvation 
belongs to those who choose it, not to those who are compelled by force.431
Tere is no love without freedom, and likewise there is no loving relationship without 
it being freely received by both sides.
Te existence of systemic coercion in the state is a clear statement that we as a 
society are dedicated to something we consider to be more important than giving 
others the space to make those choices in a personal capacity. It is a commitment to a 
vision of society that is so focused on some other telos, that the means of how we get 
there come second. Tere is a vision, whatever that may be, that we so strongly wish 
to be maintained, that coercive means are justifed to prevent someone from 
disrupting that end vision or current balance. How we treat dissidents and those who 
disagree or do not ft a rule, cannot be sacrifced for a picture of a society that remains
in our ideals. Te means that we employ shape the end that comes about as a 
431 Maximus, Or. Dom. PG90 880B [Palmer, Sherrard & Ware, Philokalia, 289].
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consequence. Te freedom to love is a way life, implying that, if we wish to seek a 
Godly way of living, we must fnd a way to get on with one another that doesn’t 
involve hiting people who disagree with us with riot shields. Neither is such a 
freedom to love somehow purely a personal endeavour, as if there were somehow a 
personal domain to our lives that does not touch those around us. Freedom to love 
awkwardly lands us with the difculty of having to fnd ways to organise and live 
with people we might sometimes fall out with, without resorting to have a full-time 
armed unit of people come in and drag them away. If we respect someone’s freedom to
receive love, we must also accept that the kind of community we are going to live in 
needs to allow people to reject that love, and to try and fnd ways of making this 
dynamic work. I discuss the difculties surrounding this kind of freedom in Chapter 6,
but it is certainly the case that we must have the ability to allow dissent and to try and
avoid reliance on coercive force to impose communal standards.
In Maximus’ hypostatic understanding of transformative nature – every single 
dissident is one to whom free choice has been given and who is called to transfgure 
the cosmos. A society built upon the silencing and coercing of such people is one 
more commited to its own idea of a community, than that intended by the Logos. A 
telos of society that can pass over a few for the sake of an end, is one that forges an 
end made of such means. A society commited to silencing dissidence through 
coercive force will create a society where such a means have and always will exist. If 
the virtue ethics Maximus sets out means anything to us, then it is precisely in the 
treatment of those who disagree with us that who we are and the world we live in is 
formed.432 Virtue not only leads to love, but is love. Te main premise of Chapter 3 was
that the path to love – to theosis – is realised in every we step we take towards it. In 
following our logoi, the Logos Himself is present here and now in the world. Virtue is 
a sanctifying act that stems from the Spirit. Telos is instantiated in present moments as
well as always being before us – this is what Maximus meant when, in Chapter 2, we 
432 Maximus, De char. PG90 965AB I.24 [Berthold, Maximus, 38]: “The one who imitates God by 
giving alms knows no difference between evil and good or just and unjust in regard to the needs of 
the body, but distributes to all without distinction according to their need even if he prefers the 
virtuous person over the wicked person because of his intention.”; Maximus, De char. PG90 965CD 
I.29 [Berthold, Maximus, 38]: “When you are insulted by someone or offended in any matter, then 
beware angry thoughts, lest by distress they sever you from charity and place you in the region of 
hatred”.
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talked of theosis being for today as well as the end time. It is both immediate and 
apocalyptic. In Chapter 2 I introduced the idea that ascetic practice is at the heart of 
cosmic liturgy. Our striving is not alone but as members of the global Church, whose 
liturgical praise and love extends to all our actions and relations. We are part of a 
community not confned by borders writen in human law, and, I am arguing, a 
community that cannot condone coercive force as a mode of human behaviour and 
community. If the macrocosmic image of cosmic liturgy is applied to the image of 
virtues and telos we have been using, then today is the hymns of praise and prayer 
that prepare us for fnal communion, and it is precisely how we act here and now that 
prepares the whole Church and cosmos for the end to come.
When we allow our relationships with others to be dictated by coercion, we 
turn away from our own calling to actively love and bind together the cosmos in 
love.433 Gregory of Nyssa reminded his parishioners that mercy is “a virtue in the 
choice of will” and that were every one of us to make such a choice freely, all the 
human social, political, and physical frameworks built to control society would fall 
away and no longer be necessary, since:
Life would no longer be lived in diametrically opposite ways; man would no longer be 
distressed by want or humiliated by slavery, nor would dishonour sadden him. For all 
things would be common to all, and his life as a citizen would be marked by complete 
equality before the law, since the man who was responsible for the government would 
of his own free will be on a level with the rest [s] What could be thought to be more 
blessed than to live thus, when we would no longer have to entrust the safety of our 
433 In a paper interpreting Maximus’ Four Hundred Chapters on Love in light of contemporary theories 
of violence and reconciliation, Michael Hardin suggested that Maximus’ work requires us to 
replaces a mimesis of worldly violence with the example of Christ: “In this way of loving, any 
violent retaliation is precluded (I.28, I.30, I.37). Unlike mimesis which ends in violence, expulsion, 
and scapegoating, love ends in the giving of life, not the taking of life, for God is ‘the Lord and 
Giver of life.” (M. Hardin, ‘Mimesis and Dominion: The Dynamics of Violence and the Imitation of 
Christ in Maximus Confessor’ in St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly. 36 (1992): 382). Hardin 
expressed not only the incompatibility of a Maximian vision with any kind of violence, but also that 
within Maximus’ ascetic writings was a way of overcoming the violence so predominant in our 
societies and cultures. Hardin finishes by quoting Staniloae on the source of mimetic love in 
Maximus: “The foundation of our own sacrifice and the source of its power, the source of our love 
for the Father in which is our true life, is the sacrifice of Christ, his spotless self-surrender to the 
Father accomplished out of love for the Father and of us, and out of love for the Father which he has
on our behalf as a man.” (D. Staniloae, Theology and the Church. R. Barringer, (trans.) (Crestwood: 
SVS Press, 1980), 196; Hardin, ‘Mimesis’, 383).
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lives to bolts and tones, but were secure in each other’s keeping.434
In an analysis of Christ’s same sermon, John Howard Yoder accuses the legal 
frameworks around us and the traditions we partake in of taking a watered down 
legalistic approach to the beatitudes, the commandments, and love. He claims that 
“Legitimacy replaces love as the standard” so that “It can ask self-discipline but not 
self-denial; temperance or moderation, but not asceticism; it can ask us to bear a yoke 
but not a cross. And so it is today: the limits of moral rigor lie at the point of survival 
– national or personal. Do not lie – except to save your life or your country. Do not 
kill – except killers”.435 In looking at the Sermon at the Mount, both Gregory and 
Yoder see human free will as a much more powerful tool for reconstructing life than 
anything the state could ever impose. Gregory’s vision of a world in which mercy 
reigns highlights the radical nature of the kind of love required of us. Yoder’s analysis 
takes a diferent but complementary angle, pointing out that not only is Christ’s love 
more radical, but that the current political framework in which we operates hinders 
the limits of our love through coercion. He writes that “We construct for ourselves a 
manageable morality, which we can handle, without repentance” and that “Tis 
temptation is still with us, especially with regard to the problems of violence and 
national egoism”.436 In grudgingly setling for just a litle less than the radicalism of 
Christ’s love, we, as Yoder poetically sums it up “bear a yoke but not a cross”. If we 
resent the means of the state but accept its telos, or even assume it an impermanent 
necessity in this world, then we set limitations in place that refrain us from focussing 
on theosis as telos above all. In Maximus’ (and Gregory of Nyssa’s) requirement that 
the ascetic have constant striving in all one does, there is no caveat that says – if it is a
litle difcult, setle for less, or, if it seems impossible in the current political climate, 
never mind, or, if loving the whole cosmos seems a bit big, then setle for just those 
relationships that are easy. As I go on to note in the next section, there are no borders 
to love, even if every day we are told there are by those who would have us believe in 
them. Te means that the state employs, for whatever end, cannot be condoned if they
434 Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5 PG44 1254A-C.
435 J.H. Yoder, “Political Axioms of the Sermon on the Mount” in The Original Revolution: Essays on 
Christian Pacifism. (Ontario: Herald Press, 2003 (First ed. 1971) (Lecture first delivered 1966)), 46.
436 Yoder, “Political Axioms”, 45.
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run counter to virtue and love. Neither can we, as participants making up the state, 
allow ourselves to remain complicit in such a relation if we desire to move toward 
theosis. In an ethics premised on free will, Maximus’ ethics seriously call into question 
the idea that coercive force could ever be a suitable response to dissidence and 
disagreement, or have a place in our communities.
5.3.1.2 Compassion – Love in Solidarity
Another way we can think about Maximian ethics in our everyday lives is by looking 
deeper at a virtue and thinking about it in the context of Christ’s love. What does 
truly mean to live out this virtue and try and understand the way Christ lived it? In 
Chapter 4 I described a way in which we can think of virtues as manifold love, or love 
being instances of diferent virtues. When looking at the way that Maximus talks 
about virtues as being simple in love, we looked at the following passage from Te 
Ascetic Life:
Do you see that this love for one another makes frm the love for God?... Te Lord 
Himself makes it clear and has shown it to us by His very works; and so too all His 
disciples, who strove til death for love of their neighbour and prayed fervently for 
those that killed them.437
Love is defned in the life and works of Christ and continued in the acts of his 
disciples. It is to be prepared to lay down one’s life for others and to pray for those 
who oppress us. In an exposition of the virtue of ‘mercy’, Gregory of Nyssa likewise 
identifes it as an “intense kind of love”438 and wrote that “Mercy is a voluntary sorrow
that joins itself to the suferings of others”.439 Tis understanding of Christ’s love not 
only being about sufering for others but also a sufering with and identifying with 
those who sufer, is particularly important for our current evaluation of coercive force.
Christ’s eating with taxcollectors, drinking with gentiles and conversing with children
is part of that identifcation with those who are lef behind or rejected by society. Most
importantly we can see this in the incarnation – Christ becomes human in order to 
437 Maximus, LA TCr Ch.7 [Sherwood, Maximus, 107].
438 Έπίτασις δἐ ἀγάπης ό ἔλεος, Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5 PG44 1252CD.
439 Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5 PG44 1252B. [Graef, Gregory, 133].
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sufer with us and in order to transfgure the cosmos. To suffer with is an essential part
of Christ’s works – a part of love enshrined in the particular virtue of mercy or 
compassion that exists in, and is love. 
If it is the part of the Christian to suffer with, then it is always our place to be 
on the side of the downtrodden. Te importance of this sufering with others means 
that some form of commitment to pacifsm is likely necessary for a Christian. To 
explore this further would involve a more nuanced look into what we mean by the 
words violence and pacifsm,440 but without delving too far into these complexities, I 
think Maximus’ understanding of simultaneous virtue and love ofers a useful way 
rethinking traditional difculties in this area. Discussions about violence and pacifsm 
require us to defne what things fall into these categories and ask where the line is 
drawn between physical and non-physical ‘violence’.441 Tis emphasis and line of 
questioning seems counter-intuitive and unhelpful to one thinking about Maximian 
ethics. Instead, if we think of virtues like compassion and mercy, and consider the way
in which they inform our understanding of love, we can rethink personal decisions on 
how we should act by looking at the balance of power, at places where oppression, 
coercion and victimisation are taking place, and placing ourselves with those who 
sufer. Rather than deriving positions on certain kinds of violence, Maximus’ ethics 
might allow us the fexibility to ask how best to sufer with those who sufer and to be 
compassionate. It asks us to act not just in response to immediate appearances, but 
also to understand people as persons; particulars whom we are called to love, and to 
empathise with them and know their sufering as our own. Whilst this may not aford 
us quick and easy answers, this kind of ethics demands us to understand situations 
deeper than face value and is an ideal place to begin deconstructing systems that 
encourage victimisation as part of their common course of operation. By thinking 
about the virtue of compassion in relation to love and considering what it means to 
have mercy and to sufer with others, we can begin to evaluate the operations of 
institutions we live in and to question how useful they are for achieving the telos we 
have before us. Here I have briefy looked at the Scriptural interpretations of mercy 
440 An overview of Christian anarchist writers on pacifism is given by Christoyannopoulos in Christian 
Anarchism, 32-52, 161-65; cf. Yoder, “Political Axioms”, 47-9.
441 For such complexities on this topic, we could consider Christ’s upturning of the tables in the 
Temple, a kind of ‘violence’ against property that would be chargeable as such under UK law, (cf. 
Mark 11:15).
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and compassion derived from Maximus and Gregory of Nyssa. With a more 
comprehensive study, bringing in other virtues and thinking about how they relate to 
love, we could develop either systematic critiques of means like coercive force and 
more fuid personal ethics that help know where to stand in situations as they arise.
Whilst theosis as communion with God both in this life and afer remains the 
telos of all we do, we cannot condone a communal mode of organising that requires 
coercive force and the suppression of dissidence through violence. Te societies we 
choose to be a part of must have the capability to identify with and sufer with others. 
If it comes to the point where protest against our society takes on a violent character, 
we as those wishing to live in relations of love, must ask ourselves how we have failed
some groups of people so badly that they are pushed to express their frustration and 
sufering in such a manner. As I will explore in Chapter 6, a society where love is 
foremost in the formation of our relationships must have the ability to acknowledge, 
sympathise and sufer with ever person who is failed by it. Te communities we aspire
to live in must always seek to minimize persecution of dissidence – of those who 
disagree with the majority. Tis is something the state cannot do with the reliance of 
its entire power structure on violence and the threat of violence. Te necessity of both 
freedom of choice and a virtue of compassion and mercy in love means that we cannot
consent to a structure of human relationships built upon coercive force. Te solution 
of course, cannot be to isolate ourselves from society, since this is no way to make 
sense of a call to love in community. In the following chapter I suggest some 
constructive alternatives that we might work towards with a Maximian approach to 
our ethics.
5.3.2 No Borders to Love
Tus far, I have argued that free will is essential to love, and claimed that personal 
response to love is not just a luxury but a necessity for cosmic movement toward 
theosis. I have discussed love in terms of sufering with others and the depth that 
explorations of virtues like compassion can lend our ethical assessment. Both of these 
points were used to criticise our complicity in the state’s violence as a means of 
maintaining societal structure and control. In this section I continue discussing love, 
virtue and their cosmic placement within Maximus’ theology to think critically about 
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national borders. I begin by discussing the way that diference is used to foster hatred, 
and think about the Chalcedonian Formula of union and distinction as a way of 
understanding cultural variation, before going on to critique national borders by 
considering love as the ultimate telos of our societies and therefore rival to any 
difering telos.
5.3.2.1 Chalcedonian Distinction without the Hatred of Division
In 5.2.2, I argued that nationalist ideologies have been used to create border controls 
that are racist, discriminatory, and have a history richly intertwined with extreme 
right wing thought and persecution of ‘undesirables’. I wish to distinguish between 
nationalist ideologies and the existences of diferences in culture. Maximus’ thought is
very well suited to giving us a way to express this diference and may help us 
articulate a division that can become blurred.442 Diference in culture does not have to 
equate the nationalist ideologies behind border and immigration controls. Tinking 
about the diferences between the two may help those who profess nationalist views 
to understand that culture can be celebrated without persecuting those who are 
diferent. A nationalist pride that revolves around competition and piting cultural 
diferences against one another is precisely one of the kinds of ideology that pushed 
for border and immigration controls to be introduced into the United Kingdom. An 
awareness of cultural diversity and a celebration of those distinctions does not have to
be a source of confict. One of the ways in which we can think about this in light of 
Maximus’ ethics is by considering the place and purpose of love within Maximus’ 
cosmology. We can think back to the principles set forth in the Council of Chalcedon 
that describe heaven and earth meeting in Christ. Both are always diferent and 
distinct, but through Christ are in harmony with one another. Neither obliterates the 
other, and yet both subsist in him without confusion, without change, without 
division, and without separation. Te defnition at Chalcedon established that union 
442 Guardian Journalist Stuart Jeffries conducted a survey looking at the way that culture and 
nationalism have been conflated together in popular opinion, resulting in the association of 
nationalist imagery with extreme right wing racism. In particular he looked at the appropriation of 
the English flag by the English Defence League and the Union Jack by the National Front. S. 
Jeffries, ‘Patriot games: how toxic is the England flag today?’ The Guardian. 26th Nov. 2014. The 
Guardian: s://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/26/patriot-games-battle-for-flag-of-st-
george-english-identity (Accessed 07.07.16).
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(ἕνωσις) could exist with diference (διαφορά), but without division (ἀδιαίρετος).443 
And as we have seen in Maximus, this way of human and divine relating in Christ is a 
microcosm of the whole of creation and the hope for perfect communion between God
and His creation. Maximus mirrors the terminology of Chalcedon when talking about 
the way that Christ gathers the logoi of all creatures to Him, and the way that 
creatures will be united to God if they follow these logoi.444 Tere will be creaturely 
distinction but also unity. 
We can talk about diference-without-division being the communion of love 
that Christ shows us in his death and resurrection. We see this dynamic applied to 
status, ethnicity etc. in the way that Maximus uses Galatians 3:28 to describe the 
Church:
Tus to be and to appear as one body formed of diferent members is really worthy of 
Christ himself, our true head, in whom says the divine Apostle, ‘there is neither male 
nor female, neither Jew nor Greek, neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, neither 
foreigner nor Scythian, neither slave nor freeman, but Christ is everything in all of 
you.’ It is he who encloses in himself all beings by the unique, simple, and infnitely 
wise power of his goodness.445
Whilst diversity and personhood are never obliterated, enmity and inequality are 
overcome in the Church through Christ. Te love we are called to in Christ is one that 
loves regardless of the distinction in others. It is a love that sees beauty in diversity 
and celebrates distinctions found in other communities and cultures. As Maximus 
highlights in his Centuries on Love,446 we are called to see one human nature and to 
love it. And as we saw in Ambiguum 41, it is this love that brings together the human 
race and the cosmos in Christ.
Cultural diversity and the diferences between us are never the issue. Te 
existence of cultural identity is not what is at issue. Te problem is what we do with 
these diferences and what we allow them to become in our relationships. One of the 
443 Chalcedonian Definition [Parvis, unpublished].
444 Maximus, Amb. 7 PG91 1077C [Blowers & Wilken, Cosmic, 54].
445 Maximus, Myst. TCr Ch 1. [Berthold, Maximus, 187]; see also Maximus, De char. PG90 993B II.30 
[Berthold, Maximus, 51].
446 Maximus, De char. PG90 993B II.30 [Berthold, Maixmus, 51].
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defnitions the Merriam-Webster Dictionary gives of ‘nationalism’ is “exalting one 
nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and 
interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups”.447 When we 
allow identity to become exclusive and insular, we allow ourselves to be moved to 
hatred for what is diferent instead of love in multiplicity. We allow the diferences 
between us to frighten us rather than inspire curiosity. We allow others to manipulate 
our fears, bringing ourselves to believe that geographical locations mater more than 
the extension of empathy to others in need. We fnd ourselves believing stories of 
entitlement because they more easily justify our failures to love and the communities 
we have built to uphold our entitlement. One of the specifc failures of the state, 
enshrined in its policing of borders, is its defence of the kind of nationalist ideology 
that makes judgements and valuation on the basis of cultural and geographical 
diference.
Te exploration of love that Maximus provides for us is one that is defned in 
Christ who at every moment embraces and respects diferences, bringing them 
together within Him in the magnitude of his love, and transfguring them – allowing 
them to be sanctifed within Him. Te divisions of the cosmos in Ambiguum 41 were 
brought together and healed in Him. As well as virtues then, we can also see that an 
understanding of love informed by Maximus’ wider cosmic vision can also serve to 
inform our ethical perspective. Virtues inform us of how our personal responses need 
to be rooted in patience, compassion, mercy, and long sufering with those who sufer. 
But remembering the cosmic vision encapsulating our actions allows us also to see a 
wider picture. In the formula of Chalcedon and Maximus’ hope for theosis we have an 
afrmation of diversity and love that is essential to the spiritual movement of the 
cosmos. Tis means we also have the beginnings of a systemic critique in our hands. 
In coming up against systems that promote division according to wealth and location, 
and ideologies that tell us that otherness is to be estranged, feared and hated, we 
encounter barriers that require us to set aside our hopes for love in Christ as the 
foundation of our communities. If our actions are truly rooted and aiming for the telos 
Maximus speaks of, then turning away in the face of these barriers is not an option. 
447 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Nationalism” in Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online Edition: 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism (Accessed 08.05.17).
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Our virtues of compassion, patience, mercy etc. are always forged in relationships 
with those who sufer and have nothing; with Christ Himself. As I discuss further 
below, the direction of our love must become subversive if we are serious about loving
beyond the borders that others impose upon the world.
5.3.2.2 Love as the Telos of our Societies
I next look at how understanding love as telos transfgures how we think about the 
state and its operations. In 5.2.2 I described the origins of UK immigration control, the 
discrimination still present in the system and the direct efects of this, witnessed by 
the organisations ‘No Borders’ and ‘No One Is Illegal’ who work with those who are 
afected by these policies. 
In discussing the difculties that national borders pose to Christian faith, it was
suggested to me that they seem to serve primarily as walls, beyond which one need 
not look to show mercy.448 Te way that national borders curb how we think about our
own actions is something I wish to explore here. I discussed in 5.3.2.1 the way that 
Maximus can help us think of cultural diversity as beautiful and necessary rather than 
emblematic of geographical division. As well blinding us to the sufering of others, 
nationalist ideologies and national borders create a host of problems that perpetuate 
poverty, inequity and disproportionately harm the most vulnerable in society. Te 
kind of atitudes we hold towards the marginalised at our borders also spills over into 
the marginalised within our country. Te control of movement and becomes another 
kind of power that is denied some and given to others. As discussed in 5.3.1.1, it is 
extremely important that we have the capacity to listen to those critiquing the 
communities we are a part of, especially when those voices are claiming our societies 
are failing and victimising people. Both ‘No Borders’ and ‘No One Is Illegal’ raise 
challenges that are very problematic for one who lives within the safety of the state 
and wishes to pursue Maximian ethics. We have two organisations calling 
immigration controls deeply and inherently divisive and dehumanising. Te roots of 
immigration and border policy cannot be divorced from a history of racism and the 
448 R.P.C. Brown, commenting as ‘Bewcastle House of Prayer’ on E. Brown Dewhurst, “The Radical 
Politics of Mercy: Commentary on Gregory of Nyssa’s Sermon on Mercy” 26th Feb 2014. 
Microcosmology: Meditations on the person in the Byzantine and Patristic Tradition: 
http://microcosmology.wordpress.com/2014/02/26/the-radical-politics-of-mercy/comment-page-
1/#comment-14 (Accessed 24.03.14).
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infuence of fascist ideology. In order to distinguish between those who are allowed in 
and those who must stay out the valuing and weighing of people must occur. Te kind
of valuation and judgement made by the state on our behalf is one that we as those 
who wish to follow Christ’s example of love cannot agree with. The control of 
movement through border policy exacerbates the division between rich and poor 
within even the host country, as movement becomes a luxury available only for those 
with the expendable income to travel. We have seen the argument that immigration 
controls criminalise people, entrench inequity and poverty, call the poor and 
marginalised to account for themselves whilst aiding the afuent, commodifying 
movement, and targeting the victimised.
Tinking back to Glover’s list of the original ‘aliens’ excluded by immigration 
laws – the poor, the ill in health, those convicted of crime in other countries – I am 
reminded of this passage in Mathew 25: 
Ten he will say to those on his lef, ‘Depart from me, you accursed, into the eternal 
fre prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you gave me no food, I 
was thirsty and you gave me no drink, a stranger and you gave me no welcome, naked 
and you gave me no clothing, ill and in prison, and you did not care for me.’ (Mat. 
25:41-3)
Who we are called to be and how we interpret love and virtue in our political 
communities is of vital importance to Maximian ethics. If we have, as I suggest in 
5.1.1, responsibility for the state in which we live, then laws like these are actively in 
opposition to the telos of love towards which we are working. Te process of 
exclusivity that defnes the parameters of who our society should care for based on 
wealth, health, race or any other basis, sets a limitation on where our mercy extends. 
If we are content to live in a society that draws such dividing lines, then we also must 
take responsibility for the harm these exclusions cause. When Christ tells us to 
welcome the stranger, there is no caveat that says ‘as long it doesn’t burden the state 
or cause us fnancial distress’. Te telos of our societies is not frst, fnancial stability, 
and second, human welfare, but love.
The question of where telos lies is a particularly important one here, as both in 
the original 1905 Aliens Act and the Border Force commitments we read earlier, the 
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priority is national economic prosperity. Borders create economic commitments, 
defne who has access to money and who profts from transactions. A telos of 
economic prosperity creates inequity in our approach to material goods and trade. Te
‘us and them’ atitude extends to how we think about proft and exploitation on both 
an international and national scale. Te presence of national borders and the notion of
national prosperity feeds into our market systems and encourages a closed loop view 
of an economy that is in fact global in its exploitation. A rhetoric of national 
prosperity hides the international efects of harmful economic decision making. 
Wealth creation plays a huge role in how our laws are writen and national borders 
are defned. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that they only make sense when a telos 
of economic growth is commited to. Ofen the full extent of this rhetoric is omited 
from political oratory, but the implicit message we are given is that as long as 
economic growth is maintained, all else is a secondary issue, and it does not mater 
who loses out. It is certainly the case that if we think about border policies and 
immigration controls through an ethics centred and pointed towards a telos of love, 
they make no sense at all. Why does it mater if someone, is poor, ill, or even a 
criminal? Where in our understanding of virtue and love are there places where the 
formation of a political society without these people is to be desired over a life of love,
empathy and inclusivity.
As discussed earlier, Maximus ofen falls back on Paul’s list of virtues from 
Colossians: “compassion, with kindness, humility, meekness, and patience, bearing 
with one another in love and forgiving one another if one has a complaint against the 
other just as Christ has forgiven us” (Col. 3:12-13). In a personal context, these virtues 
might be interpreted as passive qualities more associated with inaction. Tis is a prime
example of an instance where a dedication to such virtues in love calls for a very 
defnite rejection of the practices of a state. In an analysis of Maximus’ Ascetic Life, 
Tomas Merton reminds us that 
Very ofen people object that non-violence seems to imply passive acceptance of 
injustice and evil and therefore that it is a kind of cooperation with evil. Not at all. Te
genuine concept of non-violence implies not only active and efective resistance to evil
but in fact a more efective resistance. But Maximus takes pains to make very clear the 
absolutely uncompromising obligation to resist evil. But the resistance which is taught 
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in the Gospel is aimed not at the evil-doer but at evil in its source. It combats evil as 
such by doing good to the evil-doer, by thus overcoming evil with good (Romans 
12:21) which is the way our Lord Himself resisted evil.449
Merton interprets Maximus’ passages on loving one’s enemy as a very active form of 
resistance – he argues just afer this that to do nothing at all or to fght hate with hate,
would be to foster the kind of evil we are called to oppose.450 Whilst I do not explicitly 
afrm Merton’s position of non-violence here, his point about love being an active 
kind of resistance is one that I wish to emphasise. In orientating ourselves towards a 
telos of theosis, we remove ourselves from spheres that advocate or are complacent 
towards conficting means and ends. To these ends, it follows that one who wishes to 
pursue Maximian ethics looks towards the formation of a community that has a place 
place for compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, patience or forgiveness.451 Tis 
also implies it is within the scope of our project to make a radical critique of the 
exploitation in our market system, consumer ideology, Capitalist economics, current 
political system, border polices, immigration laws, and the very structure of our 
society. In the same way that denying refugees and asylum seekers entry to the UK is 
a failure of love deriving from national borders, so too is the act of purchasing items in
supermarkets that perpetuate a cycle of exploitation in workforces around the globe. If
we genuinely believe that an ethical system like the one we have derived from 
Maximus is cosmic in scope, then we also must realise that the small actions we make 
in our personal lives are global in their consequences, and that just because our 
borders are high walls over which we cannot see, does not mean that we are not 
harming others in the ways that we live. I shall discuss this further in Chapter 6, but 
an awareness of the end goal of theosis means a comprehensive rejection of the 
exploitative systems in which we fnd ourselves. Given that our personal actions are 
cosmic in scope, we must see what it is ofen inconvenient to see. Te ends of the state
and the ends of the market have nothing to do with Christ’s ends, and nor can they 
ever when they at essence are about maintaining power, relying on violence, or 
449  T. Merton, ‘St Maximus the Confessor on Non-Violence’ in Passion for Peace: The Social Essays. 
W.H. Shannon (ed.) (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1995 (First published in The 
Catholic Worker, Sept. 1965)), 246-47.
450 Merton, ‘St Maximus’, 247.
451 On Christian community and the possibility of reconciliation with those of differing faiths see 6.1.3.
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commited to unlimited wealth accumulation. One of the purposes of writing this 
thesis has been to illustrate how cosmic thinking in our ethics keeps our minds aware 
of the far-reaching efects of our actions. Our personal actions are literally cosmic in 
scope, not just in a mystical way but in a physical way. Unless we let our ethics inform
our actions on a personal and communal level, then we will never understand or be 
able to change the international implications of our personal actions.
In this section I have argued that by thinking about the means and operations 
of the state, like the policing of borders, we can identify ends that are very diferent to 
theosis. In consenting to live within the spaces that the state creates, we allow 
ourselves to be caught up in a system which continually works towards ends that are 
uterly opposed to our own. We consistently have to turn a blind eye to the global 
systems of exploitation, exclusion and alienation in order to continue living in these 
political communities. It is my contention that the ethics and telos we are aiming for 
cannot be reconciled with the state as a form of political community. Te state’s 
prerequisite dedication to discrimination, persecution, and exclusivity has none of the 
hallmarks we wish to embody in our search to live in love in this life, and to be Christ 
to all – microcosms of unifying love that are not confned by the arbitrary borders of 
the world.
5.4 Conclusion
Te purpose of this chapter has been to give an example of a way in which we might 
put Maximian ethics into practice. To do this, I argued that the means of the state 
confict with Maximian virtues and telos. I begun by justifying my choice to talk about 
the state, clarifying why the means of the state were important in an assessment of 
what the state is and does (5.1). I stated that my arguments and examples were made 
with regard to the United Kingdom in the present day, but noted that the critiques I 
make are applicable across a much broader spectrum. I then went on to describe two 
ways in which the state operates, drawing on contemporary political observers and 
the UK government’s own statements (5.2). I concluded by critiquing these two modes 
of operation, pointing out the incompatibilities that arise between them and Maximus’
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ethics (5.3). I looked at four diferent approaches that we might use to critique the 
means of the state. Tese were (5.3.1.1) the place of freedom within Maximus’ 
understanding of cosmic movement, (5.3.1.2) the virtue of compassion and the kind 
sympathy it requires of our actions, (5.3.2.1) the use of the Chalcedonian formula of 
union and distinction as a way of considering cultural variation, and fnally (5.3.2.2) 
love as our ultimate telos and the critique it poses to rival teloi in society. Te frst of 
these two methods were used to critique coercive force as a means of the state, and 
the second two were used to critique nationalist ideology and border enforcement.
Essential to all this was the importance of hypostatic action in the cosmos, i.e. 
Tat each person is called to Christ and that each tropos, each way of life lived, 
transfgures the cosmos in some way. Te intimidating part of a theology that claims 
that the human person is a microcosm, is the huge amount of responsibility this places
upon each unique person. We are responsible for the way we treat one another, for the
communities we live in, for the economic relationships we perpetuate. We have been 
granted freedom and the ability to love. Just because somebody ofers us a convenient 
apple, does not absolve us of the responsibility of our own actions, however menial or 
benign we may argue they are in the grand scheme of things. Te point of Maximus’ 
anthropology is that every personal action is meaningful in the grand scheme of 
things. Every logos awaits personal realisation in a communal context. Of course, this 
intimidating responsibility is also a source of hope. It is a comment about the 
importance of every personal action even in the face of what seem to be impossibly 
gargantuan difculties. 
In the next chapter I ofer some ways in which we might use Maximus’ ethics 
not only as a source of criticism for our current circumstances, but also as that source 
of hope. By keeping a telos of theosis in mind, striving for space to receive grace in our 
personal and communal lives, and seeking to live out the love that Christ is in the 
world, the revolution of love that begins in the microcosm can begin to transfgure the
cosmos.
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~ Chapter 6: Demanding the Impossible, Reaching for
the Divine ~
‘Our communities must always be rooted in and striving towards
love’
6.0 Introduction
6.0.1 Community in Ascesis
In this chapter I will reconsider the four critiques made in Chapter 5.3. Using these 
critiques I will suggest some ways we may use these Maximian tools to inform our 
ethics. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, in Maximus’ thought, our personal actions 
have a cosmic dimension. We are never creatures acting in total isolation. All we do 
touches those around us. Tis means our ethics do not just address the question ‘what 
should I do’, but also ‘who are we’, ‘how do we live’, and ‘what should we do’. In this 
chapter I move away from critiquing present human communities and instead 
consider how we might beter embody the cosmic Church we are called to partake in. 
Tere is no ethics, according to Maximus’ theology, that is not cosmic in impact. How 
we act, is how we act towards other people and the rest of creation, and therefore is 
never just a personal ethics, but also a communal one. An essential part of our ascesis 
– clearing passions from us and preparing our hearts for virtues – is about our 
interactions with other people. In most of our lives we are dealing with fellow 
creatures, and who we are and what we choose to live by comes through in these 
interactions. How we choose to organise our lives as a community is a part of our 
personal ascetic practice. As in Romans 14:7, none of us live for ourselves alone, and 
none dies for ourselves alone. Who we are as persons, each exercising their own will –
is completed in our relation to others, and ultimately in our relationship as creation to 
Creator. In Chapter 2.2.1 I talked about the Divine Eucharist being a microcosm of 
cosmic movement towards theosis. I referred to Loudovikos’ proposal that for 
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Maximus, our personal ascetic actions partake of this communal cosmic liturgy. Tis 
means that what we choose as persons is essential to the communal growth of the 
universe towards God. Tus there is no sphere in which our theology is not present, 
there is no personal life, no political life, no ecclesial life, no communal life, that is not 
wrapped up in creaturely relationship with God. Tis means that there is no place 
where our ascetic ethics should not be at the heart of our aims, and no moment where 
we forget that our hope is theosis.
In Chapter 5 I argued that the communal, political life that we fnd ourselves 
partaking in cannot be beyond the realm of ethical scrutiny. I argued that the state 
was a mode of human operation in which we participate, and that this mode of life 
conficts with that which is required of us as human beings seeking theosis. I 
concluded the chapter by asking what then is to be done, given that it is necessary to 
still live in community. In this chapter I look at some of the challenges of striving to 
live in a community that is orientated towards theosis. I take into account such 
difculties as the fact that not all those we live with may share the same telos as us, 
and how would it be possible to live with such people given that the free will to 
choose Christ and not have Him forced upon one is vital to our theology. I make some 
suggestions about how we might keep in tension the importance of choosing 
personally, but living communally. It is this awareness that we are both personal and 
communal creatures that is the focus this chapter. When it comes to thinking about 
our ethics, it can ofen be very difcult to keep this balance of personal and communal
present in our thinking and living. As an example of how we may keep this tension 
alive in our practical living, I draw examples from communal anarchist ideas. Te 
tension between personal and communal, more traditionally viewed in anarchist 
thought as one between freedom and solidarity, may be of use when thinking of 
alternatives to the state as a way of organising our communities.
Tis chapter will have two main sections, one that considers how our 
communities must be rooted in love, and one that thinks about how are communities 
can always be striving toward love. In this frst section I will consider the frst three 
critiques from Chapter 5.3, these are the place of freedom within Maximus’ 
understanding of the cosmic movement, the virtue of compassion and the kind 
sympathy it requires of our actions, and the use of the Chalcedonian formula of union 
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and distinction as a way of understanding cultural variation. I will use these three 
critiques as tools for thinking about how we can build societies that are rooted in a 
desire to embody Christ’s love on earth. In my second section I will focus on the last 
critique made in Chapter 5.3, which is love as the our ultimate telos of our 
communities.
6.0.2 A Methodology from the Past
In the course of this chapter, I will draw on a number of suggestions made by Peter 
Kropotkin and Colin Ward. My principal method in this chapter will be to present key 
ideas derived from Maximus’ theological and ethical thought and to indicate the 
utility, where appropriate, of Kropotkin and Ward’s suggestions for communal 
organising. I suggest that the Maximian principles I am carrying over from Chapter 5 
can be furthered practically by learning from and looking at current anarchist ideas. 
Tese include the anarchist concern with balance between personal and communal 
relationships in our communities, but also ideas like the necessity of ever-evolving 
communities with the ability to see and call to account the faws within itself. In 
keeping with both a Maximian focus on love and anarchist principles of co-operative 
action, the suggestions I make here are only one of a number of ways in which one 
could go about thinking of alternative methods for organising communities. 
Furthermore, the choice to draw on methods and tools from contemporary 
philosophical thought outside the Christian tradition is not anachronistic to Maximus’
way of thinking. Maximus partook in a well established tradition of drawing from 
non-Christian philosophical traditions to enrich the toolset with which approached 
Scripture and the Church fathers and mothers.452 Although I am not looking to 
anarchist thought for the same terminological and metaphysical apparatus that 
Maximus found in Hellenistic-infuenced sources, I believe the same principle applies 
when looking at the theoretical and practical methods of human organisation 
suggested and experimented with by those in the anarchist tradition.
As in Chapter 5, my choice to focus on anarchist ideas is only one of a number 
of ways in which this theology and ethics might be taken forward. Future work on 
ways to orientate human societies towards love might look to sources past and 
452 Cf. Törönen, Union and Distinction, 13-34.
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present for inspiration in transfguring our communities. My choice to draw from the 
anarchist tradition for inspiration is less to do with the ethical grounding of 
Kropotkin’s work, which is in the appropriation of natural sciences for the basis of a 
morality,453 and more to do with the practical ideas he put forward in response to an 
anthropological and economic critique of the state. Kropotkin’s despair at what he 
saw as the degrading and exploitative power of the strong over the weak epitomised 
in the political structure of the state, is countered by a hope that there may be a way 
of structuring our lives that engages with wider society and has the well-being of each
person at its heart. Te scale of this critique and the practicality of the suggestions put
forward may therefore be of particular interest to those looking alternatives to what, 
by the standards of Maximus’ ethics, I have argued are unacceptable institutions and 
organisations for a Christian to willingly partake in. Tough there are vast diferences 
in the grounding of someone like Kropotkin’s thought as compared to Maximus, we 
might, as Maximus did in his own time, see the tools and methods worth keeping from
those outside our tradition, and put them to use in a vision for a world closer to love. 
Te anarchist determination to keep striving for a beter world with a hope that we 
can live beter with one another than the present, is at least a familiar one to those 
who look for theosis.
Tough I draw from anarchist thought in this chapter, it would be a mistake to 
characterise anarchist though as a single or homogeneous tradition. Briefy, I follow 
Peter Marshall’s choice to call anarchists those who “reject the legitimacy of external 
government and of the state, and condemn imposed political authority, hierarchy and 
domination. Tey seek to establish the condition of anarchy, that is to say, a 
decentralized and self-regulating society consisting of a federation of voluntary 
associations of free and equal individuals”, so as “to create a free society which allows 
all human beings to realize their full potential”.454 It is difcult to make generalisations 
about anarchist thought, given its condemnation of set political ideologies, however, 
one thinker whose ideas continue to remain important in communal anarchist thought
even today is Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921). Kropotkin’s writings are particularly 
valuable for the way that they intertwine philosophical critique of the status quo, 
453 P. Kropotkin, Ethics: Origin and Development. L.S. Friedland & J.R. Piroshnikoff (trans.) 
(Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1992 (First ed. 1922)), 1-18.
454 Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 3.
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anecdotal and statistical evidence of difering economic systems, biological evidence to
counter the political primacy of a social survival-of-the-ftest idea, and a pragmatic 
ideas for both long and short term changes that can be made to society. 
Kropotkin’s work continues to remain important in anarchist writing today. In 
Anarchy in Action, Colin Ward goes so far as to call his own book “an extended, 
updating footnote to Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid.”.455 Ward writes that he follows George 
Orwell in believing Kropotkin to be ‘one of the most persuasive of anarchist writers’, 
before going on to say that Kropotkin’s continuing relevance is abundantly apparent 
and that, for example, “Anyone who wants to understand the real nature of the crisis 
of the British economy in the 1980s would gain more enlightenment from Kropotkin’s 
analysis from the 1890s than from the current spokesmen of any the political 
parties.”456  Elsewhere, Ward notes that the economic alternatives Kropotkin suggests 
are extremely important, especially “In the rich world, where we have fallen so far 
under the spell of capitalist ideology, and of Marxist ideology toos”.457 Ward identifes 
a severe paucity in the imagination of the lef which has largely abandoned “those 
aspirations for the liberation of work”.458 Consequently, he suggests that Kropotkin’s 
“decentralist and anarchist vision” may yet hold much for us, and that it is certainly 
much less an “absurd” idea than a socialist faith in the humanisation of work through 
the conquest of the state power by the proletariat.459 I’ve quoted Ward writing of 
Kropotkin’s relevance in 1973, 1974 and 1998, but in the wake of the 2008 economic 
crash, I think the need for ideas like Kropotkin’s are more important now than they 
ever have been before. Following the systemic failures of state socialism and 
capitalism, Kropotkin’s ideas look ever more prophetic and atractive.
6.03 What to do with our Ethics
Tus far in this thesis, I have outlined the way that Maximus’ thought might be 
understood in the context of contemporary ethics. I evaluated the difculties and 
limitations of current virtue ethics thought and tried to lay down some general 
455 Ward, Anarchy, 10.
456 Ward, Anarchy, 10.
457 C. Ward, ‘Introduction’ in P. Kropotkin, Fields, Factories and Workshops Tomorrow. C. Ward (ed.) 
(London: Freedom Press, 1998 (First ed. 1974) (First published 1899)), 12.
458 Ward, ‘Introduction’ in Kropotkin, Fields, 13.
459 Ward, ‘Introduction’ in Kropotkin, Fields, 13.
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premises that could be accepted in order to incorporate his thought. I went on to 
describe about how telos and virtue are understood by him, using these terms as a way
into talking about Maximus’ whole cosmic theology. I explained how Maximus’ 
wholistic understanding of cosmic and ascetic theology may give us a useful way to 
think about how to live by Christ’s words. I then gave an example of how Maximus’ 
theology can serve as a way to critique our present day circumstances. I used the state
as an example of a monolithic structure in human society that is extremely 
problematic when considered in light of this ethics. Te other thing I would like to do 
in this thesis is give an example of a more positive account of how we might go about 
living out such an ethics. It is all very well to provide critiques of the present day 
institutions we depend so heavily on, but much more exciting to my mind is a vision 
of how we might work for change. If the state is such a terrible thing to partake in, 
how could we live without it? As well as giving us the tools to critique our present 
day, Maximus’ ethics can also help us think about how we might try to live beter in 
future. He does not give us a manual for economic and political change, but he does 
give us something much more important – he helps us identify what is really 
important in human relationship with the divine, with one another, and with the rest 
of creation. It is up to us to try and think of ways to keep these right relations at the 
heart of the way that we live with one another in larger communities. As in ascetic 
striving and in our liturgical participation, we come before God clearing our hearts of 
atachment to worldly desires and ofering all that we can, in the hope that the Spirit 
will work through our striving. In this chapter, I look at how we might also take this 
atitude toward our communities, prioritising things like giving others the freedom to 
choose to love, placing compassion, mercy and the well-being of others at the heart of 
our communal endeavours, and being aware of our own fallibility, pre-empting that 
we may go wrong and puting in place ways to refect and change for the beter. Te 
anarchist sources I draw from represent the atempts of diferent people to try and 
think through the failures of our current communal relationships and to push 
considerations like the well-being of all through to philosophical extremes that are not
confned in imagination to the status quo. As I mentioned in 6.0.2, I do not suggest 
anarchist ideas as an exhaustive avenue of thought, but do think that the practical 
ideas suggested may inspire a more creative ethics founded in Maximus’ theology. 
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Tere are a number of ways in which we can think about how we put our 
ethics into action. Firstly, we should never forget that every present moment 
simultaneously partakes in the end we look towards. Our virtuous or un-virtuous 
activity forges or breaks cosmic relationships that have repercussions for the end of all
creatures. Although I argue for critiquing the state and trying to live in community 
outside of its infuences, we cannot forget that our love must also be for those within 
the state and its infuence. Our ethical considerations cannot be devoid from a 
responsibility of love to everyone around us. Tus, I think it essential that regardless 
of where else we take our ethical study, we never forget that in the short term we 
must work within whatever parameters we have to sufer with those who sufer and 
to give to those who need us most. Tese short term considerations are difcult to 
situate within a cosmic political framework, since many of our activities might 
continue within precisely the state structure I have been criticising. Perhaps the most 
astute insight on this mater comes from Noam Chomsky, who, from a purely secular 
anarchist viewpoint, argues that though we look for a beter way of living, we can 
never do so without keeping in mind the sufering of all others around us, and doing 
our utmost to alleviate such sufering in the short term as well as the long term.460
Te second thing we can do with this ethics is what I spend the rest of this 
chapter considering. We can start thinking creatively and imaginatively about modes 
of human organisation beyond those oppressive and coercive means that we currently 
live in. We can start thinking of ways to lessen our dependence on a state that 
necessarily exploits economically, politically and socially, humans inside and outside 
its borders. We can think about those virtues like humility and compassion that 
remind us how to strive for beter and never to allow comfort to become complacency.
I discuss the possibilities for other modes of communal relation in anarchist 
experimentations in communal living, and sum up these ideas in two sections. In a 
section called ‘Rooted in Love’ (6.2) I look at those things upon which we must build 
our communities, and in ‘Striving towards Love’ (6.3) I look at those practices that will
encourage our communities see beauty in repentance and striving for a perfection that
will always be beyond human grasp.
Te last thing we may do is emphasise that the greatest long term change we 
460 See N. Chomsky, “Anarchism, Intellectuals and the State” in Chomsky on Anarchism, 212-220.
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can hope for lies in changes in atitude. As we saw in Gregory of Nyssa’s Sermon on 
Mercy, meaningful change in the oppressive structures around us starts in our hearts 
and the way that we treat one another. We can give others the chance to see Christ’s 
love in action and to see change as real and atainable. Te eschatological grounding 
of our ethics afords us the opportunity to think beyond a status quo that we are told 
gives us security and the necessities of life. A commitment to seeking Christ in all 
things and mediating His love to the world means that we can have hope and faith 
that a diferent way of living and loving is not only possible but necessary. We can 
know that our actions today and the spaces we create inside ourselves to receive 
virtue allow the world the potential to move closer to Christ now, and ultimately 
prepare the cosmos for that fnal consummation. Our eyes set eschatologically afords 
us the time to care about particular existences here and now. We do not have the time 
to setle for political promises that tell us that oppressive and exploitative means will 
eventually give us some small return for ourselves in the future. Our concern is with 
love and loving today – with being rooted in and striving for love. 
6.1 Rooted in Love
6.1.1 Personal Choice in a Communal Life
In 5.3.1.1 I suggested that in the face of the state’s coercion, one following Maximian 
ethics must consider the importance of freedom and personal choice. I argued that we 
cannot be forced to become more fully human – that is we cannot be forced into love. 
Both the coerced and the coercer have no part in love when coercion takes place. It is 
Christ’s voluntary sufering on behalf of the other that forms the basis of our 
understanding of love. Only by imitating Christ’s voluntary act can we being to 
partake in love.
6.1.1.1 Free Association
When it comes to questions of ethics we arrive at the difculty of how best to live 
with each other whilst respecting the importance of each person’s free will. As I 
discussed in the last chapter, there are very big diferences between an Enlightenment 
concept of freedom as autonomous individual action and Maximian freedom of will. 
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For example, J.S. Mill’s understanding of freedom is defned in the context of human 
society, where freedom is seen necessarily as an individual operation that is curtailed 
by the imposition of society. Society exists to prevent one individual from eroding 
another individual’s freedom and to protect the individual from the pressure of 
majority social pressure.461 Mill thus seeks to describe a way in which these two 
opposing forces might be maximised in the society. Individual freedom must do no 
harm to another,462 whilst societal good must not sufocate the free operation of 
individuals to do any number things (Mill describes the most important individual 
freedoms as liberty of thought and feeling, liberty of tastes and pursuits and of 
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character, liberty of each individual to 
unite with others for any purpose not involving harm to others).463
Maximus, by contrast, talks about freedom in purely functional terms. It is 
something we have as humans, related to will and rationality. Freedom is discussed in 
so far as we have the option to do that which is in our natural capability. We have 
freedom to act in accord with our natural faculties that are reconstructed in Christ. 
Maximus’ entire conversation about freedom is orientated in a diferent way to Mill’s, 
since for Maximus freedom is defned in relation to hypostatic action and in 
opposition (so to speak) to natural necessity.464 Te ability to will, like the virtues 
discussed in 4.1.1, is a faculty we posses by merit of being human, but we perform the 
act of willing according to our hypostasis. In other words, we can do it because of our 
nature, but we do do it because we personally choose to. Free choice is characterised 
as a personal (hypostatic) ability as compared to necessity more commonly expressed 
through nature.
Initially, it is not necessarily the case then that Mill’s concept of freedom and 
Maximus’ are incompatible, so much as that they are talking across purposes. Where 
461 J.S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in On Liberty and Other Writings. S. Collini (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003 (First ed. 1989) (First published 1859)), Chapter 1, 8-9.
462 “That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.” Mill, ‘On Liberty’, Chapter 1, 13.
463 Mill, ‘On Liberty’, Chapter 1, 15-16.
464 I use the term ‘opposition’ loosely, since we have already determined that natures are shaped by a 
persons growing into them. I mean here that hypostatic action refers to the things we choose to do, 
while nature is simply descriptive of what is within our capability. (See the logos/tropos distinction 
in 3.2.4 and 4.1.2)
223
~ Chapter 6: Deoandini the Iopossible, Reachini for the Diveine ~
Mill’s discussion of freedom relates to political existence, Maximus’ discussion of 
freedom relates to nature. However, despite these discussions happening in very 
diferent forums, by looking at how freedom is defned we see very important 
statements being made by each about what humans beings are.
Mill’s understanding of liberty seems much more rigid in its application to 
human living. Tere is a presupposition that society must be oppressive of freedom, 
since freedom is located in the absolute autonomy of the individual. Society could be 
characterised as a kind of necessary evil, working to keep individuals from destroying 
each other with their wanton autonomy. Despite being fully aware of the oppressive 
and restrictive means of society,465 Mill’s position still lends itself to a Hobbesian view 
of the state of nature, where without society and its social contract, all would be in a 
condition of constant war, violence, fear and death.466 Tough Mill and Hobbes difer 
on how favourably they view human society, it seems that they both view it as a 
necessary means of restraining human autonomy from its more harmful 
predispositions.
Maximus by contrast describes freedom as a prerequisite to love. Love, as we 
have already seen, is necessarily communal in its outworking and descriptive of 
human relationship. If we were to draw a societal statement from this, we might say 
that freedom is necessary in order for right relation to exist between people. Tis is an
unsurprising conclusion to arrive at, given that Maximus believes that by nature 
creation was made good, and that this goodness can be atained by participation in 
reconstructed human nature in Christ. In other words, a Maximian view of nature is at
odds with a Hobbesian view of human nature being at war until it is bound in political
contract. Instead, the human is not truly human until they have placed themselves 
freely in association with other humans and lives as Christ did in the world.
Also unlike Hobbes’ view of humanity, there is a trend in anarchist thought 
that conceives of society as expressive of human freedom. Rooted in Kropotkin’s 
465 Mill’s On Liberty is concerned with protecting the individual’s freedoms from society, which, even 
when supposedly democratic, still operates oppressively. However, he believes the dangers of 
majority pressure and the need for protection from other individuals means that some form of 
society is necessary. Society is thus still presented as a kind of a restraining order placed upon 
humans in order to allow for other individuals to exercise their freedoms as well.
466 T. Hobbes, ‘Chapter XIII’, Leviathan, (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651), 76-79.
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observations that form the backbone of his book Mutual Aid467 and continued in the 
anthropological data collated by Colin Ward and others, there is a strand of anarchist 
thought that claims willing co-operation and coexistence is a natural phenomena in 
humanity. In Kropotkin’s works these claims are made as statements about human 
nature itself,468 whereas in Ward’s reassessment he emphasises this more as a social 
tendency that arises when hierarchy is absent in a group of people.469 Ward’s position 
is less reliant on naturalistic claims about human behaviour, since he allows that this 
social phenomena seems to arise more out of convenience than out of any natural 
law.470 Regardless, the observations of both mean that their practical visions for a 
human society may be of great use to one who lives in accord with Maximian ethics.
Te anarchist vision of society is one that is freely entered into out of human 
choice because it is mutually benefcial. While we could argue that Mill ultimately 
believes something similar, with his belief that society serves the common good for all,
his focus on the limitations that society forces on human freedom is suggestive of the 
coercive state structure in which he lives and implies that human community must 
always have a degree of coercive restriction if certain liberties are to be assured. 
Kropotkin and Ward’s suggestions, by comparison, start from the basis that society 
does not have to be a series of limitations placed upon the individual, but is rather 
expressive of the desire of people to aid one another. Te diference is subtle, but 
ultimately Kropotkin and Ward’s vision is one fundamentally opposed to the top 
down system that Mill’s philosophy is suggestive of. Te intent and desire for society 
means that the driving force for its creation is located with its participants, and is 
therefore a personal choice in and of itself. Tis in turn feeds very directly into the 
shape of the resulting society. Because the anarchist premise arises from the personal 
desire to freely associate, its structure comes out of these base relations. Limitation, as 
I will go on to explain, is self-imposed and community is thus expressive of free 
467 Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid begins by identifying mutual aid among animals of the same species and 
setting this in context of Darwin’s theory of evolution. He then goes on to mutual aid practices in 
indigenous communities, the development of the medieval city, and finally looks at examples 
present in society in his own day.
468 See 6.1.2.1.
469 Ward, “Chapter II: The Theory of Spontaneous Order” in Anarchy, 39-49.
470 Kropotkin’s belief that mutual aid is a natural law seems to be primarily of contextual importance, 
given his opposition to predominant Social Darwinist survival-of the-fittest ideas. Ward allows for a 
reading that is much more in line with contemporary philosophical and anthropological ideas.
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association and a desire to mutually aid one another, rather than out of fear and self-
protection. Association is formed together rather than coercively pressed upon many 
by a few. Already the coercive top-down control of the state is pushed away as the 
sole shape and vision of human societies. In the anarchist vision for association that 
arises from free will is a counterpart that may suit Maximian ethics much more.
6.1.1.2 The Federalist Idea
Te anarchist vision put forward by Kropotkin builds on a foundation of mutual aid 
and envisions ever larger and more complex human networks of association that 
might serve to aid such a society fulfl human needs. Kropotkin suggested that society 
be organised freely in structures that arise out of necessity from work and day-to-day 
living. Such structures would rise to meet needs and disappear if no longer necessary. 
Michael Bakunin, another of the great classical anarchist writers, emphasised this 
later point in particular
I bow before the authority of special[ist] men because it is imposed upon me by my 
own reasons I receive and I give – such is human life. Each directs and is directed in 
his turn. Terefore there is no fxed and constant authority, but a continual exchange 
of mutual, temporary and, above all, voluntary authority and subordination.471
Bakunin emphasises as Maximus did that it is our free choice to limit ourselves and 
willingly partake in human community that is necessary. Unlike Mill’s assumption 
that every human wishes the greatest autonomy to do anything they please (a desire 
tempered only by the desire not to be injured by another, thus resulting in humans 
subjecting themselves to the rule of society), Bakunin believes that freedom is in the 
choice to be in association with another, including our limitations: “freedom is not a 
phenomenon of isolation, but of mutual contemplation”.472 What Bakunin realised that
Mill seems to have missed is that in order to live with other people, we must choose to
limit ourselves, and that so long as we are imposed upon by the state to live in such-
471 M. Bakunin, God and State. (New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1916 (First Published
1882)). Available online: Bakunin Reference Archive: 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/godstate/ch02.htm (Accessed: 09.06.17), 
Ch. 2.
472 Bakunin, God and State. This version in No Gods No Masters, 151.
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and-such a fashion then we do not have that freedom. One might argue that in a 
democratic society we are remotely involved in creating these rules, or that society is 
still a kind of contract people wish to participate in to avoid injury to themselves, but 
in the day to day living of our lives, many of those freedoms are not readily 
apparent.473 We have opportunities in the UK to enact many of the freedoms Mill 
thought essential for humans to possess, but with the threat of law, punishment and 
coercion, just how many of these freedoms are freedoms if we are limited by a 
punitive system, state apparatus, and the cyclical confnes of poverty and a debt 
driven society? We must have the freedom not to injure one another as part of our 
choice to love.
In 5.3.1.1 I talked about the necessity of freedom in order for love to be real. 
Unless we have the option to choose that which is not God, neither do we have the 
choice to love Him. We cannot coerce another into love, but instead the desire to 
change must come from within, as far as we are concerned.474 Te ability to limit 
oneself then, is a freedom we could call essential to a human community founded on 
love. Instead of units operating autonomously within the confnes of a society that has
the authority to limit our actions, Bakunin suggested that instead we understand 
authority as expertise relevant to the need at hand: “Does it follow that I reject all 
authority? Far from me such a thought. In the mater of boots, I refer to the authority 
of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads, I consult that of the 
architect or the engineer”.475 Neither then do we assume that authority is a static good 
to be obeyed at all times. Instead, we understand relationships to be with other 
particular people, each of which has something unique to ofer community. We do not 
dehumanise structure and organisation, but instead understand it as people willingly 
operating in community with one another. Authority is therefore not arbitrary and 
total, requiring unthinking obedience, but instead is the lending of a more experienced
hand, when and where that experience is required, freely received by one who has 
respect; a relationship not born of antagonism but of mutual respect.
Authority then and the structures of organisation could be responses to needs 
473 As Mill himself also pointed out. cf. Mill, “On Liberty”, Chapter 1, 12.
474 As we saw in 4.1.3 to live virtuously is the the joint work of grace and the Holy Spirit, as well the 
person who desires to receive love in them. Without limiting the way in which grace and the Spirit 
work, we can still safely say that coercing someone into virtuousness is not possible or desirable.
475 Bakunin, God and State, Ch. 2.
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and difculties  wherein those concerned gather to resolve a problem. Kropotkin’s 
models for workplace organising drew from the medieval guild structures and the 
syndicalist ideas being experimented on in his own day. As Ward summarised
Te classical anarchist thinkers envisaged the whole social organisation woven from 
such local groups: the commune or council as the territorial nucleus and the syndicate 
or worker’s council as the industrial or occupational unit. Tese units would federate 
together not like the stones of a pyramid where the biggest burden is borne by the 
lowest layer, but like the links of a network, the network of autonomous groups.476
Decision-making might thus be made on a local basis, and where collaboration or 
consultation further afeld is necessary, networks could be in place that allow 
federated communication and decision to be made.477 Free choice to participate thus 
becomes essential to the structure of society and community. 
Tus, it becomes possible to envision communities that, at a local level of 
organisation, come together to decide all maters. Such an organisation would be small
enough that every voice could be heard and considered, but large enough that it is 
capable of undertaking most local responsibilities. Te carrying out of tasks decided 
by such an organisation would be delegated to voluntary working groups, which could
be made up of those with expertise in certain maters. Tese working groups could 
have autonomy, but would abide by collective decisions made within the community 
and bring back any maters they considered needed further collective approval.478 Te 
476 Ward, Anarchy, 33-4.
477 Federalism was also championed by Proudhon in his book Du principe fédératif published in 1863. 
Woodcock summarises Proudhon’s position on federalism thus: “In his view the federal principle 
should operate from the simplest level of society. The organisation of administration should begin 
locally and as near the direct control of the people as possible; individuals should start the process 
by federating into communes and associations. Above that primary level the confederal organisation 
would become less an organ of administration than of co-ordination between local units. Thus the 
nation would be replaced by a geographical confederation of regions, and Europe would become a 
confederation of confederations, in which the interest of the smallest province would have as much 
expression as that of the largest, and in which all affairs would be settled by mutual agreement, 
contract, and arbitration.” Woodcock, Anarchism, 117.
478 I presented a case study of working groups in action in the 2010 student occupation of Appleton 
Tower in Edinburgh University (E. Brown Dewhurst, ‘Demanding the Impossible – Reaching for the
Divine: Anarchist Living and the Theology of Maximus the Confessor’ paper presented to 2016 
Society for the Study of Christian Ethics Postgraduate Conference: Christian Hope: Embodying 
Resurrection in the World Today.  Durham, 21st-22nd April 2016). A copy of the case study is 
available online at: 
https://www.academia.edu/24943592/Handout_Demanding_the_Impossible_Reaching_for_the_Divi
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community would not be limited to this local organisation, but the basis of self-
governance would happen at this level. Coalition and communication with other 
similar organisations might result in nested, federated community structures that 
might meet at a regional, national or international level as described by Kropotkin. 
Each would be accountable to its more local group, rooting meaningful decision-
making with the person and the original community. Trough a system of accountable
and recallable delegates people might organise and fourish in a theoretically 
borderless world, capable, as I will come on to, of consistently seeing its own faults 
and persistently trying to reform itself for the beter while responding to the concerns 
of each person.
For Kropotkin, the desire for voluntary participation in community cannot be 
divorced from a concern for the welfare of fellow humans. We can see the 
interrelation of his thought and the way that free participation fuels alternate 
structures of society and is in return rewarded by them. It is not just that freedom in 
itself is desirable, but that it contributes directly to the mental and physical well-being 
of each person as well as to the welfare of the community. We can see this for example
within his work, Fields, Factories and Workshops, writen about Great Britain and frst 
collected into a book in 1899.479 In this work, Kropotkin outlines four aspects of his 
anarchist vision. Te frst is the decentralisation of industries which allows us “To 
return to a state of afairs where corn is grown, and manufactured goods are 
fabricated, for the use of those very people who grow and produce them,” so that “Each 
region will become its own producer and its own consumer of agricultural produce”.480
Te second looks at the possibilities of agriculture, and how the market garden might 
be put to good use. Te main point of this section is to illustrate that it is always 
within our means to produce food locally to feed a population.481 On this, he says, “Te
obstacles against it are not in the imperfection of the agricultural art, or in the 
infertility of the soil, or in climate. Tey are in our institutions, in our inheritances and
ne_Anarchist_Living_and_the_Theology_of_Maximus_the_Confessor. One could also experiment 
with methods of consensus decision making, as was the case in this example. For more on this see 
6.2.2.
479 Ward, ‘Introduction’ in Kropotkin, Fields, iv.
480 Kropotkin, Fields, 40.
481 Kropotkin, Fields, 103; This is still the case today with responsible changes to land use and diet, cf. 
S. Fairlie ‘Can Britian Feed Itself’ The Land 4 Winter (2007-8): 18-26.
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survivals from the past – in the ‘Ghosts’ which oppress us”.482 His point is that our 
cultural, traditional, political and economic practices are tied to our current 
institutions and prevent us from atempting to create local, self-sustaining economies 
and agriculture. In his third section, Kropotkin discusses the necessity of “producing 
for the producers themselves” and also the healthy need for all people to be involved to 
some degree in manual outdoor labour.483 On a similar theme, the last area Kropotkin 
covers is education: “‘Trough the eyes and the hand to the brain’ – this is the true 
principle of economy of time in teaching.”484 Kropotkin is keen to emphasise that 
understanding of the theoretical comes through the practical, and that this is true in 
school-learning, but also in the societies that we construct. We cannot understand 
labour unless we ourselves labour.485
In Fields, Factories and Workshops, Kropotkin demonstrates the need for our 
economic and political decisions never to occur in isolation from our social and ethical
thought. Te two belong to one another and inform each other and are built on one 
another. We could say then, that this kind of free participation and choice is one of the
means that contributes to an end vision of beter human co-existence. Freedom to 
participate in society, to choose to be a part of it and to limit our own actions so that 
we may work with one another afects how we conduct ourselves as human beings 
and the shape of the community that is brought about. Treating community as human 
relationships that must be worked at changes how we think about authority, about 
how we think about work, about how we think about living well. Freedom, in 
Kropotkin’s thought is an extremely social concept – it is about how one chooses to 
live with other people, and necessarily shapes the societies we build. In so far as this 
kind choice bears relation to the way that Maximus understands freedom as a 
prerequisite to love, the kind of suggestions Kropotkin is making may suit us beter as 
a way of trying to organise ourselves. Founding communities on the request that 
people limit themselves for one another certainly shares much more in common with 
an ethics of Christ-like love than the assumption that people must be coerced into 
such a relation by the state.
482 Kropotkin, Fields, 106.
483 Kropotkin, Fields, 158.
484 Kropotkin, Fields, 175.
485 Kropotkin, Fields, 186.
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6.1.2 A Society Founded on Compassion
I have considered the importance of freedom to love in the way we structure our 
societies, but how can we ensure that love itself is the foundation upon which we 
build our communities? In 4.1.4 I described the way that, when struggling to think of 
what it means to love in any given circumstance, we could, if it is helpful, look back at
the virtues and think about the way that they relate to love. In Chapter 3 I discussed 
the Pauline list of virtues to which Maximus make frequent mention. Tese were 
compassion, kindness, humility, meekness, and patience, bearing with one another in 
love and forgiving one another if one has a complaint against the other just as Christ 
has forgiven us.486 Tese virtues might also be summed up in the words of Christ: “You
must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your 
mind.’ Tis is the greatest and most important commandment. Te second is exactly 
like it: ‘You must love your neighbour as yourself.’ All the Law and the Prophets 
depend on these two commandments” (Mat 22:37-40). Essential to each of these 
virtues is the giving of oneself to another. It is what God does for us in Christ – 
simultaneously limiting Himself487 and outpouring Himself – ofering all of Himself to 
be received. In 6.1.1 we talked about limiting oneself – giving the other the space to 
choose as God has done for us. In this section I talk about that kenotic outpouring of 
Christ that we see on the cross, in all of the virtues and at the heart of Maximus’ 
theology. In order to partake in Christ we follow in His voluntary sufering for others, 
dying into His death and clearing our hearts of things that stand between us and love. 
Maximus reminds us of the above Mathew passage when rehearsing the conversation
between a spiritual elder and a monk:
Tis is the sign of our love for God, as the Lord Himself shows in the Gospels: He that 
loves me, He says, will keep my commandments. And what this commandment is, which
if we keep we love Him, hear Him tell: Tis is my commandment, that you love one 
another. Do you see that this love for one another makes frm the love for God?[...] Te
Lord Himself makes it clear and has shown it to us by His very works; and so too all 
His disciples, who strove til death for love of their neighbour and prayed fervently for 
486 Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 24; Col. 3:12-15.
487 Also discussed in 2.2.2.
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those that killed them.488
Here and throughout the Centuries On Love, Maximus continuously falls back on the 
path of personal asceticism being about transforming our actions towards others, 
especially those who we struggle to get on with. In order to reach for God , we must 
genuinely care for others. Tis is the only way to healing for both us and our 
neighbours:
If you harbour resentment against anybody, pray for him and you will prevent the 
passion from being aroused; for by means of prayer you will separate your grief from 
the thought of the wrong he has done you. When you have become loving and 
compassionate towards him, you will wipe the passion completely from your soul. If 
somebody regards you with resentment, be pleasant to him, be humble and agreeable 
in his company, and you will deliver him from his passion.489
Kropotkin, as we will see, rejects what has traditionally been called ‘love’ in Christian 
thought as a necessary founding principal of society. However, his principle of mutual 
aid, which assumes the well-being of others to be of utmost concern when structuring 
society, shares a great deal with Christ’s greatest commandment and Maximus’ 
interpretation of it. I shall demonstrate Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid and describe 
the ways in which it may be useful to those looking for a mode of organisation that 
originates in care for all neighbours.
6.1.2.1 To Each According To Their  eed
Te philosophical ideas underlying Kropotkin’s anarchist theory might best be 
described in the Marxist maxim490‘to each according to their need; to each according to 
their ability’ , a phrase Kropotkin used himself,491 and (incidentally) reminiscent of 
Maximus’ Centuries on Love: “...in God’s fashion to each one who has need”.492 In his 
autobiography, Kropotkin describes how from a young age he was deeply distressed 
488 Maximus, LA TCr. [Sherwood, Maximus, 108].
489 Maximus, De char. PG90 1043CD III.90 [Louth, Maximus, 39].
490 K. Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’ in Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume Three. (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1970 (First Published 1890), 13-30.
491 Kropotkin, Conquest, 24.
492 Maximus, De char. PG90 965A I.23 [Berthold, Maximus, 37].
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by the inequality, injustice and oppression inherent in serfdom, and the expectations 
in social interaction this system enforced.493 Kropotkin describes a continual struggle 
to confront the injustices he found in Russian society. Remaining at the heart of his 
struggle is the desire to give to those in need, to bring a measure of fairness into the 
lives of those about him and above all “not be just the same”494 as the privileged who 
kept others enslaved. He claimed it was no good wanting to change society simply 
through the Marxist ideas like the “right to work” or “to each the whole result of his 
labour”.495 What had to be at the heart of desire for change in human society was hope 
for ‘well-being for all’,496 based on a principle of “to every [wo/]man according to 
[her/]his needs”.497 It was in this way that common people could become “the builders 
of a new, equitable mode of organisation of society”.498
Kropotkin justifed his belief in the need for a society that seeks the well-being 
of all by locating a driving factor for this in an evolutionary tendency of the natural499 
world towards co-operation. He notes that while the traditions and history of a society
play an important part in the development of ethics, conscience itself “has a much 
deeper origin, – namely in the consciousness of equity, which physiologically 
develops in man as in all social animalss”.500 He writes that a key factor of evolution 
has been the social development and ability of animals to co-operate with one another
in order to survive.501 He calls this the ‘mutual-aid tendency’, believing it to be 
something more base and instinctive than human feeling and sympathy. For him it is a
kind of natural propensity for solidarity, “an instinct that has been slowly developed 
among animals and men in the course of an extremely long evolution, which has 
taught animals and men alike the force they can borrow from the practice of mutual 
aid and support, and the joys they can fnd in social life”.502 Kropotkin’s book Mutual 
Aid was a vital work of its time, challenging the legitimacy of emerging social 
493 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 48-62.
494 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 51.
495 Kropotkin, Conquest, 10.
496 Kropotkin, Conquest, 11.
497 Kropotkin, Conquest, 24.
498 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 379.
499 ‘Natural’ is used in reference to the biological world here, and not with any of the Maximian 
connotations with which it has been employed in the rest of this thesis.
500 Kropotkin, Ethics, 338.
501 P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. (Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 1902.), xvi.
502 Kropotkin, Mutual, xiii.
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Darwinism and proposing that cooperation as well as struggle had foundations in 
evolutionary science.503 Social Darwinism exacerbated the struggle of the individual in 
nature and derived from it a series of natural facts about the capability of the human 
and from there a legitimacy in the way in which human societies operated according 
to the survival of the ftest.504 Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid set about challenging the 
premise that the struggle of the individual is all that can be found in nature (or in 
Darwin’s theory, for that mater).505 However, the extent to which ethics should be 
informed by observing nature was not called into question. Tis makes sense of why, 
for Kropotkin, it is not enough to say that human society could be founded on ‘love’, 
though the concept for him is nonetheless an important emotion derived from this 
natural ‘mutual-aid tendency’.506 Kropotkin still holds that scientifcally proven 
tendencies in human nature must dictate the shape of our societies.507 Of course, this 
does not really explain why it could not be possible for the human, which believes 
itself to have the capacity for love, to base its societies upon such a relation. Kropotkin
writes, “It is not love of my neighbour – whom I ofen do not know at all – which 
induces me to seize a pail of water and to rush towards his house when I see it on 
fres”.508 But need it not be? Te heart of Maximus’ ascetic literature is the assertion 
that the human can precisely cultivate an atitude of love toward any neighbour, even 
one previously not known.509 Since we are able to cultivate such an atitude, we have a 
responsibility to live in this way, Maximus believes, as we are the only creatures on 
earth who have sufciently developed510 the rational capacity to live in such a fashion 
and thus enable harmony between all creatures.511 
503 Kropotkin, Mutual, ix-x.
504 Kropotkin, Mutual, ix.
505 See Kropotkin, Mutual, viii-xii.
506 See Kropotkin, Mutual, xii-xiii.
507 Cf. Chomsky’s doubt on the utility of this kind of thought in anarchism see, Chomsky, “Interview 
with Ziga Vodovnik” in Chomsky on Anarchism, 240.
508 Kropotkin, Mutual, xiii. Kropotkin is making a point here about the basis of his ‘scientific’ ethics, 
rather than actually disparaging love as mode of human living. We can see the case for love in 
anarchism made particularly strongly by Emma Goldman in her argument that marriage should not 
be a prerequisite for one to love; E. Goldman, “Marriage and Love”, in Anarchism and Other 
Essays, (New York, Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1910). Available online from The 
Anarchist Library: https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/emma-goldman-anarchism-and-other-
essays#toc13 (Accessed 10.03.17).
509 Maximus, De char. PG90 963C I.15 [Berthold, Maximus, 37].
510 On the possibility of compatibility between Maximus’ logoi-based theology and Darwin’s Theory of
Evolution, see Blowers, ‘Unfinished’, 174-90.
511 Maximus, Amb. 41 PG91 1308B-C [Louth, Maximus, 158].
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Regardless, it is clear that an ascetic call to love does not sit at odds with 
Kropotkin’s hope for ‘well-being for all’, and that Kropotkin’s scientifc reasoning is 
not a boundary to the Christian seeing utility in his ideas and practices. A key part of 
Maximus’ cosmology is that it is not only human well-being that is sought for, but the 
well-being of the entirety of creation, of which humanity is a part. As noted earlier ‘To
every man according to his needs’ might be a key slogan of nineteenth century 
anarchist thought, but the sentiment is much older and one of the places it was 
cultivated as a way of life was in practical ascesis: “...in God’s fashion to each one who 
has need”.512 To give to another person is to do the work of God, according to the 
Gospel and early Church.513
As has been hinted at, of vital importance to Kropotkin when considering how 
a society can enable each according to their need, is tackling economic oppression 
through poverty and debt. For Kropotkin, in order to give people what they need to 
live, and to give them the freedom to make their own choices without being enslaved 
to economic means, the monopoly of private property must be addressed. In the next 
section I look at Kropotkin's suggestions for a property-less society, diferentiating it 
from state Communist solutions and comparing it to Scriptural and Maximian 
considerations on property.
6.1.2.2 The Abolition of Property
In Chapter 5, I presented the state’s origin as closely tied to the protection of private 
property. In this section I argue that not only is a capitalist state instrumental in 
continuing to protect the inequity of property, but that its economy is reliant on 
perpetually increasing the gap between rich and poor. I set out the basis of Marx’s 
critique of the capitalist relationship between labour and capital. I then go on to 
contrast Marx’s concern with equity to Kropotkin’s concern for well-being for all and 
demonstrate Kropotkin’s commitment to the abolition of wages and property in 
favour of giving to others what they need.
We can see the reliance on inequity of property and the continued gap between
rich and poor in the dependence of capitalist states on debt. We can see for example 
512 Maximus, De char. PG90 965A I.23 [Berthold, Maximus, 37].
513 John 15:13.
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that the economy of the UK is heavily reliant on increasing value in the property 
market. As evidenced by the 2008 fnancial crash, the collapse of the housing market 
brought about the collapse of national and international economies, indicating that the
way fnance is invested in the property market has a knock-on efect on the rest of the
economy. In an evaluation of the frst twenty-fve years of the Right to Buy scheme 
initiated by the UK government under Tatcher, Jones and Murie wrote that over 90% 
of houses sold through Right to Buy were purchased with mortgages.514 Te majority 
of transactions involving housing purchases then, involve borrowing money. By 
measuring economic growth in relation to the housing market, we are measuring the 
increase in the value of mortgages. In other words, we are measuring the amount that 
debt (on unpaid mortgages) might fetch if sold.515 It was the potential price of property,
as opposed to the actual price of property, that was being bought and sold in the run 
up to the fnancial crisis. According to Ian Stewart, Emeritus Professor of Mathematics
at Warwick University, by 2007 one quadrillion dollars was being traded per year in 
the international fnancial system, which was ten times the total worth of all products 
manufactured in the world over the last century.516
In a book contextualising the 2008 fnancial crisis and debt, Richard Diesnt 
explains that mortgages, particularly risky mortgages which were high interest with a 
high likelihood that they would not be paid of (subprime mortgages), were 
repackaged, regraded and resold so as to cover up the likelihood of payment being 
defaulted on to buyers. Tis resulted in a large part of the economy relying and 
profting on the reselling of debt that was never likely to be paid back.517 In a BBC4 
radio programme, Tomas Gokey from Strike Debt,518 explained that:
Financial corporations don’t actually make money when they’re taking a loan that 
somebody can aford to pay. Credit card companies refer to people who can pay of the
balance on their credit card every month as ‘deadbeats’ because they’re not making 
514 C. Jones & A. Murie. The Right to Buy: Analysis and Evaluation of a Housing Policy. (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006), 6.
515 R. Dienst, The Bonds of Debt: Borrowing Against the Common Good. (London: Verso, 2011), 13
516 I. Stewart, “The mathematical equation that caused the banks to crash” The Observer, 12th Feb. 
2012. The Guardian: https  ://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/feb/12/black-scholes-equation-  
credit-crunch (Accessed 09.03.17).
517 Cf. Dienst, Bonds, 7-8.
518 “Strike Debt is a decentralized network of debt resisters, including activists, artists, and organizers.” 
From their website: http://strikedebt.org (Accessed 09.03.17)
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money of of them. Instead their real cash cow are people who struggle to pay the 
debt. Tey can add on late fees and late charges and all kinds of other hosts of fees, 
jack up the interest rates etc. Tose are the people who they’re really profting of of.519
Debt always hits the poorest hardest. Loans with the highest interest rates are made 
available to those who are least likely to be able to pay them of. The longer the period
of time that debt lasts, the greatest the proft and interest can be made from the 
original transaction. Combined with the above disinterest in how likely payments are 
to default, there is a disincentive to ever see payments ever completed, since the 
presence of debt itself is more proftable than a completed transaction. Debt itself, 
accumulated not only through property acquisition, but also through education loans 
and encouraged in all areas of consumerism, ties people into payments that may 
continue for the rest of their lives. In this way debt itself becomes a form of control 
that disproportionately falls on those who cannot aford. 
Dienst argues that poverty has come to be seen as a sin that the poor are 
responsible for, whilst capitalism is seen as the solution to this problem. He argues 
that poverty is seen as a kind of lef over from a previous history that is to be 
eliminated, rather than something created by the accumulation of excessive wealth by 
a few, concluding “Tat is why the most optimistic plans for helping the poor scarcely 
mention the existence of massively concentrated wealth, let alone suggest that such 
wealth is part of the sickness, too”.520 He goes on the claim that
Yet it should be clear that there is no way to ‘fx’ poverty without ‘fxing’ the process 
of accumulation. Without dismantling the top-heavy structures of the world’s 
economic architecture, poverty reduction programs and defcit-driven fscal policies 
can do litle to reverse the entrenched paterns of inequality. Instead of treating 
inequality as inevitable and poverty as some kind of immature condition, we should 
start by seeing both as the result of an ongoing process – actual impoverishment  - 
that is systemically produced and maintained by the current arrangement of things. 
Te basic mechanisms of impoverishment – expropriation and oppression, rooted in 
violence – have been at work for centuries, administered by a variety of social forms 
519 T. Gokey, Strike Debt, “Hope” Promises, Promises: A History of Debt, D. Graeber, BBC Radio 4 
Extra. First aired 14th Jan. 2017. Available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b054tl77
520 Dienst, Bonds, 34.
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and political regimes in increasingly multilateral and overdetermined ways.521
Dienst argues that our current economies exacerbate the disparity between rich and 
poor. Far from alleviating the poor, a capitalist economy, reliant on the resale of debt 
in the markets, creates inequity. An economy reliant on debt is one that is commited 
to the necessity of poverty.
In the wake of the 2008 crash, we have seen a continuous language of blame in 
the media: equations were ‘abused’,522 loans were ‘misused’,523 banks were ‘morally 
bankrupt’,524 fnancial regulations were a ‘failure’,525 fnanciers engaged in ‘folly’ and 
were ‘irresponsible’,526 bankers were overcome by ‘revolting greed’.527 However, it can 
be argued that the resale of debt in the manner that led to the fnancial crash is not a 
failure of market capitalism, but a logical extension of its operations. In 1900, Marxist 
economist Rosa Luxemburg argued that “as a result of its own inner contradictions, 
capitalism inevitably moves toward a point when it will be unbalanced” and that there
are “good reasons for conceiving that juncture in the form of a catastrophic general 
commercial crisis”. She wrote that “credit, instead of being an instrument for the 
suppression or the atenuation of crises, is on the contrary a particularly mighty 
instrument for the formation of crises. It cannot be anything else. Credit eliminates 
the remaining rigidity of capitalist relationships”, concluding that “In short, credit 
reproduces all the fundamental antagonisms of the capitalist world. It accentuates 
them. It precipitates their development and thus pushes the capitalist world forward 
521 Dienst, Bonds, 34-5.
522 Stewart, “The mathematical equation”.
523 I. Griffiths, “Small firms loans scheme ‘misused by banks’” The Guardian, 24th Feb. 2013. The 
Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/feb/24/small-firms-loans-scheme-misused 
(Accessed 09.03.17).
524 R. Wolff, “Lehman Brothers: financially and morally bankrupt” The Guardian, 12th Dec. 2011. The 
Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/12/lehman-brothers-
bankrupt  (Accessed 09.03.17).
525 J. McMillan, “Banking in the digital age: the failure of financial regulation” The Guardian, 20th Jan. 
2015. The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/jan/20/finance-in-
digital-age-while-regulation-stuck-in-industrial (Accessed 09.03.17).
526 The Economist, “The origins of the financial crisis: crash course” The Economist 7th Sept 2013. The 
Economist: http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-
being-felt-five-years-article  (Accessed 09.03.17).
527 The Sun, “Cowboy bankers at RBS who allegedly ruined companies, families, marriages and lives 
must be help to account” The Sun, 11th Oct. 2016. The Sun: 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1950961/cowboy-bankers-at-rbs-who-allegedly-ruined-companies-
families-marriages-and-lives-must-be-held-to-account/ (Accessed 09.03.17).
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to its own destruction”.528 Our current fnancial instabilities relating to debt can be 
seen as fundamental to capitalism itself and to our relationship with property. Marx 
characterised the existence of private property in a capitalist society as dependent on 
“the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society”.529 In no place
is this more clear than the extremes in which we currently fnd ourselves in. Te 
creation of a society reliant on debt, means that the poorest in society can have the 
illusion of private property (which they do not yet own, since they are in debt) whilst 
being tied into a continual exploitative debt. Marx decried the capitalist understanding
of property as absurd, relying on a nonsensical formulation of the value of 
commodities. He argued that the capitalist understanding of ownership and proft 
fundamentally failed to understand and properly value the input of labour and the 
labourer, and that the capitalist formula necessarily exploited workers who had to be 
kept poor and overworked for the capitalist to make proft.
According to Marx, the diference between money and capital is circulation. In 
a regular exchange, money is used to represent the value of an object and to enable it 
to be exchanged for a diferent kind of object. In Marx’s words, a commodity is 
exchanged, via money, for a commodity. Capital, he explains is where one exchanges 
money for a commodity with the sole purpose of turning it back into money. 
Ordinarily this transaction would not make sense, since money has no value other 
than that of the commodity it represents. However, when an object is sold for more 
than its original purchasing value, ‘surplus-value’ is created.530 Marx links the creation 
of surplus-value directly to worker exploitation, since in order to create a commodity 
that has more value than itself, one concerns oneself with maximising certain 
conditions in the manufacture of that commodity. Te commodity cannot be simply 
made, it must be made with minimum expenditure and waste in raw materials and 
time. Because the capitalist is concerned with end value rather than the product itself, 
528 R. Luxemburg, “Chapter 2” in Social Reform or Revolution. (London: Militant Publications, 1986 
(First published 1900)). Rosa Luxemburg Internet Archive: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1900/reform-revolution/ch02.htm (Accessed 08.03.17).
529 K. Marx & F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto. S. Moore (trans.) (London: The Merlin Press Ltd., 
2013 (First ed. 1998) (First published 1846)), 15.
530 K. Marx, “Vol I: Part II: Chapter 4: The General Formula for Capital” in Capital: A New 
Abridgement. D. McLellan (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 (First ed. 1995) (First 
published 1867)), 93-100; We can see this exact process also in the aforementioned article by 
Stewart explaining the mathematics behind the 2008 financial crisis. I. Stewart, “The mathematical 
equation”.
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it is not the quality of the product that is the capitalist’s concern, but the amount of 
surplus value that can be added to a commodity by fnding ways to undercut the 
manufacturing cost, or simply not pay for a substantial part of it.531
When it comes to the debt situation in our own day, far from being a misuse of 
money and property, the resale of debt for proft is a logical extension of the basic 
principle of capitalism. When broken down and described by Marx, it becomes 
apparent that inherent in the notion of capital, is proft out of nothing. In his 
compelling analysis of commodity exchange, Marx asserts that 
Use-values must therefore never be looked upon as the real aim of the capitalist; 
neither must the proft on any single transaction. Te restless never-ending process of 
proft-making alone is what he aims ats Te never-ending augmentation of exchange-
value, which the miser strives afer, by seeking to save his money from circulation, is 
atained by the more acute capitalist, by constantly throwing it afresh into 
circulation.532
Marx later explains that of course there is no such thing as proft out of nothing. Te 
creation of surplus-value in capital comes from not paying workers the total of what 
they have worked.533 Te total amount of time workers actually need to make a 
commodity was termed ‘necessary labour-time’ by Marx. Tis was contrasted with 
‘surplus labour-time’ the time in which a worker continued to add value to a 
commodity but was not paid for it. Tis later time is what capitalists rely on to make 
proft, Marx argued.534 
Kropotkin’s critique of Marx relies on two premises in Marx’s argument that 
we can fnd expressed in the Communist Manifesto. Te frst is that “Capital is a 
collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last 
resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion. 
Capital is therefore not a personal, it is a social power”.535 Te second is that 
531 Marx, Capital, 130.
532 Marx, Capital, 98.
533 Marx, “Vol I: Part III: Chapter 9: Section 1:The Degree of Exploitation of Labour-Power” in Capital
, 142-7.
534 Marx, Capital, 46.
535 Marx & Engels, Communist Manifesto, 14.
240
~ Chapter 6: Deoandini the Iopossible, Reachini for the Diveine ~
What, therefore, the wage labourer appropriates by means of his labour, merely 
sufces to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish 
this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation that is made for
the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus 
wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to do away with is the 
miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to 
increase capital, and is allowed only to live in so far as the interest of the ruling class 
requires it.536
In light of the analysis Marx provides in Capital, we can see that in the Communist 
Manifesto he is advocating that people be paid the full necessary labour-time that it 
takes to make a product and that the profteering surplus labour-time (unpaid time 
that makes proft) is eliminated. Or rather, surplus-value is eliminated because private 
ownership of the means of production is eliminated, thus each is paid the sum total of 
what they have worked.
Kropotkin agrees with Marx that capital is a collective product, however, he 
goes further and says that everything in society and industry is interdependent on one
another. Everything we do today is built on the collective eforts of people who have 
gone before us.537 Tus Kropotkin asks, “How then, shall we estimate the share of each
in the riches which ALL contribute to amass?”.538 Kropotkin goes on to conclude that 
“Looking at production from this general, synthetic point of view, we cannot hold 
with the Collectivists [those following Marx539] that payment proportionate to the 
hours of labour rendered by each would be an ideal arrangement, or even a step in the 
right direction”.540 Kropotkin asserts that “the Collectivist ideal appears to us 
untenable in a society which considers the instruments of labour as a common 
inheritance. Starting from this principle, such a society would fnd itself forced from 
the very outset to abandon all forms of wages.”541 Kropotkin claims that “the wage 
536 Marx & Engels, Communist Manifesto, 15.
537 Kropotkin, Conquest, 22.
538 Kropotkin, Conquest, 23.
539 Throughout Conquest of Bread Kropotkin refers to his own position as ‘Anarchist Communist’ or 
‘Communist’ and to Marx’s as ‘Collectivist’. cf. Kropotkin, Conquest, 22.
540 Kropotkin, Conquest, 23.
541 Kropotkin, Conquest, 23.
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system arises out of the individual ownership of the land and the instruments of 
labour”542 and gives an account of the individualism inherent in a dedication to wage 
labour and the monopoly of property, linking it to a history of exploitation and 
privilege. Whereas we might characterise Marx’s system as one premised on seeking 
equity in the receiving of the results of one’s own labour, Kropotkin’s system is 
concerned with seeing that all have what they need.543 Giving each what they are 
owed is meaningless to Kropotkin since it fundamentally still revolves around private 
acquisition rather than seeking the well-being of one another. Kropotkin envisions 
society operating much like “museums, free libraries, free schools, free meals for 
children; parks and gardens open to all; streets paved and lighted, free to all; water 
supplied to every house without measure or stint – all such arrangements are founded
on the principle: ‘Take what you need’”.544 More important than who owns what 
possession is the creation of an environment in which the human person may live 
without being in want. Te capitalist mentality and the ‘middle-class rule’, as 
Kropotkin calls it, has a “morality drawn from account books, its ‘debit and credit’ 
philosophy, its ‘mine and yours’ institutions” must be demolished”.545 Te threat of 
Kropotkin’s anarchism is that “we will do our utmost that none shall lack aught”.546 
For Kropotkin this is a condition that makes sense sociologically and 
anthropologically speaking. For us looking at how this thought can provide practical 
blueprints to an ethics rooted in Maximus’ thought; to give to the other and to 
overcome division in human society and the natural world is draw near to God and to 
fulfl human potential as made possible by Christ.547
Tere is a rich history of communal property in the Christian tradition that 
comes out of the Acts of the early church. For example, “All the believers were 
together and had everything in common. Tey sold property and possessions to give 
to anyone who had need” (Acts 2:44-5). Although Maximus does not follow the Greek 
of this passage,548 we can see this interpretation of love refected in his Centuries: “Te 
542 Kropotkin, Conquest, 23.
543 Kropotkin, Conquest, 24.
544 Kropotkin, Conquest, 25.
545 Kropotkin, Conquest, 156.
546 Kropotkin, Conquest, 39.
547 Matt. 25:34-40.
548 Acts 2:44-5: “πάντες δὲ οἱ πιστεύοντες ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶχον ἅπαντα κοινά, καὶ τὰ κτήματα καὶ
τὰς ὑπάρξεις ἐπίπρασκον καὶ διεμέριζον αὐτὰ πᾶσιν καθότι ἄν τις χρείαν εἶχεν·”; Maximus, De 
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one who loves God surely loves his neighbour as well. Such a person cannot hold on 
to money but rather gives it out in God’s fashion to each one who has need”,549 and 
“Te disposition of love is made manifest not only in the sharing of money but much 
more in sharing the word of God and physical service”.550 Maximus clearly continues 
in the tradition of giving to those in need as a form of love. A beter example of the 
atitude change that I think is shared by the ascetic Christian tradition and the vision 
Kropotkin outlines, however, can be found in the following story from the sayings of 
the Desert Fathers and Mothers:
Tere were two old men who dwelt together for many years and who never quarrelled.
Ten one said to the other: “Let us pick a quarrel with each other like other men do.”
“I do not know how quarrels arise,” answered his companion.
So the other said to him: “Look, I will put a brick down here between us and I will say 
‘'Tis is mine.’ Ten you can say ‘No it is not, it is mine.’ Ten we will be able to have a
quarrel.”
So they placed the brick between them and the frst one said: “Tis is mine.”
His companion answered him: “Tis is not so, for it is mine.”
To this, the frst one said: “If it is so and the brick is yours, then take it and go your 
way.”
And so they were not able to have a quarrel.551 
Te politics of possession, property and coexistence are all expressed within the 
ascetic life that treats the act of love as a lifestyle and set of choices made in order to 
live like Christ. Te story of these two old men refects on what it means to be holy 
and to truly be at peace with another person. Not only are one’s actions to be 
unhurtful, but one’s entire atitude is to be cultivated to the point where to take when 
another needs becomes an uterly nonsensical and bizarre notion. Possession and 
property hold no value in an ethos where meaningful relation is expressed through 
love. It does not mater whose brick it is, rather that it be given to the one in need and 
char. PG90 965A I.23: Ὁ τὸν Θεὸν ἀγαπῶν καὶ τὸν πλησίον πάντως ἀγαπᾷ. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος χρήματα 
τηρεῖν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλ’ οἰκονομεῖ θεοπρεπῶς, ἑκάστῳ τῶν δεομένων παρέχων.”
549 Maximus, De char. PG90 965A I.23. [Berthold, Maximus, 37].
550 Maximus, De char. PG90 965C I.26. [Berthold, Maximus,
551 Wortley (ed.) Desert Fathers. “The Quarrel”,  N.352/17.26.
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that the object not become the source of confict between two people who might 
otherwise live in peace. To live in a society where protection of private property and 
free trade are paramount is to set a groundwork for the kind of social relations that 
will characterise such a society. Where our perceptions of value and our interactions 
with others are built upon deserve, merit and right, then we fail to build a society that 
has any comprehension of compassion and the needs of others. In the story of the two
old men we see the importance of property turned on its head. Private possession is 
seen as absurd by the two men who have come to understand how to love one 
another. It did not mater to them who the brick belonged to. Te idea that such a 
thing could cause enmity between them was alien to one who knows love. Tis is a 
story that presents atachment to private property as in fundamental opposition to 
love.
I have outlined the bases of the Marxist critique of capitalism and indicated 
that our current economic reliance on debt falls into a category of exemplary 
capitalism rather than a misuse of the system. I have provided an anarchist critique of 
capitalist and Marxist positions on capital and wages in society, and suggested that 
Kropotkin’s position is one that seriously atempts to rethink economic relation in 
light of a desire to work toward human well-being. My intention in briefy paralleling 
his vision with the communal atitudes found in the early Church is to demonstrate 
that, a desire to found community on care for one another conficts with the 
protection of and atachment to private property. Kropotkin, like the story from the 
Desert Fathers and Mothers, concludes that to concern ourselves with who owns this 
and that is irrelevant in the face of who needs it. Kropotkin tells us that these concepts
of right to property have a history of violence and misuse of power, and have been to 
the detriment of those who have less. If we really desire a society that looks to the 
well-being of others, then we must do away with the idea that ownership maters 
more that caring for those around us. In the story of the brick and the two men, we 
see the same result coming from an ascetic understanding of detachment to material 
wealth combined with an understanding of love as giving to the other. Tough the 
means of arriving at these conclusions difer, the founding principle and the way of 
life consequently enacted suggest a strong degree of compatibility between the 
anarchist position and one we might derive from Maximus’ interpretation of Christ’s 
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love. I have atempted to show that the growth of anarchist responses to economics 
alongside Marxism should not isolate it from contemporary consideration by 
theologians, but rather serve as a relatively unexplored avenue for practical, 
communal coexistence in Christ’s love.
6.1.3 Enmity and Diference in Community
In 5.3.2.1 I talked about using the Chalcedonian Formula as a basis for thinking about 
diference as distinction without division – the idea that we can love unique identity 
without obliterating individuation. Tis was applied to cultural diversity, and I 
distinguished between nationalist pride which grows out of warring states and creates
identity in competition with the other, and cultural diversity as practises and 
diferences found from place to place that can be celebrated without being a source of 
confict. I described the later as emblematic of diversity without necessarily being 
antagonistic. Tolerance for those who are diferent from us is (or was) a relatively 
commonplace concept under state rule in the United Kingdom. It is much more 
difcult to extend this principle in the way Christ advocated – ‘love your enemies’ 
(Mat 5:44; Luke 6:27). Te idea of an inclusive community that respects others and 
loves them through diference seems like a simple, essential principle when imagining 
an ethics that arises from Maximus’ thought. As we have seen in ascetic examples in 
Chapter 4, Maximus’ practical advice on following Christ’s love always concerns 
refection on one’s own failures, withholding judgement on others, learning alongside 
those who wrong us by recognising our own failures, and loving those with whom we 
have disagreement:
“but I say to you,” the Lord says, “love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, 
pray for those who persecute you.” Why did he command these things? So that he 
might free you from hate, sadness, anger, and grudges, and might grant you the 
greatest possession of all, perfect love, which is impossible except by the one who 
loves all men equally in imitation of God, who loves all men equally and “wills that 
they be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth.”552
552 Maximus, De char. PG90 973A I.61 [Berthold, Maximus, 41].
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As Christoyannopoulos points out, however, Christ’s command to ‘love your enemies’
has not always been interpreted so literally by Christians.553 In this section I will look 
at some Christian anarchist interpretations of ‘love your enemies’ in light of Maximus’
ascetic guidance and Chalcedonian understanding of love and diference and how 
these difer from the basic principles of Augustinian based just-war theory. I will then 
give an overview of anarchist propositions by Colin Ward and Errico Malatesta that 
concern crime and how to live with those who harm others in communities.
Before going on to discuss those who harm us in communities, I wish to briefy
spend a moment thinking about those who might be happy to work towards a similar 
kind of community to us but have diferent ends in mind to us. By merit of giving 
those around us real freedom to receive love, we are likely to fnd ourselves living 
alongside those who don’t share our faith, or the telos of our ethics. As in any 
community, these diferences may cause friction.554 From a perspective of Maximian 
ethics we can evaluate the means a community employs, as I did for the state in the 
previous chapter. Even though a community, like for example one commited to a 
secular anarchist ideal, claims a diferent telos and motivation to our own, where 
means align we can see a telos of love and theosis still being worked for. Since our 
model of the relation between virtue and a telos of love expresses identity, there are 
ways in which we might rethink our ethics in light of the diversity of spiritual 
journeys in those present around us.555 Troughout this thesis I have stressed the 
importance of a framework in which our ethics is situated – of virtues that can be 
identifed with their telos of love in Christ through the Spirit. Tis framework is 
essential for internal consistency, evaluation of our actions, and the situations we fnd 
ourselves in. Given a commitment to the love and freedom Maximus expresses 
553 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, 128-9.
554 See Section 6.1.3.
555 Maximus writes that within the liturgy, “The grace transforms and changes each person who is 
found there and in fact remolds him in proportion to what is more divine in him and leads him to 
what is revealed through the mysteries which are celebrated, even if he does not himself feel this 
because he is still among those who are children in Christ, unable to see either into the depths of 
reality or the grace operating in it...” (Maximus, Myst. TCr. Ch. 24 [Berthold, Maximus, 206-7]).  
Although the context of Maximus’ passage is in the divine liturgy, we can see that those at different 
stages in their spiritual journey are depicted as absent of knowledge of the grace that they receive, 
not absent of grace itself. Although Maximus himself does not discuss the relevance of this outside 
the liturgy (and indeed, his analysis of the liturgy includes the moment where the catechumens and 
those not yet ready are sent away), the reception and understanding of those at different stages in 
their spiritual journey in Christ must surely be an essential part of an ethics seeking to live in love 
with others, particularly given the reading of cosmic liturgy I have demonstrated in Chapter 2.2.1.
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however, we will inevitably fnd ourselves amongst those who do not live by the same 
ethics. Te ability to love and fnd a way to live in community with such people is also
a distinction within humanity that we must consider as we put Maximus’ theological 
ethics into practice. It is thus my contention that it is much more preferable to work 
towards a community with others who share our ethical means, than it is to abide in a 
society that declares a telos so clearly at odd with its and our own means and methods.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that others may respect the means of our ethics without
desiring to be a part of the Church. Rather than rejecting the invitation to fnd a way 
to live alongside such people in a community, could we not instead see their 
receptivity to loving practices as a stage of a spiritual journey, the details of which we 
are not privy to? If our neighbour’s actions seem to live out the love we have been 
called by Christ to live by, then who are we to assume that such love in some way falls
short of moving the cosmos toward an end of theosis? If we believe in allowing others 
around us the freedom to choose to love God, and also believe that where virtue is 
present so also is the Spirit, it seems to me that we ought to focus on building 
communities of love with such people – recognising their diferences but not allowing 
such diferences to cause needless confict between us.
6.1.3.1 Love Your Enemies
In his survey of Christian anarchist interpretations of the passage of the Sermon on 
the Mount in which Christ tells his followers to ‘love your enemies’, 
Christoyannopoulos identifes two main categories: “One of these focuses on the 
implied condemnation of patriotism and war; the other argues that loving one’s 
enemy is the litmus test of Christianity”.556 In the former category, he places thinkers 
like Leo Tolstoy and Adin Ballou. In the later he places Peter Chelčický, Walter Wink, 
and John Howard Yoder. Tose in the frst category interpret Christ’s words as being 
primarily about how one ought to consider those outside one’s own nation to be 
brethren. Te anti-nationalist sentiment of this interpretation stems from a reading of 
Christ’s words where ‘enemy’ refers to those not traditionally considered to be 
‘neighbours’. Te statement thus becomes a declaration that Jewish hospitality should 
be extended to all peoples regardless of where they come from. By contrast, those in 
556 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, 49.
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Christoyannopoulos’ second category interpret ‘enemy’ as a depiction of the extremes 
of Christ’s love. Not only do we love our neighbour, but so too do we love those who 
hate us – there is no one excluded from Christ’s love, the love we are called to imitate.
Christoyannopoulos claims that Christian anarchists believe Christ’s 
commandment to love our enemies has been misinterpreted, in particular by 
Augustine and those who developed his ‘just war’ theory.557 One of the places 
Augustine’s position is put forward is in City of God, where he writes:
And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or 
in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the
wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such 
persons have by no means violated the commandment, “Tou shalt not kill.”558
In this passage and those that follow, Augustine appeals to Old Testament instances of
murder in accordance with God’s commandment. Tis base idea would later be 
developed by Tomas Aquinas in Summa Teologica into a more systematic theory 
justifying war.559 Christoyannopoulos calls this interpretation out as going “against 
both the spirit and the leter of Jesus’ clear original intention”.560 Oliver O’Donavan 
explains that for Augustine, military obligation is treated as an obligation of love to 
one’s neighbour. He explains that an un-Christian war is one that takes self-
preservation at its botom line, whereas “a Christian witness to God’s peace must 
always be acted out against the horizon of sufering and martyrdom”.561 Te central 
premise here seems to be that the intention of bringing about God’s ends and acting 
self-sacrifcially to beneft another person or a virtuous end, changes the character of 
warfare. Tough I do not have the space here to fully do justice to Augustine’s 
arguments, it is clear that in the passage above that there is litle reinterpretation of 
557 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, 129.
558 Augustine, “City of God” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: Vol. II. St 
Augustin’s: City of God and Christian Doctrine. M. Dods (trans.), P. Schaff, (ed.) (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1886), 52.
559 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (trans.) (Westminster: 1920), II.2, Q40 War, Article 1. Online Edition: New Advent: 
http://files.libertyfund.org/pll/quotes/130.html (Accessed 10.09.17).
560 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, 129.
561 O. O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.
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these Old Testament passages562 in light of the New Testament and Christ’s witness.563 
Te difculty Augustine faces when it comes to the New Testament and Sermon on the
Mount, seems to be dealt with when he writes “If it is supposed that God could not 
enjoin warfare, because in afer times it was said by the Lord Jesus Christ, ‘I say unto 
you, Tat ye resist not evil: but if any one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him 
the lef also,’ the answer is, that what is here required is not a bodily action, but an 
inward disposition”.564 Christoyannopoulos characterises this position as “absurd” 
since it enables the hypocritical conclusion that “it is said that it is fne to murder your
enemy as long as a proper inner atitude of love is maintained”.565
Te discrepancy between the Augustinian argument and the position I am 
proposing here goes back to the way I defned the relationship between virtue and 
telos in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Virtues partake of their telos. For Maximus, both will and 
activity bear out our hypostatic choices, and through them is our tropos aligned, by 
the aid of the Spirit and through Christ, to our logos. To agree with Augustine’s 
position and hold to a similar metaphysics as Maximus, one would have afrm that 
acts of a ‘just war’ not only lead to virtuous ends and are performed with these ends 
in mind,566 but also (presumably as a consequence) are actually virtuous in themselves.
Virtue is not confned to our intentions, as if somehow only our own agency is needed
in order for love to be present.567 As we saw in Maximus, love is relational, and comes 
to be through the activity of the human and God and concerns one’s neighbour. We 
have seen that Maximus afrms virtue to partake of an end of love which is Christ. To 
562 Augustine goes on to make reference to Abraham called to kill his son Isaac by divine command, 
Jephthah killing his daughter in order to keep a promise he made before God, Samson collapsing the
house on his foes as called by the Spirit.
563 The reliance of Augustine on Old Testament Scripture to justify war is affirmed by Mattox in his 
monograph defending Augustine’s Just War Theory. J.M. Mattox, St Augustine and the Theory of 
Just War. (London: Continuum, 2006), 127.
564 Augustine, “Contra Faustum Manichaeum” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian 
Church: Vol. IV. St Augustin: The Writings Against the Manichaeans and Against the Donatists. R. 
Stothert (trans.), P. Schaff, (ed.) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1887), 516-7.
565 Christoyannopoulos, Christian Anarchism, 129.
566 ie. With an ‘inward disposition’ that is Christian.
567 Neither are our actions unblameworthy just because we mean well. Such a position seems to fail to 
fully comprehend the agency of a person in their activity – as though our mind alone performs 
activities we are responsible for, and that there is some disconnect between this and what our bodies 
do. If one assumes that actions are somehow justified (sanctified?) by virtuous intention, then there 
seems to be no limit to the harms one can to do another person under this stream of thought. This 
way of thinking seems to be extremely dualistic, with the superior virtuous intention of the mind 
excusing what Christoyanoppoulos and I instinctively see as horrific (bodily) actions that bear no 
resemblance to Christ, his teaching, or his actions. 
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have a virtuous disposition is to clear oneself of (ascetic) passion and to be flled with 
the Spirit, meaning that we are talking about the presence of the divine when we talk 
about virtue. Under Maximus’ understanding, the virtues and love are Christ present 
within us. It seems not only far-fetched, but also extremely dangerous to claim that 
acts performed in ‘just war’ are Christ present in the world and in us (a claim we can 
readily make of all the virtues as they have been defned in this thesis thus far). 
Needless to say, this conclusion is very far from Maximus’ theology, and to claim that 
acts in a ‘just war’ are ‘just’ and therefore virtuous would require such a distorting of 
the Pauline virtues that not only am I inclined to agree with Christoyannopoulos that 
such a view is “against both the spirit and the leter of Jesus’ clear original intention”, 
but I would also go so far as to say there is litle point talking about virtues if they 
bear no resemblance to their original meaning and we are willing to twist them to suit
whatever agenda we fancy.
Maximus’ position on loving our enemies seems to sit much more neatly 
within Christoyannopoulos’ categories. With regard to the passage, ‘love your enemy’,
there are three instances in Maximus’ Centuries on Love in which ‘love’ (ἀγάπη) 
appears within one line of ‘enemy’ (ἐχθρός). Te frst instance is in 1.61 cited above 
where Maximus says that Christ commanded this in order to free us from hate, 
sadness and anger and lead us into perfect love in God.568 Te last instance is in 4.67, 
where Maximus identifes ‘love your enemy’ as a commandment alongside love God 
and your neighbour, and the ten commandments.569 Te instance found between these 
two is particularly interesting for our purposes, since it concerns the meaning of the 
phrase and uses language familiar to us from Paul’s list of virtues:
Perfect love (τελεία ἀγάπη) does not split up (συνδιασχίζει) the one nature of men 
(μίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν) on the basis of their various (διαφόροις) dispositions 
(γνώμαις) but ever looking steadfastly at it, it loves all men equally, those who are 
jealous as friends, those who are negligent as enemies. It is good to them and 
forbearing (μακροθυμοῦσα) and puts up with what they do (ὑπομένουσα). It does not 
think evil at all (τὸ κακὸν τὸ σύνολον μὴ λογιζομένη) but rather sufers for them, if 
occasion requires, in order that it may even make friends if possible. If not, it does not 
568 Maximus De char. PG90 973A I.61. 
569 Maximus De char. PG90 1063BC IV.67.
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fall away from its own intentions as it ever manifests the fruits of love equally for all 
men. In this way also our Lord and God Jesus Christ, manifesting his love for us, 
sufered for all mankind and granted to all equally the hope of resurrection, though 
each one renders himself worthy either of glory or punishment.570
In an exposition on perfect love, Maximus notes that human nature is not to be 
divided into those who are worthy and those who are not. Instead, we are to love all 
equally. By coupling a discussion on ‘love your enemies’ with a version of the Pauline 
virtues we are familiar with from 1 Corinthians 13:4-8, Maximus gives very personal 
ascetic guidance. He is not, as in Christoyannopoulos’ frst category, giving us a 
generic reading of how we ought to treat those specifcally beyond our nation, but is 
instead applying the text to our everyday relationships. As in other areas of Maximus’ 
ascetic writings, we see an interpretation of how to love that always begins in and is 
rooted personal relation. It should come as no surprise then, that Maximus’ 
interpretation of ‘love your enemies’ is much more akin to Christoyannopoulos 
second category, demanding love to be located in every personal relationship. To draw 
a communal ethics from this we must do as Maximus’ cosmology does, and begin by 
loving in our personal relationships. It is from here that love is extended to the whole 
cosmos, and here that we may extend the principle to building community. As in 
Kropotkin’s vision for community analysed in 6.1.1, the structure of our communities 
begins in personal choice to freely associate with another. We build community 
through personal choice. To have a ‘virtuous’ community, we must have particular 
humans in whom virtue is located and through whom love occurs. In 3.2.1, I 
emphasised the importance of love and virtue being understood as relationship and 
movement towards God. Maximus interprets ‘love your enemies’ in this very personal 
and literal way because for him love is always personal. It extends to human nature, 
and to the rest of creation but only because it is frst of all located in personal 
relationships. To assume that Christ meant – those people who are not of your nation 
should be considered as those who are – would thus be to fail to take Christ’s words 
(in Maximus’ interpretation) to their fullest meaning. Certainly by Maximus’ 
understanding of love, loving one’s enemy concerns very real face to face 
570 Maximus De char. PG90 975BC I.71. [Berthold, Maximus, 42-3].
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relationships wherever we go and whatever we do. Under the defnition of love we 
have been using, it cannot be a disembodied general feeling (as we might construe 
category one), no more than it can be a disembodied general thought (as we might 
construe an Augustinian position). It is a relationship between the human and God, 
that Christ tells us is made manifest through love of one another. Te list of virtues 
Maximus uses are used because they are Paul’s interpretation of Christ’s example. In 
every personal encounter, we are seeking to invite in the Spirit and allow Christ to be 
manifest in us. It is this that constitutes love and out of this that we seek to build 
communities.
We are lef then in the extremely challenging position of asking what a 
community might look like that takes to heart a Maximian interpretation of Christ’s 
commandment to love your enemies. Tere are always those we will struggle to get 
along with, those who, when we try to live in love alongside them may obfuscate such
atempts. Traditionally, this is one of the prime places we have turned to the state for 
help. Like in Mill’s assessment, it has been the roll of society to protect us from those 
who wish to impinge our freedom. Even within an anarchist understanding of a 
society built on voluntary association, such difculties may still arise, and how are 
they to be dealt with if not by the coercive power of the state? For a window into 
practical discussion along these lines, I turn next to look at the anarchist writings of 
Colin Ward and Errico Malatesta.
6.1.3.2 Love in the Face of Crime
In response to the state’s alienation of those who are diferent, I suggested that our 
love must overcome divisions by respecting distinctions. I believe one of the most 
signifcant discussions of what such a society might look like can be found in 
anarchist theory. Errico Malatesta, an Italian anarchist who lived from 1853 to 1932, 
wrote a article entitled Crime and Punishment, in which he spent time thinking about 
how one could live in a society with those who commit crime. Given that we do not 
want to live in a society that is coercive and harmful, what happens when there are 
those who violate the peace?
Malatesta begins by saying that the frst thing we must do is “eliminate all the 
social causes of crime, we must develop in man brotherly feelings, and mutual respect,
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we must, as Fourier put it, seek useful alternatives to crime”.571 Malatesta emphasised 
society must change frst in order to lessen the need and desire for crime. He claimed 
that with the beginnings of an ofcial judiciary and police we risk seting in place “a 
new system of oppression and privilege”. Instead of reinstating coercive systems over 
each other, he wrote that we must deal with crime:
By seeking the causes of each crime and making every efort to eliminate them; by 
making it impossible for anyone to derive personal advantage out of the detection of 
crime, and by leaving it to the interested groups themselves to take whatever steps 
they deem necessary for their defence; by accustoming ourselves to consider criminals 
as brothers who have strayed, as sick people needing loving treatment, as one would 
for any victim of hydrophobia or dangerous lunatic – it will be possible to reconcile 
the complete freedom of all with defence against those who obviously and 
dangerously threaten its572
Tere are a number of components to Maletsta’s argument that we can look at. First, 
he suggests eliminating the causes of crime. Ward proposes four ways in which we 
might see crime eliminated:
a) most crimes are of thef in one form: or another, and in a society in which real 
property and produce property were communally held and personal property shared 
out on a more equitable basis, the incentive for thef would disappear;
b) crimes of violence not originating in thef would dwindle away since a genuinely 
permissive and non-competitive society would not produce personalities prone to 
violence;
c) motoring ofences would not present the problems that they do now because people 
would be more socially conscious and responsible, would tend to use public transport 
when the private car had lost its status, and in a more leisured society would lose the 
pathological love of speed and aggressiveness that you see on roads today;
d) in a decentralised society vast urban conglomerations would cease to exist and 
571 E. Malatesta, “Crime and Punishment” in Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas. V. Richards (ed.) 
(London: Freedom Press, 1965 (First published c.1920-2)), 106. (The reference likely to be Charles 
Fourier, the French utopian socialist).
572 Malatesta, “Crime and Punishment”, 107.
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people would be more considerate and concerned for their neighbours.573
Concerned that his suggestions are too improbable and far-fetched, Ward defends 
himself from the accusation that such a society would require “a new kind of human 
being”. He argues instead that we need a new kind of environment that will take work
to build, but that that such work is not beyond a human being to set their mind to. His
argument is essentially that it is not beyond the natural capacity of human beings to 
change the way in which they act toward one another and the value they place in 
things that jeopardise their relationships with others (things like property, 
competition, status, speed, aggression). Changing our mindset and the places we put 
value can drastically change the societies we live in and, Malatesta and Ward argue, 
eliminate a large part of the confict that drives us to hostility with one another. 
Change in atitude towards those things that we are atached to as markers of wealth 
can remove much of the confict with our neighbours. Ward and Malatesta argue that 
this would also bring about a general decrease in the incentive to commit crime. We 
saw in 6.1.1 that, unlike the arguments made for a state in the past, the anarchist 
position relies on willingly entering into community with one another, and in 6.1.2 
that compassion and mutual aid encourage us to voluntarily seek the well-being of 
others. Te case for distribution of resources to where they are needed was made out 
of this concern for the well-being of others. Given the voluntary status of these 
premises, Ward suggests that the question of crime would be a totally diferent mater,
since we are talking about a society where to give to another what they need is a 
reality. Like the brick for the Desert Fathers, or the pipe carver in William Morris’ 
News From Nowhere,574 a society made up of those who have meaningful control over 
their relationships with one another, and choose to voluntarily partake in the 
distribution of resources to where they are needed, already has a very diferent 
perception of wealth, property and the needs of others.
Secondly then, Malatesta proposes that we do not forget that those who 
commit crimes are still brothers and sisters. He writes that we ought to treat them “as 
573 Ward, Anarchy, 154.
574 “‘Well, then take it,’ said she, ‘and don’t trouble about losing it. What will it matter if you do? 
Somebody is sure to find it, and he will use it, and you can get another.’” W. Morris, News From 
Nowhere or An Epoch of Rest. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 (First published 1890), 32.
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sick people needing loving treatment”, and likens the use of prisons to the deplorable 
way that mental asylums were used to remove a problem from visibility in society. 
Ward enlarges on this point, suggesting that the practice of ‘institutionalisation’ 
became a solution to many of society’s problems (including schools, poor housing, 
hospitals, orphanages, old people’s homes) whenever a crisis arose.575 Malatesta’s call 
to treat criminals as “as sick people needing loving treatment” reiterates that there are 
underlying causes to such behaviour, and that writing of such people from society 
without trying to help them is not an option for one who wishes to cares for others 
and respects their free will.
Lastly, we come to Malatesta’s phrase “leaving it to the interested groups 
themselves to take whatever steps they deem necessary for their defence”.576 Malatesta
suggests that the ultimate way in which communities deal with these issues must be 
arrived at by themselves. He makes a number of propositions himself, but always 
cautions against turning our judgement of others into something systemic, harmful 
and coercive. He warns that we are only “one of the forces acting in society, and 
history will advance, as always, in the direction of the resultant of all the forces”, a 
point not dissimilar to the one I have been making about means and ends – the means 
that we choose to live by, will be refected in the ends that come about. Malatesta 
imagines that self-defence in the face of physical violence may be necessary, but that if
we require systemic violence to deal with dissidence, then we will created a society of 
systemic violence. He suggests that the only alternative is to somehow leave any 
necessary judging that needs to be done up to the community. Ward is sceptical of this
last point, and gives a detailed account of all the ways in which this might go wrong, 
especially in regard to popular justice. However, Ward again emphasises the change in
who people are. Te kind of society we are talking about cannot even begin to 
function unless people have chosen to partake in it and chosen to make it work. When
we talk about people not wanting to commit these kinds of crime, this is not merely 
speculative well-wishing, but a comment on the existence of such a society in the frst 
place. Tere will still be difculties that we must fnd a way to deal with, and we have 
no perfect system for calling our neighbour to account, but Ward and Malatesta have 
575 Ward, Anarchy, 137-8.
576 Malatesta, “Crime and Punishment”, 107.
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more faith in a local kind of judiciary system than in one enforced at a state level. 
Ward suggests that the change in atitude characterising such a society may mean that
the approach of a local community to calling to account one of their own could look 
very diferent from the kind of popular retribution fuelled by anxiety and guilt.
While the anarchist position on crime is neither setled nor fnished, the key 
tenets of its arguments surround such premises as, how do we get along with people 
who hurt others while still respecting them as human beings? How do we help others 
who hurt us? How do we maintain the integrity of our larger relationships of respect 
and love in the face of sufering caused by one person toward another? Anarchist 
arguments rethinking our concepts of law and order argue that most stem from fear 
and anxiety concerning possessions and threats to out safety. By looking at the causes 
of confict and seeking to minimise the need for violent expression Ward and 
Malatesta were seeking ways in which we could try to love those who harm us, a 
starting point that is much more familiar to Christ’s Gospel than the atitudes towards
criminality and deviance in state structures. Indeed, Gregory of Nyssa made a very 
similar suggestion, when he imagined a community that truly lives in love with one 
another:
What could be thought to be more blessed than to live thus, when we would no longer 
have to entrust the safety of our lives to bolts and stone, but were secure in each 
other’s keeping? For just as the harsh and cruel man makes enemies of those who have
come to experience his savagery; so also, contrariwise, we become all friendly with the
merciful man, since mercy naturally engenders love in those who share in it.577
Although much work still needs to be done on this topic, the values that anarchist 
theory holds as its foundations seem to have much compatibility with the virtuous 
means described in Maximus’ work. Te uniqueness of the anarchist position is that it 
is not confned to thinking of solutions only within traditional state structures. Since it
takes as its basis the integrity of human well-being and respect for freedom, it can 
propose much more radical methods of coexistence.
577 Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Bea. 5. PG44 1254A-C. [Graef, Maximus, 134-5].
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6.2 Striving Towards Love
As well as founding our communities on love, we also need to be aware of the 
imperfections in our relationships, and to strive for continual orientation towards 
love. It is all very well seting out with good intentions, but if we are modelling our 
communal relationships on the ascetic advice Maximus provides, then we must be 
aware that striving for love is a constant struggle throughout our lives. Final 
perfection in theosis belongs to the eschaton, and whilst there instances of love that 
may come to be seen here and now, it will always be a struggle to keep seeing the 
faults in what we do and to acknowledge our failures. In this section, I look at a 
number of ways in which we might take a principle of renewal and striving to heart in
our communal relations, pre-empting that there will be things that we do wrong and 
that we will never fnish our work in building loving communities.
6.2.1 From Personal Asceticism to Communal Conscientiousness
In 4.1.3, I discussed the dynamic process of constant striving towards God in our lives 
here on earth in Maximus. Under this ascetic understanding of striving to make space 
for virtue, our tasks in this life are not construed as set goals that must be atained, but
as continuing and deepening relationships of love that must be struggled for with one 
another and God.578 We must desire to know more, and in that desire we must never 
forget to keep looking at ourselves for the problem and changing accordingly. 
Maximus reminds us to
Be on guard lest the vice that separates you from your brother be not found in your 
brother but in you; and hasten to be reconciled to him, lest you fall away from the 
578 In a conference paper, I outlined that thinking about knowledge of God as something to be 
‘acquired’ will always leave us thinking of epektasis as somehow a failure. Awareness that 
knowledge of God is what is sought and revealed in a relationship enables a dynamic picture of 
learning more about a person. If one wished to deepen a relationship with a friend or partner, one 
wouldn’t speak of getting knowledge of them, and call it a failure when not all knowledge was 
possessed. One would respect the freedom of one’s partner to reveal themselves to you, and coming 
to know a person is a growth of knowledge that may never fully come to an end. Seeking knowledge
of God is partaking in just such a loving relationship, hence even when that relationship continues in
the eschaton, it is never a failure to finish, but a growth of love in the process of deepening. 
‘Knowledge as a Relationship of Impossibility and Intimacy in Maximus the Confessor’ 
International Workshop in Oslo on the Philosophy of Late Antiquity: Platonism and Christian 
Thought in Late Antiquity. Oslo, 2nd-3rd Dec. 2016.
257
~ Chapter 6: Deoandini the Iopossible, Reachini for the Diveine ~
commandment of love.579
He acknowledges that ofen in a relationship, we are convinced that it is the other 
person who is at fault and who has done us wrong. Maximus warns us to look inside 
ourselves to see if the fault is  actually within us, much like the parable of the man 
who wishes to help his brother with a splinter in his eye whilst he himself has a block 
of wood in his own (Mat 7:3-5; Luke 6:41-2.). Maximus reminds us that when all our 
actions are directed toward love, reconciliation is the aim for our broken relationships,
and that this starts by looking at oneself rather than pointing out faws in others. He 
also acknowledges though that when others hurt us this too breaks relationships. He 
writes that
What separates you from the love of friends is this: envying or being envied, hurting 
or being hurt, insulting or being insulted, and suspicious thoughts. May you never 
have done or experienced any of these things by which you might be separated from 
your friend’s love.
Maximus reminds us that these things are two way, and that the things done to us 
hurt us in a very real way. We are not just broken by our own actions, but also by the 
things done to us. Just as we do not love our way to God on our own, but love others 
and together gather up the cosmos, so do things that hurt us and are cruel to us, 
destroy us and our relationship with one another in a very real way. Love is a two way
thing that must be worked at by both sides to foster a loving relationship. Maximus’ 
interest here is not simply in the internal integrity of the addressee (as might be 
suggested from the preceding chapters on love 18, 19 and 20), but in the maintenance 
of love between two people, thereby building a loving community. People voluntarily 
loving one another and using their rational gifs to organise their relationships in 
ways that further enable love and further care for one another – this seems to be a 
vision of divine love among us lived in Christ and gifed by the Spirit. As we have 
seen, Maximus says there is not “one form of love [assigned] to God and another to 
human beings, for it is one and the same and universal”.580  Te nature of such 
579 Maximus, De char. PG90 1052C IV.19. [Berthold, Maximus, 77]
580 Maximus, Ep. 2 PG91 401D [Louth, Maximus, 89].
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relationships is that they must be worked at, and that they are difcult. Even 
friendships that have been established for many years can still at any moment run into
the problems that Maximus outlined above. Like our relationship with God, there is a 
constant struggle to deepen love, this includes the difculties of friendship, but also 
leads to new depths of knowledge and more intimate relation with a person.
If this understanding of dynamism and repentant refection is key to 
developing our relationships of love, then there is good reason to seek it within the 
organisation of our communities. Our communities and societies are still relationships
between persons, and if we truly wish to foster love in them, then we must also have a
means of calling into question any failures to love that happen within them. A 
community that genuinely strains to foster care between each diferent person must 
have the capacity to call the things done in its name to accountability. Tis would not 
be seen as an atack on the community itself but as part of the everyday, essential, 
ever-evolving essence of what the community is. For such a thing to have any success,
there would have to be meaningful interaction on a personal level contained within 
every community. Value would have to be placed in the words of every person 
regardless of diference, and consequently a community would have to be small 
enough to do justice to these integral elements of interaction.581 As we will see, 
Kropotkin suggested that human societies should have the capacity to continually 
change, and to have a structure that facilitates this self-criticism.582 Te best form of 
society, in his mind, was one that knew that it was not best, and had the ability to 
structure itself according to the fuctuating needs of its populace.
6.2.2 Unending Striving in Society
We have seen that Kropotkin’s vision for human life is that it be led in communities 
that freely cooperate with one another, and that freedom of each never be 
compromised or subjugated. He proposed that human relations must be based upon 
free agreement. Tere must be “a society of equals” so that it becomes “an organism so
581 At least at a base level of organisation, some kind of smaller organising would be necessary. Even 
when organising in large groups, decision-making is split into smaller functional groups that 
delegate forward their decisions so that they can be heard on a larger scale. I discuss consensus 
decision-making below, which includes alternate organising and resources on large scale decision-
making.
582 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 399.
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constructed as to combine all the eforts for procuring the greatest sum possible of 
well-being for all, while full, free scope will be lef for every individual initiative.”583 By
nature of being a community built upon free relation though, 
this society will not be crystallised into certain unchangeable forms, but will 
continually modify its aspect, because it will be a living, continually evolving 
organism; no need of government will be felt, because free agreement and federation 
take its place in all those functions which governments consider as theirs at the 
present time, and because, the causes of confict being reduced in number, those 
conficts which may still arise can be submited to arbitration.584 
Community cannot be static because relation is not static. Te needs of one human 
difer from another, and a society must have the fexibility to serve the needs of each 
as well as the needs of many. Kropotkin accordingly believes that such a society:
Acknowledging, as a fact, the equal rights of all its members to the treasures 
accumulated in the past, it no longer recognizes a division between exploited and 
exploiters, governed and governors, dominated and dominators, and it seeks to 
establish a certain harmonious compatibility in its midst-not by subjecting all its 
members to an authority that is fctitiously supposed to represent society, not by 
trying to establish uniformity, but by urging all men to develop free initiative, free 
action, free association.
It seeks the most complete development of individuality combined with the highest 
development of voluntary association in all its aspects, in all possible degrees, for all 
imaginable aims; ever changing, ever modifed associations which carry in themselves 
the elements of their durability and constantly assume new forms, which answer best 
to the multiple aspirations of all.585
Kropotkin acknowledges that disagreement with one another is an inevitability, but 
that that such disagreements can further society and improve it for the beter. A 
583 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 398.
584 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 399.
585 P. Kropotkin, Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal. Freedom Pamphlets No. 10 (London: Freedom 
Press, 1909), 8. Digitised original available online: 
https://archive.org/stream/2917641.0001.001.umich.edu#page/30/mode/1up (Accessed: 10.03.17).
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society that has a framework for receiving criticisms and recognising its own failures, 
never assumes that it has reached a stage of perfection that must be upheld at all costs,
but can instead work to make amends and learn from error. Kropotkin writes that 
these kind of ideas cannot be understood by “a society to which preestablished forms, 
crystallised by law” are the norm. Where a conservative approach to the status quo is 
taken, a society greatly reduces its ability to acknowledge wrongdoing or the value of 
dissent and work towards a resolution that addresses concerns and changes for the 
beter. In an analysis of this passage Ward writes that we should not think of this 
anarchic functioning of society as simplistic or lacking social organisation, but rather 
as “complexity and multiplicity of social organisations”. He likens such organisation to
cybernetics, “the science of control and communication systems”, which can aid us to 
understand “the anarchist conception of complex self-organising systems”.586 Ward 
cites Grey Walter, a neurophysiologist and robotician who worked on some of the frst
autonomous electric robots. He uses Walter’s comparison of a brain’s functions to 
anarchist community as a way of demonstrating that organisation and complexity do 
not have to be hierarchical. Walter writes that:
In comparing social with cerebral organisations one important feature of the brain 
should be kept in mind; we fnd no boss in the brain, oligarchic ganglion or glandular 
Big Brother. Within our heads our very lives depend on equality of opportunity, on 
specialisation with versatility, on free communication and just restraint, a freedom 
without interference. Here too local minorities can and do control their own means of 
production and expression in free and equal intercourse with their neighbours. If we 
must identify biological and political systems our own brains would seem to illustrate 
the capacity and limitations of an anarcho-syndicalist community. 587
Ward draws from cybernetic theories as well as anthropological evidence588 to support
Kropotkin’s theory of interconnected and ever-changing societies capable of self-
organisation and self-refection. He later suggests that a rigidity in a society that 
586 Ward, Anarchy, 64.
587 W.G. Walter, ‘The Development and Significance of Cybernetics’, Anarchy 25 (1963), 89.
588 In this chapter Ward refers to the political systems of the Nuer and Tellensi. (Ward, Anarchy, 66) 
Being an anthropologist himself, anthropological examples of anarchic decentralised modes of 
organisation are also the topic of a number of his other chapters, including chapters 2 (27-38), 5 (68-
74), 7 (85-92), 9 (99-108),10 (109-116), and 11(117-133).
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demonises dissent is a sure way to bring about the self-destruction of free-association 
and freedom.589 Ward’s point about the complexity of anarchist organisation lies, I 
think, in its rootedness in personal interactions. As I have expressed earlier, anarchist 
theory is fundamentally about the balance between the personal and the communal. 
Te freedom and uniqueness of each person is never compromised in society, since the
operations and functions of society are always controlled and determined by 
interpersonal relationships. In a community’s day to day operations, whether in the 
basics of organising and decision-making, in the exchange of resources, or in the way 
it resolves dispute, criminality and dissent, there needs to be the ability to recognise 
its own faults and failures and to be able to change in response to them. In terms of a 
teleological ethics of love and virtue, we must be able to continually reorientate our 
own personal choices towards love, and be aware that the way we choose to act is 
instrumental in transforming our communities. How we come to decisions together 
and how we call ourselves to account as a group of people may also need further 
thought and facilitation. One way in which this might be pursued is through the 
channel of consensus decision-making as a means of communication in large groups. 
Te method is not exclusively anarchist, and neither is it endorsed in all anarchist 
thought, but as a means of thinking about personal participation in communal 
organising it may be a tool of particular relevance to a Maximian ethics.
An overview of consensus decision-making can be found on the online 
resource centre provided by the workers’ co-op ‘Seeds for Change’. In their resource 
for teaching consensus decision-making, ‘Seeds for Change’ explain it as “a creative 
and dynamic way of reaching agreement between all members of a group. Instead of 
simply voting for an item and having the majority of the group geting their way, a 
group using consensus is commited to fnding solutions that everyone actively 
supports, or at least can live with”.590 Although not without its criticisms, the method 
atempts to eliminate some of the problems of majority-rule democracy and focuses on
fnding solutions to dissent that enhance a decision-making process rather than 
overriding the concerns of a minority. I mention this briefy as a process that may be 
of interest as it nominally understands the importance of personal objection to a 
589 Ward, Anarchy, 162.
590 Seeds for Change: http://www.seedsforchange.org.uk/consensus (Accessed: 10.03.17).
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group proposition and also because its structure, even when considered on a large 
scale, puts in place an organisation system which may be suited to the refection and 
accountability I have been discussing in this chapter.591
Anarchist interpretations of societal accountability and the importance of 
always giving the dissenting voice a chance to be heard, could be a useful tool for 
those seeking to keep communities grounded in the awareness of sin that Maximus’ 
ascetic teachings on love give to us. Te understanding that “there is no fnal 
struggle”592 but that our relationships – personal and larger communal ones – must be 
continually worked at, is one that recognises that we are demanding the impossible. In 
always seting our sights higher, we keep our communities from stagnating into what 
is easy, and require of ourselves that we always seek beter ways to live in compassion
with those around us. For Maximian ethics, we set our sights on God – and the time to
come when the cosmos is gathered in love to Him. Even then in theosis though do we 
anticipate ever-moving rest,593 a relationship that continues to ever deepen. 
6.3 Conclusion
Te purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate some practical ways in which our 
communities must always be rooted in and striving towards love. I ofered some ways in 
which we might use the tools present in already existing philosophical traditions to 
shape our communal response to Maximus’ ethics. Tough many of these ideas are 
not unique to the anarchist tradition, anarchist thought in particular seems to me a 
useful source of inspiration, given its capability to think of possibilities beyond the 
state structures in which we presently live.
I took the key criticisms made of the state with Maximus’ ethics from the 
previous chapter and considered how anarchist thought had sought to respond to such
591 The benefits and drawbacks of consensus decision-making are discussed along with anthropological 
studies in L.M. Woehrle, “Claims-Making and Consensus in Collective Group Processes” in 
Consensus Decision Making, Northern Ireland and Indigenous Movements. Volume 24. (Oxford: 
Elsevier Science, 2003);  A. Szolucha, “Learning Consensus Decision-Making in Occupy: 
Uncertainty, Responsibility, Commitment” in Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change.
Volume 36. (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd: 2013).
592 Ward, Anarchy, 37.
593 Maximus, CCSG 22 Ad Thal. 59 131.
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criticisms. Where freedom was threatened by coercive force, I looked at Kropotkin’s 
suggestions for decentralised botom-up communities and theories of federation that 
allow persons to make meaningful decisions in the communities in which they live. 
Where compassion was threatened by coercion, I instead looked at how a society 
founded on compassion might start rethinking its atachment to inequity and 
property.  Where diference fuelled nationalisms and entitlement to land, travel and 
the establishing of borders, I instead asked what a society looks like that receives not 
only those who difer from us, but also those who hurt us and hate us. I presented 
Malatesta’s hopes and concerns on treating criminals as fellow brothers and sisters 
and eliminating institutionalised isolation and dehumanisation of criminals. And 
fnally, where the telos of a state clearly bore no relation to that of Maximus, I looked 
at some of Kropotkin’s suggestions on how to try and continually improve 
communities so that they perpetually seek the well-being of people.
In the process of seting these things out, I noted a number of key diferences 
in anarchist intentions, particularly in anarchist ends, which ofen (though not 
exclusively) are secular in orientation. I expressed that the suggestions and tools 
provided by anarchist thought may none-the-less serve as a source of inspiration to 
those seeking practical ideas for a communal outworking of Maximus’ ethics. I 
additionally concluded that there was no reason why we might not also try to work 
alongside those who share the same means, since acknowledging diference but 
seeking ways to love falls into the ethics we are practising. My intention in this 
chapter was not to state a correct way of thinking about the communal outworking of 
Maximus’ ethics, but to make headway in considering practical suggestions for how it 
might be done. 
When critiquing something as omnipresent as the state, the last thing we want 
our ethics to do is compromise on its values before we’ve had a chance to think about 
what real alternatives there might be. Tere are far too many interesting ideas and 
working experiments for us to hide behind an excuse of impracticality when it comes 
to imagining what more loving communities might look like. According to the 
anarchist critique, the state is highly impractical, since it succeeds only in inequity 
and control, and fails in all the places that mater. As I demonstrated in 6.1.2.2, these 
accusations are very much still prescient in our own day where debt is necessary to 
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national and international markets, so that the poor are preyed upon to feed the 
increasing excessive wealth of a few. Once we recognise and accept responsibility for 
our personal participation in such such oppressive systems, it seems only sensible to 
start asking what a beter way of living with each other might be. Kropotkin’s 
response was that the state does not have a monopoly on complex, functioning human
communities, and that there are much beter ideas out there worth trying.
In seeking to partake in a cosmic liturgy, we acknowledge the limitless place of
love in the cosmos, and in the microcosm. We are not just loving in certain times and 
places and under certain political conditions, but everywhere and in all we do. We 
must see the way our actions hurt and harm others and support exploitative structures
at present and seek to understand how an ethics of love and virtue requires us to 
challenge these communities and the roles we play in them. When we seek to live out 
the personal ethics Maximus helps lay out, even the smallest personal interactions are,
according to the means and ends of state, reactionary. Where the state is not directly 
challenged, such things are passed by, but as we saw from protestors, and heard from 
those working with illegal immigrants and refugees in Chapter 5, the state is very 
quick to criminalise those who work for ends contrary to its own when the threat is 
great enough. Whether we choose to defne them so or not, Christ’s virtues and love 
are seen as political and subversive when they do not conform to ends held by those 
with the monopoly on violence. Whilst my purpose in Chapter 5 was to demonstrate 
that subversiveness, in Chapter 6 I have sought to let the tragedy of present 
circumstances fuel a desire to start working for something beter. While anarchist 
thought is by no means the only avenue to pursue such change, the infectious hope of 
the tradition and the practical suggestions for alternatives certainly seem like a good 
place to start.
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~ Conclusion: Let the World Turn Upside Down ~
In choosing the title ‘Revolution in the Microcosm’, I meant to imply several things. 
Te frst is that Christ’s words and the virtues he asks of us are, and always have been,
revolutionary to those who hold a monopoly on power and violence. Te requirement 
to love those who have nothing and to stand with the persecuted is a subversive 
rhetoric in a status quo that afrms stability and safety for those with wealth, status, 
property, and power. Te second reason for the title, is that revolution more truly 
means change, and that change in the world starts with change within. Te human 
person is the microcosm, and by using the word microcosm I mean, as Maximus did, 
to draw a parallel with the cosmos at large and the importance of human activity 
within this cosmic story. I have highlighted throughout this thesis that personal 
ascetic activity has a communal cosmic impact. I wished in this title to show that 
although this change is located in persons, it does not mean that it is not vital and 
integral and transformative. Tere is something very hopeful, as well as daunting, 
about the theological importance that Maximus places upon the unique human and 
their free will to receive the love of Christ.
Te way in which Maximus discusses virtue is very diferent to contemporary 
virtue ethics. In explaining the place that virtue occupies in his thought, explaining 
virtue as dependant in its defnition on Christ, as well as describing its relation to a 
telos of theosis, I hope to have opened up some opportunities for discussion between 
Maximian use of virtue in ethics, and contemporary virtue ethics. In the same way 
that theologians like Augustine and Aquinas have become hugely infuential in their 
systems of ethics, it is my hope that Maximus’ contribution too may shape of our 
responses to contemporary ethical concerns. Although his work remains rooted in the 
context in which it was writen, Maximus paints us a theology that expresses both the 
minutiae and magnitude of Christ in all things. He tells us that the liturgy brings all 
the cosmos into the microcosm of the Church, and that the ascetic every day life 
becomes a part of this cosmic liturgy that exists in the moments of the liturgy itself 
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but also as the entire perpetual movement of creation towards God. He ofers us, not a
way to make God understandable, but a language for recognising the paradoxical 
enormity of a personal relationship with the unknowable. His theology demands a 
huge amount from the human, claiming that through the gif of rationality, free will, 
and the ability to love we have the potential of the universe resting upon us. At the 
same time he notes that all we must do is be open and ready, and that divine grace in 
the Holy Spirit will work within us. His theology ofers a way of acknowledging the 
vast problem of sin and the brokenness that human choice has caused in the world, 
and at the same time asks us to have hope because transfguration happens in every 
human activity, and rests in persons and their love for one another, not in 
governments, corporations, or states. Inside a cosmic vision that ofers a coherent 
view of the movement of creation toward God, Maximus has time for very personal, 
very practical advice that looks inside the human heart.
I have spent the last two chapters especially looking at how these very 
personal ascetic ideas are simultaneously communal and make very pressing demands 
upon the character of our relationships. Drawing out Maximus’ understanding of the 
human as microcosm, with cosmic actions, I suggested that part of our ascetic striving 
must be a striving to live in communities that are shaped by and looking towards 
virtue and love. I focussed specifcally on the state, since talking about the state allows
us to rethink so many of the safeties and dependences we allow to almost 
subconsciously take a lead in our life. Following this, I discussed our dependence on 
violence, on alienation, on exploitation, and systems of ideology like nationalism and 
Capitalism that all in their myriad ways fail to love others. Te oppression and 
exploitation, both at home and abroad, of human and non-human life has become part
and parcel of our daily lives. I follow many anarchist thinkers in believing that the 
state enshrines and supports these ideologies and relationships, and that if in our 
ethics we are asking about the right way to live with one another, an important part of
that must be questioning the utility of the state as a mode of human living. My aim in 
this thesis has not been to ofer an exhaustive response to this criticism, but rather to 
suggest some alternatives that may inspire us to broaden our imaginations when it 
comes to trying to love.
I do not think Maximus’ thought will ever lend itself to a rigorous system of 
268
~ Conclusion: Let the World Turn Upside Down ~
ethics like some may expect or wish, but, like the kind of society Kropotkin envisions, 
I think Maximus’ thought has the capability to be versatile and personal as a 
contribution to ethics. It is rooted in a single end aim – that of theosis, fullest 
communion of love in God – but like the prism of love that refracts into many virtues, 
so Maximus ofers many diferent ways of trying to think about seeking Christ in this 
life. I drew on a few diferent ways in Chapter 5, using a traditional critique through 
virtue, but also thinking about the Chalcedonian character of Maximus’ understanding
of diference and unity, using telos as a means of critique, and also thinking about the 
foundational importance of free will in Maximus’ broader concept of cosmic 
movement and mediation. In Chapter 4 I ofered some further suggestions on how one
could use virtue to think about ethics, noting that the the multiplicity of love in the 
virtues might lend depth to ethical difculties, or the simplicity of love help to clarify 
conficting virtues, or even the vices, as a means of working out how not to treat 
others. Much work remains to be done, I think, in exploring all the diferent ways in 
which Maximus’ non-linear theology may help us develop an ethics. Especially 
welcome would be a broad study of the personal ethics one could develop from his 
thought. I however am more interested in what this personal ethics means for our 
communal lives. I think sometimes in virtue ethics, the personal focus of character and
habit building sometimes leads to a neglect of the communal outworking of such 
ethics and the awareness that our actions have global repercussions. Given Maximus’ 
recurring interest in expressing the simultaneous relation of the macrocosm to the 
microcosm, I think he could be key to reminding virtue ethics of its personal and 
communal dimension. Part of this communal outworking must include an awareness 
of the cosmic impacts of our day to day actions. Now, more than ever, do we live in a 
global economic system, where we cannot close our eyes to the way that small, 
thoughtless actions, have devastating impacts on our own societies, on our 
ecosystems, and on those on the opposite side of the world. Part of acknowledging the
responsibilities we have been given in the gifs of rationality and free will, is not 
allowing the convenience of easy living in situations like my own, a Western middle 
class person living in a state with relative personal freedoms, to obscure the realities 
of the damaging lifestyles we are living. Te spiritual calling of humankind, involves 
physical, material creation here and now, and that means asking difcult questions of 
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powerful and dangerous institutions that would create borders to our love.
One of the things that makes Maximus’ ethics so revolutionary, I think, is that 
all of his ethical advice comes straight out of his theology. Tere are no caveats to the 
love he seeks to express – he does not try to reconcile it to the status quo of his own 
day, leaving loop-holes for international warfare or property and power for wealthy 
patrons. He envisions all the world sanctifed and a liturgical theology that has 
outworking even in ascetic day-to-day living. His ascetic ethics comes from his cosmic
theology, and his cosmic theology comes from a rigorous exploration of Scripture, 
Church doctrine, and the early Church Mothers and Fathers. Te ethos of his work as 
one that seeks to leave space for mystery and yet remain practical, to depict the 
cosmic trajectory of our responsibility and yet remain personal, and to voice an ethics 
that arises from a rich refection on theology, is one that I think is exceptionally 
important for today. Tis kind of grounding to our ethics is uncompromisingly 
Christian and yet gives us myriad opportunities to work with, celebrate, and love 
diversity in all we come across. It forces us to question what is easy and demands us to
love what is other. In the old maxim, it requires us to afict the comfortable and 
comfort the aficted.
In this thesis I have set out some parameters for understanding Maximus 
within a virtue ethics context. I have given an outline of his cosmic theology with 
theosis as the telos of all creation, and a cosmic liturgy as a vision of transfgured life 
now and tomorrow. I have defned virtue within this context, describing how Maximus
draws from Paul to call the virtues a kind of love. I also set this dynamic onto the 
paradigm of logoi and Logos, so that we can build on this rich feld of contemporary 
Maximian study to enhance our understanding of virtue in Maximus’ thought. I then 
talked about the ascetic dimension of this cosmology, explaining how virtue can be 
acquired through grace and praxis, and explaining the practical importance of the 
human as mediator. Afer seting up this picture of Maximus’ theology, I asked how 
we can bring this to the present day to help us with our own problems. I explained the
problems surrounding the state as a mode of human organisation and the hidden 
reliance of such communities on violence, alienation and persecution. I claimed that 
such a mode of living is uterly opposed to our hopes of theosis and the virtues that 
embody this end. I concluded by suggesting that there are many hopeful ways that we 
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can start reimagining human relationships, such as those that have been the topic of 
discussion in anarchist political thought over the last two hundred and ffy years. 
Tere are many ways in which we can take Maximus’ ethics forward from 
here, some of which have already started to arise, as I outlined in the introduction. But
all the ethics we build from Maximus’ theology will necessarily have a radical favour, 
because the love of Christ, which is at its heart, has a radical favour. In 1649, 
Winstanley penned a pamphlet on behalf of the Diggers, a group of peasants that had 
taken a hill near London to farm as common land in response to the Inclosures Acts. 
He addressed it to the city of London and the army:
[Y]ou are all like men in a mist, seeking for freedome, and know not where, nor what 
it is: those of the richer sort of you that see it, are ashamed and afraid to owne it, 
because it comes clothed in a clownish garments for freedome is the man that will 
turn the world upside downe, therefore no wonder he hath enemiess [T]he Word of 
God is Love, and when all thy actions are done in love to the whole Creation, then 
thou advancest freedome, and freedome is Christ in you, and Christ among yous [I]f 
thou wouldst know what true freedome iss thou shalt see it lies in the community in 
spirit, and community in the earthly treasury, and this is Christ the true manchild 
spread abroad in the Creation, restoring all things into himselfes594
Drawing on Acts 17:6, where the followers of Christ were accused of having turned 
the world upside down, Winstanley reminds us “no wonder he hath enemies”. Te one 
who seeks Christ and tries to live in His community of love, challenges the structures 
of power and the concepts of freedom in the world. Te task of love is one that turns 
the world upside down. What is freedom?, Winstanley asks, you do not know what 
freedom is or where it is to be found: “When all thy actions are done in love to the 
whole Creation, then thou advancest freedome, and freedome is Christ in you, and 
Christ among you”.
Te revolutionary character of Christ’s love has long been a recurring theme in
theologies past and present, but in Maximus we fnd the metaphysical and cosmic 
594 G. Winstanley, “A Watch-Word to the City of London, And the Army” in The Complete Works of 
Gerrard Winstanley, Vol. 2. T.N. Corns, A. Hughes, and D. Loewenstein (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009 (First published 1649)), 81-2.
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dimension that give this thought depth, as well as the plain ascetic advice that places 
it within the realm of hope and possibility. It is my hope in writing a thesis that 
expresses Maximus’ ethics in terms of this revolutionary love, that we will refnd his 
theology as a grounding for radical change today. His theology lets us think about 
theosis as something immanent and present, as well as unexplainable, mysterious, and 
eschatological. In requiring us to contain these paradoxes in out thought – paradoxes 
like our actions and choices being vital, and yet grace and the Spirit remaining the 
true source of change within us – his thought perpetually requires us to be hopeful 
and yet aware of our own fallenness. We are called to constantly strive toward the 
unknowable and to partake in the imparticipable. To gather together the cosmos in 
love is to begin a revolution in the microcosm.
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